the city could work to insure that health care providers have information to health care information. research shows which is promising that if physician has access to that information they'll work in the best interest of their patient. one study showed when they had accessed the information of case such as diagnostic test, that they were ordering for patients. she ordered fewer of them. physicians are the gate keeper of our health care spending and this is promising for the impact on quality as well as on cost. and i think that greater quality and price transparency for providers them self could have an impact on physician referral pattern and how they deliver care. as we look at new methods of payment, physicians will have greater and greater incentives to make smarter choices but transparency has to be a building block. as executive representing many health care providers across the country, they and consumers buy transparency and i commend the city working together to advance the efforts. >> can i ask you a few followup questions. you talk about price information. as you think abo

had had their information looked at by the nsa. further more, this legislation would allow telephone and internet companies to tell consumers basic information regarding the fisa court orders they receive is the number of users whose information is turned over. the principles outlined in this bill to increase transparency for americans and private companies would clear up a tremendous amount of confusion that exists with these programs. that is why transparency reform is included in multiple nsa reform proposals including the intelligence oversight and reform act introduced by senator widen, the usa freedom act by chairman leahy and myself, and the improvement act introduced by senator feinstein. mr. chairman, while positions on the collection program may differ, many of us agree on the need for more transparency. that is why i urge support for the franken-heller legislation before this subcommittee today. we're talking about millions of calls collected and stored by the nsa. americans should have access to some basic information r

holes in the information that consumers need. employers have to rely on the health plan even if they feel another vendor might be better suitable. cps have been supporting its members to be a critical mass pushing providers to remove these barriers. we supply our members with with questions that they can ask health plan partners and model terms with their contract with the health plan. we facilitate meetings for them to discuss transparency. cpr outlined and set specification and how we think prices should be. one of the tools you can find offered by health plans or independent vendors is they don't do a great job of helping consumers. there might be quality information and price information, but it would take complicated out rhyme to see what the best choice is. the various stakeholders in the industry that are prevy could work together. it's unlikely that it will lead to transparency. they may be a need for government to step in. the city and county of san francisco could facilitate price transparency in a variety of ways. the

you talk about price information. as you think about the data set that would be ideal, what does that include asided from prices? is there an agreement across the fields that there's line up, what do you think about that? >> that's a great question. we have more to learn about how consumers understand information and use it, so i'll say that we need to continue to research that and experiment. but at the end of the day, i think it's essential that compare price information with quality information. we have research showing us that people assume more expensive care is better care, but the data don't bare that out. there's no correlation between prices and the quality of care and so if we provide any information, it must be paired with quality. >> okay. and were you familiar with or did you work with senator lino on his transparency? >> no. >> we'll talk to other speakers. supervise mar has a question. >> i'm sorry i want here. supervisor avalos were at the air quality management district as we passed a climate action p

so in order for consumers to be informed rationale consumers, they need information. this is going to be -- this is a big switch. basically we need to switch our health care delivery system to a retail system. it has been largely a wholesale system where blue cross buys and does most of the paying. now we're asking the individual consumer to get much more involved at a very micro level and the system has not been set up to provide this information. >> can i ask you aside from and i think kaiser is different, but in models like this, are you seeing this trend, the red shading across all plans? >> good question. i actually printed out 20 of these and gave it to my class and analyzed them. all of them had a cost like this. it's the individual market and not the employed market but if you had to guess, i'm going to guess that this model is going to creep into the employer market and so we're going to see within a couple of years a lot of red lines on coverage for employees provided by their employer. there's a reason for this. this lowers premium. all these red things low

the nsa is collecting information on industry as well, private information. i think there is a healthy level of mistrust between industry and the government, and the idea information sharing could somehow take place in a siloed universe where nothing wrong would ever be done with that information. exposing the companies to liability or exposing them in some way would occur. i think this ignores the considerable concern that certainly yahoo, google and others are expressing right now about information sharing with the government. >> the one thing i'd add to that is i don't think we have a problem in offensive operations. we carried out offensive operations. what is wrong with these snowden people? why haven't they published it yet? we have carried out offensive operations. some you may have heard of. i was talking to one of the people responsible for these. i said what's the legal thing you do under it? we try to do it under title x, if it's a problem we do it under title l. we don't have a problem carrying out offensive operations. that said, there is no such

that's something that our adversaries could glean information from that. that's the type of thing i'm talking about that's different than in the wiretap context where everyone knows a basic wiretap is something you can do. i'd also like to address the latest question. the reason it's different than other collection methods is that's just collecting business records. it's not an interception capability. you're not intercepting communications in realtime. you're just collecting business records that the companies have and so that's a distinction that we don't have the same concerns about revealing the numbers that we would with intercept capabili capabilities. >> thank you. i thank you the ranking member for his indulgence. i have gone way over my time. >> thank you. it's been useful questions. but if you could kind of drill down a bit in terms of increased man power and what it would take to actually make some determination of the percentage of individual who is are surveilled. what would that look like without revealing more than you need to reveal here? w

is a wealthreport of information. nobody is arguing that criminals in manhattan are reading the wiretap report. they're less likely to get their phones tapped. my bill would not even require anything near this level of reporting. any time a number of americans the reporthan 500, would say fewer than 500. why wouldn't this raise national security concerns if the far more detailed reporting wiretapents in doj's does not raise public safety concerns? >> that is a good question. the regular wiretaps don't involve classified techniques. there are platforms we use an intelligent context. it is unknown to anyone outside executive branch as to whether we can collect on a particular medications technology. >> the disclosure would not be talking about technology other than it is on the internet or phone. demo we think our adversaries can surmise -- we know that there is a company that has a particular number of surveillance requests. that number is published. new introduced a capability, a new service they provided. all of a su

of the information. and we are entrusted by the american people with protecting it. it is part of our training. everything we do in terms of having access to information, that we understand the laws and the policies and regulations that apply to protecting the information to an sure that we do so in a way that is consistent with the civil liberties and privacy of all americans. >> what further could you say to the american people who have these concerns about the right to privacy in their concern it is being violated or could be violated? what more could you say to this is athem that concern that the administration and those with whom you work are mindful of? >> i think what i would say is, then, the training and oversight that we are subject to is unlike anything i have seen anywhere in the world. and it surpasses that which we experienced 10 years ago or even five years ago. so, the degree of oversight that we are subject to by congress, by the judicial branch, i other elements of the executive branch,

need more information? go to studentcam.org. thursday the son of homeland security committee held a hearing examining the shooting at the washington d.c. navy yard that killed 12 people trade witnesses include defense department and office of personnel management officials. this is two hours and 50 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> good morning. the committee will come to order. welcome one and all. on monday september 16 a horrible tragedy unfolded in the navy yard in washington d.c.. a very troubled individual took 12 lives in a senseless act of violence. the circumstances that led to this tragedy are multidimensional. the issues raised by this tragedy such as the adequacy of our gun laws and the quality of mental health care are outside the purview of this committee. but as we have learned more about aaron alexis a number of my colleagues and i have been asking each other why such a troubled unstable individual possessed a security clearance from the united states government. why was he originally granted a security paren

other streams of information, then turned over to brokers of information, people who sell it, and you would have control over how this information was used. it's all the difference in the world. be opt in, opt out. and markey, as i say, and others went to clinton and said, look, whatever we think of this bill -- which is a horrible bill bill -- be you're going to sign it -- if you're going to sign it which you seem determined to do, why don't you at least have this opt-in protection over the records that are being merged. and clinton refused to do that. he promised at fist, and then he -- at first, and then he betrayed that. now, that remains a very -- again, you're the person that i want to address this to -- what do you think about that? is it too late for an opt-in requirement? is this the battle we should be having? >> i think we need to be having several battles on a number of different fronts. i love the idea of opting in. i also -- >> does everybody understand what we mean? okay. >> with i also don't think that it's ever too late. i have a favorite passage i want to read briefl

-- private information. susannah will give you the information if you let her. >> ok. >> i'm sorry. i'm not following the question. >> i was trying to get the staff to speak you. the bottom line is that there are security risks today, according to you and the ranking member. this website still has boehner abilities. is -- vulnerabilities. is that correct? >> i'm talking about a deliberately that distorted reality on two modules that were inactive. it used misinformation to suggest -- >> the security problems in your letter to refer to the website. >> my questioning to mr. chao had to do with -- >> i understand you rehabilitating mr. chao. >> i'm trying to get the facts on the record to correct a deliberate smear against mr. chao, not to rehabilitate him. in the name of this committee. >> i appreciate your concern. >> i'm glad you do. and you wrote a report did not want it released because it shows a roadmap to the vulnerabilities of the site, as it is today. >> mr. chairman, i began our our jointcknowledging

and hope they kept that information for long enough to be relevant to provide the information you need. whether it's three months, six months, a year. the other way we tried to this use 215 program. collect the data. and limit the circumstances under which we can use it. but then have a data base that can be searched under strict control to see what number has called or been called from. in a they determined at that moment when time is of the essence are there other bombs, perpetrators, associates as part of a broader investigation. i think it's useful to think about how the 215 program can be useful. to acheefl -- achieve the speed and aguilty. >> quick question. was it ended if -- not helpful. what would you like to sew -- see with regard to that? >> i have to look and see what the documents said. haven't had a change to see the documents. the meta data program. the internet meta data program publicly stated ended because nsa determined the operational benefit were not -- >> as for the internet is that the e-mail. >> that's the e -- >> under -- that is -- [inaudible] yeah. yeah. >> s

which is the nsa collecting information on industry as well. private information. i think there is a healthy level of mistrust between industry and the government and the idea that information sharing could somehow take place in a siloed universe where nothing wrong would be done without exposing them to liability or hurting them in some way occurs. i think it ignores the considerable concern that was certainly yahoo!, googling with and others are expressing right now information sharing with the government. i was talking to one of the people responsible for these. and i said, what is the legal thing you do? and he said we try to do it under title 10. if a problem we go it under title 50. we don't have a problem carrying out offensive operations nap said, there's no such thing as cyber deterrence. there are issues that congress needs to work on, most of them are domestic, but in term of our military capabilities, fortunately -- i'm not cynical about congress. i'm cynical about this congress. [laughter] in term of our military capabilities, the military is not waiti

they held it was in the public interest to disclose the information they found anyway. so i think that you're exactly right. when we think about consumers in the market and the impact that this is having on them, the public policy is going to sway in the other direction. as we start to see more aco's develops and more bundle care and providers have a larger burden of determining -- we only have a certain amount of a patient and we have to make referrals to different providers. it's going to be important to how much it costs so they can keep their own cost down when they're thinking about making referrals. it's not going to be just patient that needs this information, but it's vital for the provider to make that decision going forward. there's a number of different ways of addressing these barriers and it's true legislation. one of the first thing that has been tried to address the contract terms and either prohibit gag clauses or previsions in these contracts. california has done this through sp 57 recently. 751 prohibits gag clauses once an individual is in a plan. sb

it seems that is being used but that s a mountain to collect information to share information. us officials i'm new and i think that we don't know the issues you know how these organizations are operating on bill thomas of our information is being shared across borders engine databases and the comedians are. they just concerned and want answers. stir and laugh with and i wanted to go back to something. glenn greenwald talked about in a cbc interview. in response to claim that these revelations would expose state secrets at it and those involved in terrorism and airport would do more harm to national security then and i'd take a look into this. here is a long they don't know that the us and uk governments do everything possible to monitor communications class some of them are huge human couriers. we can tell that era's leading the dinar to know people people that the snorting or ordinary citizens around the world that the spying system is directed not at the terrace at that. the remake of an argument that the leak this information could actually a tear as they do you agree with

they share information sometimes with us. >> they do, mr.airman. >> the accusation that the national security agency was collecting information on these citizens of the perspective nationstates -- i want to get on the record again -- is false. that did not happen. >> those screenshots that lead people to believe the nsa or the united states collected that information is false. it is false that it was collected on european citizens. it was neither. it certainly has created an international row. very poor and in accurate reporting. something that we are going to have to deal with here in the future. i'm glad you clarified that. , given theapper recent row about leaders that may or may not have been it and numbers that may have been collected by the national intelligence services, would that information find its way to the national security council in the white house? >> it certainly could if you are speaking -- i would rather not speak specifically, but speaking in totality, leadership intentions are an important the landscape out there for al

what is that classified information? if you overclassify, then you overclassify positions, then it starts the snowball effect of having five million people -- -- five millinon people who have classified clearance. >> just quick note. i did a little bit of math. i hope i did this right. if there are 8,400 people out of the 4.9 million people that have clearances, that's about .16% of people that owe government money. hopefully they are on a repayment schedule. we don't know. hopefully they are. 40% of those are on repayment schedules. that means about .1% owe government money, they are not on repayment schedule. that's not good. compared to what? compared to the 99.9% that have a clearance who don't owe the federal government anything on taxes, so -- >> would you yield for a minute? >> sure. >> it raises the question, it's not about a percentage. if you're not following the law in terms of paying your faxes, why should you have a security clearance at all? whether you got a payment plan or not? you have not complied that

the government already has controls in place on classified information. the bill would give senior officials authority to define what are known as special secrets that would include information related to information, diplomacy, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. public servants found leaking or deliberately obtaining such information could be jailed up to ten years. they hope to pass the bill before the upper house before this session of the diet wraps up next month. >>> critics argue the bill will allow government officials to keep far more information from the public and they fear the provisions do not include enough oversight. nhk world tomoko kamata has more information. >> this bill is closely related to another bill the upper house is debating right now. prime minister shin doe abe is trying to coordinate foreign affairs and defense policies and this is called a japanese version of the u.s. national security council, but the americans have been reluctant to share sensitive information with their japanese allies, so members of the ruling coa

what other information. oh, the 76 survey files upstairs. >> we have the original files and we also, i guess there are two secret things i can share. lawrence held up the binder for the unreenforced masonry building. if your buildings on there and you think it's quite snappy, we have the negatives. we also have the negatives from the 1976 survey and if you make an appointment with me and my number is up there, i can make arrangements to have enlargements of these made for you. then, the 76 survey itself was a windshield survey that the planning department worked on with some graduate students that looked at what they felt in their served jury pool to be the representative top ten percent of the top stylist architecture so they gave us photograph and some information of the outside of the building from 1976 often thousand buildings in every part of the city. >> how do you know if yours is on that list. >> the planning department has a list of all the surveys any given property may not have background informat

information. we've had cases where one or the other of us has been contacted about dealing with something when the other of us was with already running a parallel investigation to that kind of activity which provided absolutely critical information to resolving that particular case. the other thing to keep in mind for the american people is these investigations are really hard because of the difficulty in getting asterisks about who finish attribution about who's actually doing it. but with dedicated investigators, we have brought town a number of these bad actors. >> can i just add a word, senator? i've worked a lot of different kinds of investigations in my career, career, and when you're doing a la cosa nostra investigation, you can deconflict by calling up each other or setting up a meeting for next wednesday. when the threat is moving as a foe on the does on the internet, there's no time to make that phone call. so the genius of this is the fbi and dhs person are sitting next to each other, t

and the same information. i would point out that when one brings a lawsuit, seeking damages from another entity that they make a party to that lawsuit, they are not entitled to anonymity in doing so. the purpose of the complaint, the initial pleading filed in the lawsuit is to disclose who it is that's seeking the damages and what damages they are seeking. all we're asking for in this legislation is that trusts that have been entrusted with funds that are to be made available for the exclusive purpose of elping the victims of asbestos problems have the opportunity to have information that they would have if it were a normal plaintiff filing a lawsuit. that is what we seek to have disclosed. i urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment and to support the underlying bill and reserve the balance of my time. the chair: the gentleman reserves. the gentlelady from texas. ms. jackson lee: how much time? the chair: the gentlelady from texas controls 1 1/2 minutes. ms. jackson lee: and the gentleman from virginia? the

>> it was our chief information officer and chief information security officer. >> two other questions. is there a way to track what personal information any employees can see we're working on this? we have a lot of contractors involved in this and all of the contractors who they even are. is there a way to track? there's personally identifiable information and is there something in place that tracks what people can see as far as personally identifiable information. >> if you call the center -- >> i'm talking about people working on the back end. >> the gentleman's time is expired. you can finish the question. >> in certain cases yes, like if you're in a testing environment. a very few people touch a production environment. they wouldn't even have access to that live data. sometimes when we use testing data, you want to see the results so you do have developers having access to that information. it's not live people's data. >> i thank the gentleman from oklahoma. for the record, mr. chao, i want to point out, those items that you identified as particular inherent risks were identified

leads information for its counterintelligence information is a threat information of the personalityinvolved with time to get that information proved pretty difficult. technically aggregating that within one central repository, that is kind of where it is if that answers your question. >> so, i would like to ask a question. there are studies out there to kind of bring forth these indicators. for example there are a lot of psychological studies that can be cited to profile or put that indicator in this aspect rather than another one. can you shed light on that. >> yeah. there is certainly a lot of research out there. it's kind of oxymoronic but there's more research on the psychology side of things than there is on a lot of the cyberintellectual but we have more capabilities on the cybercontextual than the psychosocial. the research i'm aware of within the psychological community is there a lot of risk factors have been identified that solely focus on the bad population. these are the psychological elements of spies but again they have and compare that to try and understand what is di

>> we can get you that information. we don't have it with us. >> how -- in your database, how would you know that information? >> well, if, for example, someone fails to report, do you mean on their form, they are deceptive? >> either lying on their application or failure to report after a serious event that occurs after the clearance? >> we will have to get you that information. the latter is certainly grounds for revoking a security clearance and the failing to report or being dishonest when you feel out your form is something the adjudicator would decide to grant a clearance in the first instance. >> with all due respect, if you're not checking local police records, you have no guarantee that when somebody checks the box and says they've never been arrested that they're telling the truth. >> with respect to that, there's never a guarantee, but we don't just take their word for whether they've been arrested. we do an f.b.i. check. and the f.b.i. database receives reports -- probably more familiar with that than i am,

what information do we look at? when do we review people in the suitability and security clearance process? how can we improve on all these aspects? the review i talked will be done collaboratively. the reviews, the department of defense reviews and the overarch regular view which all our agencies are involved in. we will act on any improvements as quickly as possible. where there are gaps, we will close them. where there were failures we'll correct them. if i was one of the families of the victims, i wouldn't just want to hear about prophecies and proceed yiffers, i would have some concerns that there's a blue ribbon type creation as opposed to actual improvements to prevent this happening again. i would just say to them, i live near the navy yard. on the morning of september 16, my wife and my 2-year-old son were playing in a park across the street when they were cleared by police as the trang diwas unfolding in the navy yard. we lost a husband of a senior member of our acquisition community. i would tell them tha

you know he's in hiding but why would they want to access to every what is information because that was the only way they could get access to the accounts that were under investigation was by demanding the s.s.l. keys. unwrapping mean crippin that was protecting all of the connections coming into the system and inferi isolating out the ones of interest but what was interesting about this whole process was that they were completely unwilling to provide any transparency back to me they were completely unwilling to prove that they were only going to be collecting information on a handful of accounts so all i'm left to do is assume that what they really wanted to do was collect information on everyone's accounts but what exactly did they tell you. they told me that they would be collecting mated data content passwords and then the other information of interest to their investigation so because i was going to ask it wasn't it easier to just give access to one account instead of shutting down the whole thing but now i'm realizing they wanted the whole thing right. that's precisely the pro

we need data information. in order to be able to keep up with and oversee and ensure compliance with the law base, some of the most powerful financial institutions in the world. we need data to be able to proceed in the area of public policy. as for knowing what any individual is doing, in terms of buying something at k-mart or going on line, i don't care in the least about that. what we're trying to do is identify the patterns of how institutions treat their consumers. >> again, as i said, i understand and appreciate and trust your motives. we've had experiences recently and other agencies where fe father or motheral abuses of this kind of information were undertaken. as i see it, all is necessary. for this phenomenal amount of data to be made available is for someone to unlock the key that the third party contractor has put in place. that's the only barrier that i see. the data that we need and is now collected with enforcement power i see is different. i still agree that at least there are concerns with thi

i don't have much more information than that. i don't want to give out information that may not be consistent later on. and so i i appreciate your cooperation and just getting this little bit of information out now. >> next we're going to hear from gina marie lindsay and let folks now in terms of what's happening at the airport with flights and traveling public and traffic around the airport -- >> hold on, one second please. we'll take questions after, sir. >> i want to let everyone know, technically, lax is still accepting incoming flights. but we're doing that at less than our half of our normal arrival rate. we're only accepting those flights on the south air field, not accepting any flights on the north air field. passengers were ready when this incident happened have left on the aircraft or holding in the terminals. all of the amenities are available in the terminals. we have aircraft that are also situated on the west remote pads. they have not been unloaded yet. there is one or two diversions we are making to ontario airpo

if we have the time, we will go search for information.here's a certain way that we talk to people to find out, do you have anything to offer us? >> the bottom line is, we don't lie to them. we don't tell them we can do something for them when we can't. i think that's the most important key for us. >> but finding and grooming good informants isn't easy. not when the average candidate is either a drug addict or career criminal. and female inmates are the hardest to recruit for different reasons. >> women have a different set of circumstances than men. yes, murder is murder, possession is possession. but when you deal with people that take care of children, you know, when you deal with a mother, a grandmother, it's a little bit different. they are less likely to talk than the men. because i think women have more to lose. they have children and that's always a deciding factor for a woman to divulge any information. you know, their families are still out in the world. they are not as ready to give up that sort of information. >> rather than ri

is the information, how necessary to get the information and a large quantity. that's a critical factor here that the information is not protected by the fourth amendment picked it's just phone numbers. it's not content. and so that's a key consideration that would not make this program available for other context particularly with respect to content information to i don't know that answers your question but i do think technological changes do make a difference. >> yes, it does. i'm trying to get at what some seems an open-ended notion of having the technologies rising the extent of the collection authority as opposed to the old fashioned method of will this lead to some evidence. that leads into -- i think have time for one more question and that is, as i read it the governments legal justification as laid out in its papers and some of the material that's been disclosed for the current 215 program, has to and does rely heavily on a smith marilyn notion that the telephone metadata in that case did not constitute a fourth amendment are legally the -- privacy inte

it is not a case about classified information. the individuals and that litigation were an accounting technician and a grocery store clerk respectively. both plosser eligibility because of a modest amount of delinquent debt due to circumstances beyond their control. they were penalized because of their credit scores and worse they had to face the loss of their jobs. this is deeply troubling to afge and it should be a real concern to this committee. hardshipthat financial is unsupportive and offensive. that the practice of penalizing employees based on their credit scores has added ons apportionment impact employees over 40, female employees, and employees of color. conyers is an ill-founded extension of an earlier case. the department of the navy --sus aegon held that the the merits of the security clearance cannot be reviewed and that course of adjudicating an adverse action. in the absence of a security clearance. -- theeral service the taxruling rejected structure and the history of the civil service reform act along with the p

those might be options to promote disclosure and get that information out there. that's another option. the third option with respected trade secrets is to test them in litigation. so there's a couple of ways to do this. you can disclose information that someone had claimed trade secret over and wait to see if they file a claim against you, but more lawful way of doing that is to make a request to get that information to a california public records request and if the request was denied then test the clause and appeal. there's other ways to do that. so we've addressed with the legal barriers are to to gaining price trans transparency and some of the possible solutions to that, in a final note, i want to reiterate that was said by the people before me which is that above market prices arise not from just a lack of price transparency, but from the market leverage that drives cost up and keeps these prices secret. that's where this is coming from is the exercising of the prices. if you don't fix it, you may not get the results you're hoping for which is lower cost. a

>> much more so because so much of the personal information, including health information, was involved in that process. >> during the course of the question, with a job of evoking the issue of whether the there was a security problem here, there is no evidence that there has been. that is -- there's no evidence here that would make us doubt that. that should encourage americans to participate more actively. and since one other thing has come up, and it involves the question of 80%, and something i want to clarify because the press reports have been that the administration has set as a metric that 80% will be able to get on the site and smoothly sign up, enroll for health care at the end of the month. that's not to mean that the remaining 20% will not be able to access affordable them a quality health insurance, is it? >> no. i cannot speak to the exact percentages, but i think there is a recognition that some people, whether it be a healthcare.gov or any system -- if you walked into an ssa field office, how many people can get their business done in one visit as compared to the greater

you up as an informant. that is a fake neighs. that's what we use any time we describe you and how you get paid. >> every informant has an agreement, source information agreement. in that agreement, it lists all the things you can't do. you can't sell drugs, you can't pretend you're the police. they have to abide by it. >> i have to pay you. >> they need to stay viable. they need to run with the same crowd they ran with. see the same people. that's the only way we are going to get the information from them. >> this is my last time up in here. >> how many times you been locked up? >> three times. >> how many times you say you never coming back? >> i'm going home today. i ain't coming back. >> that's three times. >> i ain't coming back. >> there he times you got it covered. >> many of the best informants begin their careers while locked up at chicago's cook county jail. detainees here are ripe for recruitment, most are accused, not convicted of crimes, and are being held awaiting trial. those who flip and coop

burgundy hoodie. >> it's on the informant. you, they can. >> no, no, you've got to sell her today. you've got to sell my guy. >> you've got to be straight with us. >> you said she won't talk to you all. >> who's the up-and-coming guy?

but they will share information. i told you in 30 minutes you are going to be tough with insurance quex so, when you talk to people, what has changed? it's getting attention, so talk about your eyes glazing over. i talked to an investment firm in new york a little while ago and the ceos that i really don't want to know and i don't care. if i make my mark into the money i'm expecting i don't care if someone else makes money off of it, to mac. he got excited. but, you have the sea level attention and that will change things. information sharing is a good topic to think about some of the obstacles we have been developing a private response. and i'm not holding up the government as an example or anything at the moment. there is a real reluctance to share information among the companies and you can work. there was an fcc ruling last year promoted by senator rockefeller that basically said that people -- when something bad happens to people of course the response from the company was to find bad. it turns out nothing bad h

to collect information and share information with u.s. officials so you know i think that we don't the issue is we don't know how these organizations are operating we don't know how much of our information is being shared across borders and different databases and i think canadians are mostly just concerned and want answers on the shore and lastly steve i wanted to go back to something glenn greenwald talked about in his c.b.c. interview and response to the claim that these revelations would expose state secrets to those involved the terrorism and therefore it would do more harm to national security then than good take a lesson of the terrorist have long ago known that the u.s. and u.k. governments do everything possible to monitor their communications that's why it's all been modern used human couriers we didn't tell the terror as anything they didn't already know we polled people that they didn't already know or ordinary citizens around the world that this spying system is directed not at the terrorists but. so what do you make of the a

particularly in the information sharing bucket where we are trying to figure out what information can or should be shared. getting a base line of what the information is, what it is is very difficult in a technophobia world. >> i have trouble seeing you. do you have anything to add on the privacy issue and legal concerns that have been raised? >> where you started was i have something to contribute to this debate. i hope it is a point of this audience will appreciate. my title is associate general counsel, not director of strategy and policy so people in think tanks can debate the subjects, our role is trying to help with legal ways to move forward. in terms of privacy protection and information sharing the information sharing cornerstone of it has got to the trust and confidence in one another so privacy protection is absolutely critical and it has to be built into the whole project. i can talk about that a little more but underlying this whole conversation has got to be a level of trust and confidence and belief in one another and a lot of it comes back to privacy protection which w

gerri: you could get bad information, disturbing information about your own genes? you the genetic. next is to empower you a road map for your health, what you might be at risk for, and actions you should potentially make. >> emily, not all diseases are driven by dna, some stuff you can take steps to help yourself. >> sogen edicts -- genetics are one component, life style and other factors are important. genetics are important, 23 and me lets you look at your genetic information to use as a guide. >> i did this myself, i am excited to talk about the results, ann, the web site, there salehers, and layers of information you get, and also a community, really built around the web site. >> soy, it is really about 23 and me, we don't require you to go to a physician, you get it on-line, we created tools for you to understand your genetic information, if you have questions, you can ask your community, the community is really engaged. >> i'm finding cousins i never knew existed. >> that as well. gerri: talk about my results, i was blown away, and surprised. start with ances