almost all jsoc operations take place under cover of darkness. the afghan government says they want these night raids to stop. >> night raids are against our culture. even if it doesn't cause any harm, that's unacceptable, because it's a disgrace to people's dignity in our culture. >> narrator: mohammed daudzai is chief of staff to the afghan president, hamid karzai. he is worried that night raids do more harm than good. >> you have a village, has a very peaceful life, and in the middle of the night, people come and surround the village and search a few houses and take a few prisoners. and in that scuffle, a few of them are killed and women disgraced. the next day, what do you expect? the entire village youth becomes taliban. they are searching for the taliban to recruit them and give them weapons. >> narrator: general mcchrystal knew that night raids could turn the afghan population against american soldiers. he restricted conventional troops from conducting them, and instead ordered the elite forces of jsoc to take the lead. now they are doing

and that jsoc work well together. sometimes intelligence needs to be developed rapidly to get inside the enemy's operational loop. and sometimes it needs to be cultivated, grown as if it were a delicate bacteria in a petri dish. an interview at c.i.a. headquarters two weeks ago, a senior intelligence official said that two proud groups of america's secret warriors had been deconflicted and basically integrated. finally 10 years after 9/11. indeed according to accounts given to journalists by five senior administration officials sunday night, the c.i.a. gathered the intelligence that led to bin laden's location. a memo from c.i.a. director panetta sent sunday night provides some hints of how the information was collected and analyzed. in it he thanked the national security agency and the national geospecial intelligence agency for their help. n.s.a. figured out there thank there was no telephone or internet service in the compound where obama was. or where osama bin laden was. how it did this without pakistan's knowled

watch and listen for the words jsoc in the next few days. i think people are going to start recognizing incredibly difficult work they've been doing for a long time, often unrecognized, very difficult work. >> and more about that later, richard engle talking about the joint special operations command likely responsible for this news. now again we are told that we are within a two-minute window until we hear an announcement from the president in the east room. there you see finally the picture of the podium, the long red carpet, the central transverse hallway that separates the state dining room at the far end of the white house from the east room where the camera is located. the president will likely emerge from one of the three rooms on the left hand side and will come out and address more than a national, but certainly a global television audience, as so many millions of americans. families are in touch with one another, saying, are you watching this on television? osama bin laden is dead. again, it's been nine years, seven months and 20 d

. >> roger, let me ask you about this special force that came in from jsoc. we're going to talk about it. we have something who was part of that operation, that was part of jsoc before, tell everybody about what that is. do we have a better capability to swoop in with helicopters that we didn't have before, for example, when you worked at the clinton administration? >> no, it's tough to compare the two. joint special operations command is some of our most experienced and trained fighters, but what's important to understand is what phil said, you put together a mosaic of information to paint an intelligence picture. then when you have as high degree as possible in the accuracy of that information, you then task the military operators to come up with a operational plan to go in there. . the ecpart of it is we've had years of experience in operating in the afghan theater and then the adjacent pakistan theater. they did the degree of comfort we now have in that region is the highest it's ever been. that helps as well. the third thing is you have a group of milita

it would be a mistake for us to rest on our laurels, let jsoc do it. i carry preposition this morning is that the embassy team is in effect a mechanism for achieving a whole of government effort would be adequate resources. i think of washing today we are seeing a consent is that some problems are beyond the scope of any part of the u.s. government. humanitarian disaster conflict, stabilization and counterterrorism. what is not generally appreciated around town is that your country team in the field is an ideal way of achieving a whole of government effort. the u.s. military is particularly challenged to understand that and therefore they are on client to set up ad hoc interagency coordination groups. now an effective country team argue in the book starts with the ambassador and it is critical that ambassador now represents the state department, but rather as a personal representative of the president in that form a letter from the president to each ambassador is a critical tool in his or her management. but it certainly does not end with the ambassado

and the military community has a tremendous reference for everybody in jsoc. think about the tactical proficiency and skill it would require to enter that room, shoot a woman in the leg and take out bin laden with two shots while the president is watching. and that's an incredible amount of discipline, dedication, a whole life built toward a moment like that. and to do it with such professionalism. and that's why we call them the silent professionals. they'll do this job and they are probably off on another mission or being debriefed already. folks are already back at work in afghanistan. it's a testament to the larger military. think about the folks back on patrol in afghanistan or back patrol in iraq. our community really needed it. it's a big boost to the morale to everyone and our families back home. >> that raises a point, mark. reporters always try to get the information. but people on the inside on a secret mission like that, have to keep that information. this ability to the part of the servicepeople involved here, anybody was moving paper with regard

to these navy s.e.a.l.s, jsoc units, are the absolute elite of the u.s.tution in american society. prior to killing osama bin laden. >> and in this case, could that boost the visibility even more for -- especially for outstanding high school students, you know, those who have lots of options before them, but may choose a career in the military. >> well, i tell you one thing, if i was, you know, 40 years younger and could swim better, i would be out there trying to join the navy s.e.a.l.s. >> all right, well, i spent three years up there working for the dean of the maxwell school. you tell my old friends i said hello. good to see you today. thank you. >> good to be with you, contessa. >> the race for 2012 when we come back. [ female announcer ] the healing power of touch just got more powerful. introducing precise pain relieving heat patch. it blocks pain signals for deep relief precisely where you need it most. precise. only from the makers of tylenol. >>> the timing couldn't be worse for republican hopefuls getting ready for their first debate in south c

as i said earlier, coming from special operations forces, this really is a jigsaw -- jsoc mission to capture until on the ground. it will limply review a limit our focus to direct action footprint, with threats along the border. i would warn that there are several risks in the strategy that are worth understanding. the first is, it will reaffirm our regional perception that the u.s. is not a reliable ally. some people may consider that important, some minutes, but it is certainly the risk. the second and in my view it fails to eliminate the sanctuary and an ally in afghanistan. it does not prevent an alily from emerging unless they are defeated or agreed to a settlement. second, i suspect that a precipitous american drawdown will encourage afghanistan's neighbors including pakistan to increase their support level to afghan insurgent groups, the haqqani network and the taliban as a bulwark against a perceived indian access into afghanistan. and as we will note in the question and answer session come my concern is with senior al qaeda leadership from is solid. to others, there is still

and yet these commandos now, jsoc, they're so well trained. they know what the mission was. they know the time they had, they moved quickly, they moved expeditious expeditiously. and it was a total success. >> i understand there was some pushback. there was some on the national security team who pointed out, they had no way to get virnl eviden visual evidence he was there. they had other intelligence data, but it was really a gutsy play. >> that's true. there was no visual identification of osama bin laden. >> before going in. >> correct. apparently some of the surveillance picked up someone pacing back and forth in the courtyard. but they were unable to make a true identity. but it really was, i think this really was an intelligence success because the intelligence was brought together. it was red teamed and looked at and red teamed and then looked at. and it really emanated from the one major courier who was moving out, going 90 miles, making a phone call, taking the battery out, using al qaeda trade craft and then the size and the expense and the construction of that part

to all of those who worked, the military, the national security team, the intelligence community, jsoc, secretary of state, secretary of defense, and others not named, we thank you because we realize that you stand in the shoes of those men and women that are forever brave. to their families i say thank you and to this leadership i say thank you and i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: thank you very much, ms. lee. your comments are so well taken -- mr. garamendi: thank you very much, ms. lee. your comments are so well taken and so well said. i was thinking about the situation room and what led up to the time when the program was being carried out, the extraordinary and difficult decision the president had to make but it was a decision he had made months and years earlier when he spoke to the american people as he was asking them for their vote to become president, that he was going to focus like a laser on the man that caused the problem. that he was going to go wherever it may take and do whatever is necessary to settle the score. and to bring to justice osama bin laden. and when t

osama bin laden, it is tempting to believe that there is a shortcut to victory, and that shortcut is jsoc, joint special operations command, or perhaps predators. in our experience in yemen, a kinetic operation -- the predator strike -- was necessary. but it was far, far from sufficient. individuals, even bin laden, cub replaced. -- can be replaced. kinetic successes give us momentum, and they give us space to apply broad counterterrorism. and that broad counterterrorism must include diplomacy to motivate partner governments, public diplomacy to create support among their populations, political and economic development to address the underlying driver of extremism, law enforcement to promote an international rule of law, as well as military cooperation often in the guise of effective training and intelligence to protect ourselves and to expose al-qaeda. .. >> it would be a mistake to rest on our laurels and go to it. we cannot. they cannot. now, my third proposition to you this morning is that the embassy country team is in an effective mechanism for achieving. i think in washington today

i mean, if we think about what's really happened after 9/11, jsoc is a perfect example.ame into its own after 9/11 to bring special operations groups in. i'm not just talking about the s.e.a.l.s, there's a s.e.a.l. team 6 or delta or even sometimes bringing in the rangers. but the agency also has an organization within itself that frequently comes from those very same people. and sometimes, they worked jointly. now, if you talk about all the things that you did here, all of this came together very hand in glove to make this operation work. and so, to say other government agency -- in this case, leon panetta was actually running this operation himself. guess what. that is the other government agency. the cia ran this op, even though they may have been using the u.s. military on the ground. >> well, i'll tell you what. the way they worked it from top to bottom, it took a long time, but boy, did it pan out. jack rice, thank you so much for being with us tonight. >> thank you so much. >>> well, we've tracked down and killed osama bin laden. coming up next, eliot will talk to

- and probably should-- increase the public debate or the public's knowledge of this entity called jsoc. >> suarez: for more on special operations, we turn to former seal team 6 member retired and a half eye commander ryan zinke, now a montana state senator and former army special forces officer retired colonel kalev sepp, he also served in civilian special operations posts in the pentagon. he's now an assistant prove ster-- professor at the navy postgraduate school. and senator, let me start with you. just a short time ago vice president biden call kd the units that pulled off this operation in afghanistan some of the most capable fighting forces in the history of the world. who are they? how do you end up training, being picked for one of these units? >> well, what you are seeing is two tier 1 forces which really represent the best of the navy and the army. on the field side, it takes five years to, in order-- on the seal side it takes five years for when a man says i want to be a navy seal, that process alone is a long and arduous journey. it represents about a 90% attrition rate. an

i think that is what i was talking about, the jsoc model and afghanistan. my point is that i think we can sort of lighten up about how much the dni should be controlling this. this is the network's environment that we were talking about here that mic and i both had mentioned. i think that is working very well and the dni should be nurturing that but the dni should be above it all looking for where there are gaps where you can better enable it, better resource than two growth that capability for the intelligence. i don't think there's anyway we are going to get back to the old days where you had an essentially control distribution of intelligence support. >> right and i hear you saying that we shouldn't try to get back to that. the world is gone beyond that. >> it is just the expectations we have put on the dni. if successful authoritative dni and by the way i don't see a secretary of defense who worries about a lot of what is going on. i think this is, a lot of the success we have had in afghanistan is because we have developed a network capability and that

i think that is what i was talking about, the jsoc model and afghanistan. my point is that i think we can sort of lighten up about how much the dni should be controlling this. this is the network's environment that we were talking about here that mic and i both had mentioned. i think that is working very well and the dni should be nurturing that but the dni should be above it all looking for where there are gaps where you can better enable it, better resource than two growth that capability for the intelligence. i don't think there's anyway we are going to get back to the old days where you had an essentially control distribution of intelligence support. >> right and i hear you saying that we shouldn't try to get back to that. the world is gone beyond that. >> it is just the expectations we have put on the dni. if successful authoritative dni and by the way i don't see a secretary of defense who worries about a lot of what is going on. i think this is, a lot of the success we have had in afghanistan is because we have developed a networ capability and that

jsoc operates behind him. and mike mullen, the president's top military adviser. tom don lynn is next to him in the blue, and then bill daily the chief of staff and then peeking over the shoulder is tony blinken, the president's national security adviser to the president, and in the back is a woman named audrey thomasson, director or the counterterrorism. and then you will see jim mcdonough in the blue sheet, and you know john brennan as assistant to the president for counterterrorism, andb you can barely see in the corner at the aej national intelligence director james clapper and everybody knows secretary of state hillary clinton and secretary of the military general gates. >> and we know that panetta was sort of explaining what they were looking at, but we don't know what specific moment that was, and perhaps we will never know. jessica yellin, thank you so much. here is an acronym that you and i have been learning here today. ekia, and it is an acronym for enemy killed in action. so how do you begin to train for a mission that results in those letters? who nee

i think that is what i was talking about, the jsoc model and afghanistan.my point is that i think we can sort of lighten up about how much the dni should be controlling this. this is the network's environment that we were talking about here that mic and i both had mentioned. i think that is working very well and the dni should be nurturing that but the dni should be above it all looking for where there are gaps where you can better enable it, better resource than two growth that capability for the intelligence. i don't think there's anyway we are going to get back to the old days where you had an essentially control distribution of intelligence support. >> right and i hear you saying that we shouldn't try to get back to that. the world is gone beyond that. >> it is just the expectations we have put on the dni. if successful authoritative dni and by the way i don't see a secretary of defense who worries about a lot of what is going on. i think this is, a lot of the success we have had in afghanistan is because we have developed a network capability and that

caller: we cooperated with jsoc, in a way.here is a story that they are pushing against each other. the day after the al qaeda leader in iraq was killed, i got a personal, handwritten note from stanley mcchrystal, just a simple thank you. host: thank you for helping us to understand this news this morning. caller: thank you, goodbye. host: david, your thoughts on osama bin laden being killed? caller: first of all, this is the real mission accomplished. i want to thank the troops. i disagree with the caller who asked what the cost of this was. the cost of this was showing the action of not making tough decisions, which have happened over the last few years, made us look weak throughout the world. there is expert -- a strong message to islamic extremists that if you, and our land and kill us, we will hunt you to the end of the earth. that also goes to show that the pakistani intelligence service had some idea where this man was living. sitting right next to the military academy, someone had to know something. i think the preside

described as one alternative, and that is a very small group of people that do intelligence work, who do jsoc work that, in fact, do this in afghanistan plus yemen, plus somalia plus a lot of places that we to keep on everybody. in this matter without getting into the governance of a situation that is proving to be very difficult, if not impossible for us? does anybody have a comment about all of that? >> i'll go first, senator lugar, i know my colleagues have comments as well. i would argue several things. first, al-qaeda was created here in the peshawar area. it's stronger support base in for my view is here as opposed to any other place in the world, somalia, yemen. in particular if one looking at the tribal structures peshawar structures with the others, these are the individuals who have thought for the last three decades and provided sanctuary to a range of al-qaeda leaders. so they have a long-term relationship. they are also in addition to the tribal subclan issues there are a range of tribal groups that have supported al-qaeda so i would strongly argue that this is a safe haven, in m

we have the constitutional fabric along with the united states military and the likes of jsocr -- jsoc many others to work with the american people. we can bring the men and women that are based now, over 100,000, in afghanistan home and you know what? mother's day was this past week and sadly soldiers nell in battle on mother's day -- fell in battle on mother's day. let us not have another mother's day where a mother loses a child to battle in afghanistan where we can use smart power and use intelligence and use the minimal of force. it is time now for america to welcome home her heroes with honor and as well to thank those who indicated the braun and the intellect that could make good on a promise that, yes, you will come to justice if you do harm to the american people. i yield back and ask support for the underlying legislation and the rule. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from texas. mr. sessions: thank you, mr. speaker. you know, mr. speaker, i do understand that the democratic party is interested in leaving afghanistan now that osama bin laden has been killed but i would