one month later joseph e. johnston is wounded at the battle of fair oaks, late may, early june of 1862 and roernt e. lee is the one sprung to take command of the army of northern virginia three weeks after he takes command, as doug crenshaw is in the crowd, has written a book about the battle of seven days, lee strikes and attacks. look at where he does that. he knows his army for the most part, throughout the war, the confederacy is going to be outnumbered, lee knows one main thing -- first he's got to keep the initiative. but also in order for him to win decisive battles, he has to use a tactic used by napoleon. napoleon is often outnumbered as well. mass your troops at one point. put more of your troops at the point of the spear than what the enin i can put. where does lee choose to attack in the battle of the seven days? george mcclellan and the union army are divided and split by the chickhominy river. lee masses his troops north of the chickhominy river where mcclellan has less men and that's where lee strikes. i

one month later, joseph e. johnston is wounded at the battle of seven pines or fair oak, late may or june of early '62 and robert e. lee is the one who is sprung in to take command of the army of northern virginia and look what he does three weeks after he takes command. of course as you all know and as doug crenshaw who is somewhere out in the crowd has just written a book about the battle of the seven days, lee strikes, lee attacks but look at where lee does that. lee knows his army for the most part throughout the war, the confederacy is going to be outnumbered, lee knows one main thing. he has to keep the initiative but also in order for him to win decisive battles he has to do a tactic used by napoleon. napoleon was often outnumbered as well. mass your troops in one point. put more of your troops at the point of the spear than what the enemy can put. where does lee choose to attack at the battle of the seven days? george mcclellan and the union army are divided, split by the river. lee masses his troops north of th

lee, at his point here, was in daily contact with joseph johnston and jefferson davis. a few days before johnson and the confederate army pullout of their works at yorktown, this is what joseph johnston writes to robert e. lee. i will read almost the entire letter. this is april 30 of 1862. we are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win. it is claimed that general mcclellan will adhere to the system adopted by him last summer and depend for success upon artillery and engineering. we can compete with him and neither. we must therefore change our course. take the offensive. select all the troops we have an east and crossed the potomac with them. our troops have always wished for the offensive and so does the country. please submit this suggestion to the president. we can have no success while george mcclellan is allowed, as he is by our defenses, to choose warfare." what mcclellan is doing as he is putting the confederate army in a no-win situation. he is using the superiority in artillery and engineering and naval power at yorktown to fix the confederat

johnston says. and lee's reaction to this letter from joseph e. johnston is written the next day. he says, "the feasibility of the proposition has been the subject of consideration with the president for some time. so far as advancing a column to the potomac with all the troops that can be made available." he concurs in reviews as to the benefits to be obtained by taking the offensive and is very desirous of being able to carry it into effect." well, one month later, joseph e. johnston is wounded at the battle of seven pines or fair oaks in late may-early june of 1862, and of course, robert e. lee is the one who is sprung in to take command of the army of northern virginia. and look what he does just three weeks after he takes command. of course, as you all know, and as doug crenshaw, who's somewhere out in the crowd has just written a book about the battle of the seven days, lee strikes and lee attacks. but look at where lee does that. lee knows that his army, for the most part, throughout the war, the confederacy is going to be outnumbered. lee knows one main thing. first, he's

joseph e. johnston commanded the army of tennessee from december of '63 to july of '64 and approved one death sentence every 17 days. and johnston organized the largest mass execution of confederate soldiers in the civil war, 14 of his soldiers were executed on one day, may 4th, 1864, something bragg of course never did and would never dream of doing. and yet people like joseph johnston hate braxton bragg. so, you know, my point is that a lot of bragg's problems was public image, publicity. he made an enemy very readily of all -- almost all newspaper reports. it's like sherman, you know. newspaper reporters naturally hated sherman and sherman hated them. the same situation with bragg. he detested newspaper reporters. the irony is bragg had one newspaper reporter friend, a guy named john forsythe, who owned and edited the mobile register, who was a staunch supporter. but even in the pages of that newspaper, there regularly appeared articles which condemned bragg's leadership. because forsythe hired some

this is what joseph johnston writes to robert e. lee. and i will read almost the entire letter. april 30th of 1862, johnston says to lee we are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win. it is plain that general mcclellan will adhere to the system adopted by him last summer and to pend for success upon artillery and engineering. we can compete with him in neither. we must therefore change our course, take the offensive, collect all the troops we have in the east and cross the potomac with them. our troops have always wished for the offensive and so does the country. please submit this suggestion to the president. we can have no success while mcclellan is allowed as he is by our defensive to choose his mode of warfare. what mcclellan is doing is putting the confederate army in a no-win situation. mcclellan is using it at york town to fix the confederate army of northern virginia in one spot and pummel it. the confederate army can neither attack mcclellan's works. they cannot stay there much longer because they will be pummelled. mcclellan has put them in a no-win s

bragg, joseph johnston, our johnston, richard taylor, name them all none of them did better than bragg in commanding these forces in the western theater. the problems went way beyond personality or individual ability of any individual. i put it this way. it is true bragg's army, i call it that. he commanded it 20 months. much longer than anyone else did. whatever level of quality there was in that field army mostly comes from bragg's training. his stamp of approval. that army won only one battle, chickamauga. let's not look at battles. let's look at battlefield days. were there any days in the civil war that the army of tennessee did well? yes. ofre were at least four days brilliant tactical victories on the battlefield that the army of tennessee achieved. bragg was responsible for three of them. three of the four. the army of tennessee suffered dismal tactical defeat on 14 days of the civil war. bragg was responsible for only four of them. while commanding the army of tennessee for 20 months bragg was responsible for 75% of the tactical success days but only 20% of the tactical defeat

to his credit, lee even tried to make something out of joseph e. johnston. something useful, though he had limited confidence in the man's command ability. he put up with, as everyone did, the imperious behavior of pt beauregard in 1864 when grant would have had both of those men relieved of their commands, if not shot. there are some failures of personal management. personnel management. grant failed with thomas. lee failed with longstreet. both subordinates were slow, plodding, resistant and guardedly insubordinate. but their positive attributes and their wide popularity made them worth the frustration that came with them. neither grant nor lee operates in a political vacuum, especially lee, who is often criticized for being virginia centric in his thinking. he is certainly to appoint, but lee is always aware with happening elsewhere in the confederacy. he may not seek to influence it, but he's interested in how it might influence what is happening in virginia. they both understood the value of popular morale, of civilian will and keeping the people behind

he was accompanied by his main general joseph e. johnston who voud to be indid he funfatigued. after the civil war one of the more interesting stories that took place here deals with john roy lynch. he was a former slave who earned his freedom during the civil war and rose dramatically throughout the ranks, becoming a member of the mississippi house of represent he was and eventually becoming the first black speaker of the house of representatives. one of the biggest ration to riches story is john roy lynch who we like to talk about. this room has seen a dramatic change in looks throughout the years. from the beginnings in 1839 through the end of the civil war in room would have been dominated by white men serving as representatives for mississippi. after the civil war and during reconstruction african-americans had the opportunity to take part in the political process and did that for the next 10, 15 years. unfortunately mississippi went through the redemption process where the white democratic party regained control through violence and economic intimidation. to the next 100

he was accompanied by his main general joseph e. johnstonwho vowed to be indefact -- many remember the quotes when vicksburg and jackson fell. after the war more interesting stories deals with a man named john roy lynch. john roy lynch was a former slave who earned his freedom during the civil war and rose dramatically throughout the ranks becoming a member of the mississippi house of representatives and eventually becoming the first black speaker of the house of representatives. spoke in this very room. he went onto become a u.s. representative. so one of the biggest rags to riches stories is john roy lynch who we like to talk about. this room has seen a very dramatic change in looks throughout the years. from the beginnings of 1839 through the end of the civil war, this room would have been dominated by white men serving as representatives for mississippi. after the civil war and during reconstruction african-americans finally have an opportunity to take part in the political process and did that for the next 10, 15 years. unfortunately mi

and he was attempting to get to the railroad depose further west and go south and join up with joseph johnston'srmy in north carolina. do you really think that that was a pipe dream and was impossible or if that lower wooden brinl had been destroyed properly, could he have done it? >> he still couldn't have -- if you look at where the southernmost union kors were he couldn't have made it to joe johnston, i don't think. my problem is that the soldiers in the army of northern virginia on that retreat, they were no longer fighting for the confederate i. they hadn't fought for jeff davis in a long time. they were fighting for robert e. lee. they loved him. lee knew by the same -- the same day as high bridge, his sun order nature officers, generals coming to him and saying, sir, is isn't fair. you've lost. it's not fair. right here in farmville, brigade commander who goes to lee while lee is washing up in the morning. he just reads lee the riot act and lee's responses gently, he says, you know, you realize what you've just said is a court martial offense and, you know, basically go and then lee turns

atlanta and his eviction of the city civilians and continuing until he secured the surrender of joseph johnston and his confederate troops at durham station. sherman and his soldiers knowingly invaded the homes of wealthy confederates. those people they blamed for the war. in the hopes that a violation of domestic space would encourage the surrender of southern women and their soldier husbands, fathers, brothers, sons, sweethearts and friends. for their part, confederate women recognized that the campaign was designed to hit them at home and they repeatedly railed against an enemy who did not respect domestic boundaries. sherman did not shy away from this tactic or feel a need to apologize when he heard the criticism it inspired. on the contrary, in an 1865 letter to his wife ellen, he explained of the confederates that, quote, they regard us just as the romans did the goths and the parallel is not unjust, end quote. the other perspective i'd like to introduce is that of wealthy slave holding women. those who personally encountered sherman's soldiers. like most elite women in columbia, south ca

and he was attempting to get to the railroad depots further west and go south and join up with joseph johnston'srmy in north carolina. do you really think that that was a pipe dream, it was impossible? or if that lower wooden bridge had been destroyed properly, could he have done it? >> he still couldn't have -- if you look at where southern most union corps were, he couldn't have made it to joe johnston, i don't think. my problem is the soldiers in the army of northern virginia on that retreat they were no longer fighting for the confederacy. they hadn't fought for jeff davis in a long time. they were fighting for robert e. lee. they loved him. they loved him. and lee knew by the time, you know, same thing as high bridge, he has subordinate officers generally coming to him saying, sir, it's not fair, we've lost. you got to surrender. he threatened some with court-martials right here in farmville. and i'm sorry i'm blanking out on the name of the brigade commander who goes to lee and while lee is washing up in the morning, he reads lee the riot act. and lee's response is, gently, he says, you kn

the department commander, joseph abby johnston johnson sang just evacuate city. he ends a pleasing none. pemberton at the battle of champion hill, which was the pivotal battle for the city. pemberton out of five division only brings three of them with him. the other to remain in the city. when green to tax the city. fresh.roops are he just was, he just was indecisive. he just would make up his mind. johnson on the other hand pulled pemberton to come join forces with him. one of the most bizarre incidents of the civil war the same time, johnson is marching with, literally, a way. johnson gets the jackson mississippi -- may 13. paper for the city. i geoff davis says -- i'm too late. what you have got here is the ingredients -- yeah. who is more to blame, i don't know very pemberton is on the same day he is field commander ultimately. marriage.o to have a even a question. >> new jersey, new jersey. and >> 89. yet. yeah. into a scout from exit, it's got different customs over there. >> that we do. we have an interest of statement or information about well,an casualti

lee himself when general joseph e. johnston was grievously injured in the shoulder and chest at seven pines may 31, 1862. earlier that april 1862, the confederacy's highest ranking commander in the western theater and lee's own former commanding officer fell medicortly wounded shiloh. on the evening of may 2, 1863, the difficult terrain of the wilderness of spotsylvania county, virginia, the commander of the second corps, stonewall jackson fell mortally wounded when he was accidentally opened fire on him and his staff while he was engaging in a dangerous nighttime reconnaissance at the battle of chancellorsville. and on may 6, 1864, after initiating a successful flank attack at the battle of wi wilderns, james longstreet would be wounded in a confusing incident nearly choking to death on his own blood. not dissimilar from the same friendly fire incident that mortally wounded stonewall jackson in those same wounds that same wilderness nearly a year before. the army's of the confederacy has sustained grievous losses due to the pe