just like i personally did with james dobbins, we did very good things. but we also made mistakes. the same thing that is happening today. a lot of very good things are happening, but not everything is perfect. a new approach is needed. that new approach, we think, quite a few interesting elements in this report. i will stop there. james dobbins will tell you the truth. >> you will have to speak for yourself about those early mistakes. [laughter] i agree with both of the mistakes that you mentioned. one of the things that struck us as we did our research for this report to was the overwhelming support within afghan society for some kind of process of negotiation, a combination. -- accommodation. polling shows is strikingly strong majority that wants a peace settlement, that are prepared to make some unspecified accommodations to get a peace settlement. what is interesting is that there is strong support -- even in the segments of society that one would assume would be the most skeptical -- this support is not universally shared among the political representatives, all boat is impor

and finally, james dobbins, director of the security defense policy center at rand. thank you very much. i am glad you could join us today. let me invite just to the stage. >> thank you so much. thank you all for coming. two years ago, as the new obama administration confronted the imminent collapse of the neglected project to reconstruct and secure afghanistan, washington's thinktank beehive was above with excitement about counterinsurgency as the elixir to cure a deterioration situation -- you're a deteriorating situation. -- to cure a deteriorating situation. major troop reinforcements could gain ground, but this has been for 30 years a war with lots of foreign hands and maybe too many intelligence services. the and the game would not be shocked and off, but after a regional and global politics. financial support from the carnegie corporation, the rockefeller brothers fund, and active collaboration with the german foundation, we embark on a project to look at afghanistan in its regional and led byateral dimensions lend i tax force composed by a distinguished peopl

special representative from 1997 to 1999, as well as 2001 to 2004, and finally james dobbins, director of the policy from at the research division at rand and special envoy for afghanistan. thank you very much. let me now invest jeffrey laurenti to the stage. jeff? >> thank you very much, steve. thank you all for coming. two years ago as the new obama administration confronted the eminent collapse of the neglected project to reconstruct and secure afghanistan, washington think tank was a buzz with excitement about counterinsurgency as the cure the desperating situation. from the century foundation in new york, reflecting with our friends at the carnegie corporation, we were doubtful that this would end what was already's afghanistan's 30-year war. major troop reinforcements could recoop loss ground, but this had been for 30 years a war with lots of foreign hands. and perhaps too many foreign intelligence services involved to be set right by yet another military solution. the end game would not be shock and awe we thought, but afghan regional and global politics. so enlisting financial