>> the iaea just issued a report recently that iran had complied with all obligations that iaea had allthe access the past four and could verify that the obligations had been met. indeed when the j.p. 0a was finalizing close consultation with iaea to meet those additional obligations the community came forth quite quickly to supply all the money that was needed in fact, if we are able to get the comprehensive agreement and i am not sure if we will or not i am sure the iaea will need additional resources for the international community to come forward because any additional budget the iaea needs is small potatoes compared to the cost of iran having a nuclear weapons. >> i suspect you could sign me a buzz enthusiastic with that regime possible with that iaea distrusted and verify given the past and current unlikely future activities like cheating on the nuclear efforts in the past we should invest heavily into a proactive inspection regime. undersecretary:that turns to a subject when you testified before the of british services subcommittee i asked about the burdens facing your group with

complete this declarations of the iaea. this is the report of the findings. due to the fact that iran has been running the nuclear program first without filling it, both with obligations and security council resolutions. i have recently publish ed five principles with senate negotiators. i highlight some of those basic principles. the first one, to minimize the opportunities for violations and delays in compliance. an exampleover creating an unstable situation lowering the amount of energy in iran by increasing to 10,000 or more. keeping stocks exceedingly low would be in practice. ambiguity leads to slippage. with regard to the practical leads, i place them here. timely protection on the other state or states came and produced is a complex task. there are aspects that we don't know. the iaea must provide the correctness and completeness of declarations, establish the total number by iran and the size of its uranium stocks. >>> people and materials. >> sure that the iaea has legally binding authorities to conduct the additi

what measures beyond the initial iaea protocols? and what types of verification measures are being considered for procurement of key proliferation sensitive goods as well? >> thank you, mr. chairman. transparency and monitoring is absolutely critical and in the agreement. as i said one of the pathways of greatest concern is, of course, covert action. and entrance patransparency and monitoring are the elements that help to ensure that if there's a kuo vert program one knows in time to be able to take action and stop it from happening in the first place. in the joint plan of action, the fact that we can now have managed access to centrifuge production, to rotar production gechs our intelligence community and experts the kinds of information that allow us to know whether something is being sent over to some other place and isn't in the pipeline as is required to be inspected. so in addition to modified 3.1 in if additional proelt cool where i are absolutely critical to a comprehensive agreement and i believe iran understands that. on e

iaea has a right to inspections under the existing agreements where appropriate.to have access to all areas with materials iaea needs to do its work it also requires iran to verify to stop the proliferation for the nuclear program. . . is the heart of iran limited production at iraq. to remove the current and replace it but not able to hold enough or out of the around the reactor. but he is changes there would be no need to produce what could be used in this reactor. iran has also resisted making concessions about what to do with that which would exceed the total agreed number. if not removed and rendered harmless, it would reconstitute the operations and create a sizable breakout capability. adequate for the last point. and it must remove the response to the major violations by iraq. reports from the key part of member states can use these reports to complement their findings. the uranium is the more difficult and time-consuming person and the uranium at its disposal the material would vanish. [inaudible] as was was the case of south africa. in a summary it would

iraqi government officials informed the iaea that the insurgents took the material from a university in the country's second largest city of mosul. reuters says nearly 40 kilograms of uranium compounds were kept at the university for research purposes. the iraqi government is asking the u.n. for help to stave off the threat of their use by terrorists in iraq or abroad. iaea officials say the materials are low grade, but they say any loss of regulatory control over nuclear and other radioactive materials is a cause for concern. over the last month, sunni militants have taken control of a number of cities in an offensive across northern and western iraq. >>> u.s. vice president joe biden has indicated that his country could move forward with another round of sanctions against russia. biden spoke by phone with ukraine's president, petro poroshenko, about cease-fire negotiations that are going nowhere. white house sources say poroshenko told biden that the kremlin and pro-russian separatists in ukraine had rejected numerous proposed venues for peace talks. biden told poroshenko the u.s.

but according to the iaea, iran has done what it promised to do. the result is a nuclear program that is more constrained, more transparent and better understood than it was a year ago. a program that has been frozen for the first time in almost a decade. meanwhile as the under-secretary will make clear the sanctions relief for iran will remain limited to announce that will do little if nothing to heal the deep-seated economic problems. over the next four months the valuable safeguards that freed the program will remain in place as they strive to negotiate a comprehensive plan. i will be blunt and say that we will never rely on words alone when it comes to iran. we will and have insisted the commitments be monitored and verified in the terms of access and inspection be thoroughly spelled out. the goal is to structure an agreement that would make any attempt to breakout of such an agreement so visible and time-consuming that iran would either be deterred from trying was stopped before it could succeed. speaking more generally, i want to emphasiz emp

iaea, thee where the international organization that monitors, wants access to that negotiations.ese we have seen them take several steps, we have seen them remove dirt from the site where the did their nuclear testing. then we see them bring in new earth in good measure after they knocked down the buildings. we have seen them asphalt the whole area, but there are still -- too reticent to allow the iaea to come in to check. the checks would file a the other agreements that they had had. if they aren't in the process of violating agreements, how willing are they -- remember reagan's old adage, trust but verify --how willing are they going to be? we know the zeal for a deal. we have seen that before with respect to the north korean situation. and having gone down that road before, we want to make sure that this agreement is verifiable. yes, we are weighed in, and to your question about how long they will draw this out, my suspicion is that they are going to try to play for time, because as they do, they continue to enrich more and more. --ther authorization observation would be their d

iraqi government officials informed the iaea the insurgents took the material from a university in the city of mosul. reuters says nearly 40 kilogram of compounds were kept at the university for research purposes. the iraqi government is asking the u.n. to help to stave off the threat of their use by terrorists in iraq or abroad. the officials say the materials are low grade but they say any loss of regulatory control over nuclear and other radioactive materials is a cause for concern. over the last month, sunni militants have taken control of a number of cities in an offensive across northern and western iraq. >>> authorities in germany have asked the top american spy in berlin to leave the country. they expelled the cia station chief after they discovered what they believed to be two new cases of americans saying that. authorities refused to identify the spy by name but local media say the person obtained secret government information. germans were already angry with the americans. last area they learned that u.s. agents had evens dropped on the mobile phone of chance lore angela mer

the iaea says the uranium was low grade and does not represent a nuclear proliferation risk.comes a day after the same militants seized a chemical weapons factory north of baghdad. those wea seized said to be degraded but you can see the danger right this week. martha: nuclear material and a lot of thing that are potentially dangerous. martha: governor perry agreed the humanitarian crisis is a -- it appears facebook has better surveillance and facing recognition toalg than our own fbi. what's that about? don't miss red lobster's new! lobster toppers event. four entrées, starting at just $15.99. like our new lobster-topped wood-grilled shrimp... or the new! lobster-topped lobster. and now for lunch, try our new lobster tacos, just $9.99.ends soon so hurry in. >>> it is described as a title wave of human misery. flooding across the border. r refugees seeking shelter at the intake camps. welcome to hour number two of "america's newsroom." i am martha maccallum. >> and i am bill hemmer. the news facilities are invited to visit fort sill but no cameras. the rules are being demande

but there's still too reticent to allow the iaea into check. obviously, what the czechs would show is that they probably violated the other agreements that they had. and if they are in the process of violating agreements, how willing are they -- remember reagan's old adage, trust but verify -- how willing are they going to be? congress has these questions because we know human nature. we know the zeal for a deal. we have seen that before with respect to the north korean situation. and having gone down that road before, we want to make sure that this agreement is verifiable. so yes, we are weighed in. so your question about how long will they draw this out? my suspicion is that they are going to try to play for time, because as they do they continue to enrich more and more. and another observation would be that their demand at the end of the day is that the inspections ceased after a period of time, let's say 10 years. and after that they are treated like any other power on the world stage. at that point obviously they could go forward without a

nuclear con proliferation treaty and following its withdrawal from the n.p.t., north korea kicked out iaea inspectors, restarted the reactor that had been frozen under the 1994 agreed framework and moved spent fuel rost rods to a facility that can produce plutonium. at the time, north korea said it had no intention of making nuclear weapons and its nuclear activities would be -- quote -- "confined only to power production and other peaceful purposes." of course as we now now, north korea would conduct a nuclear test establishing its potential to build nuclear weapons. this history should serve as a warning about what could happen if we allow iran to maintain a robust nuclear infrastructure. the fact is iran is simply agreeing to freeze, to temporarily lock the door on its nuclear weapons program, as is, walk away, and should they later walk away from the deal as they have in the past, they can simply unlock the door and continue their nuclear weapons program from where they are today. that's exactly what the talks in my mind were intended to avoid. now, as i stand here, there is a rush for

iaea, thee where the international organization that monitors, wants access to that negotiations.ese heen them take several steps, we have seen them remove dirt from the site where the did their nuclear testing. then we see them bring in new earth in good measure after they knocked down the buildings. we have seen them asphalt the whole area, but there are still -- too reticent to allow the iaea to come in to check. the checks would file a the other agreements that they had had. if they aren't in the process of violating agreements, how willing are they -- remember reagan's old adage, trust but verify --how willing are they going to be? we know the zeal for a deal. we have seen that before with respect to the north korean situation. and having gone down that road before, we want to make sure that this agreement is verifiable. yes, we are weighed in, and to your question about how long they will draw this out, my suspicion is that they are going to try to play for time, because as they do, they continue to enrich more and more. --ther authorization observation would be their demand at

>> the final agreement will -- iaea be iea satisfied. that is where they are today. you for having this hearing. i want to thank the witnesses for being here. one of the natural questions one would ask is what are the gaps between where we are and where we want to close? come in an open setting, that's not a good thing to have. i know senator flake mentioned he believes this is a historic opportunity. i do, too. everyone up here really does want to see a diplomatic solution. everyone appreciates the work that all of you are doing. -- jphe jp away came out jpoa came out, you saw strong responses from all those involved. we went through agreements with other countries and here we are pushing our friends to not enrich. yet, we open these negotiations, acknowledging enrichment. there are a lot of concerns. i do want to close by saying this. in spite of the fact that we want you to be successful, you said there is no deadline. i know you have to fudge a little bit because you don't know what's going to happen. in essence, it was said that there is not a deadline. this the

. >> what we know is that an iaea report said that 1,000 to 2,000 centrifuges were removed from natanznown reasons. and we know that stuxnet targets 1,000 centrifuges. so from that, people are drawn to the conclusion, "well, stuxnet got in and succeeded." that's the only evidence that we have. >> the only information that's not classified. >> yes. >> and there are lots of things about stuxnet that are still top secret. who was behind it? >> what we do know is that this was a very large operation. you're really looking at a government agency from some country who is politically motivated and who has the insider information from a uranium enrichment facility that would facilitate building a threat like this. >> an intelligence agency, probably. >> probably. >> we know from reverse engineering the attack codes that the attackers have full-- and i mean this literally-- full tactical knowledge of every damn detail of this plant. so you could say, in a way, they know the plant better than the iranian operator. >> we wanted to know what retired general michael hayden had to say about all this

now the iaea and the united states are saying this is not enriched uranium, it's not weapons grade.hey don't assess it as being something that would pose a current or immediate threat, but the iraqi government is using whatever rallying points it can at this stage to get even more international support in the ongoing battle against isis. it has now been a month since the terrorist organization took over iraq's second largest city of mosul with the government here no closer to gaining it or other key territory back as isis fighters continue to try to push their way towards the capital. erin? >> arwa, thank you very much. "outfront" tonight bob baer, you heard them saying it's low grade, not weapons grade. when you have 90 pounds of uranium that isn't weapons grade, how quickly can it become something that can be a serious threat? >> well, it's not particularly lethal, but if you turn it into a dirty bomb, let's say a car bomb or a truck and exploded it in baghdad, which isis is capable of doing, it would have an enormous psychological effect and have a wider kill radius. you'd see pe

iaea looks into these, any of these complaints or requests. they've done that. they're doing that now. and they've also issued a statement that i would point anyone to, to take a look at. this is medical and scientific equipment. our level of concern is not high in this case. >> the german government has asked the cia station chief to leave. this is, of course, the second report of the u.s. spying in germany. we really seem to be in a rough period in the u.s./german relationship right now. >> i would disagree with that, jake. obviously, there are points in every relationship where you may have disagreements or you may have rough patches and certainly we've gone through some serious discussions with the germans over the last several months. we also work together very closely on a range of issues, p5 plus one negotiations or the situation on the ground in israel. that will continue. and the secretary will be able to engage soon with the prime minister. >> you would grant it's a rough patch when these things happen? >> the signative strong, important relationship i

and the iaea are saying this is not enriched uranium. not believe it would pose a potential threat. that being said, it is understandably quite a disturbing development with the iraqi government reaching out to the united nations for assistance in this matter. the iraqi government has really been trying to drum up international support in its ongoing battle for isis. it's now been a month, dana, since isis first took over mosul iraq's second largest city. the security force is struggling along these various front lines, barely keeping isis away from the capital. cnn.com's chelsea carter took a trip to a hospital in baghdad, where she managed to speak to some of the wounded iraqi soldiers coming back from the front lines, telling harrowing tales of what they witnessed, painting a different picture of the battlefield from what is being told by the iraqi government. a lot of stories about how they did not have enough weapons, enough ammunition, logistics supply lines completely falling apart. so the iraqi government at this stage really try

the things that iran has tried to do in addition to its effort to undermine the credibility of the iaea is to show that it stood up to the u.n. security council, whose legitimacy is also impugned. and so that in itself, that kind of change in dynamic, is an important change in itself. when it comes to the particulars, i think we made that vital concession on iran -- iran has been seeking this since 2003. we conceded any restraints iran is under will be temporary in nature and quite short in nature and iran will be treated like nye state at the end of this process, despite, again, those obligations. we have granted some implicit legitimate si to those facilities which, remember, constructed in secret and in violation of -- the -- now will remain in place and not be dismantled. we have not forced iran to address the weaponnization question or the ballistic missile question. so all of these things are significant concessions we made in the course of these talks. on the second part, how do we bolster the credibility of the sort of or-else. i think it's important that there be a clear messag

what the iranians have done and what the iaea has confirmed they have done is to live up to their agreement of taking the medium enriched, the 20% enriched and either diluting it or converting it to oxide. with the last extension they made the further commitment to speed up the using of the oxide to make it into fuel plates for their tehran research reactor which puts it farther out of reach with regard to possible proliferation concern. there have also been formulas that have addressed the plutonium route with regard to the iraq reactor, which appears to be involved, which -- so we've got the outline right through. it's a bit of a further chalen for the obama administration in selling the final agreement, to put it bluntly, we bot the better side of the deal. we got the key providers that drains bb's bombs, and in returns the iranians got minor sanctions relief. airplane parts, petrochemicals, trade in gold, a small fraction, access to a very small fraction of their frozen assets. all the big debilitating sanctions are still firmly in place. as they put it, we will come down as a ton of br

north korea should be sincere with its commitment to the 2005 joint statement and allow iaea inspectors to renew their activity in the country. i'm also concerned with north korea's deplorable human rights record. north koreans do not have freedom of speech, movement or religion, they're also subject to chronic starvation and a dismal public health system. the u.s., based on our values as americans, should remain a strong supporter and leader within the global community and promoting human rights. i look forward to reviewing our actions, positions and policies toward north korea as we work an denuclearization and their human rights record. mr. chairman, with that i'd like to yield back. and thank you for calling this hearing. >> the gentleman from california is recognized for opening statement. >> thank you. mr. king, welcome home. mr. chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. it was just a few months ago that you and i were at the dmz and also discussing north korea with president park and with prime minister abe. north korea doesn't trade with us, doesn't need us. it needs china

. >> the iaea standards and their code of conduct identifies category 1 sources as if not safely managed, or secured, likely to cause permanent injury to a person what handled them or was in contact with them. it would probably be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded material of a period of a few minutes to an hour. that's the most -- and these sources are used in ir radiators and they're strong sources, they tend to be cobalt 60. category 2 is one step down from that, where if you were in close contact to it for an hour or two, there would be serious injury and possibly a fatality. >> i would assume that for category 1 devices, that the level of risk would be higher. >> yes. >> and the requirement for securing the device would be greater and maybe even inspections would occur more often. give us an idea of how often inspections would occur for the different categories. >> annually for category 1 sources. >> and for the other categories. >> it varies. some are a period of every two or three years depending upon the strength of the material and its potential to harm members of t

in other words, freezing their nuclear programs, inviting the iaea back in to inspect them. eventually leading to the dismantlement and elimination of the north korean nuclear weapons program. that's the foundation of the six-party process that we've been engaged in for many years, and we've made a great deal of progress indicative to china keeping the solidarity of japan and the rok with us. there is no daylight between any of the three allies, in order to get north korea moving down that path of the nuclearization. they are far away from it, and, therefore, we are in a pressure face and that's where we concentrate a lot of energy on is putting pressure on north korea so it understands it only has one option, and that is the peaceful, diplomatic option. >> and i understand that and there's an issue i will discuss with my very capable staff. but there seems to be at least somewhere along the line for north korea there is at least some ways around what has been quote put in place for strategic containment and isolation for them. because at this point summit is just not come i