and let us bury once and for all the myth that john foster dulles john foster dulles rent american foreign policy in the eisenhower years. everyone close to both men, and i talk with a number of them, knew that ike was in charge. dwight eisenhower was out of the white house, people hardly believe this, light eyes i was out of the white house for three and half months. accepting tonight on his way to recuperating at gettysburg. drama number two is the one at the heart patient so restricted in his other activities upset about, that is, what he should run for a second term in 1956. i'm satisfied ike always intended to run. in the age of roosevelt you had to have a second term to be a great president. and ike wanted to be a great president. but the heart attack rates the enormous question of whether physically he could run. ike repeatedly discussed possible successors with aids. none of whom had a snowball's chance in hell of getting nominated, let alone elected. the only republican with sufficient stature to run was chief justice earl warren of the supreme court, and if you want to know why i

by the time he returned to the white house on july 15th 1956 john foster dulles decided to withdraw themerican offer of aid to the project, largely because congress was opposed to it. on july 19th 1956, important date, dallas and a 12 minute meeting, 12 minutes, obtained eisenhower's decision to withdraw the offer of aid. he was not on top of the issue. his recovery from surgery had been difficult. he had been plagued with bouts of depression. that afternoon dulles and formed the british ambassador of the decision. the next day dollars proudly told friends that the united states had made a big chess move and that it was in a hell of a spot. a week later in retaliation he nationalized the suez canal company. he would use its profits to build the dam. the british and french controlled that company for decades. two-thirds of the oil came through the canal. now it was the united states and its allies that were in the hellespont. immediately the british and french prepared to go to war. eisenhower was adamant that war was not justified. egypt, he said, had a right to nationalize the canal be

he did not hesitate to use subordinates like secretary of state john foster dulles as lightning rods for controversial policies that were in fact his creation. eisenhower had a wild temper. a timber that exploded like a rocket, but at a tense moment requiring great decisions he was unfailingly cool, koln and deliver it. this was a profoundly religious man who had prayer at the beginning of cabinet meetings. yet when the famous temporary rot income he could turn the air blue with soldierly profanity and he did so frequently. above all, eisenhower saw himself not as a warrior, but as a peacemaker, and that's what this book is about. and tonight at a time of war and unrest in the middle east, it's fitting that we would review the most dangerous international crisis of the eisenhower presidency. that crisis is also in the middle east. this is a tale of the abiding trauma. number one begins september 23rd, 1955 in denver, colorado, on the golf course. the white eisenhower had not enjoyed a vacation so much in years. believe it or not, the president of the united states had himself cooked

relationship since 1954 when pakistan joined the southeast asia treaty organization which was part of john foster dulles' sort of, you know, ring of treaties for containment of communism. so pakistan and the u.s. have been allies for a long time, but sometimes i feel like this is a couple that has been married for a very long time but still doesn't know each other. [laughter] and that is why we have periodic difficulties and differences. pakistan culturally is a society which values relationships and consistency in relationships. the united states has a rell tyly more -- relatively more functional approach, especially in international relations. and that has been the real sore point here between the two. the americans always come and say, you know, let's do this together, and the pakistanis think, ah, this is the beginning of a relationship. and when that is done, the americans say, fine, now, you know, we've got other things to do. and the pakistanis feel this is very disturbing, this is a disturbing trend, the americans are not really our friends. then a few years later something else comes up, and th

sectioned and then we have had a treaty relationship since 94 since the organization just off john foster dulles, back then there of banalize a long time but sometimes i feel this is like a couple that is being married for a long time this still doesn't know each other. [laughter] and that is why we have the periodic difficulties and differences. pakistan culturally is a society which values relationships and consistency in relationships. the united states as a more functional approach especially in international relations, and that a man to say let's do this together and the pakistan-based thing this is the beginning of a relationship and in pakistan the americans say we've got other things to do and the pakistanis feel this is a disturbing trend the americans are not our friends in the something else comes back and they say now we need to do this together. so the most important thing is to understand if there is going to be an american pakistan a partnership, it has to be a long-term strategic partnership and it cannot just be transaction. there are transactions even in the closest of relation

a treaty relationship and pakistan joined the southeast asia organization which is part of john foster dulles' ring of treaties for containment of -- so pakistan in the u.s. have been allies for a long time but sometimes i feel that this is like a couple that has been married for a very long time and still don't know each other. [laughter] and that is why we have periodic difficulties and differences. pakistan culturally is a society which values relationships and consistency in relationships. the united states has a relatively more functional approach especially in international relations and that has been the real sore point here between the two. the americans always come and say give no buts do this together in the pakistanis think, this is the beginning of a relationship and that is done and the american say fine. now you know we have got other things to do and the pakistanis feel this is very disturbing. this is a very disturbing trend and the americans are not really our friends and something else comes up in the american say we need to do this together. the most important thing is to u