1862-63 he urged the general holmes commanding in arkansas to make a connection with general joseph johnston in mississippi and to assist johnston. he tempered his language to general holmes by telling him he must use his own judgment. additional examples could be brought forth, but i hope i made my point. it's difficult to explain the contrast between davis' handling of his field commanders and his management of the war department. it was surely not because he didn't comprehend the change brought by the telegraph. he used the telegraph constantly communicating with generals it throughout the confederacy. perhap c

63 he urged general theophilus holmes commanding in arkansas to make a connection with general joseph johnston in mississippi and to assist johnston. but he tempered his language to general holmes by telling him that he must use his own judgment. additional examples could be brought forth, but i hope i made my point. it's difficult to explain the contrast between davis' handling of his field commanders and his management of the war department. it was certainly not because he didn't comprehend the change wrought by the telegraph. he used the telegraph constantly, communicating with generals and with other politicians throughout the confederacy. perhaps, perhaps it came from his military background. generals should be left alone. possibly a service in mexico with general zachary taylor, whom he admired and influenced him. general taylor constantly growled about influence from above, especially from civilian secretaries of war and presidents. but whatever the reasons, davis gave his generals enormous leeway. not only did he fail to direct them, he also too often left them in command long after th

the most famous incidents involving davis and his commanders during the war was his firing of joseph johnston in 1864 before atlanta. yet, that action did not occur because johnston failed to obey orders from richmond. davis fired johnston because johnston wouldn't tell davis what johnston was going to do. even so, in my judgment, this instance was the exception that proves the rule. a much more common situation prevailed after the failed confederate advance into kentucky in 1862. davis saw high hopes for this, offense into the home native state. as you all know it failed and confederate failure in kentucky came from several directions. at the same time the inability of confederate commanders to cooperate was certainly a central reason for that disas r disaster. i said davis was terribly supportive, and the drawback into tennessee he called these three men to come to richmond. braxton bragg, polk, who was bragg's senior subordinate and edmond kirby smith. he called them to richmond. each man defended himself, deflected responsibility, and blamed the other two. after hearing these recripple na

june of 1861, general joseph johnston was up at harpers ferry, and a message to johnston set the tone. johnston was told that davis wanted harpers ferry held as long as possible. but he said davis said that his commander on the scene, johnston, had to make the final decision. kentucky, a few months later in september, kentucky, as i'm sure you know, claimed neutrality, not siding with the union or the confederacy. and davis did not want confederate soldiers to be the first to enter the state, his birth state as it was lincoln's. yet his commander out there, former episcopal bishop of louisiana leonidas polk decided he had to go into kentucky and occupy columbus on the mississippi river before the federals got there. so pope broke the neutrality. political uproar. the governor of tennessee writes davis and says, look, this is going to ruin us in kentucky. you've got to get that man out of there. davis immediately sent a telegram to pope. you've got to come back. pope remonstrated, no, i need to do this. what did davis tell him? davis says the necessity must justify the action. the mili