it had been the work of iraq.her members of the administration? >> i had conversations with him in particular. he was quite convinced that there was a connection, a strong connection, between saddam hussein and al

was co- response will in iraq. -- responsible in iraq.because i understood or was told by my own legal adviser that there might be questions about the uk + responsibility for the detention facilities in mmd se, i got my legal adviser to purloin a writ -- a copy of the report from his contacts in the cpa, go through it, while i was away on a visit elsewhere, and check what was relevant for british concerns and make sure that those parts were reported back to london and to the ministry of defence which you did. he did not go through the rest of the report or give me any other indication that there were general questions here about the overall administration of iraq that might arise and so i missed an opportunity to focus on that. >> the senior british officers did not convey this to you? >> they did not. >> you were not able to give london and a warning that this issue is likely to blow up but some time? >> i do not know whether london of the west got a full copy of the report. i think we sent them the parts of the report that affected brit

iraq was neither. but today there are international lawyers like the president of the national lawyers guild point* united states arguing that afghanistan does not meet the criteria of a just war either. but for that situation the u.s. did not have ratification but it is not an act of self-defense either, of the war. said basically when the u.s. was attacked it was not attacked by the nation nor the people of afghanistan. 19 guys in planes coming 15 from saudi arabia, the other four from iraq or afghanistan. a large body of lawyers come international lawyers arguing that afghanistan is also a violation of international law. then there is nothing in the u.s. constitution called the supremacy close. the supremacy clause also says, they don't need to argue this part but it says when the u.s. signs a foreign treaty, then we are obliged by our own constitution to follow that treaty as though as it is the lot of our land as well. hence the words supremacy clause. of a soldier refuses to deploy to a record af

actually for the coalition in iraq as we might come to later but which was a vision for iraq and was publicly available to iraqis. that made it clear that some flexibility, adaptation in the coalition's approaches might well be necessary but that was not the message that i got from ambassador bremer in that particular conversation. >> do you think that it was too much emphasis on the sectarian approach looking for the -- iraqi situation in the way the americans were approaching the reconstruction? >> it was more than reconstruction. it was an attempt to establish a new iraqi government. it was highly political and i thought, and the u.k. approach was behind this all the way, that the iraqis needed to be both consulted and, indeed, groomed and brought to the point where they could start taking decisions for the administration of iraq and that they needed to be quite closely onboard for the political process that we followed. >> what role did you play in ensuring that happened? you obviously operated in a very subtle manner. did you succeed in changing views? >> if you hit a small hicc

on iraq, i just wanted to say a little more in context about iraq.at this. things aren't going well. the policy of sanctions is in tatters. the smuggling -- smugglers are getting away with blue murder and we need to do something about that. so i suppose the batting order there was nuclear missile defense, russia in that context, not a lot about the middle east. i remember her saying to me, we don't want president bush to become the middle east desk officer, like bill clinton. because clinton was in the final throes of trying to fix the problem, which eventually failed. nor were they intent on doing that into northern ireland either. so we got a heavily missile centric account of foreign policy. two days later -- i think it was two days later, i saw karl rove, and he more or less gave me the same account, but emphasizing that as with most presidents of the united states in the first few months, you focus on other things other than foreign policy. there was going to be tax cuts, health care for senior citizens. >> it's interesting that in your book, "d

that would create too much unemployment as a difficult period in iraq.hat was the only formal veto that i put down. on the whole, we've always had to get our arguments for a constant reiteration by working different parts of the system by going to the iraqis and influencing them rather than anything top down. thank you. >> market -- -- martin -- >> you felt we were not bring in enough resources. not enough in police training, not enough into the center, where was the blockage? why was the british, not producing enough results? >> it goes back to more than the british. the most basic error that was made in the whole planning for the post-conflict phase in iraq was not to upset the american military, the mission, of administering iraq after the war was over. in my view, general tommy franks was given the long mission to invade iraq, get rid of the saddam hussein and her turn it over to the minister is bridge he should have been given the mission of getting rid of saddam,'s of fighting iraq, making sure that iraq was a secure military area and then handing

it's not going to work in iraq. it was interesting to hear him essentially praise the bush policy in iraq and how it succeeded. it was bizarre to hear him say some of these things. i have to tell you, larry, i hate to be even saying these things. i honestly think barack obama is a good and decent man. he has a good heart. i believe he's a man of peace. i was thrilled that he won the peace prize. so to see him make this mistake, i don't think there's any kind of evil or dark place in his heart where this is coming from. i just think that he's listened to the generals. he's taken bad aadvidvice. he's human. we all make mistakes. somebody told time warner to buy aol. i mean, you know? he's listening to the same kind of people that always seem to give the wrong advice to people in charge. >> larry: jesse ventura said last night, he agrees with your position by the way, that we should consider bringing back the draft. and we should have a war tax so that people suffer. if we're all going to pay a price for this. what do

those in iraq are moving across.t's a tough decision for general mcchrystal because the general in iraq still has responsibility. but there is a huge shift in resources. and the biggest source of resource, we have been taking the best people we could find to go in. we have had good leadership in afghanistan, but we have now tried to assemble what most regard collectively as the best we have. general mcchrystal and rodriguez and general kaldwell to be the general commander. and integrating efforts and control with pakistan. it's a much more effective organization. >> senator, you flew up with the president up to westpoint and back, what was the mood on the plane? what was he talking to you? can you give us a sense of that mood? >> yes, the president was consumed getting the last parts of the speech and getting that right. and i sat with others and there was a feeling and it was powerful, that this is a result of a deliberate, careful review. they felt confident about the outcome. and they felt confident that the presi

daud in iraq -- that when you have more american troops -- and i have seen this in iraq -- that when you have more american troops, it improves the behavior of afghan officials. for example, i am told that there are five checkpoint between dnr and the south -- between cancer heart and the south. in those checkpoints, truck drivers are shaken donndown. you could have american troops side-by-side with the afghan officials and they will stop shaking down every truck that comes through. because that is a tax on the people that come through and there a cure -- a poor people. you could improve the behavior of the afghan government and deter the taliban, stop this vicious cycle that drives their people into the arms of the taliban. that does not end the problem, you're right. what it does is say, now the afghans have a problem -- a chance to stand up a police force and an army cured by live in afghanistan. it was not always a brutal and violent government. in the 60's and 70's it was actually a golden era. it is a myth that these people have been fighting each other for centuries. until the

was not responsible in iraq. secondly, he did not pass a copy of the report over to me, which perhaps partly answers your earlier question about responsibility for these areas. because i understood or was told by my own legal advisor there might be questions about the u.k.'s spobalt for detention facilities in m & d southeast, i got my legal advisor to obtain a copy of his report from his contact in the c.p.a., go through it. actually while i was away on a visit elsewhere, and check what was relevant for british concerns and make sure those parts were reported back to london and to the ministry of defense, which he did. he did not go through the rest of the report or give me any other occasion that there were any -- other indication that there were any other -- so i missed an opportunity to focus on it. >> and the senior british officers didn't contrary -- this to you either? >> no. they did not. >> so you were not able to give london any warning that this issue was likely to blow up at some time? >> i do not kno

they have had two rotations in iraq and one in afghanistan. they are scheduled to go back to iraq.d on the last mission, it will be changing. a very honorable division. my memories are fantastic. host: lincoln, nebraska. go ahead. caller: i salute your service to the nation, general. my question, the prime minister of iraq has said that most of the slaughter occuring in iraq is because of the neighboring countries supporting those terrorists. how long will the united states continued dialogue with countries that are small -- slaughtering civilians in iraq? before they take some action to put a stop to these terrorists? guest: thank you for your question. did there have been recent discussions about what has caused these recent attacks. the prime minister, as did -- prime minister credited the recent attacks to al qaeda. but there is another insurgent movement in iraq. it is a nationalist movement. it is focused on the former regime. there is support for them from the neighboring countries. i know that the united states is working diplomatically with neighboring countries to try to

did you report this as the first signs of iraq coming into view? >> i don't have the reporting telegram in front of me, but we were watching this stuff like cox we almost got too close. there was no doubting the for an office with this kind of reporting. i remember the press conference pretty well. of course we did. without having it in front of me, i can't believe -- i don't think the foreign office can claim ignorance the way the wind was blowing. they made it extremely plane. -- plain. on the fifth of november, i could not find in the archives, they lay all this out. -- laid all this out. we were may be overly deciduous -- assiduous. >> this is the moment to take a break. we will come back in 10 minutes. if members of the public need to leave the room, that is fine. please come back in 10 minutes, or the doors will be shut and that will be had for the morning. thank you very much. we will begin again in 10 minutes. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> let us resumed,

let me draw another analogy to iraq.raq, once it was clear the surge was working, it was pretty plain that the iraqis wanted us out about as fast as possible. the security agreement and everything flowed from that. that is not entirely clear in afghanistan. they live in a very rough neighborhood. we have a balancing act here and the centerpiece of our debate for the last several months is, how you did the afghans to begin to step up the responsibility for their own future, there on security in a way that allows us to have confidence that they will not once again become the safe haven for al qaeda? the hearing now that balance in terms of how you incentivize and get a sense of urgency to the afghan, and at the same time signal results to our adversaries, was the tough part of this for us. >> i appreciate that answer. >> to me that is the essence of moving down the road to victory in afghanistan. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i was going to start out with the in that status, that it has been pretty well covered right now. an

if you just got out of iraq, it would train and then go back in. still, the strain has been significant. it has played out in what you are seeing now in terms of divorce rates, mental-health issues. we have to be conscious of that very concerned. i think that has motivated the president to not only energized the afghanis, but also to signal that this is not an indefinite commitment of large-scale u.s. forces. >> is there anything congress can do to help with that? is there a way for you all to help with the strain or try to increase troop levels? >> we have increased the troop levels, not by some of the figures from when iraq started. we anticipated the need for more forces. it took a long time to even get the increase we have now. what we are trying to do to ease the strain is ensure that the commanders have the resources for all of the quality of life services that are so necessary. when a soldier first deploys, it helps to know that the schools back on the post are functioning, the day care centers, hospitals, the family support groups are in pl

it's different than iraq. beyond that, forget about the subject, is you're going to have a lot of people over there, and i'd be very interested in knowing because of this very, very good plan that was shared with me, what are goug do to make sure when they get out in the boonies that they're being taken care of? now i did hear you -- you're going to initially rely on the military. is that right? >> yes, sir. the arrangement that has been made is that -- is that we, the diplomatic security, are responsible for the staff that are at the embassy in kabul and are at the embassy in kabul and associated missions in @@@@@@@@s >> you indicated that you have done an analysis of the people that should be governmental and replacing contractors. do you have that anywhere written down about what somebody did to some -- essence fought into what this was like and you made some decisions to say we're going to have people that are going to be on the federal payroll rather than contractors. >> yes, sir, i want to clarify that i

actually, the same was true in iraq.it is just been at this need with respect to these ratios is about right for afghanistan. >> that is one of the reasons why they added contributions from our allies and partners are so important. basically we want them to take responsibility for the northern and western parts of afghanistan so that we can concentrate and focus our efforts in the southern and eastern parts of the country. >> secretary gates, i think one thing that all of you sit in your opening statements is we need of better participation by the iraqis and by the non american coalition. we all agree with that. i happened to be over there in 2003 when we were turning over the training of the ana to the afghans. it was the oklahoma 45th guard unit that was in charge of that. they contend that they are great warriors, and yet you look around and see so many of these young, healthy afghans that are walking the streets who ought to be in the military. what can we do differently to encourage greater participation with the an

i think there are four in iraq., i think it is four or five boeing 27 or 8 in afghanistan. from myxd viewpoint, we have the oversight -- going to 7 or 8 in afghanistan. >> we have one in the country. i mean the interface with that individual. in the past six months, there was a system into place to observe and reportçó back to thr staff and captor evaluation of our performance. ñr-- to capture each evaluation. there is formal oversight that goes on consistently. >> thinking. >> i think there are two aspects of oversight, formal contract oversight, and i think in our case that putting -- they are putting more people in place. Ñiçóthe more informal and less structuredñr is adequate. xd>> thank you. let me ask in terms of, and we have had some discussion about contractors having the rule to identify better practices and finding ways toÑi streamline, improved, save costs, avoid duplication, etc. in your experiences, the you have examples where you have offered up and contributed new and better ways to do things to save

with regard to iraq, one would be surprised that they speak about iraq less at these summits than one might imagine. or expect. or believe. and a reason has to do -- going back to 1976 and their memories of iraq's view towards all six of these countries, their forms of government. their lesser degree of development. their lacking in agricultural sector, their lacking in industrial sector and their lacking the driving force of the baath party, they are not having thought in a war like iraq did in iran and suffered as many casualties. so this suspicion about iraq's ultimate intentions not just towards kuwait but all the others there is one suspect with it and the same with regard to iran. but it also has to do with march, 1975 and if i had to say one single agreement that is the strategic glue of all six of them it's the algiers accord of march, 1975. now, this took place in the ecos and the wakes and the shadows of person and increasingly american talk about doing the unthinkable. of utilizing force and mobilizing and deploying force to the oil fields and the gas fields of the gulf. be

if you look at iraq, we're building up certain civilian capacities in iraq right now as our military withdraws. so we're taking over certain responsibilities. i think we have to look at the different parts of it separately and it shouldn't be a source of confusion. it is progress when the military is able to leave and civilian programs can step in and have a more normal relationship. >> i couldn't agree with you more. the difficulty is i really question whether you're going to have the same security situation in afghanistan that you have in iraq right now looking forward to july of 2011. i hope i'm wrong. but in addition to that, the financial commitment to stand up their army and police, particularly over the period of time that karzai is talk about it, i don't think the american people are going to accept that. >> senator, if i could, just talk about what secretary lew had said, our goal is -- we'll agree, is on as rapidly as possible have an afghan government that can provide for the security of their own people and provide sanctuary for al qaeda. the july 2011 date is very import

to iraq security forces funds. there could also be some milk on products that go directly through army corps of engineers and onto the commands in theater. so i can understand why you would get different facts. >> that's how things get lost in the shuffle. what, serpa is doing big stuff now and i'm about out of time for this and turn it over to senate bennett. serp is no longer just fixing broken glass. serp is due in large on the large projects. the question is are they contracting with people to do that or the army corps going to come in and do that? that's where i'm not clear. as serp drifted from its initial, what i affectionately call walking around money. as it drifted into the category of an ait or army corps reconstruction project and are we losing expertise in the shuffle and more importantly are we going to get the monitoring we need? thank you and alternate over to senator bennett. >> thank you very much. following through with what the chairman, excuse me, has said. i've talked about the coordination be

but while we have achieved hard- earned milestones in iraq, the situation in iraq -- in afghanistan has deteriorated. after escaping across the border to pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al qaeda's leadership established a safe haven. although a legitimate government was elected by the afghan people, it has been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, and underdeveloped economy and insufficient security forces. over the last several years, the taliban has maintained a common cause with outright as they both seek an overthrow of the afghan government. -- with al qaeda as they both seek an overthrow of the afghan government. gradually, they have begun to control additional portions of afghanistan while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the afghanistan people. -- against the afghani people. the troop levels there remain a fraction of what they were in iraq. when i took office, we have just over 32,000 americans serving in afghanistan compared to 160,000 in iraq at the peak of the war. commanders in afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with t

on iraq, i just wanted to say a little more in context about iraq. need to look at this. things aren't going well. the policy of sanctions is in tatters. the smuggling -- smugglers are getting away with blue murder and we need to do something about that. so i suppose the batting order there was nuclear missile defense, russia in that context, not a lot about the middle east. i remember her saying to me, we don't want president bush to become the middle east desk officer, like bill clinton. because clinton was in the final throes of trying to fix the problem, which eventually failed. nor were they intent on doing that into northern ireland either. so we got a heavily missile centric account of foreign policy. two days later -- i think it was two days later, i saw karl rove, and he more or less gave me the same account, but emphasizing that as with most presidents of the united states in the first few months, you focus on other things other than foreign policy. there was going to be tax cuts, health care for senior citizens. >> it's interesting that in

troops from iraq. i >> this week, the three former solicitors general discuss the role of the solicitor general, duties associated with the job, and are doing for the supreme court. i-- and arguing for the supreme court. >> now available, c-span's abraham lincoln, great american historians on our 16th president. it is a unique perspective on lincoln from $56, journalists, and writers. -- it is a unique perspective on lincoln from journalists and writers. learn more at c- span.org/lincolnbook. >> the u.s. house has passed the biggest restructuring of financial regulation since the new deal. but it will give the government new powers to break up companies that threaten the economy and ordered new oversight for some financial markets that have been unregulated. now, portions on the debate. gentleman from idaho. ms. minnick: madam chair, we all support the goal of a strong stronger, more uniform consumer protection regulation. but you don't acheeven that by adding two regulators and in many cases thousands

as military withdrawals, ds already has a very large presence in iraq. we believe that it will affect ds because some of the protective service is the the military may be providing currently could be transferred over to ds. but we don't have any specific information with regard to what the staffing implications of that might be. in our report we had indicated i believe it was last year ds had i believe 81 special agents in iraq which is by far the largest number of any overseas post. so the point that we are making in the report is there is likely to be some implications for ds as we withdraw forces from iraq just like there will be if we surgeon to afghanistan. so, but we don't -- we have not yet been briefed on what the actual numbers will be and what the resource implications might be for providing protective services in iraq once the military starts to withdraw. >> ambassador, would you have anything to add to that? >> only to say it is a major challenge facing us. as the military withdrawals, we will take over, we, the department, will take over cer

i did not agree with that in iraq because we brought al-qaeda from iraq. i believe that the leaders of the damage us is there and we must eradicate the threat. host: our next call for rep joe sestak. mark supports the president. caller: good morning. let me commend c-span for not putting party lines. on the president's decision, i'm sure he got a real long and hard. his party is questioning him now, but i do think he made the right decision. i know he opposed the war in iraq, but we are still in iraq. we are still maintaining stability. the only thing that bothers me is that he does not command of the surge in iraq because of afghanistan. how can you mention the pullout on war when nobody knows how long it will take? nobody knows how the commanders on the ground will stipulate how the troops should move. when i look at the time date, one year is in there now. it is perfect timing for his reelection, and then some of the troops coming home, and then he claims victory. that is the only reason he would do that. i commend the man for making a very tough decisi

in iraq all the problems in iraq were caused by a single individual, saddam hussein. i think there's an effort in sudan to suggest bashir as a single individual is the problem. this is a gross simplification of these conflicts and not on to whitewash these people who were all indeed criminal persons who did very criminal things, but to suggest that certainly in the case of yugoslavia, there were many villains and it was a complex war that could not be reduced to single personalities but nevertheless there was an effort to simplify it by reducing it to single personalities because that plays much better in public relations terms. what's very striking is not just that it was accepted by the public but a lot of intellectuals who really should have known better with advanced training and degrees from ivy league institutions seem to accept these very simplified accounts of what actually happened. indeed, you'll see some really very intelligent people. a social theorist said, and yugoslavia you a over when milosevic became president of serbia. as if all the problems were ca

already in iraq.itute innovation to help the iraqi's clear and secure neighborhoods to help them protect the local population and to help ensure that iraqi forces left behind were capable of providing security. notwithstanding secretary or senator reid's statement that the war is lost, and the search is not a compassing anything stated back in april of 2007. the search did create space for political solution and reconciliation. my question would be did the success of the iraqi search inspired afghan search? what lessons learned from that surge pro and con, or incorporate into the troop deployment? secondly, i agree that we need an exit strategy. but shouldn't it have been kept secret?

it was the generals, mccystal and betray us, fresh fro iraq, -- mcchstal and petraeus, fresh from iraq, who argd for troops on the groun mcchstal may have one of the troops, but joe biden may have onwon theresident's mind. ving the withdwal in 18 mohs is a very strange, unusual ent. he is saying to his generals, "i willive you a year-and-a-half, show me we canin this, otherwise we are ait." >> wonder if its even a year and a half. , maand june, with the congressiol elections giving up, if they areot making measurable progress in the southern pronces in helmand, kaahar, if we don'tee real results on the gund, there will be a real amor to get t. it would shock me if we start to pull thelug. >> o troops will on be in by the enaugust. >> but thelamor -- to clamor our you are talking to schedules. >> he has put a rush on this. the army is going t have problems. >> there i only one figure tt counts, and that is casualti. if a 500 americans are dyi, and in that war, you can forget public sport, public -- popular support and that war, mcchrystal, petraeus, forget it. >> the were high casualtie

in iraq we had success reaching out to former adversaries. we must pursue a similar process in afghanistan, while understanding it is a very different country. there's an uncompromising core of the taliban. they must be met with force. and they must be defeated. but there are also those who have taken up arms because of coercion or simply for a price. these afghans must have the option to choose a different course. that's why we'll work with local leaders, the afghan government an international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province. as their ranks dwindle, an enemy that has nothing to offer the afghan people but terror and aggression, must be further isolated. we'll continue to respect the rights of all afghans, including women and girls. going forward, we'll not blindly stay the course, instead we'll have clear metrics to mick progress and hold ourselves accountable. we will measure the growth of afghanistan's economy and its illicit marketic production. we'll evaluate whether we're using the right tools and tactics to

we have done so in iraq. we seek to do that in afghanistan, president karzai recognizes that the bush doctrine remains intact. that promoting freedom and a stable self-governing country in afghanistan lays out the foundation consist ten with the bush doctrine which is, provide for that foundation of legitimate government. if that happens, the voice of the people is heard, and the voice of the people is heard through the ballot box and other means of self-expression, freedom of press will be another one, then the tension diminishes, we don't have to have revolutions in america because we have elections in america. . there's dispute resolution and a legitimate means under the rule of the law. president karzai understands the bush doctrine is very much alive, that the directive of the strategy that was laid out by president obama actually maintains and holds the bush doctrine intact. it does so with a minimum number of resources, and we are going to have to look forward to say the utter excellence of our noble a

the equipment, at 95% out of iraq.our folks in this last rotation have been doing a magnificent job phasing down, breaking trail for the much larger army, shipment of equipment that is going to follow. evacuating are stuck both through kuwait and jordan as well. -- our stock both through kuwait and jordan as well. a lot of it is going to afghanistan. a lot of the things coming out of iraq are getting a very rapid rehab in theater and are making their way to afghanistan to be able to support the additional troop requirements there. what i told the troops in iraq is that the most dangerous thing that our corps is doing today is happening in afghanistan. the most important thing we're doing today is happening in iraq. and that is because we are sealing the win there. they are making sure that although the clock is ticking down and we are on the other guys' 5 yard line, that they do the right things to close this out. the reason that is so critically important is that it is the first battle of this extended war against ext

in iraq, 150 americans lost their lives this year. that toll is nearly half what it was in 2008, when 314 u.s. troops died. 2009 ended with some positive economic news. the labor department reported new claims for unemployment fell unexpectedly to their lowest levels since july 2008. but for all of 2009, nearly 14 million people claimed unemployment. stocks on wall street closed out the final day of the year's trading on a down note. the dow jones industrial average lost 120 points to close at 10,428. the nasdaq fell 22 points to close at 2269. but for the year, wall street made a major comeback, rebounding from 2008's dismal drop. the nasdaq climbed almost 44 percent, while the dow gained nearly 19%. ruth lilly the last surviving great-grandchild of pharmaceutical magnate eli lilly died last night in indianapolis. over the course of her life, lilly gave away the bulk of her inheritance some $800 million dollars. most of it went to charitable organizations and arts groups based in indiana. she also gave a $100 million dollar donation

now is primarily afghanistan and iraq. that's perfectly straightforward. and what's the justification for it? in afghanistan the justification we hear again and again is that we have to protect women and girls from the, you know, actions of the taliban. we have to let the girls go to school, for example. and, you know, it's a very, it's an argument that pulls at your heart strings and among reasonable people at least in the west very few would dispute the fact that, you know, it's a good thing that women and girls be protected from, you know, attacks by people like the taliban, and the taliban are, generally speaking, an ugly political group. i think most of us would agree on that. and it's a very effective argument for war. and that's the main argument, at least that i'm hearing right now. the humanitarian need to help the afghan people, particularly women and girls, but the afghan people more generally, protect themselves against the taliban. but at what price? is the cure worse than the disease? i think it's starting to look like that in afghanistan. an

and you have experience as well in iraq? guest: yes, i was in iraq for two years. this is my first time in afghanistan. i have been in the marine corps about 10 years now. host: tell us about what a typical day is like for you in your duties there and afghanistan and what did -- to this day is like in afghanistan, this holiday, this christmas day. guest: my duties are basically, i am a commander. i basically take packs and equipment to different basis in the alr of kabul. host: we are going to take some calls from viewers as we will be talking to a number of service members. the numbers to call are on your screen. sergeantsstiffarm is the first -- sgt stiffarm is the first of this morning. what will the troop increase mean to you in afghanistan? guest: that would mean to me that i get another chance to come over here and make a difference. that is what is important to me. host: sargent, tell us about what motivated you in the first place to join the marine corps. guest: what motivated me was when i was in third grade, had a sponsor. these send me some gifts from ko

i believe it was a big mistake to go into iraq. but i believe in what the gentlewoman there said, as far as this would have been better to go in in 2002, 2003, where they were ready and they were willing and but now they're not as willing and acceptable of us being over there. zphr thank you for the call. this is maybe a side bar part of story but do you have any insight of what led to the discussion as to why west point instead of washington or oval office address? guest: a little bit. an oval office address thought shouldn't be more than ten minutes. people lose interest. it's not a dynamic setting. he wanted an audience. he felt that the speech works better with an audience. and west point speaking to cadets who are going to be going to excute this strategy seemed like a very powerful and symbolic venue for them. the cadets themselves, though, you know, it's a military academy. they're very disciplined. they did not show a lot of emotion during the speech. they were essentially told ahead of time by the commandant of the academy

so i went to iraq.senators do when they go to iraq, which is to look at the conflict through the present -- the prism of the military mission, i went specifically to oversee contract in and what was going on with contrasting. i spent more time in kuwait, which would surprise some of you, then i spent in theater. and i had many different things that happened on that trip that are seared into my hard drive. realizations about the lack of coordination and integration between various pots of money. amazing lapses in scoping contracts and making contracts definite enough they could be in force, particularly from any kind of accountability stand. in the government and getting their money that -- fromt he standpoint when it did then -- in getting their money back when it did been used and misused by contractors. i will tell you how bad the problem was in iraq. we were sitting in a roroom in iraq. and as is often the case, when you get a briefing from the military, there was a power. point. there must be in law

. >> same thing in iraq. and, again, we had to, you know, so general mcchrystal's challenge as was the challenge for the commander in iraq is to understand who can do what, employ them to the fullest extent possible and then figure out how to complement what it is that they can contribute with the actions of other forces that can truly do everything everywhere. >> what do you mean by -- >> senator, i have to interrupt. >> if the general could clarify whether some means a majority or -- >> clarify it but it would mean you have three minutes more than anybody else. clarify for the record or -- >> i would be happy to do that sir, thanks. >> we can do another round. there is no problem in that. i want to be fair to everybody here if we can. senator cardin. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. first, let me thank secretary lew and ambassador eikenberry and general petraeus for your service. you all are providing extraordinary talent to our nation and we thank you very much. general petraeus, i just really want to

forces in iraq. the president is suggesting, is proposing a timeline for the beginning of a transition of responsibility for security in afghanistan. we will review this formally in december of 2010. and make the, decide then whether our strategy is working and whether we think we are in a position, whether we need to make adjustments but the president's clear intent and his decision is we will begin that process, but the key is to -- to realize that i guess another point i'd make is that in iraq, as soon as the surge was clearly going to be successful, the iraqis wanted us out as quickly as possible. that's not entirely clear in afghanistan. the afghans live in a very tough neighborhood. they have been at war for 30 years. it would be understandable if they would enjoy having the united states army and marine corps there for a, an extended period of time to provide protection. we're not prepared to do that. and so what the president has tried to do is set in place something that demonstrates resolve

i provide my assessment of the situation in iraq as commander of the multi-national force in iraq andi appreciate this opportunity to discuss the way ahead in afghanistan. let me state up front thapt i fully support the policy president obama announced at west point last week. success in afghanistan is necessary and afeign abttainable challenges are greats. the united states and its isep partners can defeat and set conditions in afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of the sanctuaries that enjoyed there prior to 9/11 and we can degrade the capabilities of the afghan taliban and other extremist elements while building afghan security forces that can increasingly lead the fight against the taliban allowing international forces to redeploy over time, but none of this will be easy. improving the capacity of the afghan government will also be difficult, as ambassador eikenberry forthrightly observed during the deliberations of the president's national security team. nonetheless, while certainly difficult, or different, and in some ways tougher than iraq, afghanistan is no more hopeless th

let me draw another analogy to iraq.in iraq, once it was clear the surge was working, it was pretty plain that the iraqis wanted us out about as fast as possible. the security agreement and everything flowed from that. that is not entirely clear in afghanistan. they live in a very rough neighborhood. we have a balancing act here and the centerpiece of our debate for the last several months is, how you did the afghans to begin to step up the responsibility for their own future, there on security in a way that allows us to have confidence that they will not once again become the safe haven for al qaeda? the hearing now that balance in terms of how you incentivize and get a sense of urgency to the afghan, and at the same time signal results to our adversaries, was the tough part of this for us. >> i appreciate that answer. >> to me that is the essence of moving down the road to victory in afghanistan. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i was going to start out with the in that status, that it has been pretty well covered right now

army's approach in war in iraq. really intellectual work in understanding it and then also, as a commander and forcing down a new idea of counterinsurgency down through the ranks. that said, it struck me that petraeus was very, very active in selling this new policy in the spring of 2007. president bush leaned on him a lot. i'm writing a article in the post about how general petraeus had been mentioned by president bush at least once a week for something like 3 of running weeks, total of 53 times. petraeus was very visible at that point. petraeus to my mind has been almost invisible on iraq and afghanistan for the last few months. that may be a thing and maybe hey, the president doesn't need me to be out in front. but, i do have the sense that if petraeus was so active on the iraq policy in '07 with president bush, after tonight, after the president's speech, i would expect him as a good officer to do the same thing for president obama in the coming weeks. >> host: why do you think he has been, as you say, invisible

all of the ingredients for a civil war in iraq@@@@@@"': -- i think the next year in iraq, 2010, willbe like 2003 and 2007, a real turning point year. . run about afghanistan that i am about iraq for two reasons. first, iraq does not strike me as having a coherent national identity. it is still very much its part, the kurds, shiites, sunnis. and afghans do still have a national identity, despite their years of warfare. the sec and more important reason is afghanistan has experienced is limited extremism in the government in kabul and the vast majority of afghans did not like it. they do not like the corrections and abuses of the kabul government, either. if you force them to make a choice, they might pick the taliban. there was a good interview in the stars and stripes with an afghan soldier who said, we did not like the taliban, but at least they did not break our little boys like the police do. that is a chilling point. host: next call, grand rapids, minn., robert on the democrats' line. caller: did you write a book about the history of the united states and overkill in intervention

before services in iraq.en holding us back on late-based life support is not knowing exactly what the requirements are born to be. now that president has made decisions requiring the drawdown and other@@@@@@@ @ @ @ contractors, so if we needed to increase requirements, which we obviously need to do now, we would have that capacity in there. plus, we did not want to have a single point of failure. which is what we recognize in iraq. we were tied to kbr in iraq and kbr decided not to perform any more, we did not have a back up. this way, if we have performance problems with one of the contractors, we will have two there in the theater on the other one can pick up. i know you have concerns about the way that we structured these task orders. we recognize that if we were going to select one for the north and one for the south, we would have to find a way to preserve the competition that we had with those awarded the task orders. we established a service price matrix and took about 80% of all of the key services th

and you have experience as well in iraq? guest: yes, i was in iraq for two years. this is my first time in afghanistan. i have been in the marine corps about 10 years now. host: tell us about what a typical day is like for you in your duties there and afghanistan and what did -- to this day is like in afghanistan, this holiday, this christmas day. guest: my duties are basically, i am a commander. i basically take packs and equipment to different basis in the alr of kabul. host: we are going to take some calls from viewers as we will be talking to a number of service members. the numbers to call are on your screen. sergeantsstiffarm is the first -- sgt stiffarm is the first of this morning. what will the troop increase mean to you in afghanistan? guest: that would mean to me that i get another chance to come over here and make a difference. that is what is important to me. host: sargent, tell us about what motivated you in the first place to join the marine corps. guest: what motivated me was when i was in third grade, had a sponsor. these send me some gifts from ko

we were against the war in iraq.what about an exit strategy that was promoted that america as a democracy you is not able to fight a guerrilla war. we should really be moving into a defensive strategy, which we could do well. as a democracy, we cannot with all the conflicting issues have a coherent policy for settlements on the west bank. we cannot stop it. >> the short answer to your question is we tried a defensive policy between 1998 when they declared war on us and september 11th, 2001. we ended up with september 11th, 2001. i sat in the situation room in the white house when we launched cruise missiles. that is a very difficult strategy to carry out because we have to be lucky in foiling every single plot. they have to be lucky once or twice to have a devastating effect on us. we may get their -- there. if it is not working in 18 months, we need to be honest and rigorous and say it is not working. then we may have to go to that strategy. i would rather try to find out whether there is a better alternative to the

we did it in iraq. we are in danger to a certain extent losing it in afghanistan as the face a threat to this country that has a high degree of mobility. and, senator corker i think it's made some really valid points and we have heard again and again this question about time line versus concepts and i am going to mention something on that again, but before i do, i want to just-- secretary gates i want to give you might you want something you said just to clarify byfield for the record when you said in your view a lot of afghanistan people don't want us to leave and that being one of the motivations behind appointing some sort of a date on the process and perhaps that is more true among people who are in the government then it is afghanis writ large. i would comment there is in asia foundation survey this year, which shows that 56% of those surveyed were sympathetic to anti-government groups that use violence against us and this is the country as i mentioned yesterday that has long history of opposing an

the second one, the unsettled the outstanding issues between iraq and -- kuwait and iraq. these are the first to. in the manner of concentric circles, they focused on the members unsolved needs and branch out. in this case to iran and iraq in different ways in terms of the threat that each has seen and then yemen and then after that to the arab-israeli conflict and some of the issues pertaining to pakistan and afghanistan. that is the sequence and the priority they have focused on at that time. with regard to iraq, one would be surprised if they speak about iraq less at the summit's then one would imagine or expect or belief. the reason has to do going back to 1976 and their memories of iraq's view towards all six of these countries. their forms of government, their lacking in agriculturally and industrial sectors, lacking in the energy and leadership of the baath party. so this suspicion about iraq's altman intentions, not just towards kuwait but the others is [unintelligible] and the same with iran. it has to do with march 1975. if i had to say one single agreement that

so i went to iraq. and the purpose of my trip was not to do what many senators do when they go to iraq, which is to look at the conflict through the present -- the prism of the military mission, i went specifically to oversee contract in and what was going on with contrasting. i spent more time in kuwait, which would surprise some of you, then i spent in theater. and i had many different things that happened on that trip that are seared into my hard drive. realizations about the lack of coordination and integration between various pots of money. amazing lapses in scoping contracts and making contracts definite enough they could be in force, particularly from any kind of accountability stand. in the government and getting their money that -- fromt he standpoint when it did then -- in getting their money back when it did been used and misused by contractors. i will tell you how bad the problem was in iraq. we were sitting in a roroom in iraq. and as is often the case, when you get a briefing from the mili