holbrooke came out once in awhile every couple of months in a c-20. my job was to create what was called the federation forum. which was a group of croats bosnians, so catholics and muslims, because these things are always seen in confessional terms in the balkans, who had been fighting each other. having started out as allies, they ended up fighting each other, and this was to get that half of bosnia working again. and the federation forum met virtually every week. my staff consisted mainly of me and embassy officers. i'll leave it at that for now. >> can i just deal with one more. the next question of the structure of the envoy's office within the state department, and as bob mentioned, he had very few staff. we looked at various envoy situations. some had staff from the regional bureau. some had little. there are three instances we deal with in the report of significantly autonomous officers under the special envoy. currently the special representative for afghanistan and pakistan. and the office that i directed, the u.s. office on sudan and south

holbrook for the last time before he's released from holman. >> hey. mr. pippin, how are you doing today? good to see you. >> i wrote my aunt. she wrote back and said i had a place so i'm going to stay with her. >> that's a for sure thing? >> yeah, that's a for sure thing. you can call her. i told you last time i would probably go to the halfway house but i ain't going to no halfway house. it's one thing to be able to go somewhere and be comfortable where you're at and another thing to be forced to be somewhere you don't want to go. when i get out of prison, i want to be free. i don't want to have to abide by some more rules that are institutionalized, you know. >> well, keep in mind that your aunt will have expectations, also. >> right. i know, she -- >> she has chores to be done around the house. >> that's one of the main reasons why i'm going. she's -- she's not a midget but she's a small person. and she has problems getting around the house and doing stuff and running errands. she lives by herself. >> halfway house would be better for him, but like he

holbrooke came out once in awhile every couple of months in a c-20. my job was to create what was called the federation forum. which was a group of croats a s bosnians, so catholics and muslims, because these things are always seen in confessional terms in the balkans, who had been fighting each other. having started out as allies, they ended up fighting each other, and this was to get that half of bosnia working again. and the federation forum met virtually every week. my staff consisted mainly of me and embassy officers. i'll leave it at that for now. >> can i just deal with one more. the next question of the structure of the envoy's office within the state department, and as bob mentioned, he had very few staff. we looked at various envoy situations. some had staff from the regional bureau. some had little. there are three instances we deal with in the report of significantly autonomous officers under the special envoy. currently the special representative for afghanistan and pakistan. and the office that i directed, the u.s. office on sudan and so

hell brooks as a request -- who will holbrookes for a request for release. the report was ready. however there is a major foul-up, a real showstopper. the review process was bungled from start to finish. all references to unauthorized disclosures of highly classified information by senior officials had to be stripped from the report before it could be published. this draconian measure, which gutted the report mandate it unfit for -- report and made it unfit for publication. this long-standing department policy was known only to the two leaders of the investigations, deputies holbrookes and ives. it was their responsibility to execute it at the front end of the review. i want to make one point crystal clear. i don't support the policy of seinsensenbrennersensorring rep. it is a bad policy that needs to be changed. here is my beef, though. if that policy -- if that's the policy, then it should have been followed, but it wasn't followed until the last possible moment. to make matters far worse, both ives and holbrookes failed to communicate the policy mandate to those who need the i

." >> phil leclerc's winning bid of $40 at kelley auctions of holbrook last week made him the proud ownerork. >> "it had a broken foot, the was missing, which i found in a drawer." >> but when he rattled it around a bit. >> "it was absolutely amazing." >> an envelope dropped down out of a narrow opening. >> "we found 50s, and then we found 100s, 200s, 500s, and then we found a stack of 6 $10,000 bonds." >> all tallied, more than $127,000 of mature savings bonds. >> "ten years ago, we opened." >> phil went back to the auction house to track down the owner, who needed the money from the auction to help his 94-year-old father. >> "this man was getting his dad's house ready for sale so he could pay for his care. it's a lot of money! i mean, it's going to change their lives. completely change their lives." >> and this surprise could not have come at a better time. >> "that's what i said, happy thanksgiving. he said, "oh, it will be now!" >> the man who bought that desk -- never did find that missing knob. >>vicki liviackis and sports night live we have a full half-hour of sports and a breakdow

and i don't-- can't quite put my finger on that because i really add miferment i look at hall holbrook and what did in the movie into the wild. and it was so unbelievably perfect and poetic and simple and brilliant. i thought look at that guy. nailing that. that is admirable. there is part of me that goes i want to be that guy, and part of me wants to go this is aisle, this is em bar rags. i should have a job where i actually make something. like a person, i don't know, i don't get it sometimes. i get confused. >> the best that i know feel a little bit like that. >> really? >> that's either encouraging or discouraging. >> much success, thank you for this. >> thank you. >> rose: michael keaton. the fill some "birdman". ♪ ♪ i remember when i lost my mind ♪ ♪ there's something about that day ♪ ♪ feeling your emotions. >> how did we end up here? this dump? >> you were a movie star, remember? i'm crazy ♪ ♪ maybe you're crazy ♪. >> "birdman". >> maybe we're crazy wait and see. >> you're "birdman". let's go back one more time and show them what we're kanl of. >> why don't you get your wings a

>> so when i was helping richard holbrooke negotiate the bosnian settlement at dayton in 1995, i went in with the deputy secretary of state to moscow. it was october of 1995, and one of the russian generals said we know what you americans are up to in eastern europe. this is our part of europe, and you're coming into it. and you say you'll be gone in a year, but you won't be. i said, no, no, no, president clinton's already said we're going to come out of bosnia, troops will be there for a year, and then we're leafing. he said, please. we are russians, we understand you. [laughter] but don't worry, we would do the same thing in your position. so the russians see the world as a chess board, and when we didn't come out of bosnia right away, they didn't like it. when we took action in nato in kosovo, they didn't like it. so we were running the air campaign there, we did 78 days of bombing to halt serb ethnic cleansing in kosovo, and on the 10th t of june we got an agreement in the united nations to stop the bombing and that we were going to get nato forces in there, baa the peacekeepers -

and i ask, one of the reasons we were able to successfully negotiate in bosnia was ambassador holbrook was not -- not only knew more about the facts on the ground, we knew more about the facts on the ground than milosevic did. your newest map was six months old. how would we draw those kinds of maps if we wanted to do it in near realtime, 24, 48 hours old? >> the newest one was october 5th this year. >> oh, it was? i didn't see that. because it's on facebook doesn't mean it's true. >> well, some of them are not from facebook actually. some of them i got from the syrian intelligence community itself. some of them were drawn by independent institutions in europe. and i used to verify this information with the military advisers of the united nations special envoys to syria, who has a very capable military officers there. thank you very much. >> well, thank you. and again, on behalf of the institute, we want to thank all of our distinguished panelists and speakers. i hope that you will go away with the idea that whether you're talking about a military type of strategy in action, war, a civ

holbrooke wrote a book, and more. people like the red and achieved a huge impact on our lives. that's not because he was a perfect demand and everyone got along perfectly. it was about an aspiration in this way and one of the things we're looking not in the broader context is getting people excited about diplomacy. i joke with the secretary that they have a hollywood liaison almay niece and nephews know exactly what we're thinking what a soldier inspires. they do not know a diplomat is. there's been some tv shows that it started to play that out. but we want to look at case studies not to learn from them, but also to celebrate. the most enjoyable part of my job has been to see amazing work that nobody hears about that our folks are doing everyday to try to build peace and policy out of poverty. to me this is part of getting better. we've got to get better, that is beyond us. but we also want to tell the story about the fact that the american people, one of the things they support of this kind of effort. with that, i will hand it to you all with our thanks for the report. >> i c

and i ask, one of the reasons we were able to successfully negotiate in bosnia was ambassador holbrook was not -- not only knew more about the facts on the ground, we knew more about the facts on the ground than milosevic did. your newest map was six months old. how would we draw those kinds of maps if we wanted to do it in near realtime, 24, 48 hours old? >> the newest one was october 5th this year. >> oh, it was? i didn't see that. because it's on facebook doesn't mean it's true. >> well, some of them are not from facebook actually. some of them i got from the syrian intelligence community itself. some of them were drawn by independent institutions in europe. and i used to verify this information with the military advisers of the united nations special envoys to syria, who has a very capable military officers there. thank you very much. >> well, thank you. and again, on behalf of the institute, we want to thank all of our distinguished panelists and speakers. i hope that you will go away with the idea that whether you're talking about a military type of strategy in action, war, a civ

holbrook wrote a book to end a war. people like me read it and it had a huge impact on our lives. that's not because he was a perfect man and everyone got along with him perfectly. it was about an aspiration in this way. and i think, you know, one of the things we're looking at in the broader context that i think this can be a piece of is getting people excited about diplomacy. i've joked with the secretary that the state should have a hollywood liaison, that all of my nieces and nephews know exactly -- or think they know exactly what a soldier and a spy is. they do not know what a diplomat is. now there have been some tv shows in the last year and some other things that have started to play that out. but i think you know, we want to look at case studies not just to learn from them, but we also want to celebrate. it's been the most enjoyable part of my job has been to go around and see amazing work that nobody ever hears about that our folks are doing every day in countries to try to build peace, try to pull people out of poverty. so, you know, for me i think this is part of getti

. >> just a follow-up very quickly, you write in the book that richard holbrooke, the special envoy, and to thank karl eikenberry, the ambassador were working against the reelection of our campaign of our ally they are, hamid karzai. and she didn't seem very happy about that. how did that happen? >> well, first of all, karzai may have its shortcomings but he sure as heck knows what's going on its own capital. so the idea that we could do this and him not know we were trying to get rid of him was pretty naÏve, in my view. and so when you see all these problems that karzai creates for us, is knowing that we for all practical purposes attempted a pooch against him in the summer of 2009 probably didn't help the relationship. >> and he is still there. with nursing some resembles archer. i have some questions from the audience. here's a statement from first of all, just a flat-out position paper. thank you for your longtime commitment to protecting my family and country. get well soon. godspeed, and go aggies. [laughter] i'm going to have -- am reading this but it's my distinct the chairma

want to ask, so one of the reasons were able to successfully negotiate in bosnia was ambassador holbrooke not only knew more about the facts on the ground and milosevic did come we are able to demonstrate we knew more about the facts on the ground than most of which get. i noticed your nose map was six months old. how would we draw those kinds of maps if he wanted to do it in near real-time? 24, 48 hours old. >> it was a this year. >> but because it's on facebook doesn't mean its true spirit some of them are not on facebook. some of that i got from the intelligence community itself. some of them taken, were drawn by independent institutions in europe, and i used to verify this information with the military advisors of the united nations special envoy to syria who is very capable military officers there. >> well, thank you. antigen on behalf of the institute, i want to thank all of our distinguished panelists and speakers. i hope that you will go away with the idea that whether you are talking about a military type of strategy, and action, a war, a sibling type of strategy action or nation

this is so complicated by take it back to afghanistan, pakistan, richard holbrooke and the fact that inside the state department trying during the first obama term to do something. then, of course, his tragic death and that effort fell apart. nobody wanted to deal with this. as we withdraw from afghanistan this is making it that much more complicated. >> much more complicated to withdraw from afghanistan. i obviously, i've been saying since 2009 we should be withdrawing as aggressively as possible. now you look at the rise of isis and what's going on in pakistan. it's just not that simple any more. >> this does complicate so far delayed withdrawal as you recall, president obama has already said we'll leave more troops in afghanistan i think than originally planned, quite a few more. but let's not forget for pakistan to make a serious effort to go into the territories and root out the taliban, is no small under taking. it's a big war. it's something they have been reluctant to do. the taliban is concentrated kind of a no man's land, ungoverned space. and so it's, you know, if they cou