he picked joe johnston from obscuri obscurity. he was command of the bayous of mississippi, he had no choice, johnston was in command. the union army that was opposing johnston was based in chattanooga, and when sherman moved into north georgia in 1864, he confronted johnston in his fortifications. and the campaign began and followed a pattern johnston's idea of a perfect battle was to take up a strong position, fortify it, and sit in it. hoping that sherman would attack it, in that case, johnston's fortified men would be able to repulse the attack and win the victory sherman however had made up his mind based on earlier experience, that attacks in the civil war were not likely to work, and it was better to do something else. the pattern of the campaign was set, one general didn't want to fight at all, the other general didn't want to fight unless it was perfect conditions, which never exist. so sherman -- johnston would take up his position, fortified it, sherman would march up in front of it, they would skirmish for a few days, s

he wrote vile things about jefferson davis in his treatment about joe johnston. even some of the northern writers wrote stuff about it. and his main source for writing about the atlanta campaign was edward a. pollard. and greeley said he got his information from johnston, so he knows it must be correct. this would not be the critical thinking one would like among historical writers. johnston also benefited by his early biographers. johnston died in 1891. he had two quick biographies. one of them by badly t., who a dear good friend of his and military subordinate, who confessed in his induction that i love joe johnston and the other ones by his kinsman robert hughes and for 50 or 60 years those were the only two biographies of joe johnston that were available. hood didn't have a biography at all until the middle of the 20th century. johnston benefits from all of these things. he also benefited from trends in civil war writing. the overemphasis on virginia meant that people writing about the war in georgia and atlanta didn't have much to work with and didn't spend a

he picked joe johnston from obscurity. was command of the bayous of mississippi, he had no choice, johnston was in command. the union army that was opposing johnston was based in chattanooga, and when sherman moved into north georgia in 1864, he confronted johnston in his fortifications. and the campaign began and followed a pattern johnston's idea of a perfect battle was to take up a strong position, fortify it, and sit in it. hoping that sherman would attack it, in that case, johnston's fortified men would be able to repulse the attack and win the victory sherman however had made up his mind based on earlier experience, that attacks in the civil war were not likely to work, and it was better to do something else. the pattern of the campaign was set, one general didn't want to fight at all, the other general didn't want to fight unless it was perfect conditions, which never exist. so sherman -- johnston would take up his position, fortified it, sherman would march up in front of it, they would skirmish for a few days, she

all davis cared about was embarrassing joe johnston. this was johnston's basic approach. want longer than that when hood submitted his report, which was a total reverse of johnston. johnston had not been heavily outnumbered. he had chosen to retreat, to abandon the strong positions in north georgia. he had lost some 22,000 moan, johnston claimed he had lost only about 10,000. johnston's army had been demoralized. johnston had passed up many opportunities to strike at the enemy, and the army was so weakened in numbers and morale that not even hood could win success when he replaced johnston. these two views of the campaign which for simp hisity sake we'll call the johnston interpretation and hood interpretation, it echoed from that point down to this. but for most of that time, joseph e. johnston's view of is the xam had prevailed. for one thin hood had failed. the confed razz had not -- and kind of hard to disguise that fact. food recalls reduced to arrangen that i held it longer than johnston had this is sort of like, i did not inhale. for another reason -- one he deserv

joe johnston was just great. it got into books and movies, and it's very difficult to get people to understand that what they see in movies and television is not necessarily so. i had an interesting experience along these lines one time. there was a movie made back i believe in the late '50s called "on the beach." one or two of you look like you might be old enough to remember that. but it's a movie set in australia in the aftermath of the world war iii, the united states, they have killed everybody on earth except the people in australia. those blokes are down there drinking beer and singing and awaiting the arrival of a radioactive cloud to wipe them out, too. and this became the kind of pilot movie for a whole genre of films like this on wiping out all life on earth. there was one i was teaching at north carolina state. i think it was a made for television movie if i recall correctly called "the day after." same thing except they're in indiana or kansas or north dakota or somewhere. i had students come up and

the glass bell jar was fine, but somewhere in the jarring around the little figure of joe johnston had gone -- that seems very symbolic. thank you people. i hope i've given you something to think about. [ applause ]

i will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan in which i am to knock joe johnston and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. i think william tecumseh sherman understands what is expected of him in the coming campaign. and joseph johnston's army of tennessee is indeed to be the first target for sherman's combined army group of the military division of the mississippi. and he'll later summarize this strategy by saying he was to go for lee, and i was to go for joe johnston. that was the plan. the confederate armies would be the first target. but there had by 1864 to be a second target, and that was the war resources. that are mentioned in this order. because by 1864, the confederate states of america had created a capacity principally in central georgia and central alabama, and now you can turn to the handout that i've provided you, and in particular the side that is in the lower right-hand corner labeled number 1. the side with the map of the southeast of the united states on it principally. you'll notice there in central georgia, and central alabama,

he writes in this letter, where joe johnston was claiming, i was never planning to abandon atlanta.mith says, he surely was. these are on the battle of -- the spring hill affair. some of you are aware of this. it is where hood flanked general schofield's army and caught them in the open on the road in the middle of the night, cut them off, had them surrounded. i'm trying to use easy to understand terms. but something happened, and the yankees, the confederates did not block the road and the yankees escaped right up the road. hood claimed he had given orders to block the road. cheatham he had the luxury of outliving hood, and whoever outlives somebody gets the last word. he claimed, i never got the orders. stephen lee says to hood, after the war in 1875, he is imploring hood, you have got to tell the world what happened at spring hill. you have to tell them he did not block the road. in these letters, the first says, " i think you can now write with more profundity. -- than at any time to the state, and possibly it is now your duty." the last one in april 1879, lee is getting really

when i finished my talk, he got up to give me this little figure of joe johnston that he had made. he had a rather sheepish look on his face and he said would you like me to take this and make one of hood? what are you going to do saw off one of the legs? i mean that's what the doctor did. but it's a wonderful little thing. it's a nice item. anybody interested in the civil war would like to have this to put on the mantle piece. i was very glad to get it. i thanked him for it. took it back to the motel that night. i was going down to waco to speak down there. wrapped it up in an old dirty t-shirt, put it very carefully in my suitcase. went down to waco in the rental car the next day. spoke there, came back. went to the airport at dfw. checked the bag to go to washington because i was going up there to a smithsonian program, spend a few days at my brother's doing research in the archives. did that. jar still wrapped up in its t-shirt. went back after i finished to the airport, checked the bag to go back to my home. changed planes in atlanta. they change the bag to the little world wa

he picked joe johnston from obscuri obscurity. he was command of the bayous of mississippi, he had no choice, johnston was in command. the union army that was opposing johnston was based in chattanooga, and when sherman moved into north georgia in 1864, he confronted johnston in his fortifications. and the campaign began and followed a pattern johnston's idea of a perfect battle was to take up a strong position, fortify it, and sit in it. hoping that sherman would attack it, in that case, johnston's fortified men would be able to repulse the attack and win the victory sherman however had made up his mind based on earlier experience, that attacks in the civil war were not likely to work, and it was better to do something else. the pattern of the campaign was set, one general didn't want to fight at all, the other general didn't want to fight unless it was perfect conditions, which never exist. so sherman -- johnston would take up his position, fortified it, sherman would march up in front of it, they would skirmish for a few days, s

i will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan in which i am to knock joe johnston and do as much damage to the muh resources of the enemy as possible. i think william tecumseh shermae understands what is expected of him in the coming campaign. and joseph johnston's army of tennessee is indeed to be the o first target for sherman's r's combined army group of the military division of the y mississippi. and he'll later summarize this strategy by saying he was to goe for lee, and i was to go for joo johnston. that was the plan. the confederate armies would b : the first target. been but there had by 1864 to be a second target, and that was the war resources that are mentionet in this order. because by 1864, the confederata states of america had created a capacity, principally in central georgia and central alabama -- and now you can turn to the handout that i've provided you, and in particular the side that is in the lower right-hand corner labeled number one. the side with the map of the southeast of the united states on it principally. you'll notice there in central georgia