>> china is too vague, and -- ibg, and it has a huge population compared to any other country, and governing hough and 1.3 billion people -- governing 1.3 billion people is a huge task, so some of the problems have to do with the difference in numbers. some house to do with the difference in history. american history is relatively brief. chinese history is a uninterrupted for 4000 years, so the perspective is different, too. >> i wonder whether or not our relationship we have with china now is on the right track, moving in the right direction or the wrong direction? >> the government at both sides have said they want a partnership and even a strategic partnership, but in practice, all whole series of issues keep coming up, like the south china sea issue, the korean issue, some economic issues that indicate the solution of some problems have not caught up with what leaders have put forward. >> china has many issues. you cover many of them in his books. i just got back from china, and there are number of things i would like to ask. it appears to me the issue of poverty and wealth and equality

arrangements like this gave rise to the acronym ibg-ybg meaning i be gone, you be gone. homeowners, too, responded to the rising home prices, flexible terms and tax advantages of mortgage debt to raise their home equity. cashing out to the tune of more than half a trillion dollars per year that the peak of the boom. meanwhile financial institutions frequently thought to maximize the balance sheet leverage. the sometimes moved to the shadow of balance sheet structures for regulation and capital requirements were less stringent. that strategy worked brilliantly until the eventual collapse of the confidence and market liquidity and back on to the balance sheet where there was not enough capital on hand to support them. leading financial companies proved that at creating new loan structures and funding strategies in the years leading up to the crisis. but all too often these innovations left participants with badly misaligned economic incentives. the compensation of loan officers, portfolio managers and bank ceos typically based on the current year loan volume earnings and s

arrangements like this gave rise to the acronym ibg ibg, meaning i'll be gone, you'll be gone, a watchwordustry during the boom. homeowners responded to rising home prices, flexible terms and tax advantages, cashing out to the tune at the peak of the boom. meanwhile, financial institutions for going back to maximize their leverage. they sometimes move asset to shabbily off-balance structures for regulation and capital requirements for less stringent. that strategy worked brilliantly until the eventual collapse of investor confidence and market liquidity force these assets back on the balance sheet where there is not enough capital on hand to support them. leading financial companies proved in that that new loan structures and funding strategies in the years leading up to the crisis, but all too often these innovation left participants are badly misaligned economic incentives. the compensation of officers, are probably of managers and ceos is typically based with little regard for the risk were building not the system. most damaging of all, some of the largest and most complex financial com