effectively enforcing the terms of the jcpoa will require more than just additional inspectors. while inspectors are vital, the iaea will also be required to train a new generation of nuclear scientists and to continue to develop more and more innovative nuclear detection and monitoring technologies as well. and you know taking is complex as it is important. so that's why, mr. president, i urge congress to increase america's voluntary contribution to the iaea to a level at least $10.6 million above the president's 2016 request and commit to a sustained and long-term investment so that we can be confident that the iaea has the resources to recruit, to train, and to place the very best inspectors the world can produce. the increase of $130eu 6 million that i'm urging will provide reliable fundin funding for the, the funding they need to monitor the iran nuclear program while continuing to work for a secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology throughout the rest of the world. it would not crowd out other contributions from other states. extra funding could be directed to specifi

the mxm in the jcpoa. there is a fairly long paragraph written most recent report from on iran says iran has seals that transmit information to inspectors enter the use of online enrichment on a terry. -- onlinenue monitoring. they continue this. the real challenge with iran is not verifying what is going on at the facility. iranian declared facilities that declared a enrichment plant, even before the jcpoa, and arer, a much smaller -- much smaller than most places. if you look at the smaller plant in terms of the easier it is to safeguard. iran wantstions, if to save the deal from a nuclear facility. the amount procured could remove any detective abilities in grams. it is very small that it could remove from a declared facility. the new technology is somewhat helpful in reducing the safeguards for the iea, making it cheaper for the iea to do verification. they can do this very well even with the jcpoa. finding the existence of undeclared facilities is the challenge. the jcpoa, the measures contained in th

iran has complied with the jcpoa. i highlight major commitments just because the biggest steps iran had to take frankly in rolling back its program are things they've already taken. shipping the stockpile out of the country, removing amount of centrifuge infrastructure, converting their reactor, allowing for inspections and transparency measures to be put into place. so we do believe that they are complying with the jcpoa. the ballistic missile launches, you know, this is a nuclear deal. we've always been very clear that jcpoa is about rolling back and constraining iran's nuclear program. we were also clear that they were going to continue to be engaged in behavior that we found counterproductive. ballistic missiles, support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the region, that's not the nuclear deal. it's a separate set of issues in which we have the ability to respond. and so even as we've provided sanctions relief under the nuclear deal, we've actually added additional designations, additional sanctions relat

the missiles were left outside of jcpoa. jcpoa stands by itself. the missiles are separate track, the arms are a separate track. and we purposefully did not want to confuse the implementation and accountability for the implementation with these other things. so that's why we put additional sanctions on because of the missile launch on three entities and eight individuals. now, you raise the question about 2016, if not now, when. well, now is a good time, sir, to have the discussion. this is part of the discussion. we're having it here today. and i'm saying to you that we should be informed in whatever we choose to do on the isa by how well the implementation goes, by how necessary it is to be thinking about a concern about the application of the sanctions. we don't need -- excuse me. we don't need the isa. >> right. i'm sorry, i'm out of time, but i just wanted to ask, is one of the reasons that there's a hesitation to go forward now even after implementation day is that iran is going to view this as -- interpret this as some sort of violation of t

i wrote a letter saying no, it does not violate jcpoa.explained and defended the law and made clear to them we were going to keep our jcpoa commitments. now, the -- what we're doing is actually following the letter of the law, but you have to -- please, would like you to understand that our friends, our allies, french, germans, british, others, are deeply concerned about the impact of this law inadvertent on their citizens. they have dual nationals. if one of those dual nationals just travels to iran, all of a sudden, and they're in a visa waiver program and they're a very legitimate business person -- >> if i could just use my time, look, i wrote the law -- >> let me just finish -- >> i'm the author of the bill. i understand the intent of the law. we had conversations with the white house. you tried to get this business exemption written into the law. that was rejected by the leadership and the congress. and the time to have changed that was prior to the president signing it into law. once you sign it, the president signed it into law, y

stack clearly the jcpoa is not continuing to train them on the ballistic missile program. would you agree with me on that? >> i would agree senator and what i would say is what we in the people in the region are concerned about is barely have an over match with numbers of ballistic missiles. the people in the region remain concerned about their cybercapability and their ability to mind the straits and certainly that to the other quds forces which we seem aligned activity not only throughout the region but all around the globe as well so there are a number of things that lead me to personally believe that their behavior, they haven't changed any course yet. this is something we will continue to watch. >> i would argue that clearly the sanctions the administration did put in place what i've said from the beginning are pathetic and weak are having absolutely no impact given that they are not continuing to test ballistic missiles and i would hope that we would up our game and impose real tough sanctions on iran on our ballistic missile program. i want to follow up on an import

and of course this follows on after the jcpoa was signed. the ballistic missile test that they did in november and october this year. clapper has testified before this committee that would be their preferred method for delivering a nuclear weapon. are you concerned about their continuing pursuit of testing ballistic missiles? >> i am, senator. >> what are the implications of that? >> well, certainly we hope that jcpoa will prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in near and midterm, forever hopefully, but this is something we'll continue to watch. >> clearly the jcpoa is not continuing deterring them on the ballistic missile program. would you agree with me on that? >> i would agree, senator. what i would say is that what we and the people in the region are concerned about is that they already have overmatch with numbers of ballistic missiles. the people in the region remain concerned about their cyber capabilities their ability to mine the straights, and certainly activity of their qods forces. when e see around the region an around th

security council and iaea resolutions the agency will only monitor and verify iran's compliance with jcpoacommitments and will no longer provide broad reporting on its nuclear program. you write the board of governors closed the file. but it gets worse you write. not only are the new iaea reports much narrower in focus they omit data how iran is complying with the nuclear deal. how do you explain this? >> those that follow this issue were puzzled over the last few months these reports became vark data was missing and certain things were not being reported. the head of the iaea said well my answer guy under the nuclear deal security council and iaea resolutions that provide inspection mandates to do this were removed. i also believe that the iaea has been told privately by the united states and western states do not report on this any more because iran does not want detailed reports and we want this deal to go through. >> your reaction to what john kirby said earlier this week. he said we're confident that the iaea has the authority to do its job and that the access it needs to verify compl

>> we hope the jcpoa will prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in near to mid term in forever. this is something we'll continue to watch. >> clearly the jcpoa is not continuing to deter them on the missile program. would you agree with me? >> i would agree on that. they already have overmatch with numbers of ballistic missiles. the people in the region remain concerned about their cyber capability and we see malign activity not only throughout the region but around the globe as well. there's a number of things that lead me to believe that they're behavior is not -- they haven't changed any course yet. this is something we'll continue to watch. >> i would argue the sanctions the administration did put in place, which i've said from the beginning are pathetic and weak and having no impact given that they are now continuing to test missiles. i would hope we would up our gain and post real sanctions on their missile program. this is something i've asked both your predecessors about, my concern is where will we detain these individuals under long term law of detention. most importa

they are separate from the jcpoa.d they were purposely separated in the context of these negotiations to protect our ability to be able to push iran if they engage in those activities. now, we just sanctioned iran on january 16th. we sanctioned three entities and eight individuals for their support, for the missile activities. and we have made it very clear to iran that if it chooses to engage in those activities going forward there will be further activity. secondly, mr. chairman, we haven't lost our ability to put the sanctions in place or snap back as i said to you, they are not reliant. that power is not reliant on the iran sanctions act. >> my time is expired so i'm going to go now to mr. engel, the ranking member of this committee. >> thank you. i'm going to throw out a few things and ask you to comment on them. first of all, to continue on on iran. what steps are we taking and will we take to combat iran's support for terrorism, what are we doing to make sure that israel will be safe as iran rearms and continue

consider to be prevailing positive inenvironment and detrimental of the good-faith implementation of the jcpoabasically they say no big deal. we're back with the panel. it seems like there are growing calls, charles from, both sides of the aisle to put sanctions on iran. >> but what obama did is he dismantled this whole prohibition in advance. the iranians are actually right. the 2010 security council resolution said iran shall not engage in any activities relate to do ballistic missiles. so, at the very last minute in vienna, in order to get the deal over the finish line, kerry caved in changed the language so that the current existing security council resolution it calls upon iran not to engage. the russians, of course, seized on that because it was understood that means you go from a binding commitment to nonbinding and said we are not going to approve any sanctions. and our u.n. ambassador, samantha power whines today and says russia seems to be lawyering its way and look for reasons not to act. well, surprise, surprise. what did you expect? you are shocked that the russians are supporting

first president obama as i earlier said with jcpoa has regained a little ground. but a considerable cost. not least of which isn't even more robust military to military relationship, intelligence relationship, and has been highlighted, and increasing funding may be bought a billion dollars but it is you went away to morecambe if all the previous military and diplomatic advice had been followed come if we have not assisted in setting up an experiment that would result in ethnic cleansing, akin to our own indian wars, in the heart of palestine, even if we had not managed to unbalance major our own approach to the precarious dance required to manage such a concoction of even if all had gone swimmingly since 1940 with regard to israel, the region in question, southwest asia in the middle east, call it what you will, would still be a boiling cauldron of instability chaos and wreckage. in short, were there no state of israel at all the region would still be mms. or settled the israeli-palestinian challenge tomorrow with a decent two-state solution that worked and the sa

i understand you sent a letter -- >> explaining that it didn't violate jcpoa. we have an interest obviously in being able to guarantee that iran over a period of time or any other country may be able to change, maybe able to move to a different posture. and our belief is from a national security point of view that if people are able to do legitimate business, that over a period of time that changes things. we look at what's happening in vietnam today for instance, or we look at what's happening in burma, other countries. transformation takes place, and we believe that transformation is in the national security interests of our country and some of it comes from entrepreneurial activity where people are able to see and do better. >> that's a good answer, sir, but let me reference a -- reclaiming my time, let me reference a white paper that the state department put out that says as discussed in the legal paper, which we have asked for a copy of the legal paper referencing this white paper and have not seen that yet, but it says as discussed in the legal paper this

jcpoa if it continues success into the future has been a tremendous gain to start to defuse a very dangerousituation. where i would fault the administration is that it was very late to recognize that come with the exception of united kingdom, the other nuclear weapons state did not buy into the prague agenda. it took several years for the administration to get it thinking around that. part of the administration that still don't understand that. second, a failure that in conjunction with the first point i made to push back against putin and the nuclear saber rattling. third, despite frank's very valiant efforts to push back against the ins violation, he's been undercut by some of his seniors who at the same time he is pushing to get the russians back into compliance with the treaty are saying, but really we are ready to talk about a new strategic arms committee, thereby signaling it may not be that important. and, finally, the administration shares blame with theongress and the budget control act for failing to do anything seriously about modernizing our strategic forces for the bulk of the a

jcpoa, if a continue successfully into the future, has been a to mend us gain to start to diffuse a veryangerous situation. where it would fall the administration is that it was , with theto recognize exception of the united kingdom, the other nuclear weapons states did not buy into it and it took several years for the administration to get its thinking around that. there are parts of the administration the stolen understand it. with then conjunction first point i made, to push back against vladimir putin and the nuclear treaty and third, despite the valiant efforts to push back against the imf violation, he has been undercut by some of the seniors who while he is pushing to get the russians back into compliance with the treaty are saying we are ready to talk about a new strategic arms treaty thereby signaling it may not be that important. finally, the administration shares blame with the congress and the budget control act for failing to do anything seriously about modernizing our strategic forces for the bulk of the administration. you can look at the fact that the strategic program ha

under the jcpoa a lot disturbing in effect for the next eight years. my concern is andy kay maybe he acknowledged of how, but look, i have five children, for have been to college. all four have change their majors in college. someone can come into i'm not going to study nuclear engineering, go to school in fact take nuclear engineering courses. to have a safeguard to make sure that iranians don't come here and literally gain access to what i believe is the best education in the world, technical education in the world, to go back and build weapons against us? how do we safeguard against the? >> it isn't in my speech that is probably i.c.e. i imagine? >> we will be happy to get with you or your staff spirit i would appreciate that. that's of some concern to me because people can come your. we don't know their intention. they will fill out a form that says they want to be a history major and independent and injured in school learning things that will come back to bite us. thank you very much. i yield back. >> mr. chairman, thank you so much. to questions.

. >> and you made the point that this is not a violation of the jcpoa, but the nuclear deal itself wasbacked up with u.n. security council resolutions. so if iran feels comfortable violating one, why would they not feel comfortable violating the rest of it? >> well, i guess the point is that they haven't. and the international community has inspectors in place to verify iran's ongoing compliance with the nuclear agreement. and there obviously are no guarantees that iran will fulfill their commitments, but we certainly will know if they don't. and that's because we do have the most intrusive set of inspections that have ever been imposed on a country's nuclear program that are now in place with respect to iran's program. that required them to cooperate with putting those inspections and those mechanisms in place to review not just their nuclear facilities but also -- or their enrichment facilities, but also as it relates to their nuclear stockpile and even things like uranium mines and uranium mills, you know, the effect iive chang to their plutonium reactor that essentially render it h

the jcpoa required iran to complete key nuclear steps verified before any sanctions were removed. iran has shipped out 25,000 pounds of low enriched uranium thereby trip hreupbg its breakout time. iran has removed the core of its iraq heavy water plutonium reactor and has rendered it unusable. iran is also limited to 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to only 3.67% which is below weapons grade. these are positive steps towards preventing iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. but they came at a time when the world community possessed the most leverage and iran had the most to lose by not complying with the deal. now in the aftermath of implementation day and with certain sanctions relief provided to iran, we must remain increasingly vigilant in our efforts to counter the iranian regime support for terrorism and violations of human rights of their own people. the iranian regime must understand that there will be consequences for violations however minor of the jcpoa. if iran seeks a nuclear weapon, the world community led by the united states is ready to implement the snap back of sa

doing and administration is doing to monitor that cooperation and any potential violations of the jcpoa in terms of nuclear proliferation between those two countries? >> yes, at this point in time, we do not assess that there is a violation, but we have in place restrictions under the u.n. security council resolutions to be able to act, if there are. director clapper is on target, and he's accurate, and we agree with that assessment, and we're working very closely to address that. i think we're on the verge of having an agreement hopefully with china. in fact i'm meeting with the chinese foreign minister this afternoon. we are very hopeful that we know we've made progress in the negotiation in new york in coming up with a substantial and improved -- with the u.n. security council resolution with respect to what we will do with the results of the activity. so we're taking both national steps and multilateral steps. we have entered the conversations with south korea on the t.h.a.d. missile deployment, t.h.a.d. defensive system deployment, and we obviously have other options available to u

they are separate from the jcpoa and they were purposely separated in the context of these negotiationsto protect our ability to be able to push iran if they engage in those activities. now, we just sanctioned iran on january 16th, we sanctioned three entities and eight individuals for their support for the missile activities. and we have made it very clear to iran that if it chooses to engage in those activities going forward there will be further activity. secondly, mr. chairman, we haven't lost our ability to put the sanctions in place or snap back as i said to you. they are not reliant. that power is not reliant on the iran sanctions act. >> my time has expired so i'm going to go now to mr. eliot engel, the ranking member of this committee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, i'll throw out a few things and ask you to comment on them. first of all to continue on iran, what steps are we taking and will we take to combat iran's support for terrorism and other malign activities? what are we doing to make sure that israel will be safe as iran re-arms and continues to arm hezbolla