john lehman: no. to my knowledge, this was something that came out of the domestic side of the white house. this was something that used to drive henry and al crazy. that very often, things would appear that did not come through kissinger. and obviously came through halderman or early when -- ehrlichman or the domestic sides of the house, or came from the state department, or somehow got into the president without going through kissinger's filter. and this was clearly one of them. because we felt that this was going to lead to, politically was a really weak, almost laughable argument. that would be made. even though you could construct a legal basis around it, it just wouldn't sell from a public relations point of view. and so, you know, this is one of the times when kissinger used to just shake his head. and it was, one of the reasons we chafed the nsc staff for keeping us totally separate from the rest of the white house staff. you really -- he really felt that very strongly. keeping us out of the w

. >> next on american history to tv exerts from an interview with john lehman.s about about joining the foreign-policy team under henry kissinger as well as president nixon's policy towards vietnam and cambodia in the early 70's. he also discusses the administration's arms negotiations with the soviet union and some of the major foreign-policy players of the time. the richard nixon presidential library conducted this interview as a part of a project to document his administration. this is about one hour. john: i came to be the legislative advisor and lobbyist for kissinger, really by default because there was no such thing on the national security council at the time when we came in. and when dick, and i was assistant to dick, when he took over the base, the overall pace study, ---based study, that was all full of congressional relations because the subcommittee, the foreign affairs committee was holding a series of hearings, a major series of hearings on foreign commitments and overseas commitments of which the bases were seem to be -- seen to be a central part

lehman brothers, and the whole thing. the president was there to be in a position to bring the country together. right before he was sworn in, he asked then leader johnhner and i to a meeting, and he was president-elect. i recall the meeting in the lbj room in the senate hearing he came over to us and said i am really serious about learning to work with you. i want us to work together and bring this country back so we can move forward. he indicated that we should bring him our ideas about what should be and what was reported to be coming, the stimulus bill. after the swearing-in, we all went to the white house and met in the roosevelt room. i was so bold at the time that i brought a white paper to show the president. he said bring your ideas, and i did that. the president looked at initially and said there is nothing unreasonable, nothing crazy in here, i think he said. we were very careful not to be crazy in this white paper. i know that what the assumption was that what republicans wanted , tax reform, stimulus, was not going to sell. >> it was essentially a policy memo? eric: a policy memo. the items on the white paper never made it into the stimu