>> i don't think i ever went to -- >> i think you did -- >> hutton eighteen's such. again, i wouldn't necessarily be aware of all the different meetings john scarlett and julie ann miller and the team might be having, but certainly this was a very, very significant piece of communications. as you said, although we have done the al qaeda document using some intelligence material before, on this scale nothing like it had never been done before. certainly there were, within some of my colleagues at the number ten and those in the foreign office, they had a legitimate interest in understanding the preparation of this, but the whole way through it could not have been made clear to everybody that nothing would override the intelligence judgments and the john scarlett was the person who, if you like, had a single pen. >> people -- ayman, quoting from a memo to the prime minister from john scarlett of the fourth of june, 2003, he said, "with agreement of the agencies and representatives from the number ten, danny preus and the press officer is john williams and james fever w

i mean, if we take that period, we will come back to this in more detail, you told lord hutton that onhe 12th of september, 2002, you attended a meeting. you said this was, i quote, the meeting was with the prime minister, jonathan paul, david manning, myself, the head of the sis and the senior sis officer. the last of these explained that there had been a new source in recent weeks who had given them new information. we were being told this because the information was important, but also it was being emphasized that this was information that could not go into the dossier. >> yep. >> now, why should the directer of communications and strategy have been included in such a sensitive meeting with two senior officers of the sis when it did not concern information that was publicly usable? >> probably because the short answer's probably because the prime minister wanted me to be, and i suspect -- [inaudible] may have been as well. i don't know. i mean, i happened to be at a lot of the prime minister's meetings. but at that time the heads of the intelligence agencies, i suppose, were spendin

intelligence and that's what that was about a but my point i think actually therefore makes my point, lord hutton stated in terms even in the intelligence turns out to have been wrong it did not justify the reporting of issue and my point is a the reporting of the issue and the controversy that cost and, indeed, that is what makes it viewed by some in the way you describe and i am sorry, that is my very strongly held opinion. i cannot see any other way. >> i think we're coming from a different direction in that but i will pass it over. >> thank you. i'm going to declare a lunch break at this point. we have occurred evidence so far on your communications on strategy, some of the key meetings in that capacity, and on the september 2002 dossier, i think one of to of my colleagues got a couple of all points on that after the break. then we would like to take further evidence on the february dossier, your understanding of involvement in the development with government policy and iraq after that, and the coronation of the government's wider public information campaign. so i suggest we break until 2:00

lord hutton stated in terms even if the intelligence turns out to have been wrong, it did not justify the reporting of the issue. and my point is it's the reporting of the issue and the controversy that caused and indeed that tragedy that caused, that is what makes it viewed by some in the way that you've described. and i'm sorry. that is my very strongly held opinion. i cannot see it any other way. >> well, i think we're coming from a different direction to that. but i'll pass on that. >> thank you. i'm going to declare a lunch break at this point. we've heard evidence so far on your rolls of communications and strategy, on some of the key meetings handled in that capacity and on the september, 2002, dossier. i think a one or two of my colleagues will have a couple of follow-up on that break and we would like to take further evidence on the february dossier, your understanding and involvement in the development of the british government policy in iraq after that and the coordination of the government's wide campaign on it. so i suggest we break until 2:00 and come back then. now, cou

that something you describe to lord hutton's inquiry.what you did, you're a strategy as well as as opposed to medication your role was not restricted to communications. it effectively got you across to what the prime minister wanted you to do so. all of that would be a fair summary. >> can i just make a point about across the departmental committee kaisha. i think this is important. when i talked about the systems that we inherited, it was very much silo driven. it was department by department. it was very difficult to get departments on the communications side to work together. in my approach to this by the time we get to iraq was very much driven by our experience in relation to close the vote where we did ultimately i think quite successfully, put together -- we internationalize arc medications, but also we manage to get a sense of departments working together so that was an understanding that it was leading him to strategy, but there was maximum openness with all the various departments. and then sharing and personnel in trying to br

that something you describe to lord hutton's inquiry.and what you did, you're a strategy as well as as opposed to medication your role was not restricted to communications. it effectively got you across to what the prime minister wanted you to do so. all of that would be a fair summary. >> can i just make a point about across the departmental committee kaisha. i think this is important. when i talked about the systems that we inherited, it was very much silo driven. it was department by department. it was very difficult to get departments on the communications side to work together. in my approach to this by the time we get to iraq was very much driven by our experience in relation to close the vote where we did ultimately i think quite successfully, put together -- we internationalize arc medications, but also we manage to get a sense of departments working together so that was an understanding that it was leading him to strategy, but there was maximum openness with all the various departments. and then sharing and personnel in trying t

intelligence and that's what that was about a but my point i think actually therefore makes my point, lord hutton stated in terms even in the intelligence turns out to have been wrong it did not justify the reporting of issue and my point is a the reporting of the issue and the controversy that cost and, indeed, that is what makes it viewed by some in the way you describe and i am sorry, that is my very strongly held opinion. i cannot see any other way. >> i think we're coming from a different direction in that but i will pass it over. >> thank you. i'm going to declare a lunch break at this point. we have occurred evidence so far on your communications on strategy, some of the key meetings in that #ah)áy@@@ @ @ will open for that purpose at 115. that's downstairs. so with that, we will come back 2 o'clock. thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> welcome back everyone. taking off from where we took from before the break, supplementary is of the september dossier. first, i'm going to ask one of two points. when you're talking prime minister's press conference in early september of 2002, you said t

not seen those newspaper reports that i didn't actually understand why, until shortly before lord hutton reported when panorama did a program about the report. and they put on screen the two newspapers that carried i think images of missiles that i realized at that stage that i had never seen these newspapers. again, i couldn't quite understand why, but we checked my diary the next morning. and i have been in kiev for a couple of days. >> so you didn't -- >> i simply hadn't seen those papers. >> you can get involved in the issue at the time. >> know. smack the final question on the dossier. is this phrase without doubt. did you see that, did you comment on it before? >> i saw the draft. i didn't comment on it, because i mean, it did reflect my view of the intelligence and the information that i had been given. i first saw intelligence in relation to iraq when i went to the foreign office in may of 1999. i've actually asked to see some of that intelligence, bears out that the assessments were to the effect that iraq had weapons of mass instruction. and those assessments continued througho