of course of the time he was still the jic chair. >> i was talking about jic. the assistance team, yes. >> we are going to turn the question now to a different topic. >> i would like to turn from the intelligence aspect and ask you about your work in the period of 2002 and early 2003 with regard to communicating with the ever met iraqi policy to the media and public and answer the public's considerable concerns and questions. the meeting after crawford the prime minister set out certain priorities sometimes in the course conditions of supporting the united states. the top three were taking the u.n. route and advancing the middle east peace process and gaining support of public opinion. in your diary at the beginning of september 2002, you write it was clear the public opinion moved against us during august. i want you to tell us how you said about dealing with this beyond the dossier what were your methods of dealing with this problem? >> there was nothing terribly fancy. the most unprecedented move was the publication of the dossier. we had at one point with t

at the time he was still jic. >> i was talking about jic. the assessment team, yes. >> all right we are going to turn the questioning now to a different topic. >> i would like to turn from the intelligence aspect and ask you about your work in the period 2002 to 2003 with regard to communicating the government's iraqi policy to the medium public and answering the public's considerable concerns and questions. immediately after crawford the prime minister set out certain of priorities sometimes called conditions of supporting the united states of the top three taking the ulin route advancing the middle east peace process and gaining support of public opinion in your diary the beginning of september 2002 you write it was clear that public opinion moved against us during august. i'm wanting you to tell us how you set about dealing with this beyond the dossier well was your method, were your methods of dealing with this problem? >> there was nothing terribly fancy or we were not able to see at the time. the most unprecedented move was the publica

of course of the time he was still the jic chair. >> i was talking about jic.e assistance team, yes. >> we are going to turn the question now to a different topic. >> i would like to turn from the intelligence aspect and ask you about your work in the period of 2002 and early 2003 with regard to communicating with the ever met iraqi policy to the media and public and answer the public's considerable concerns and questions. the meeting after crawford the prime minister set out certain priorities sometimes in the course conditions of supporting the united states. the top three were taking the u.n. route and advancing the middle east peace process and gaining support of public opinion. in your diary at the beginning of september 2002, you write it was clear the public opinion moved against us during august. i want you to tell us how you said about dealing with this beyond the dossier what were your methods of dealing with this problem? >> there was nothing terribly fancy. the most unprecedented move was the publication of the dossier. we had at one point with the

taken directly from the jic i believe.o basically the line that has been taken here, put it this way, iraqis knew how to cook but lacked ingredients. as long as sanctions were in place they wouldn't get the ingredients. if sanctions were removed it could would take them five

use -- if i had taken for example the words out of the -- even the 9th of march, 2002, march 2002, jic assessment, it said it was clear then. now, if i said it was clear that... in the forward, rather than i believe beyond doubt, it would have had the same impact. i actually think, now, and this is i think a lesson that came out of the inquiry but it is relevant to this as well and i said this at the time now i would take government right out of this altogether, i would simply have pisublished if they were willing for the jic assessment because they were absolutely strong enough on their own, and if you look at the dossier itself and of course the dossier itself, take the executive summary, and, i mean, i won't go through and read it, but this executive summary was not drawn up by me, it was drawn up by the joint intelligence community and they did it perfectly justifiably on the information they had before them and it is hard to come to any other conclusion than that this person has a continuing wmd program and we'll come at a later point in this, to the issue of what the truth was, a

jic, we already heard is be who served on the jic. sir william airmen. the just doubt phrase was not justifiable would you say the parliament was misled prime minister saying beyond doubt. >> no i wouldn't. >> you wouldn't? okay, thank you can i move on to my final point. broad point from writing what was said this morning you used phrase which i've seen used many times, to describe the threat, the phrase, current, serious and credible threat from iraq. but when the prime minister spoke in the debate in parliament on the 4th much september was reconvened and dossier had been put in the library of the house of commons he used a different phrase. he said, his, meaning saddam hussein's wmd program is active, tailed, and, growing. now what was, the basis, the evidence, the for him to tell parliament that saddam's program was growing? >> it was, within the dossier. it was the story, narrative he was setting out within the dossier. >> but the dossier doesn't use the word growing. >> the dossier may not but the prime minister setting out what he said from the i

i think also in a way it hopefully was of assistance to john of the jic. sense we were so clearly having that relationship because to the rest of government it was sending very, very clear the message that is now the document the prime minister is going to present to parliament. that guy over there, john scarlet, is the man in charge of it. >> but it was sort of anen usual thing. it wasn't a president that chair the meeting with intelligence professionals? >> well, there had been meeting that i had before where intelligence people would have been there. because they had legitimate and appropriate advice to give to me about presentation on communications issues. >> you said after wards which indicated the main headings to be covered. the important of this being a jic product. and in terms that john has to be happy with it. there were two additional points. you do attention to the fact that media will be focused on what's new? and you express pleasure that the intelligence community was going to take a healthy approach in going through their material. what d