the iaea has committed to keeping them confidential. and so therefore, they are committed to keeping these protocols under csa confidential as well. sen. cotton: i'm aware that is the statement you also gave to senator corker. i assume you're not implying any kind of moral equivalence. undersec. sherman: i indeed said to the senator -- you were not here yet -- that i understood that this was a very different circumstance in the sense that we are trying to keep iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and that this was a international understanding negotiated amongst 6 parties and iran. so yes, i understand this is a different circumstance. which is why i believe the iaea at an expert level shared the protocol arrangements, understanding they would be classified. and i made clear to the iaea under our system, i would be required to share, in a classified, confidential setting, with members of the u.s. congress what i had seen. and i will do so this afternoon. sen. cotton: did you make clear to iran that these laws required congress to receiv

the iaea has committed to keeping them confidential. and so, therefore, they are committed to keeping these protocols under tsa confidential as well. >> i'm aware that that is a statement. you also gave senator corker us and you're not implying any kind of moral equivalence between the united states and iran. >> absolutely not. i said to a senator, you are not yet here, senator cotton, that i understood that this was a very turf -- different circumstance and since we can to keep iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and was an international understanding that had been negotiated among the six-party and iran. so yes, i understand this is different circumstance, which is why i believe the iaea at an expert level shared the protocol arrangements, understanding they would be classified, and i made clear to the iaea under our system i would be required to share in a classified confidential setting with members of the united states congress what i had seen, and i will do so this afternoon. >> did you make it clear that u.s. law, u.s. law was s

iaea. i know you will say this is a different situation. i grant you that this is an international understanding to try to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon, and that is a different circumstance. in the development of where the iaea is going is that they came to us for technical expertise, as they came to every other member, and in a classified briefing this afternoon, i will share everything i know about this. also grateful that the director general on his own cognizance is meeting with the senate foreign relations committee in an informal setting . it is extreme he on usual, because every other country wonders why he is. >> you did not see the final document? >> i was shown documents, but whether there were other discussions -- you know, what is about the technical modalities that the iaea uses, and i will share with you this afternoon in a classified setting every single thing i know about that, and i think it will give you great confidence that the iaea is doing what it needs to. >

the iaea knows what it's doing. you can trust them even though the document leaks no withstanding isn't public. here we're also saying it doesn't really matter that much. that's the other thing that's being said is that this doesn't really affect the fundamental validity of the deal. and i have to say i agree with george. if you're somebody who's got to vote on this in congress, they're asking you to take a big risk. they're asking you to believe those two things without really being able to know everything you would want to know. >> here is the corker language in the bill, the iran bill that passed. it's the senate language, the house passed it. this sets up this whole thing of this vote, approving the deal. "the term agreement and all related materials and annexes means the agreement itself and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance technical or other understandings, whether entered into or implemented prio

states and the iaea. now, i know you will say this is a different situation, and i grant you that this is an international understanding to try to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon, and that is a different circumstance. so in the development of where the iaea was going, they did come to us for technical expertise expertise, as they came to every other member of the p5+1. and in a classified briefing this afternoon i will share with you everything i know about this. >> so, let me -- >> i'm also very grateful that the director general on his own cognizance is meeting with the senate foreign relations committee in an informal setting which is extremely unusual because every other country sort of wonders why he is. >> did i understand you to say to senator corker that you personally did not see the final document? >> no. what i said is that i was shown documents that i believe to be the final documents, but whether, in fact there are any further discussions -- you know what this is about, senator are the

usedechnology has been now by the iaea.nitially it was a technology which was made available to them by, in particular, american laboratories but also others. it is a capability that the iaea has established its own laboratory paid for in part by the united states. both german and canadian equipment and various other countries participated. this sounds like something that is very science fictiony or more like a crime scene investigation. something swipe of and you can then put whatever comes off onto a piece of plastic and put it into a nuclear reactor. individual particles which weigh one million millionth of a gram will show fission damage. pick these particles out and tell what the chemical composition is and their isotopic composition and the morphology of the particle. so you get a tremendous amount of information. you have to know where to look and you have to be careful that you do not cross contaminate. and you have to be very cautious about leaping to conclusions. carefulant very attention to the collection and ana

it is not us, it is iaea. the goal is to go where there is suspicious or suspicion of nuclear relevant activities. if they are in a military site it doesn't matter. they are still the iaea access to those sites. senator: i only have a few seconds left. i would hope that you would reconcile those statements for the public. mr. moniz: we cannot control their statements. senator: you have stated the 24 day waiting. for international inspectors will not allow the regime to conceal any illegal activity. as i read the agreement many people have pointed out the inspectors request to his of those sites could be delayed more than 24 days. i know that you are not concerned about the 24 day period. you believe that iaea would be able to handle that. but if you look at different parts in q of annex 1 of the agreement, we have the the potential of an 89 day delay. do you think that would be possible? how confident are you -- mr. moniz: we certainly cannot allow for that. i might say i did not say any , illegal activity. i

the iaea knows what it's doing. trust them even though the document leaks no withstanding isn't public. here we're also saying it doesn't really matter that much. that's the other thing that's being said is that this doesn't really affect the fundamental validity of the deal. and i have to say i agree with george. if you're somebody who's got to vote on this in congress, they're asking you to take a big risk. they're asking you to believe those two things without really being able to know everything you would want to know. >> here is the corker language in the bill, the iran bill that passed. it's the senate language, the house passed it. this sets up this whole thing of this vote, approving the deal. "the term agreement and all related materials and annexes means the agreement itself and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance technical or other understandings, whether entered into or implemented prior to th

or the iaea into our military sites.if we cannot get physical access, boots on the ground access to all military sites and i am deeply concerned about the efficacy of the inspection regime. if we do not trust our this section -- inspection regime, we have a serious problem. dr. levitt: we can trust iran to engage in more new various activity. beyond that we cannot trust iran. the verification regime is critically and orton -- important. there are some holes big enough to drive a truck through. the question is not so much is it fair that the people who do not have a vote get to read these agreements and others do. why was that agreed to? it is absolutely true that we want those provisions to be made kept secret so that our information is not made public either but why was that agreed to in the deal? that is what i do not understand. the question is how strong these verification tools will be. ambassador burns: president reagan said of the soviets, trust but verify. we must not trust but we must verify. if this agreement i

it is a tech shared between the iaea had a talk about his information the iaea about the dimensions of iran's nuclear program in the united states and negotiating partners have made clear this deal, this broader agreement will not go forward until iran has complied with all the requests for information and access they need to write the report. that is why i would not describe this as a side agreement. this is an agreement directly between iran and the iaea. but we have made clear if any sanctions relief will not be provided by the international community and tell iran has complied with requests for information and access submitted by the iaea. >> they determine whether or not iran is complying with respect to part she. is that right? the p5+1 has agreed to the interpretation of compliance that is acceptable and we are okay with that. >> the iaea is an organization of nuclear experts responsible for enforcing the non-proliferation treaty around the world. when we talk about the most intrusive inspections that were imposed, the survey conducted by the iaea and essentially the internation

on the military dimensions of its program stonewalled the iaea on for about eight years now, and then obviously then the ongoing inspections once the deal takes full effect. so i think it's very important to see what was concluded with iran and to see also if there are any side deals between the united states and other negotiating partners in iran and what will satisfy them about iran's prior military activities. these are things that have never been resolved, even if you read the agreement and look at the security council resolution 22231. it's still unclear exactly what it is that the iaea will have to say come this december or thereabouts. this is very important for congress to pin down and amano is the perfect person to ask about it. do you think congress will pin him down? the administration says there's no side deals and the ambassador to the iaea saying this stuff is confidential in tehran. >> well, that's what they would like people to believe. you know, if iran were a member in good standing of the iaea like iceland or belgium or norway or sub-like that, then you can say, all

that's usually done by the iaea. that's the international atomic energy agency. but according to the state department, the way this is all constructed is still consistent with the position that the iaea will take the lead in investigating iran's nuclear program. >> we're confident in the agency's technical plans for investigating the possible military dimensions of iran's former program. issues that in some cases date back more than a decade. just as importantly, the iaea is comfortable with arrangements which are unique to the agency's investigation of iran's historical activitactivities. >> the administration and iaea may be comfortable for their part. but presidential candidate lindsey graham issued a statement "allowing the iranians to inspect their own nuclear sites, particularly a notorious military site, is like allowing the inmates to run the jail. and california congressman ed royce called it a dangerous farce "international inspections should be done by international inspectors period." critics are asking why if the administration knew all about this si

directlyagreement between iran and the iaea. what we have made clear is any sanctions relief will not be has i e provided until iran complied to the iaea agreement. iaea toll be up to the determine whether iran has complied. agreed toplus one has opinion is iaea's correct. they are a group of international experts. be inspections will conducted by the iaea. with the u.s. and international community is doing as we are coming on on the iaea and iran that they must cooperate at every turn. when it comes to repairing their report about the military dimensions. moving forward, the international community is going to insist, including the u.s., that iran cooperate with iaea inspectors responsible for verifying compliance. they are responsible for the permanent, never ending commitment iran has made to never develop a nuclear weapon. that is why there will be permanent inspections in place by iaea nuclear experts. what has happened is iran has given the iaea the runaround. the international community has come forward and said, if you w

that's between iran and the iaea. fifth, is the likelihood of an international consensus remaining if a deal is rejected? what happens if the deal is rejected? some have suggested actually some top level israeli officials suggested iran will comply with the terms of the agreement. we'll get relief from other partners, and the u.s. will be isolated. others have suggested iran will rush toward the development of a nuclear weapon with no constraints. is there any reason to believe iran would comply with the terms of the deal if it's rejected and not proceed quickly to a nuclear weapon? if the weapons -- six, if weapons are transfers to hezbollah during the five-year period, which is a violation of the u.n. resolution but also a violation of the interim agreement, would that constitute a violation and cause snapback? in these intervening five years, if arms are sold to hezbollah? and finally, what will happen to the u.n. security resolution specifically the listing of the arms embargo and the provisions if congress does n

should we trust the iaea? secretary moniz: we have always trust of the iaea.dent organization. i might add, partly because at a place like los alamos national laboratory, we have courses that all of the iaea inspectors take, for example. that has been going on for decades. we have obviously, many, many nationalities involved in the iaea safeguards activities area a number of them are american. typically coming from our laboratories. they will not be part of the inspection teams because of our lack of diplomatic relations, but they are a very confident organization. but we have done is give them the tools they need to apply this talents. and i might say, to expand their scope relative to other things as well. for example, the issue of having verification opportunities literally for the uranium supply chain is something they have sought -- they would love to have. they have sought in other occasions. unsuccessfully. this will be the first time they will have the capability. this is aperiod in which they will have the ability to deploy advanced technologies, enri

and as i say, i think both the iaea and the u.s.government are pretty confident that they have in place a solid technical plan to do that. but, again, let me say one more thing. there's also a site visit. >> there is going to be a site visit. some iaea inspectors will go to parchen at some point? >> yeah. the director general and the deputy director general who is the top inspector, they are going to go -- the iranians are calling it a courtesy visit. i don't care what the iranians call it. they can call it anything they want. the thing is, he left that detail out of the story. i'm not sure why. >> here's what i'm hearing, to sum this up. we're talking about a body, iaea, who has already kind of doggedly uncovered some level of possible deposition, possible untoward activity at this facility, built up a level of data, have some sort of fingerprints for what was going on there, and they're confident that they can use this methodology to satisfy their own questions about that facility. and the question is whether we think they're the

between the united states and the iaea.know you will say this is a different situation and i grant you that this is an international understanding to try to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon. that is a different circumstance. in the development of where the iaea was going, they did come to us for technical expertise as they came to every member of the p5 plus one, and in a classified briefing, i will share with you everything i know about this. i'm also grateful that the director general on his own cognizance is meeting with the senate foreign relations committee in an informal setting , which is extremely unusual. mr. toomey: did i understand you to say to senator corker that you did not see the final document? ms. sherman: what i said was i was shown the documents that i believe to be the final documents. senator, areabout, the modalities, the technical uses.ties that the iaea and i will share with you this afternoon in a classified setting everything i know about that and i think it will give you great confidence th

it's not the -- >> you are saying that if they comply with the iaea and the iaea ultimately concludes that they have not -- they are not satisfied on pmd because they don't have access or didn't get access to the sites -- >> they are not in compliance. that would be a breach. we would not do sanctions relief. they know that. >> i respectfully suggest it's not at all clear in the agreement. we can talk about that, but i would like to move on to the issue of specifically the sanctions. this has been brought up by a number of my colleagues. the annex to the lists, lots and lots of individuals and entities getting sanctions relief under the deal and many of them are involved in not just proliferation activities but also involved in terrorism, support for terrorism and human rights and they went on the list because it was easier to get the european allies to go along with the proliferation sanctions. secretary lew i appreciate that we will continue to sanction hezbollah, but will be be able to and are we going through the process of scouring the list for banks and shipping lines to re-impo

that's between iran and the iaea. fifth, is the likelihood of an international consensus remaining if a deal is rejected? what happens if the deal is rejected? some have suggested actually some top level israeli officials suggested iran will comply with the terms of the agreement. we'll get relief from other partners, and the u.s. will be isolated. others have suggested iran will rush toward the development of a nuclear weapon with no constraints. is there any reason to believe iran would comply with the terms of the deal if it's rejected and not proceed quickly to a nuclear weapon? if the weapons -- six, if weapons are transfers to hezbollah during the five-year period, which is a violation of the u.n. resolution but also a violation of the interim agreement, would that constitute a violation and cause snapback? in these intervening five years, if arms are sold to hezbollah? and finally, what will happen to the u.n. security resolution specifically the listing of the arms embargo and the provisions if congress does n

that's usually done by the iaea. that's the international atomic energy agency. but according to the state department, the way this is all constructed is still consistent with the position that the iaea will take the lead in investigating iran's nuclear program. >> we're confident in the agency's technical plans for investigating the possible military dimensions of iran's former program. issues that in some cases date back more than a decade. just as importantly, the iaea is comfortable with arrangements which are unique to the agency's investigation of iran's historical activitactivities. >> the administration and iaea may be comfortable for their part. but presidential candidate lindsey graham issued a statement "allowing the iranians to inspect their own nuclear sites, particularly a notorious military site, is like allowing the inmates to run the jail. and california congressman ed royce called it a dangerous farce "international inspections should be done by international inspectors period." critics are asking why if the administration knew all about this si

iaea does allow iran to take swipe samples but iaea inspectors must be present or monitoring them atnd containment bags used would be provided by the iaea. >> you're literally taking a material that looks like cotton and you're swiping it over a surface and you're putting it in a bag. if it's a face-saving measure for the iranians to do that, physically watched over by iaea inspectors to ensure it's done properly, then frankly i think that's an entirely unproblematic procedure. >> reporter: today the iaea director said he was "disturbed" by statements suggesting that the iaea has given responsibility for nuclear inspections to iran. adding that the iaea has long-established protocols for inspecting nuclear facilities or suspected facilities and the agreement will follow those protocols. today the state department emphasized the inspection of current nuclear facilities will be more robust. >> we are very confident that this very aggressive inspection regimen that's in place in the deal going forward, for future, is the strongest ever peacefully negotiated. >> from the beginning of the

the iaea's thing is very interesting. before this was finalized, the iaea presented iran with 12 sets of questions about the militarization of their nuclear program. they had answered -- >> previous. >> previous. >> they had answered two. they left ten unanswered. those were left unanswered when this thing was finalized. that's still hanging out there. that's what i think is in the side agreements. >> pretty clear we're not going to get an answer to that. at least not the american public. >> well the administration is essentially letting it be known that it expects iran will never admit to its past weaponization work. and that's vital. if we don't know what they already know then we really don't know how much time it may take them to go from having quantities of enriched uranium or plutonium to building a bomb. >> let's talk about public opinion on the democrats, dan. they hold a key to the democrats. president only needs 1/3 of house or senate to be able to sustain a veto of a resolution of disapproval. but it's interest

with the iaea standing there watching them do it is not so outrageous.i don't think that is anything unusual at all. fact, -- but as he said, and what is used against it in this case is that it was a confidential agreement but the agreement is between the iaea and iran, not between the united states and iran. a lot of countries that are being inspected don't like to publicize all -- everything they're doing because in many cases, it is embarrassing to them. this is a way of dealing with that that the iaea has worked out over the years. amy: on a different issue, you worked with jimmy carter. you worked under president jimmy carter. today he will beholding a news conference announcing his diagnosis with cancer. your thoughts? >> you know, jimmy carter -- he was a man that i must say i look back at my work with him and knowing him, how it people can say that a job at that level, at the white house level, that you spent five years in constant crisis and the president never asked you to do something in any way that violated your values, the way you feel abou

the iaea have been trying to get into the facility for summer use the iaea has been able to string out because there's obligation for them to provide access any kind of framework unlike under the jcpoa way we would've gotten access way back in 2011 had it been in place. however, we believe that if iran's editor nuclear weapons research in 2003, we have not seen any signs that research has resumed, and this question is whether not the iaea will be allowed to pursue their legitimate investigations with a country like iran under safeguard has a responsibly to provide the iaea access to the places, people and things, documents, that they deem necessary to complete an investigation. what we've been working to do is not figure out what went on at parchin because with a fairly good sense of what went on, even things we haven't necessarily this blows -- disclose publicly, but to make sure the principle that iaea kids what it says it needs is what we are working to support. so that in five years iran can't say that there is a facility that the iaea as interest income because it has a legitimate

i would like to iaea to find out.ut if we believe that they were doing nuclear weapons research in parchin under this do we get in in 24 days to the iaea could get in into authorities the anything we the pretensions of clerk up on civil dimensions of the past only apply to the previous investigation anything moving forward what opera does the rule laid out by the jcpoa. >> this judgment over there on the far right have raised his hand early on. >> steve, manchester could congratulations to the sponsor to i think he set a record for attendance august 12 at an event and congratulations on the format which i wish i going else would follow women are the subject of my question is off because it will make it quick. we did the u.s.-israeli free trade agreement, supposed to be view as the egyptian-israeli free trade agreement which will it was not put on the table idea. the u.s. has five things but agreements in the middle east with oman, bahrain, israel, jordan and morocco and so one. were thinking it was one to send a signa

i really would like the iaea to go there to find out. but if which believed that they were doing nuclear weapons research at parchin under this deal, we could get in in 20 four days, the iaea could get in 24 days. that is absolute. anything we agreed to in terms of clearing up possible dimensions of the past only apply to that previous investigation. anything moving forward would operate under the rules laid out by the jcpoa. >> there is a gentleman over there far right that raised his hand early on. >> steve land did i, manchester trade. congratulations to the sponsors. i think you set a record for attendance on august 12th of an event. congratulations format which everyone else would follow because which know the subject. my question is fairly offbeat. i make it quick. i spent my life in free-trade agreements. the. on the table idea. the u.s. has five what we call in spot agreements now in the middle east with oman, bahrain, israel, jordan and morocco. we're thinking if you want to sinned signal to minor countries why don't you conside

you're taking word of iaea.f we're not trusting allies and organization we fund, iaea we have larger problems than one deal. >> we also fund the u.n. and i don't trust them. >> i'm sorry, harris i don't trust iaea. united nations. i think we should cut off funding to them. i think we should kick them out of new york city. what are the other side deals? if this is one of them we learned about, what are the others? you talk about all the time. susan rice says there were number of these deals done on the side nobody seems to have access to. >> what julie is talking about, a sticking point here, that is a huge deal to have in draft and take out for final version. why in the world would iran, ayatollah agree? this is so juicy, do you agree to a deal that doesn't have it in it? we can inspect our own sites? >> they're laughing and celebrating. the president used these words, unprecedented verification this deal offered. we learned it is built on trust of iranians. why then do we continue on daily basis to learn there

states and the iaea.ow you will say this is a different situation and i

the iaea was right, the united states was wrong. and there was a significant generation-altering consequence of that. i completely get the notion that we want to dig into what the iaea is going to do on this. i don't want to leave this room with the impression that they haven't demonstrated their chops. they haven't been perfect either. there were weaknesses in the north korean negotiation, especially with respect to north korea covert programs but the iaea and the international community went back to add the additional protocol to fix challenges. so let's not leave the impression that the iaea doesn't know what they're doing because in one of the most critical decision that we have made as a nation in our foreign policy history, we trashed their conclusions, they were right, we were wrong in a war that should never have been started, that's an editorial opinion, was the result. >> would the senator yield? >> yes. >> i don't want you to think and i don't know if you're referring to my -- >> no, actually not you. >> because i agree e

with the iaea. i think that point stands. the other question i would like that ask secretary kerry relates to what the secretary of defense said in his testimony about the "i" in "icbm." he said that stands for intercontinental, which means flying from iran to the united states. simply countries develop icbms to deliver a nuclear warhead and these will be aimed at us not moscow. and at the same time these missile restrictions are coming on, sanctions on the iranian scientists involved in their bomb work are also coming off. so how is that making us safer? it seems the winner is rush which shah which -- russia which demanded the lifting on iran's behalf the lifting of these icbm sanctions. why did we concede on that? >> we didn't concede on that mr. chairman in fact, we won a victory because the -- we have seven nations negotiating, three of the seven thought the sanctions ought to be lifted immediately -- iran, russia, and china. four of them -- germany, france, britain, the united states -- thought

the iaea will have eyes on production for 20 years. for 25 years, the iaea will have eyes on uranium from the time it comes out of the ground until it is milled, from its mining until it's milling, conversion set into gas so that they will not be able to divert one ounce of uranium, one portion of uranium. we will always know where goes. i wrong, in essence -- iran, in essence, would have to create an entire new supply chain covertly to get a nuclear weapon. in addition to all of these new measures which have to be put in place, iran has to take all of the steps the iaea requires on pmd. that is supposed to happen around october 15, adoption day as opposed to implementation day, so even sooner. all of these things have to take place and all of these are detailed in annex five of the agreement, before theirre is any sanctions relief whatsoever. all sanctions relief is a lifting, not a termination. termination comes 20 years later or when the iaea reaches broader conclusions, meaning they have no undeclared fifth ladies and they can cert

leave that for you folks decide if you trust and verify the iaea. lou: kevin, thanks so much, great reporting. >> you bet. >> thanks. antiabortion group today releasing a seventh and perhaps most vile video of disturbing practices at planned parenthood. what i'm about to describe to you is horrific. it is graphic. and i want to prepare you, so please turn away, turn down the sound if you must, and the video we're about to show you, you will hear even more graphic language about what happened. this most recent video featuring an interview with a former medical technician from a company called stem express, who worked with planned parenthood in harvesting body parts. in this video, she describes how she witnessed her colleague perform a late-term abortion of a live male feet us -- fetus. they discussed the removal of the fetus's brain during that discussion. it is these videos are the most extraordinary yet. >>> our next guest may have to vote on a measure to defund planned parenthood. it's a bill sponsored by congresswoman diane black, it would block

all they have to do, the iaea has to write a report. but if they d-minus it or a-plus it, they tell us everything, sanctions relief still occurs. so i would just ask miss sherman, after this painstaking effort we went through to make sure we didn't ask you to give us documents you couldn't give us, you knew what the iaea protocols were. why now will you not give us the documents that exist that are so important to all of us relative to the integrity of this? why not? >> thank you very much. and thank you, mr. chairman, for all of your hard work along with first senator menendez, then senator cardin on this deal and all your attention to it. let me answer your question, but then i want to come back to one other point you made. you're about to have the director general come and meet informally with the senate foreign relations committee. he made this decision on his own because the iaea is an independent agency. you made a bipartisan invitation to him, and he agreed to come. and i found out about it about the same time you found out about

first, will the iaea have access? the second question is, am i right -- because i don't see any other way to read the agreement that satisfaction of pmd will not be a pre-rick sit to iran getting sanctions. >> it is. it is a prerequisite. if they haven't conemployed with the iea and lived up to the dates laid out in the program, august and october they will not get relief. >> mr. secretary i acknowledge that. but by october 15th they have to have activities that they need to set out what they're going to do but it's december 15th by which the director general and the board of governors will assess whether or not they've complied. and that is not a condition under the deal. >> actually, it is. they will be in material breach if they't do that. more over -- >> i would point out it's specifically omitted in the list of pacht and present concerns. it's not a requirement. >> well, the outcome. if you're talking about the october, it's not dpent dependent on the outcome because we have no way of knowing which way -- >> but

i want to say a few words about the iaea. they are pretty good. they're probably undermanned for this job at this time, but they have a record -- and they are going to be, by virtue of iran at some point in the next three months, accepting what is called the additional protocol to the nonproliferation treaty, they will have authority to be much more intrusive in what they do in iran that they have been now, which is something that israelis have noted to me that has an advantage. there will be more intrusive monitoring. if you look at, even the issue -- here is where the problem will come on that side. the first time we detect some sort of suspicious activity somewhere, and iran does not want us to look their -- there there is an elaborate procedure that can stretch out over 24 days of negotiation about whether we can look, and everyone is assuming that during that period of time they would sanitize that site. i want to say the iaea has pretty good records of that sort of thing. there are instances in both iran and syria where they have gone in aft

iaea secretary-general is firing back.n a statement he said he was disturbinged by the ap story and went on to say it misrepresented way we will undertake this important verification work. he doesn't elaborate what indeed that work will entail. that stayed though, the obama administration that iran will be involved with the inspection of this particular site. melissa? melissa: he didn't go ahead and deny it in that denial. very interesting. john huddy, thank you very much. david: non-denial denial. we've heard those -- before. concerning news as forecasters up grade danny to hurricane. the storm had maximum stained winds of 75 miles an hour, making it a category 1 hurricane, just enough to clear the bar. this is the first hurricane of the season. way out in the atlantic ocean pretty much right on time. average day of first formation is typically august 16th. >>> biden jumps, hillary slides. latest polls what they may say or may not say about the 2016 race. jon podhoretz is here to talk about that. plus the swag primary. th

this is between iran and the iaea.he west believes that site was used for covert nuclear military activity. now there is word of downplay of the concerns. >> the most robust set of inspections. that has ever been peacefully negotiated with another nation. i won't talk about the details of the leaked documents or draft documents from the iaea. we are comfortable. secretary kerry is comfortable that the iaea will have access and information it needs to make proper accounting of the program. >> u.s. officials voicing concern that russia is moving ahead to sell iran a sophisticated missile system. this could damage the ability to challenge tehran's air space. >>> asian shares are lower. shanghai down 3.4%. major worries of china's economy. european and u.s. stock futures are lower. the dow lost 162 yesterday because of a selloff in oil stocks and an indication that the interest rate hike could be weeks away. >>> more women starting their businesses. according to a study, more than 10 million women-owned businesses in 2012.

is confident the iaea can completely monitor any iranian nuclear program. >> the iaea is comfortable with arrangements that are unique to the agency's investigation for historical activities. when it comes to monitoring iran's behavior going forward, the iaea has developed the most robust inspection regime never peacefully negotiated to ensure iran's current program. lauren: house majority leader kevin mccarthy saying they should concern every member of congress who supports or is thinking of supporting the deal with iran. sandra: that's the path of global markets. asian markets closed lower with the shanghai composite down 3%. the hong kong hang seng and bear market territory down within 20%% from its april high. taking a look here in europe how europe is steering this morning with retail sales data down about half of a percent. proving slightly on the ftse though the cac nta debt down one percentage. you will see selling again with the u.s. stock index futures pointing to a lower open for half of 1%. we've got to check on commodities. oil at 439. hovering around the 6% as. that is

the iaea has to give 24 hours notice of its intent to inspect. then iran has 14 days to let the inspectors in. of course, they can stall for ten more days in the agreement itself. that's 25 days minimum to hide whatever they're working on. that's a lot of time to be able to move computer equipment and all sorts of installed things. at the end of it, the iaea would say we could actually determine if there was ever uranium there even after 25 days, but basically nothing else. we have incredible people that work in the intelligence community, that work for us, that most americans will never see and will never meet, but there are some amazing patriotic americans. but they can't see everything, and they can't catch every needle in the haystack that is in iran. it would help the intelligence community, it would help us in our inspections if we had access to the previous military dimensions for the nuclear weapons program that iran has had on board but the agreement itself only says we have to get all things from right now forward that we don't have to

the iaea done has to provide evidence and then the iranians have another chance to negotiate.hat period can go on indefinitely. eventually, it stops. the ieee will get fed up and say, no more negotiation and we want access, we want to go in. that begins another 24 day what isthat involves called the resolution committee. +1 and they eu look at the evidence both sides present and then they say yes, or know if the iaea deserves axis. at the end of that 24 days, the iranians, if the committee says so, would be obligated to let in the iaea at some point in the future. the administration says immediately, there are arguments that they could take months and months and months. 24 days,e at least perhaps indefinite, process to get into the undeclared nuclear facilities where cheating is less likely to happen. that is for facilities where they are doing work on actual nuclear material. there is another class of facilities that have to do with where they would do work that is relevant to building nuclear weapons that does not have anything to do with radioactive isotopes. that third cat