>> that is what jonathan powell said. >> it wasn't for tactile reasons. that if you wanted to make a real change to this whole issue and again this is very important to understanding certainly my strategic thinking but also the strategic thinking of many people who looked at this issue. and i would probably have a far greater understanding of it today and even back then. what i believed we confronted with the new threat that was based on political ideology, but i'm religious fantasist on. it was a complete of the proper faith of islam, but it was real and active and they demonstrated their intent to go very large numbers of us that they possibly could you whatever strength you set out, not for tactical reasons, but deeps, strategic reasons is why did we need to do to make a successful assault on this ideology that was a dangerous? and therefore, the middle east peace process for me was not a kind of tactical thing, it was actually fundamental, still is in my view, to dealing with this issue. >> i think there rodrick wants to comments. >> eisai moment ago

and he made clear to jonathan powell that he was not optimistic that resolution 1441 would provide at it was desirable for him to provide advice at that point.@@@@@@@ ha) now, by then we're into a period in which the armed forces had actually been instructed to prepare for military action, and in which you were moving along the track towards an intended second security council resolution. though, that wasn't tabled until late february, i think about the 24th for memory. don't you think that it would have been useful as he obviously felt if he would've the formal advice of the attorney general ahead of these now increasingly important developments? >> no, i think what was important for him to do was to explain to us what his concerns were. and look, all the way through this, there was a -- as i know myself, lawyers take different views of issues. and an issue such as this, they were bound to take very different views. peter was quite rightly saying to us these are my concerns, this is why i don't think 1441 in itself is enough. we had begun military preparations even before we got the

blair, from jonathan powell, from alastair campbell, among other witnesses, is essentially that it did not matter if the official cabinet committee did not meet, or committees were ad hoc, but what that mattered was that policy on iraq was being discussed intensively with the relative -- with the relevant people, with the appropriate formation, with challenge, with risk assessment, with diversity of views. was that the impression you had? >> absolutely not. i believe in the old-fashioned civil service way of running things and i was a private secretary years ago in the home office when sir john chilcot was a young assistant secretary. >> you did better than him. [laughter] >> well, knows? minister should be in charge of the department, but all voices should come to the table, everything should be challenged and looked at. no one gets everything right. you improve things by that kind of discussion, and my department became famous as an effective organization and i think it was because we did things in that kind of way. the government does not and did not work like that. it is partly tha

and he made clear to jonathan powell that he was not optimistic that resolution 1441 would provide asound legal basis for the use of force if iraq were found in breach at a future stage but without a second resolution. and he suggested that it was desirable for him to provide advice at that point. but he wasn't encouraged to do so. the response instead was that he should -- he could of a meeting sometime before christmas at downing street. and that meeting duly took place with some of your officials. and at that meeting he was again told that he wasn't being called on to give advice at this stage. this stage being the stage in which he felt 1441 had created an unfair situation. but what he was invited to do was to put a paper to u.n. draft of his advice. and he handed that, i think, personally to you on the 14th of january. now, by then we're into a period in which the armed forces had actually been instructed to prepare for military action. and in which you were moving on the track towards an intended second security council resolution, though, that wasn't tabled until late february

he said i'll ring when i get back. >> the argument that we with heard from jonathan powell was that at this point asking for more time what really wasn't going to make any difference at all. it was effectively clear that saddam wasn't complying. the french and russians, the french n particular had made clear they weren't going to agree to resolution authorizing military action. actually, what was the point the of seeking more time? >> that was the line at time. so they have to keep saying it. but it's not true. and blix was saying -- do you remember he said these are not ticks when he got rid of the ballistic missiles. he said, he started off believing the wmd. then he was getting to the point where they breaking up ballistic missiles, can you bring anything to test the desert. and he started to see, he was getting some progress. they were terrified. they started briefing against blix. they were testify if id of -- terrified of blix's success. >> how much more time was need? >> there was talking about asking for 45 more days. people were saying -- do you remember jack straw said we hav

and he made clear to jonathan powell that he was not optimistic that resolution 1441 would provide a sound basis for the use of force. if iraq were found in breach at a future stage, but without a second resolution. and he suggested that it was desirable for him to provide advice at that point. but he wasn't encouraged to do so. his response was, instead he should -- he could have a meeting sometime before christmas at downing street, and that meeting took place on the 19th of december with some of your officials. and at that meeting he was again told that he was a bit cold on to give advice at this stage. this stage being a stage at which he felt that 1441 would create a situation. but what he was invited to do was put a paper to u.n. draft of his advice, and he handed that i think personally to you on the 14th of january. now, by then we are into a period in which the armed forces had actually been instructed to prepare for military action. and in which you were moving along the track towards an intended second security council resolution, though that wasn't able until late februar