that's why the iaea is doing it. and this is also the reason why iran is today challenging the security council resolutions. doing actually a very twisted -- in a very twisted way. they say

noncompliance, according to the iaea secretary, -- i a t a the iaea statutes is not-- the director general. in practice, it does not work like that. actually, the iaea board makes its own practices and procedures and rules. so there are precedents, for example, from north korea, but you don't need to follow exactly that way. it was not the inspectors who report. it was the director general. past practice shows this argument of iran is perhaps not the right one. but this is one of the lessons we need to learn. so, what needs to be done next? well, first, there should be a meeting, the 5 + 1 next week, friday april 13. actually, someone asked me this morning how it is going to take place. i characterize it as i think it is still a royal mess. it appears to me they have not yet even agreed about the venue where this important meeting takes place. i have not seen anything on the agenda either. so we will see we're takes place. it is an important juncture in the sense that if we look where iran is today -- and i spoke about that they might have 250 kilos of 20% in maturing in by the end of this

and which is actually a good example for the way iaea works. because first of all, south africa had given up its weapons program. i think it was ' 86 or '87 but then there was an agreement, and iaea started verification in late 1992. so we started to verify a thing which didn't exist anymore. so what we did, we actually established the whole history of the south african -- until 1992, see how it went from peaceful plow share type of explosives that is to the weaponization. we went through the programs, we went through the equipment, we went through the nuclear material, day by day, huge amount of information, which was also -- which was very difficult, because some of this information, actually, south africa had destroyed by purpose, because they were expecting a regime and felt at that time it's not good to leave this documentation. so we have to interview the people in order to understand what took place. and then all this information -- locations and people and the funding together in order to get cohesive -- as cohesive picture you can get

you have a line in the sand being drawn by the iaea. you have a confrontation, which could really play big in the june report. that said, i don't think any of this will impact the diplomatic process. and i've been told that by people from several members of the p5 plus 1. and the reason for that is that, first of all, it's not new that iran is not cooperating with the iaea. it's not new that iran is hiding nuclear work from the iaea. and i think there's a divorce between the diplomatic process, which itself is so tentative, and the iaea investigation. short answer to your question is whatever happens at the iaea, unless they happen to discover that iran is actually working on a bomb somewhere, it will not affect the diplomatic process and the effort to get talks going. >> in the middle there? please wait for the mike. >> i'm ray mcgovern from professionals for sanity. >> please speak up, sir. >> okay. i see a kind of surreal aspect to this discussion. there are two elephants that are in the room that are either referred to by euphemisms

. >> the iaea, they say find somebody to sell it to us.gentina. this time the iaea goes out and says who is willing to sell fuel rods to iran for their reactor. the answer came back, no one. the obama administration created this plan, you give us your 3.5% enriched uranium, we'll give you fuel rods, in return for the uranium you've enriched to 3.5. that deal fell apart an was revived by the turks and brazilians. that's when iran says look, nobody is giving us this fuel. we're going to make our own. it's not a pilot program, they've made the 20% fuel. >> the concern as articulated by israel and the u.s. is part of it has to do with the way that the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is designed. iran is a setting torrey, israel is not a signatory. in which it's possible to essentially be in compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty until the day that you are no longer in compliance, when you can weaponizedç next day -- >> not the next day, six months. >> a short window. i want to talk about where this is going after this break. ever

north korea reportedly told the iaea that inspections are off the table now that the possibility of food aid has been withdrawn. the u.s. government withdrew its offer of food shipments after the launch last friday. the u.s. says the launch was in violation of an agreement between the two countries sealed in february. under the terms of the agreement, north korea pledged to suspend long-range missile tests and accept iaea inspectors at its nuclear facilities in exchange for 240,000 tons of food aid. meanwhile, an official from north korea said the country remains committed to implementing the february agreement. the official was speaking at a recent international arms reduction conference. the state run korean central news agency reported the comments saying the official voiced the north's willingness to accept international inspectors at its nuclear facilities. analysts say north korea apparently aims to shift responsibility for any breakdown of the agreement with the u.s. by claiming a cont leader came , we started crumbling and stumbling. so, you know, this is -- we have to wait and s

north korea reportedly told the iaea that inspections are off the table, now that the possibility of food aid has been withdrawn. the u.s. government withdrew its offer of food shipments after north korea's launch last friday. the u.s. says the launch was in violation of an agreement between the two countries that was sealed in february. under the terms of the agreement, north korea pledged to suspend long range missile tests and accept iaea inspectors at its nuclear facilities in nyonbyong in exchange for 40,000 tons of food aid. meanwhile an official from north korea states the country is ready to implement the agreement. the state run korean central agency said the official voiced the north's willingness to accept international inspectors at its nuclear facilities. analysts say north korea apparently aims to shift responsibility for any breakdown of the agreement with the u.s. by claiming a continued wish to implement the deal. >>> japanese researchers warn the country's economic momentum could be sputtering. ai uchida from the business team joins me now the findings of the report

north korea reportedly told the iaea that inspections are off the table, now that the possibility of food aid has been withdrawn. the u.s. government withdrew its offer of food shipments after north korea launched the missile last friday. pyongyang says it was a satellite-carrying rocket. the u.s. says the launch was in violation of an agreement between the two countries that was sealed in february. under the terms of the agreement north korea pledged to suspend long-range missile tests and accept iaea inspectors at the nuclear facilities in nyongbyon in exchange for 240,000 tons of food aid. meanwhile, an official from north korea said the country remains committed to implementing the february agreement. the official was speaking at a recent international arms reduction conference. a state run korean central news agency reported the comments, said the official voiced the north's willingness to accept international inspectors at its nuclear facilities. analysts say north korea apparently aimed to shift responsibility for any breakdown of the agreement with the u.s. by claiming a cont

he will make the request this summer when he visits iaea headquarters in vienna. the international nuclear watchdog has sent specialists to fukushima since the disaster. he wants continued help with disaster response and decontamination. he will also discuss a conference in fukushima during his visit. the iaea and the japanese government will host the meetings in december. >>> a shinkansen bullet train operator plans to strengthen its early detection system to slow trains more quickly in the event of a strong earthquake. central japan railway company says the measure will help prevent trains from derailing. the company says it will upgrade its system to enable the bullet trains to apply emergency brakes up to two seconds faster. the upgraded system will take into account a possible inland quake just below train lines. it will enable operators to directly stop the trains earlier. the company's current anti-quake system is mainly designed to respond to powerful quakes offshore. officials expect the improved network to perform better in the event that a powerful eart

for over ten years and concealed aspect of their program and misled iaea inspectors. there is not any doubt in the minds i think of any serious observer around the world, that what iran is doing is moving towards nuclear weapons. and, the idea that they can string us along as they have for the last ten years, speaks more to our weakness than our success. >> dave: and, finally, your prediction? >> the positive tone of the talks will continue and i think there will be baroness ashton's words, sustained engagement, and, i think iran is doing exactly what they have done so well before and simply leads me to believe they are going to get closer to getting the nuclear weapons they've sought for 20 years. >> eric: thank you for joining us, as you do every sundays morning, and we'll talk to you again when the talks resume again. >> jamie: the scandal that rocked the secret service and reportedly involving members of the u.s. military. an entire unit of the secret service sent home from columbia. ahead of president obama's arrival for the summit of the americas. there are repo

cutting off funding for agencies like the world health organization, the iaea and the world intellectual property organization would deal a major blow to global health, nuclear nonproliferation and the protection of american businesses. our participation in unesco is also valuable. therefore the administration's budget request includes funding for the u.s. contribution to unesco and a statement of intent to work with congress to find a solution that would waive restrictions on paying our financial contributions when doing so is clearly in our national interest. we appreciate greatly this committee's long standing efforts to help us meet our commitment to the united nations. staying up to date with our contributions has helped us deliver some of the most significant accomplishments to advanced u.s. interests and promote u.n. reform in more than a decade. the active and full support of this committee remains essential to our efforts. i thank you and i welcome your questions. >> thank you very much. we'll go as we have before in seniority as you are seated in the -- in this room. i'm going

they want to halt nuclear tests, missile tests and allow the international atomic missile energy, iaea inspectors back into the country. they did that and turned right around and launched the missile. how do you deal with that? i mean, you know, you folks indicate that we ought to continue to try to negotiate with them. every time we negotiate with them, they turn around and stick us right in the ear. the second thing i would like to ask is we have both congressional and presidential elections in the u.s. and south korea is going to be this year. north korea is developing into a strong and prosperous nation. this was supposed to be the year they were going to do that. whatever that means. it appears these three elements could form a perfect storm. do you expect them to sabre rattle and provoke further. and then is i know i'm preaching to the choir when i say that south korea is one of our closest allies. and we passed a free trade agreement this year and i'm glad the president signed that. given the ever present dangers posed by north korea and the regime, which can congress, what can

for those 20 months, iran has continued to ignore the demands of the security council and the iaea. earlier you mentioned that we've increased pressure on iran successfully and that they're feeling this pressure. you also mentioned that the security council i think tomorrow will assess -- >> quarterly review. >> quarterly review. you know, we're hearing reports that the security council may be divided on, you know, additional sanctions against iran. you know, what's your thoughts on that? and what are you doing, if anything -- or what can be done, if anything, at the u.n. to raise pressure on iran? or you mentioned taking the next step as far as putting more pressure on iran. can you help the committee understand what you mean by that? >> well, in the wake of the passage of 1929, which raised substantially the baseline of global sanctions against iran, we, the united states, our european partners and a number of other countries, japan, south korea, some of the gulf countries, canada, australia and others implemented additional sanctions using 1929 as a legal foundation but raising t

that's not something that you're going to do between iaea visits. that means kicking the inspectors out, leaving the mpt and that would be something that we would see, our intelligence capabilities notwithstanding. that would be pretty remarkable. so iran's behavior up until now seems to me to be a country that wants to be in the scientific place where they can break out if they so choose in the future. i don't think they've made that choice. they just want to have that latent capability. your second question was about the -- was israel and the united states. can you just repeat it? >> i'm not an oddsmaker. >> i'll take both of those up. my colleagues have raised this idea that iran is going to stop at a virtual arsenal. we can wish that is the case. i don't see any reason to believe that is the case. iran has been very clearly that its two primary strategic goals are to continue to exist, which they think that means being able to deter a major u.s. or israeli military attack, and their second goal, and their own strategy documents that they publish

then the weaponization and the iaea. first call if you see someone is working with the experiments on the nuclear weapons you should be worried about the completeness of the declaration of the state because sooner or later if you work with this kind of thing you would raise the question has all the material been clear to the iaea or some other activities of which i don't know and in order to understand that you also need to study velo weaponization part and see how it fits in the other findings and this is a scheme we have been true for example in self africa can which is a good example for the way that it works because first of all, south africa had given up the weapons program was 86 or 87 the tenet concluded and they started the verification inlet 9292. still we started to verify thinks. what we did is published a whole history of the south african development until 1992, see how it developed from the peaceful type of explosive studies to the well-positioned we went through the equipment, through the nuclear material

it doesn't matter because it happened at the iaea. when they do that come come back and i make in assessing. what are we doing here? what is the purpose? for not working on nuclear weapon? >> i wanted to pick on this here this is something i wanted to ask anything barbara, you raised it. how significant is it that at the time as president obama clarified the objective of u.s. policy is prevent a wet then as opposed to weapons capability? and how significant is it all so -- and this is the rest of the point that congress' language in their sanctions and other measures is very different. what is really going on? >> first, i think this distinction he made is really crucial. iran already has nuclear weapons capabilities in the sense to how to build the bomb and has amassed enrich uranium tamika maybe four or five nuclear weapons if it decided to do so. they could make a device, put it in a suitcase and deliver xml. perhaps it couldn't put it on a missile yet. so it's a meaningless term to talk about nuclear capability even though it's a t

visiting the iaea web site today, they have an eight-minute introductory film. one of the commentators was henry kissinger who said, if we are standing with the podium with 20,000 nuclear weapons under our feet, it's very difficult to ask another nation not to develop one. if we are going to be serious about a nuclear-free world, do we not have to be serious about disarming ourselves? >> look, i think ultimately the nuclear none proliferation committee has reciprocal commitments. and states like the united states and the soviet union and others that signed the treaty initially as nuclear states, they have an obligation to move towards disarmament. i think actually the obama administration shares the view that there are obligations on both sides, which is why they moved aggressive forward on new start, which was not an insignificant political risk. i think matt thinks some of those cuts go through too deep but i don't know if that's true or not. but in any case, i think the administration believes basically we also have to make good faith efforts to start to shri

the head of the iaea recently said that he had serious concerns that iran may be hiding skreet atomic weapons. i'm very concerned that the time for talk has passed. this promise could be another stalling tactic. we want to hear what actions you're taking at the u.n. circuit court council to imcrease pressure on iran. closing ambassador rice, i want to thank you and the u.s. delegation station in new york and around the world. we appreciate the sacrifices that are made on a daily basis and we thank you for being here and now i turn to ranking member for her remarks. >> good morning, ambassador, rice. i join with chairwoman granger in welcoming you today and i thank you for your service to our country. much has happened. from the crisis in syria, to the famine in the horn of africa to the transition in afghanistan, the u.n. has been deeply involved in matters of great importance with the united states and the global economy. in a world where threats do not stop at borders and at a time when americans are tightening their belts and looking to us to make every dollar count, tun plays an i

if there is an attack against iran, they can kick out the iaea, the regime can crack down on opposition. there will be a greater swell of national pride. i don't think iranians necessarily will forgive the regime for sins because of an attack, but it will put the regime or it could very well put the regime in a favorable position, especially if the israelis do not manage to really damage iran's nuclear program very much. the military strike will set back the u.s. objective of democracy in iran and could lead to greater instability in the region. diplomacy is a solution and barbara mentioned that the goal is really to manage the situation to prevent an armed conflict. in terms of diplomacy, going to rely on diplomacy, this situation can go on and on and on for several years and ultimately there has to be a solution not just to the iranian nuclear program but a solution to the islamic republic and our relations with the islamic republic. i would argue that as long as itoe la is in power in iran, we will not solve our problems with iran, that he is not amenable to normal relationship with

of us argued that if you pursue nuclear weapons secretly, or nuclear technology in violation of the iaea, you aren't entitled to nuclear technolo technology. >> what do you recommend? >> i think states that cheat have no right to peaceful nuclear technician, period. we have to make it clear that north korea is not entitled because it will use it to make nuclear weapons. they were proliferation resistant but they could still be used to make nuclear weapons fuel. i think that's something we should work on. iran is another story and i agree completely on that front. i think there's an assumption if we can cut a deal and pay them off, we can manage it. the north koreans are not going to sit still. nay they're continuing to raise the asking price. so we need a stad ji that focuses increasingly on roll back. missile defense, alliance cooperation, interdiction of sanctions. i think you do need some channel for communication for a variety of reasons. we made the negotiations the center stage and all the other pieces the sort of second subsidiary considerations. >> the north koreans don't take us

do you see any new window with the invitation for iaea inspections? and how do you assess that situation? >> thank you very much, mr. schiff. russia and china in the security council. their behavior to protect the assad regime has been reprehensible. and i think, frankly, they have heard that message from the entire international community, not just the united states and our western partners. the entire arab world and the majority of members of the united nations. soon after the second double veto the general assembly took up more or less the same resolution that was blocked in the security council. it was adopted by an overwhelming majority, over 130 countries voted in favor. a very small handful, i think about eight countries, voted no. and they include russia and china and venezuela and zimbabwe and north korea and iran and syria. it was company that one would -- it's very unique company that russia and china typically don't like to find themselves in. that has been followed by continued strong action out of the human rights council and repeated in

meanwhile, the effect on iran would likely be that they would kick out the iaea inspectors and redouble their efforts to build a program in the facilities that weren't destroyed or build new clandestine ones. really you're just buying a few years but probably redoubling iran's motivation to get a deterrent to prevent a resumption of attacks against it at some point in you the the future. it simply defers the problem to the future by a small number of years. the last point i would make is that the good news is we still do have some time for diplomacy. sanctions are having a pretty devastating effect on the iranian economy and the sanctions that the united states has put in place and the european oil embargo haven't been fully implemented yet. iran's leaders have signaled willingness to return to negotiationses. we're likely to see negotiations in the near term. i don't think we're going to get a break-through in the next few months but there's a possibility to start building confidence through the iranians taking steps to dial back their enrichment of our rainiam below the 20% level, tak

so i think the international community believes the iaea when they talk about what iran has on the ground. and outside experts do these cal lagss and say if they made the decision today, four months to the material, a year to a weapon, et cetera. i don't think intel is going to be the problem. in terms of can we build the coalition, i think we can, but i think that, you know, we haven't even really begun and i think that that's a mistake. i think that we should be doing the initial outreach. i think we'd have a better idea of what kind of coalition we could build if that was over and part of our diplomatic strategy. >> i agree with the first part and disagree with the second part. if we started over diplomacy or even quiet outreach to the permanent members of the security council or others on military action, it would confirm there were suggestions about the united states, which is basically we're going through the motions of sanctions and diplomacy in order to justify -- create a fig legal around a military strike in iran. it could complicate our ability both to have diplomacy work, beca

let's see -- halt nuclear tests, missile tests and allow the national international energy agency, iaea, back in the country after a three-year hiatus. did that and turned around and launched a missile, how do you deal with that? you say we try to negotiate with them. every time we negotiate with them they turn around and stick us in the ear. that's the first question. the second question, in 2012 we had -- we -- we've had both congressional and presidential elections in the u.s. and south korea it's going to be this year. north korea's developing into a strong and prosperous nation. this was supposed to be the year they were going to do that. whatever that means. it would appear that these three elements could form a perfect storm. in other words, do you expect north korea to continue to saberrattle and promote further aggressive behavior this year so as to try and impact the ongoing election cycle in south korea? then the final question, you can answer them all if you like -- i know i am preaching to the choir which i say that south korea is our closest allies. we even passed a free t

security council resolutions in the iaea. now it does seem we see a shifting of the u.s.ns and it's not exactly clear why that is. clearly there's a desire to sort of alleviate this crisis. but we can't lose sight of the fact that now is when we really hold all of the cards. now is when we have a strong bargaining position. we need to use that to really finally, once and for all, address this issue with the iranians. >> thank you, michael. great to see you. welcome home. >>> in southampton, england, hundreds turned out to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the the "titanic's" departure of the fatal, final voyage. the english port city was home to more than a third of the 1500 people who died when the "titanic" crashed into the iceberg. an update on the memorial cruise that is retracing the route of the "titanic." the cruise has been plagued with problem. it was forced to turn back to ireland after a passenger developed heart problems. the vessel had already been delayed because of bad weather and massive waves. the ship set sail sunday with 1,300 passengers with some re

checklist of activity that is iran would commit to refraining from and insist that iran allow the iaea unfettered access to its sites until the agency is satisfied that any military program has been shut down. they must receive some award for allowing such unprecedented inspection, and the obvious option would be the relaxation of sanctions, step by step as inspections proceed unimpeded. now, for any deal to stick, it has to be accepted by two groups. the first are the hard liners in tehran led by the supreme leader ayatollah. he might be amenable. he might be cure enough to accept a deal. he has beaten back the green movement, accommodated one key rival, sidelined another, president ahmadinejad. he has also given himself room to make some concessions on the nuclear program, saying recently islam considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin, but if iran does make concessions, the united states would have to be able to accept then and relax some sanctions. this is where the second important group republicans in washington could be an obstacle. if they demagogue the deal or re

i want to point out that two months after the figure was released, north korea told the iaea that it had decided to reactivate nuclear facilities and go ahead with the processing of spent fuel. north korea may have amassed several more weapons with plutonium since april 2009. it may have get even more nuclear weapons. we now know after years of arguing or with the u.s. government, north korea a uranium enrichment program. it was worked on over and expended -- and extended period. north koreans wmd program is a special concern as is its reactor that we have to think about very closely with the possible breakdown of the syrian state. i want to know that i believe north korea and iran closely watch each other's diplomacy with the united states. if israeli prime minister ,etanyahu's claim is accurate it will have a significant effect on north korea's negotiating posture when u.s. officials tried to resume diplomatic talks. the reverse is probably true. thank you, madam chairman, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. dr. green? >> thank you for inviting us to testi

neither the iaea nor the security council for the european union, or anybody else is really capable oftopping iran or any other rogue state that wants nuclear weapons. only the united states is capable of doing that. we have led from behind in the last three-and-a-half years and led from behind for the 16-and-a-half years before that, when iran was pursuing that objective. we have got only ourselves to blame here for not understanding the nature of the threat and the extent of the threat, a nuclear iran poses and time is running out. >> eric: and on the each of the talks on friday, the prime minister of turkey, a exposed friend of tehran, came back from a visit there. look what he said. this is shocking. let me get your reaction. he says, quote, because of the lack of honesty, they keep losing credibility in the world. this is not the language of diplomacy but another language and that does not suit me, he's talking about the iranians, what they are saying and the prime minister of turkey is basically calling them a liar. >> well, he's right. that is the most encouraging thing i think

food aid, north korea was supposed to suspend its enrichment, uranium enrichment program and allow iaeaspectors back to the country to monitor its program, but certainly ben rhodes saying, and other officials saying that that deal is halted right now. no food aid coming to north korea right now. >> what happens now to u.s. relation was pyongyang? >> senior u.s. officials are telling me it's less about engagement right now and more about containment. let's not forget, gary, we're in an election season and mitt romney, president obama's presumed challenger in the november election, is calling him an appeaser of north korea. so officials are saying they can't imagine, there's really no appetite now for engagement. those six-party talks with the other countries in the region are going to be off because north korea really gave a slap to the face of these diplomatic efforts. it's going to be more about containment, sanctions, putting in measures to curb north korea's program so that it doesn't develop any further. but not that much diplomacy going on right now certainly. >> okay. very interes

i was visiting the iaea website today and they have an introductory film. one of the commentators was henry kissinger, who said, if we are standing at the podium with 20,000 nuclear weapons under our feet, it is very difficult to ask another nation not to develop one. about a nuclear-free world, do we not have to be serious about disarming ourselves? >> i think, ultimately, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has commitments. we're committed -- places like iran are committed not to develop nuclear weapons. the united states and others, initially nuclear states, have an obligation to move toward disarmament. the obama administration shares the view that their obligations on both sides. the move forward on new start. not an insignificant political risk. it is thought that some of those cuts go too deep. i don't know if that is true or not. the administration believes that we also have to make good- faith efforts to shrink our arsenal. it does not excuse iran pose a commitment. sometimes, people ask, doesn't iran have the ability -- the fact of the mattress,

i want to point out the months after -- north korea told the iaea that it decided to reactivate nuclearities and go ahead with the reprocessing -- reprocessing fuel. as a result, they have had several more weapons made from plutonium. we now know after years of arguments within the u.s. government, north korea has the uranium enrichment program. this program could be a source of weapons grade fuel. north korean program is also of special concern, about its reactor, which it was helped build in syria, which could lead to a breakdown of the syrian state. i want to note that north korea and iran watch diplomacy with the united states. if the israeli prime minister's. [inaudible] -- it will have a significant effect on north korea's negotiating posture when u.s. officials try to resume diplomatic talks. the reverse is probably true. too generous and too quick of a deal will probably emboldened by ron to drive a hard bargain in those talks. thank you, madam chairman, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. doctor green? >> chairman, members of the committee, thank you f

and to begin this process weapon states could offer and put under iaea safeguard fissile material that is no longer in weapons. in a second step, there could be a verified positive of these excess stocks, and as is already being done in the case of heu and it can be done in the case of plutonium. i think to begin this process, however, we need to develop a culture in a sense where these excess stocks are identified and declared as such. and, you know, this aspect hasn't really received much attention so far. and in a sense we have made progress with regard to reductions in the nuclear arsenals, we have new starts quite recently, but, you know, that really is where the debate stops. we don't ask, you know, what happened, what's going to happen to these weapons and what's going to happen to this material that you recover from these weapons, and i think this will have to change. but i also think we need to go further and focus on new production on fissile material also. the p5, the weapon states of the npt, are no longer producing fissile material for weapons, but there's no collective st

the iaea is talked about that too. for all countries engaged in nuclear production.any rate there's lots more to talk about, car production, clean engines, i mean, the canada-u.s. collaboration on cars is huge. most people don't understand that exports between the u.s. and canada keep adding content on both sides of the border. the same thing is true in mexico. >> the average cars, the average car, north american car, when being produced crosses the border 16 times. after being a symbol. >> just did, the mexico institute, said research on our shared border with mexico which shows that 40% of the content of export to mexico, and imports from mexico, have contributed by both sides of the border. so it's very different from an import export relationship with china or other countries but let's just finally turned to foreign policy, and david, if you have these cards, you need to be bringing them up to me. so if anyone has questions, i hope you handed them off someplace, please. foreign policy, as i told you, my focus in congress was on intelligence and security. we have

because the iaea, the n watch dog has discovered troubling information that the iranians cannot explainearly the eastern easterns are doing things only consistent with a knock weapons effort. if it is a civilian program it is not buried beneath the mountain where a bunker buster cannot reap. >>guest: and you do not do testing necessary to create a nuclear weapon. >>alisyn: thank you, gordon chang, for coming in. >>dave: coming up, a democratic congressman pushing to kill small business tax cuts but will this cripple the all right hurting economy? we always hear about jobs leaving america. here's a chance to create jobs in america. oil sands projects, like kearl, and the keystone pipeline will provide secure and reliable energy to the united states. over the coming years, projects like these could create more than half a million jobs in the us alone. from the canadian border, through the mid west, to the gulf coast. benefiting hundreds of thousands of families throughout the country. this is just what our economy needs right now. pull on those gardening gloves. grab the nearest spade. an

i was visiting the iaea website today and they have an introductory film. one of the commentators was henry kissinger, who said, if we are standing at the podium with 20,000 nuclear weapons under our feet, it is very difficult to ask another nation not to develop one. if we are going to be serious about a nuclear-free world, do we not have to be serious about disarming ourselves? >> i think, ultimately, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has commitments. places liketed -- iran are committed not to develop nuclear weapons. the united states and others, initially nuclear states, have an obligation to move toward disarmament. the obama administration shares the view that their obligations on both sides. the move forward on new start. not an insignificant political risk. it is thought that some of those cuts go too deep. i don't know if that is true or not. the administration believes that we also have to make good-faith efforts to shrink our arsenal. it does not excuse iran pose a commitment. sometimes, people ask, doesn't iran have the ability -- the fact o

visiting be iaea website today, they have an eight minute introductory film. one of the commentators was henry kissinger. he said, if we are standing at the podium with 20,000 nuclear weapons under our feet, it is very difficult to ask another nation not to develop one. if we are going to be serious about a nuclear-free world, do we not have to be serious about this -- disarming ourselves? ultimately, the non- proliferation treaty is reciprocal. state says it will not will not. states like the u.s. have an obligation to move towards disarmament. the obama administration shares the view that their obligations -- there are obligations on both sides. that is why they took risks. some of the cuts go too deep, that's what matt things. -- thanks. the administration believes we have to make efforts to start to shrink our arsenal. it does not excuse iran's commitment. a lot of people ask, do they not have the right to have nuclear weapons? they give up their right to have nuclear weapons when they signed a the not. unless they want to pull out, theyat right is ironcla

>> well, my, my assessment would be that it may be an effort to minimize the findings of the iaea thiseek which said that they had serious concerns about the nuclear program in iran. i know from speaking with the former cia director michael hayden that he always felt that iran was one of the toughest issues to brief on to the president. in part because our general understanding of the regime is very limited, our intelligence. he said it was very opaque. you never really understood where the pressure points or the leverage points were to try and convince them. to abandon this program. and that when you have countries that have unlimited intelligence -- a limited intelligence view and you have a country like iran which is becoming more and more isolate isolateed, which is part of your strategy to try and convince them to abandon their nuclear program, as they become more isolated and out of touch with the rest of the world, you do what? you increase the likelihood of a dramatic miscalculation. so you have two parties, limited information about each other, and the likelihood for miscalcul

it is also an important opportunity to reinforce the council's support of the work of the iaea as well as the importance of each u.n. member state implementing resolution 1540 to prevent proliferation of wmd and related materials. i also want to point to the event on the week, the day of april 25th, the following week in which there will be an open debate on the elicit flow of materials, goods and people. the title of the event is, threats to peace, international peace and security, securing borders against illicit flows. the security council has consistently identified through its resolutions and presidential statements how such transfers whether we're talking about wmd, small arms, drugs, terrorists, even human trafficking, can field some of the most critical threats to international peace and security and trigger instability, that these threats, these flows, we often look at in sort of a stovepipe fashion. each individual threat, and we have instruments both in the secretariat and in some of the specialized agencies that are designed to assist states that need assistance and want as