the key in the counter insurgency is that to deny the support for the insurgents by the locals.et think we're moving toward a position in which that is more and more the case in afghanistan. there is increased pressure on the leadership of the insurgency. we saw more and more signs of in-fighting and it leads to a situation where you see, a couple of years ago, the insurgents moved from a conventional approach towards asymmetric tactics. there were quite effective in that. especially the use of ied's which has a huge impact. intimidating the afghan people will have a very negative impact for the insurgency by the evidence. Ñi-- by the afghans. if you're able to protect people from the insurgents, that is where you need these additional forces. you will be in a situation where you will relatively soon see the effects of a degrading capability of the insurgents in afghanistan. >> you talk about the need to merge the formal government and the informal government. how is that possible? >> if you cannot find any proof or evidence that the informal government structure is like with cr

we face a complex and resilience insurgency.he afghan taliban is a permanent threat to the government of afghanistan. they aspire to once again become the government of afghanistan. the insurgent groups have more limited geographic objectives but they are no less lethal. all three groups are supported to some degree by external groups outside of afghanistan. they coexist within narcotics networks, feeding off of insecurity in the region. the mission in afghanistan is undeniably difficult, and success will require a steadfast commitment and incur significant costs. i participated fully in the president's assessment and decision making process and was supported multiple opportunities to provide my recommendations and best military advice, which i did. combined with insight and policy considerations within our government, i believe the decisions reflect a realistic and effective approach. to pursue our core goal of producing al qaeda -- reducing al qaeda and present -- and preventing their return to afghanistan, we must deny their

in many ways that happens in many insurgencies.nistan, because the insurgency grew as a recovered after 2001 but slowly until 2005, that grew, that shadow governance, the presence among the people was not met by increases in afghan national security force strength levels or in coalition forces. so what i'm saying is we lagged behind that. we have a saying as we studied this that counterinsurgency is not a game where you play catch-up ball. i think we can get ahead of it this time. >> thank you. >> i thank the gentle lady. mr. kline. >> thank you for being here. general mcchrystal, i want to be perfectly clear and get this on the record. i believe you responded to the ranking member, mr. mckeon, one of my colleagues, when asked about the july 2011 date if that was a date that you had proposed or recommended. >> i did not recommend that date. but i did identify to my leadership that i felt that 18 -- in about 18 months, about december of 2011, that we felt we could make significant progress against this insurgency. >> i understand, e

point and the size of that insurgency.a number of 400,000 divided between the army and the police of 240,000 ultimately in the army and 160,000 in the police would not be really out of range for that part of the world for standing armies and police. but, i think we need to view that not as a hard number at this point but as a goal we work toward and adjust constantly. the president's decision is to grow those forces, like we're growing the army to 134,000 by next fall, and we'll clearly continue to grow the police but to re-look that every year will allow us to reflect what the state of the insurgency is and then, of course, what their ability to grow is, can they make those numbers? we're getting some very heartening feedback here recently there have been pay raises for both the army and the police implemented by the government of afghanistan, with our -- the international community's help and we're seeing a significant improvement. but, we've got to see whether that's sustainable long term. >> okay. and you recognize tha

the insurgents one. i think bush, we will see. he made it possible for the insurgents to lose in his war. >> barack obama?

second, we do not confront a popular insurgency. the taliban have no widespread constituency, have a history of failure in power and lack in appealing vision. third, where our strategy is say plied we've begun to show we can help the afghans establish more security and more credible governance. finally, afghans do not regard us as occupiers. they do not wish for us to remain forever, yet they see our support as a necessary bridge to future security and stability. i've been back in afghanistan for six months now. i believe that with the president's decision and ongoing reforms i outlined in our initial assessment our efforts are now empowered with the greater sense of clarity, capability, commitment and confidence. let me start with clarity. the president's recently completed review of our strategy to include its deep and pointed questioning of all assumptions and recommendations has produced greater clarity of our mission and objectives. we also have greater clarity on the way forward. additional forces will begin to deploy shortly,

this is rural insurgency. that means that he was able to project its power and protect the people in rural areas will play a key role in securing southern afghanistan. i agree with you that it is not just focusing on places where most of the people live. it might need more indirect approach. but also maintain the current footprint of our forces. >> last question? >> to follow up on that, you say you are still maintaining a footprint, but some of the outposts are being closed down. houri maintaining a footprint? -- how are you maintaining a footprint? in the rural areas? >> we work constantly in a process where we closedown outposts while establishing other outposts. as soon as an area is quite secure, and the security is led by the afghans themselves, there is no use of having coalition forces deployed there. what we should do is reinforce the afghan national army to deliver security. so, every time we deploy forces in the basin, this is not a fixed approach. that is one of the reasons that you will see less c

point, and the size of that insurgency.umber of 400,000 divided between the army and the police of 200,000 ultimate in the army and 160,000 in the police would not be really out of range for that part of the world for standing armies and police. but i think we need to do that not as a hard number at this point, but as a goal we work toward, and at just constantly. the president's decision is to grow those forces like we are going to army to 134,000 by next fall. and we will clearly continue to grow the police. but to relook that every year will allow us to reflect what the state of the insurgency is, and then of course what their ability to grow is, can they make those numbers. we're getting some very heartening feedback you recently. there have been pay raises for both the army and the police, and with our international committees help and we are seeing a significant improvement. but we've got to see whether that is sustainable long-term. >> and you recognize that our goal is to make it the afghans protecting their own nei

counter insurgency is a complex system.me you wind changed something, it has intended and unintended consequences somewhere else. we have come in with all good intentions, and someone is given a requirement to do something like build a school. the quickest and most efficient way to do that particular task may be to hire people from outside afghanistan, maybe pay a higher wage, you can get it done faster. but the unintended consequences are people who would be schoolteachers or would-be soldiers picked up and move into something that would not be efficient for the nation of a long haul. in afghanistan, a number of things are out of balance. we had doctors and educated people doing things because they can make money, usually for the international community. but they are not taking their rightful place in the economic system overall. this is where we've got to improve the unity of effort. when you are not unified, decisions are made that seem to make sense, but the larger picture -- it is very complex and it is not just u.s. m

defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.defeating the insurgency is no longer possible. if that was flew august does that mean we have nine months to turn this thing around? >> i think it's important that we turn it around quickly. i might say a little bit longer now, but we eyesed the last six months at full throttle. so we didn't waste a minute of the last six months. agency as we start to deploy those approved what i tell my command, by next summer i expect there to be significant progress that is evident to us inside our force, by next december when i report back to you in detail, i expect that we'll be able to lay real progress out that will be clear to everyone, and by the following summer of july 2011, i think the progress will be unequivocally clear to the afghan people, and when it's unequivocally three to them that will be a critical, decisive point. >> thank the gentleman. the general lady from california. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you both gentlemen for being before us today. general mcchrystal, on marc

it speaks to the long term in a way that counter insurgency does not.t's critical that we may tanina balance there. it's not just what they do in the military maneuvers that are important. are we there in the post military to help them with the reconstruction? with the rebuilding? that gets to the question you're asking about the local prove provential leadership in the area. there is the capacity to work with local leaders on progress. to do economic development to support local decision making, local institution, and we've been having conversations with the government of pakistan where it's clear we're going to work with the ministries and the local leadership. i think it's important that we not make it either/or. there's a tendency to hear that we're turning off of this. we're very much working with the national government and the ministries of pakistan. what we vntd done in the past is develop those relationships at >> i wanted to directly address the issue. in recent months, there have been some unprecedented steps taken to extend certain political

particularly with regard to reversing the insurgency's momentum in 2010.and given the stakes in afghanistan for our own national security, as well as that of our partners around the world, i believe the time we took was well worth it. secretary clinton and gates -- secretaries clinton and gates have already walked you through large policy issues in question. i will not repeat them. from a purely military perspective, i believe our new approach does three critical things. first, by providing more discrete objectives it offers better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ their forces. they'll still work to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al qaeda and prevent afghanistan from become ago safe haven. they'll still strive to protect the afghan people who remain the center of gravity. they will still pursue major elements of the counter insurgency campaign which as we all know involves at least some measure of active counter terrorism operations. but now, they will tailor this campaign and those oerngss by focusing on key population areas by incr

we face an insurgency which is, for the most part, confined to the pashtun community.finition, that means the majority of afghans do not favor the taliban. and more than that, we know from reliable polling that the majority of pashtuns don't want to see a return to the islamic return of afghanistan. no one in their right mind would want to go back to living that omar created in the 1990's. it is the self-constraining factor on the taliban which offers us the most hope to be able to turn this around. thirdly, let me talk about pakistan. pakistan is today the strategic prize in this part of the world as well as the most dangerous country in the world. why do i say that? because all of the things that should worry americans about the future of the world in the 21st century come together in pakistan in a unique and combustible way. nuclear war and peace, proliferation of nuclear technology, terrorism, the future of islam, the future of democracy in the islamic world, the relationship between military and civilçó world in t islamic world, all these issues are alive in pakis

insurgency has lost the momentum. but the summer of 2011, it will be clear to the afghan people that the uncertainty will not win. from that point forward, while we begin to reduce u.s., levels, we will remain current with the afghan security forces in a supporting role to six holiday -- to consolidate the gains. results may come more quickly. we must misshape progress toward measurable objectives. there are no silver bullet. success will be the effect of sustained pressure across multiple lines of operation. increasing our capability has been about more than two increases. for the past six months, we have been implementing operational changes that are already showing improvement. . . already reflecting improvements in our effectiveness. but the additional forces announced by president obama are a -- are significant. forces to increase our capacity to train the afghan national security forces and forces to partner with afghan army and police in expanding security zones in key areas will provide us the ability to rever

occupations fuel insurgencies. if you want peace, you work for peace, if you want war, you work for war. we can't claim war is peace. it's not. it is the path for more war. the constitution when it was written, our founders were very clear. they didn't want an imperial government. they wanted to make sure the dog of war was chained and they put that decision in the hands of the congress. this is about our constitution. our constitution, which i always carry a copy of. this constitution requires us to take a stand and have a vote and in january, we will have a vote whether to remain in afghanistan and continue operations in pakistan. thank you, madam speaker. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. ms. ros-lehtinen of florida. ms. dahlkemper of pennsylvania. what purpose does the gentlelady from ohio rise? >> permission to address the house for five minutes and revise and extend my remarks. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. ms. kaptur: maybe some day, real banking reform will be consider

it speaks to the long term in a way that counter insurgency does not. it's critical that we may tanina balance there. it's not just what they do in the military maneuvers that are important. are we there in the post military to help them with the reconstruction? with the rebuilding? that gets to the question you're p),v @ @ @ b@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @'v address. as you know in recent months there have been unprecedented months to extend certain political rights and other rights to the those that live in the sort of tribal areas. rights they've never had before and i think that's an important step forward as well. >> i appreciate you saying that. i agree with that. those areas, rights they've never had before. zb . >> i appreciate you saying that. i agree. >> ambassador, i just have a couple of comments and the time when i'm permitted to respond to this point. as your organizing of the embas embassy, staff has observed their debty ambassadors working in afghanistan they face considerable bureaucratic obstacles. maybe from ourselves. i'm hopeful that you're cogn

particularly with regard to reversing the insurgencies momentum in 2010. given the stakes in afghanistan for our own national security as well as that of our partners around the world, i believe the time we took was well worth it. secretary clinton, secretary gates have already walked you through the larger policy issues in question. i will not repeat them. from a purely military perspective, i believe our new approach does three critical things. first, by providing more discrete objectives, it offers better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ their forces. they will still work to defeat al qaeda and prevent afghanistan from becoming a safe haven. they will still strive to protect the afghan people who remain the center of gravity. they will still pursue major elements of the counter campaign, designed by general mcchryst by working to degrade the taliban's influence and by streamlining the growth of competent afghan national security forces. at its core, our strategy is about providing breathing space for them to secure their own peop

that can help the insurgents and does. and then there are clear ties with al qaeda and other transnational terrorist networks and that is part of the critical threat to the rest of the world. despite this challenging environment, i believe this mission is achievable, and i believe that for several reasons. first is that the afghans are resolved to win this fight. we often talk about the graveyard of empires and desire of afghans to throw out all occupiers. they don't view us as occupiers but the coalition is there to assist them and taking their rightful place and responsibility for their own security. it's imperfect to be sure, but they view us as a partner to help them get to where they need to be. the insurgency we face is resilient and lethal, but it is not popular. it doesn't have a compelling narrative or deep popularity with the people of afghanistan. it is grudingly accepted where they can establish control. and we have had success where we apply security and follow that with the correct approaches of governance an

the of the population would go with that insurgency if they had the choice.i do not think that reflects the situation in afghanistan. a poll was done recently that said that only 8% of the population of a canister and supported it in any way the taliban and the insurgency. i believe most wants security and safety. i believe that they will support the partnering of british and coalition forces with afghan forces and i believe that we have the ability to work with the afghan people to defeat this insurgency. i also believe that there many people associate -- associated with the insurgency who do not share with the extremist ideology of the taliban or al qaeda, and they wish to join the ordinary political process and renounce violence. >> why has it taken the prime minister so long to make up his mind to send these extra troops? commanders on the field had been asking for extra troops for least a year. why the delay? >> last year we had 8000 troops in afghanistan appeared at the moment we have over 9000 troops in afghanistan. so the idea that we've not increased

the example set by maliki and the government to be able to take over responsibilities once the insurgency was reversed is evidence of the same thing we have to accomplish in afghanistan. although in a much different way because of the history and nature of that country. and i commend you all on what your effort is. >> it was established by presidential decree. it doesn't have a legislative basis. >> thank you. particularly, general petraeus, i'm one of those who understand that never have so few been asked to bear so much of the sacrifice. we have defined our national security as having stability and security in afghanistan in our own national interest. is that correct? >> our overriding objectedive is to ensure they don't reestablish a sanction ware in afghanistan, such as 9/11. >> we want safety and security there. >> the way to ensure the overriding interest is to have a country that is not a failed state and allows that to happen. so if that is the case, then what follows is that why we are aspirational as to whether president karzai will meet the starve standards of eliminating corru

it speaks to the long term in a way that counter insurgency does not.t's critical that we may tanina balance there. it's not just what they do in the military maneuvers that are important. are we there in the post military to help them with the reconstruction? with the rebuilding? that gets to the question you're asking about the local prove provential leadership in the area. there is the capacity to work with local leaders on progress. to do economic development to support local decision making, local institution, and we've been having conversations with the government of pakistan where it's clear we're going to work with the ministries and the local leadership. i think it's important that we not make it either/or. there's a tendency to hear that we're turning off of this. we're very much working with the national government and the ministries of pakistan. what we vntd done in the past is develop those relationships at a deep level. i think it's critical we do both in the coming months and year. as you know there have been unprecedented steps taken to

the new counter-insurgency strategy and the extra troops announced by america last week do show that we have the last best chance to get this issue right. does the prime minister agree that we simply cannot waste any time in getting every element of the strategy in place, including troops, helicopters, equipment, development aid, civilian coordination and, of course, the pressure on president karzai to cut corruption? >> i am very pleased that he was able to go to afghanistan, and i also know that many members have visited our troops in afghanistan. i pay tribute to them for visiting our troops, but i pay greater tribute to our troops for the great work that they do. he is absolutely right that we must move quickly. our additional troops will be going to afghanistan in the next few days. we have called a conference for january 28 in london, to bring together all the powers that are involved in afghanistan -- the 43-nation coalition. that will discuss and agree, i hope, on civil coordination. president karzai has agreed to come, and he will have to report on the reforms that he promis

guest of that was the primary insurgent group -- guest: that was the primary insurgent group that we going after. mosul was in our area, so we went after them in a big way. their influence has diminished. i would make the case that the al qaeda ideology has alienated themselves from the majority of the iraqi people. counterinsurgency, separating the people from the insurgency. not many people in iraq will leave in the al qaeda ideology. their primary motive is to conduct these very high profile attacks to discredit the iraqi security forces. when you saw what happened in baghdad last week, that was what they were doing. through that is where they continued to gain influence. host: finally, the lead story this time from "the new york times," "blackwater guards tied to secret cia raids." did you have any contact with whitewater? guest: -- contact with blackwater? guest: not in my area. host: numbers are on the screen in case you would like to call in. rex, tennessee. caller: a couple of questions. first, do you believe that part of the problem in iraq is that the people had been hard-p

this is a war of insurgents. this is a civil war. and therefore, we must find a way to handle this in a manner that serves all. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlelady's time has expired. the chair lays before the house the following personal requests. the clerk: leaves of absence requested for mr. abercrombie of hawaii for today, mr. barro of georgia for today and balance of the week, mr. davis of illinois for today, mr. davis of kentucky for today, mr. kirk of illinois for today, ms. mccollum for today until 11:00 a.m. on tuesday, december 2. mr. shimkus of illinois for today. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. the requests are granted. for what purpose does the gentleman from texas rise? mr. poe: mr. speaker, i ask unanimous consent that today following legislative business and any special orders heretofore entered into that the following members may be permitted to address this house, revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material, mr. wolf for today, december 2, 3 and 4. myself, mr. poe, f

the leadership of the insurgency is extremely important. that's what i think the drones are being used for. because they are across the border hiding in parts of pakistan and the other part that this is going to happen here, i think, as far as the plan, is to bring the pakistan and nato coalition forces closer together along the border with pakistan. and starting to coordinate their actions. i think this is absolutely essential. because this is much more than just an afghanistan problem. it's a strategic problem for the researchen. the drones are part of that. you are going to have a counterinsurgency, but counterterrorism. you need to blend both together. i think that's what's going to be happening now in the next several months. >> good morning, on the democrats line. >> hi, i just don't understand why this is america's war. and i don't understand why we have to put up the brunt of money and forces and it seems to me like when bush talked about in iraq the coalition of the willing, and there was very little support. it was our war. and i

it is the task of military pressurize the insurgency. but it is right and essential that this work is combined with those prepared to renounce the political process. both national and local levels. people in towns and their country -- a identify the likely economy and provide afghans with credible economic insurgency. harvest is expected to be the highest in 30 years. programs funded by our this year create 20,000 jobs, and by 2013, raise the incomes of 200,000 people. deployments. support our strategy particular, to train more afghan soldiers and police forces -- the government implemented once 3 conditions were met. i can now report on each of these conditions. number of british personnel in afghanistan only if we were assured that it would continue soldier and unit deployed is fully equipped for the operations they are asked to undertake. the chief of the defense staff additional 500 troops. the continuing delivery of new equipment. helicopters have today been given the green light for operations in afghanistan, one month ahead of sch

when you have lost control of the prison camps in which you are putting insurgents and counter insurgencyeep, deep hole. every measure we have demonstrates the momentum is entirely with the taliban today. bob gates reiterated that several times in his statement last week on the hill. but it is not yet lost. because we did not face and afghanistan, a nationalist uprising. what we face in afghanistan is a pashtun insurgency which is confined to the pashtun ethnic community. the soviets faced a national uprising. virtually the entire country was an opposition to soviet occupation and soviet behavior reinforced that opposition. we face an insurgency which is, for the most part, confined to the pashtun community. by definition, the majority of afghans do not favor the taliban and more than that, we know from reliable polling that the majority of pashtuns don't want to see a return to the islamic terror of the afghanistan. no one in their right mind would want to go back to living in the medieval held that malone omar created in the 1990's. it is the self constraining factor of the taliban that

the potential reaction that would lead to increased insurgents. we also know that a lot of the people who are in the taliban do not share the overall goal which is more to. the mullah omar core group that heads the afghan taliban and is closely allied with al qaeda has morphed into not just in nationalistic islamist group, but now kind of buying into this caliphate idea. and therefore a lot of the people who have been conscripted into effect into service on behalf of the taliban have no real allegiance support of the challenge here and it's something that we are working on with president karzai obviously we have a whole team in bigot in the nato isaf with retired british general, general lamb, who played a major role in iraq, the sons of iraq and the awakening is to begin to do a much more thoughtful job to separate out. the taliban are a homegrown entity. the taliban, the students rose up in part against the oppression of the soviet regime, keels of the war lord your and desire to have an islamist state that imposed sharia order etc. so, we know

guest of that was the primary insurgent group -- guest: that was the primary insurgent group that we were going after. mosul was in our area, so we went after them in a big way. their influence has diminished. i would make the case that the al qaeda ideology has alienated themselves from the majority of the iraqi people. counterinsurgency, separating the people from the insurgency. not many people in iraq will leave in the al qaeda ideology. their primary motive is to conduct these very high profile attacks to discredit the iraqi security forces. when you saw what happened in baghdad last week, that was what they were doing. through that is where they continued to gain influence. host: finally, the lead story this time from "the new york times," "blackwater guards tied to secret cia raids." did you have any contact with whitewater? guest: -- contact with blackwater? guest: not in my area. host: numbers are on the screen in case you would like to call in. rex, tennessee. caller: a couple of questions. first, do you believe that part of the problem in iraq is that the people had been h

hans hope and the insurgents lack of hope because there's not going to be daytime in the long term. and i turn it over to karl. >> thanks, congressman. first of all, on the threat financing, we have a very integrated robust effort within afghanistan and outside afghanistan an integrated effort which includes our intelligence agencies, department of treasury, our military, diplomatic efforts. i also want to highlight that within afghanistan itself, our department of treasury agents on the ground are actually building within the afghan ministry of finance and within their central bank, their own independent threat finance xapabilities. we're mentoring with them and they're starting to get some impressive results. secondly, with regard to the emphasis that you place on the date, july 2011, the transition date, i'm absolutely in line with general mcchrystal and how we look at this. afghanistan, they've -- they have a lot of insecurity based on their people. their people are insecure people based on their history, based on other nations withdrawing their support over time. they live in a

it is the task of military pressurize the insurgency. but it is right and essential that this work is combined with those prepared to renounce the political process. both national and local levels. people in towns and their country -- a identify the likely economy and provide afghans with credible economic insurgency. harvest is expected to be the highest in 30 years. programs funded by our this year create 20,000 jobs, and by 2013, raise the incomes of 200,000 people. deployments. support our strategy particular, to train more afghan soldiers and police forces -- the government implemented once 3 conditions were met. i can now report on each of these conditions. number of british personnel in afghanistan only if we were assured that it would continue soldier and unit deployed is fully equipped for the operations they are asked to undertake. the chief of the defense staff additional 500 troops. the continuing delivery of new equipment. helicopters have today been given the green light for operations in afghanistan, one month ahead of sch

>> actually i have said before and it is tied to my belief about insurgencies, and the insurgency is always moving and it is moving in one direction or another. we are in our third straight year of still a very significant deterioration but with respect to the security environment. the 2009 levels of violence, up 60% from 2008, to speak to one measure of that. it is tied as well to general mcchrystal's assessment of what he found, when he was there and certainly from that standpoint, we are not winning. in an insurgency u r e the winning or losing and if we are not winning we are losing, which is why i said that, because of the trend in this insurgency. it also speaks to the requirement to reverse this thing as rapidly as possible which is to why we are getting as many forces there as fast as we can, why the president made this decision, because it is important to reverse that momentum. >> speaking of reversing momentum one of the issues that never came up in the last couple of days with general mcchrystal is the role of counter-terrorism tactics-- tactics. he talked a little bit abo

fight that insurgency. at the same time help train afghan national security forces and army and police and accelerating that to the point where the transition moment that the president identified as july, 2011, is the point that he believes we should begin that transition. and begin to, i think you heard secretary gates say today, we have build, we have hold but importantly we have transfer. and we -- we are not going to be there forever. the president said that. the folks testifying today said that. this is not an open-ended commitment. we are going to provide them with the incentives that they need via this transition point to get their act together, to train that security force and army so that beginning in july, 2011 we can transfer the responsibility of afghan security to the afghans. that's what's fundamentally important about this. and i think the president believes based on the decision we made this is the best course forward. >> foreign defense secretary rumsfeld took issue on the  speech last ni

the insurgency has gotten better and better since 2006. and by that -- and so for us, it's gotten worse and worse. the level of violence was up in 2009. almost 60% from 2008. and nothing's going to change there unless we turn, specifically turn that around. that's really the effort. >> and you said more than once that 18 months, it's not necessarily withdrawal date t is a date we either do it or we don't is that right? >> well, july 2011, obviously that's been a date that has been broadly discussed since the president rolled it out in his speech. and my view of that is that's really critical. it is a target date for us. it's a date, it's very clear we will start to transition the security responsibility to the afghan security forces. and thin out and start to draw down some of our forces. but we've not set a withdrawal date. there is no specific number of forces. it could be very small number or -- and it could be a large number. and actually, the date while some have seen it as arbitrary t wasn't arbitrary at all. it was a date that we in

. >> ifill: but members of prime minister nouri al-maliki's ruling party said the insurgents' mean to shake the public's confidence. >> ( translated ): today's bloody explosions are aimed to hinder the political process, specifically the electoral process. >> ifill: other lawmakers said iraqis are angry at the failure of their own forces to secure the country as the u.s. military drawdown continues. joining me from baghdad who reports from iraq for the christian science monitor and global post, an international news website. welcome. we have been through a period of relative calm it seems in iraq. i wonder if today's attacks aren't the beginning of the end of that. >> well certainly this is a city that's on edge, gwen. everyone is expecting more violence in the run-up until the elections in march now. we've seen that in august. we've seen that in october with major bombings of ministries. this was kind of more of the same. the attacks were government institutions. in fact, two of them connected to the finance ministry and the justice ministry were based in buildings that were actually

these conditions and a mounting insurgency pose great challenges to military operations as well as tothe governmental, nongovernmental and contractor organizations that provide security, reconstruction, logistical and humanitarian assistance. it is safe to say none of the countries assisting afghanistan in its struggle against hard line insurgents and terrorists wants to have a long-term military presence there. certainly the united states does not. that is why building well-trained, well-led and law-abiding national security forces in afghanistan is a vital mission. that mission is daunting. afghanistan's military was severely degraded during the soviet occupation and the civil war that led to the taliban regime. today the beleaguered afghan national army numbers about 105,000, about half the size of iraq's army, even though the two country's populations are nearly equal. the afghan national police and border police have their own problems. the said in an august report the afghan national police are riddled with corruption and short of equipment and no one could argue with that. in s

the insurgents one. i think bush, we will see. he made it possible for the insurgents to lose in his war. >> barack obama? >> i went down to the inauguration. i was doing that for "the newshour." there was a historic quality to that which can never be taken away. it is one thing but it is a very important thing. the quality became more real because he was elected president. there is the rest of his term. what do we do today, mr. president? i think we're seeing problems that he has gotten himself into and i imagine we will see many more of them. he is in an interesting position after his afghanistan speech, which is that his supporters on that will be his enemies, and his opponents are his base. that is a tricky position for a politician and we will see how that plays out. >> sarah palin? >> i will give you cole porter. you have got that thing that makes the birdies for get to get to sing. she has something. i was dismayed when she quit as governor of alaska. she is running -- she has had executive experience but why does she cut i

. >> -- the strategic horizon away from the insurgency. >> i want the american people to know the job you have been dealt. >> no matter how many afghan army folks are on the payroll or numbers on a piece of paper, we are only using 150. i think that says a lot about the state of the army. another role is the 96-hour rule. as i understand the policy, isaf have to turn over a detainee within 96 hours of captured to the afghan government, and all they had -- all they can do in field interrogations' is ask them basic questions. is that policy going to be in effect as we move ford? >> senator, we're working through that policy as we try to move different forces under isaf. i am working with general petreaus on the right calculus. we call it the detainee facility -- that will go to afghan control. with our assistance, they will run the facility. we will help provide the expertise, particularly like things like exploitation and effective use of diligence. in the long term, that is the most effective thing we can do -- build their capacity to do counterinsurgency and partner with them. >> cou

he is able to focus where we need to focus to get at this insurgency.ctually, the same was true in iraq. it is just been at this need with respect to these ratios is about right for afghanistan. >> that is one of the reasons why they added contributions from our allies and partners are so important. basically we want them to take responsibility for the northern and western parts of afghanistan so that we can concentrate and focus our efforts in the southern and eastern parts of the country. >> secretary gates, i think one thing that all of you sit in your opening statements is we need of better participation by the iraqis and by the non american coalition. we all agree with that. i happened to be over there in 2003 when we were turning over the training of the ana to the afghans. it was the oklahoma 45th guard unit that was in charge of that. they contend that they are great warriors, and yet you look around and see so many of these young, healthy afghans that are walking the streets who ought to be in the military. what can we do differently to encoura

if the strategy is because of the insurgency and needs something more like a our military, then so bestand that at the end of the day, whatever that is, you may not have a trained police force. you will have a paramilitary force. >> am i right that your understanding of what the afghan people want from your program is not merely paramilitary but those policing skills that you try to speak -- try to teach. >> i cannot speak for the afghan people. they can look at them and say these are people who are here to protect and serve. >> @ thank you for allowing me the time, mr. chairman. >> i thank you for your question. >> i really have one more question which is contract related. it also deals with your experience in theater. it has to do with a concept that is developing and in some places we may be competing with ourself. recording for afghan national police and the army has been a challenge. is part of that because the government is awarding contracts for logistics services, reconstruction services, and other activities in essence to create a competitive job market. we could potentially

the insurgents one. i think bush, we will see. he made it possible for the insurgents to lose in his war. >> barack obama? >> i went down to the inauguration. i was doing that for "the newshour." there was a historic quality to that which can never be taken away. it is one thing but it is a very important thing. the quality became more real because he was elected president. there is the rest of his term. what do we do today, mr. president?

what certainlys there is an insurgent force whicis, which has both in rhetic and action called up alas a mentor force, as the standa it would follow and it's goa lot of people worried >> reporr: when i asked anderson wheer he returned from somalia wh hope or fear. he cited last week's scide bombing as wl as his own experience in mogashu. the setting was a prate university, estaished only recently to train ctors amid the chaos. and the the government ministers killed, he sd, were iaspora" somalis-- who'd fle thviolence, but later returned to hp their country. so i came away with a stron feeling of hope on thene hand becae i saw diaspora somalis, somalithat had lived out comfortae lives in the west, but had rerned because they're patrtic, because they want to do something with theilives other than make money someere. d yet, you know, worried and anxis because of the ability the shabab to destroy so cle to the very heart of this very fragile state. so, ve mixed feelings. >> reporter:on lee anderson, thanks for talking with us >> tnk you. >> ifill: ited nations serity council today took

unlike vietnam, we are not facing a broad based popular insurgency. and most importantly unlike vietnam, the american people were viciously attacked from afghanistan and remain a target for those the same extremist were plodding along its border. to abandon this area now and to rely only on efforts against al qaeda from a distance would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al qaeda and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies. second, there are those with knowledge that we cannot leave afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the trips that we already have. this would simply maintain the status quo in which we muddle through and permit the slow deterioration of conditions there. it would ultimately prove more costly and prolonged our stay in afghanistan because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train the afghan security forces and give them the space to take over. finally, there are those who oppose identifying a timeframe for a transitio

a foreign army alone cannot be an insurgency. the insurgency in afghanistan requires an afghan solution. this is their work. he went on to say any success must come and go by, with, and through the afghan government." and other words, without a legitimate, credible, reliable government afghan partner, it sounds like the strategy would be flawed. by all reports that we have, president karzai, as a result of a flawed or fraudulent election by default. he presides over a culture of corruption, and dependent on unfortunately, and opium economy. what i am concerned about is whether we are taking a leap of faith here with respect to our afghan government partner, and not irrespective of that, but related to that, if we are going to spent -- send 30 dozen more troops and expend additional u.s. dollars, should we not be looking for more a indices or evidence that he truly will be a partner that has a response from his own citizens and support of them, so that we are not just in there without him, and not be perceived as just occupiers. a

you can't do justçó a little bi of c/u(uq)insurgency.ion with general mcchrystal it became clear to be able to deliver the effects and to be able to have success, it is key that you deploy these additional forces to afghanistan -- to be deployed the southern afghanistan. that is key. from that point of view, i would say i'm very glad to see the developments over the last couple of weeks, any announcement by president obamai it shows you that i think overall we got the concept right but we need to have -- a strategic -- and it is not security that will deliver the effect in the long run but the governance i see as key for success in the long run. >> the great concern expressed by a number of officials that no matter how skfl you are militarily, if you -- successful you militarily, the ability, the pakistanis -- the whole effort will be forgot, what is your sense about the whole level of corruption and what it is going to take to overcome that problem? >> i would say that the definition of corruption in afghanistan is different than corrup

what certainly is there is an insurgent force which is, which has both in rhetoric and action calledl qaeda as a mentor force, as the standard it would follow and it's got a lot of people worried. >> reporter: when i asked anderson whether he returned from somalia with hope or fear. he cited last week's suicide bombing as well as his own experience in mogadishu. the setting was a private university, established only recently to train doctors amid the chaos. and the three government ministers killed, he said, were "diaspora" somalis-- who'd fled the violence, but later returned to help their country. >> so i came away with a strong feeling of hope on the one hand because i saw diaspora somalis, somalis that had lived out comfortable lives in the west, but had returned because they're patriotic, because they want to do something with their lives other than make money somewhere. and yet, you know, worried and anxious because of the ability of the shabab to destroy so close to the very heart of this very fragile state. so, very mixed feelings. >> reporter: jon lee anderson, thanks for ta

the insurgents one. i think bush, we will see.he made it possible for the insurgents to lose in his war. >> barack obama? >> i went down to the inauguration. i was doing that for "the newshour." there was a historic quality to that which can never be taken away. it is one thing but it is a very important thing. the quality became more real because he was elected president. there is the rest of his term. what do we do today, mr. president? i think we're seeing problems that he has gotten himself into and i imagine we will see many more of them. he is in an interesting position after his afghanistan speech, which is that his supporters on that will be his enemies, and his opponents are his base. that is a tricky position for a politician and we will see how that plays out. >> sarah palin? >> i will give you cole porter. you have got that thing that makes the birdies for get to get to sing. she has something. i was dismayed when she quit as governor of alaska. she is running -- she has had executive experience but why does she cut it

>> yes, one thing that is fundamental to the insurgence is for the military to develop capacity. >> howoncerned are you for the military deployments over the forces over the eight to nine years? >> the strain is significant, we owe a great deal to the men and women of our armed services. they are remarkable. one thing that has happened over the last years is that there is a dependent-well period. my friend's son just got back from iraq and he can expect two years back at fort bragg, and before it was 18 months. that's been stabilized. but still the strain is significant. and it's played out in what you are seeing now in terms of divorce rates and mental health issues. we have to be conscious of that and very concerned. and that's one of the factors that has motivated the president to not only energize the afghans and to signal this is not an independent commitment of a large-scaled u.s. combat forces. >> is there anything that congress can do to help that? given the economy climate, is there a way to help with the strain? >> we have increased the troop levels, but not some figures that