i.t. security systems. professor it would ahem braised is the executive director of the e use agency for network and information security. expertise is widely respected in the i.t. sector and he's increasingly concerned about the spread of identity theft. right now he's on his way to an i.t. security conference in potsdam. we asked him why experts can't get a grip on this ominous problem. isn't that a lot of companies are bringing i.t. products on to the market but no one seems to know whether they actually provide proper security. is that possible today this is sort of like unfortunately yes when i buy a product i don't know what sort of security features it might have. that's the case was typical fingerprint readers or facial recognition software and smartphones . but it's not there's no guarantee that it will do what the manufacturer claims but it all i can do is hope that it does save us all to come off of hopefully. the head of the e.u. agency for network and information security can only hope that a pr

i.t. security specialist going up parata. governments and private sector companies often make use of his expertise for example if their systems have been hacked. do we place too much trust in the security of biometric data. given this data is not secure and it's vulnerable to attack. we usually have no idea where and how our biometric data are stored sometimes this information is encrypted sometimes not. did it can also be stored on the device that we're using or in an app or in a cloud. litigious is going to it's certainly convenient to just use a fingerprint to unlock a digital device the system works well to do until the data falls into the wrong hands this is new technology and we don't have a lot of experience using it. if something goes wrong. it's often too late to fix it and this is shawn suspects. this is how the biometric fingerprint authentication process usually works the image is evaluated converted into digital form and then stored in a database and when you try to access the device with a fingerprint it's compared with the image in the database if it matches your in. if it doesn't access is denied but how secur

audited and inspected various security related aspects of tsa, including passenger and baggage screening operations, precheck, the federal air marshall service, and i.t. systems. these resulted in being issued 24 reports to tsa with 138 recommendations designed to reduce security vulnerabilities in the aviation transportation system. for example, these covert testing continues to reveal persistent, troubling problems. since inception, we conducted thousands of covert tests. we assessed through covert testing checked baggage screening, passenger screening at check points, and airport access controls. our findings and conclusions from these tests have been consistent with those of tsa's internal testing in these areas. because covert test results are classified, they cannot be discussed here today, but we provided the department, tsa, and our appropriate congressional committees with our classified reports. our covert testing has identified vulnerabilities related to people, processes and procedures, and technology, specifically. people often contribute to weaknesses and security operations due to complacency, or failing to think critically. tsa processes and p

securing election infrastructure. states may use the money to replace their aging equipment with voter verified paper ballot voting systems but also ongoing maintenance of election infrastructure, enhanced cybersecurity, and operations of i.t. infrastructure and enhanced cybersecurity of voter registration systems. originally, the bill, as introduced, would have authorized $1 billion for this initial round of surge funding. however, during the committee on house administration's markup, the committee approved an amendment in the nature of a substitute that authorized $600 million instead. combined with the $280 million that congress appropriated last year in election security grants, this funding reaches the $1 billion that experiod of times have said is necessary -- experts have said is necessary to implement these necessary protections. the bill provides in section 111 $175 million in biyou annual maintenance funding -- biannual maintenance funding. cybersecurity threats will not dissipate. they will only evolve. state election officials have told us repeatedly they need more funding and a sustainable source of funding. section 103 of the safe act fosters innovation for voters living with disabilities. it provides grant

securing election infrastructure. states may use the money to replace their aging equipment with voter verified paper ballot voting systems but also ongoing maintenance of election infrastructure, enhanced cybersecurity, and operations of i.t. infrastructure and enhanced cybersecurity of voter registration systems. originally, the bill, as introduced, would have authorized $1 billion for this initial round of surge funding. however, during the committee on house administration's markup, the committee approved an amendment in the nature of a substitute that authorized $600 million instead. combined with the $280 million that congress appropriated last year in election security grants, this funding reaches the $1 billion that experiod of times have said is necessary -- experts have said is necessary to implement these necessary protections. the bill provides in section 111 $175 million in biyou annual maintenance funding -- biannual maintenance funding. cybersecurity threats will not dissipate. they will only evolve. state election officials have told us repeatedly they need more funding and a sustainable source of funding. section 103 of the safe act fosters innovation for voters living with disabilities. it provides grant