now, a lot of what looks like the same sort of thing-- covert action-- is done by jsoc. now, they say when they do it, it's not covert action; it's a military operation. so the president does not by law have to approve every operation, and the intelligence committees are not notified. >> narrator: then, in afghanistan, a story circulated that rumsfeld wanted to use jsoc forces on a new battlefield: iraq. >> schroen: you could see changes being made in the us military staffing in afghanistan, that the green beret units-- the 5th special forces group, for the most of it-- were being pulled out to refit and get ready for iraq. and it was clear that the kind of guys that i think a lot of us believed were essential us military personnel with special operations capabilities were being pulled away. >> scheuer: by 2002, in the springtime, it was almost taken for granted that we were going to go to war with iraq. >> narrator: the president needed a convincing reason for war with saddam hussein. george tenet and the cia said they had no evidence saddam had helped al qaeda, but sec

jsoc, special operations, you know, within the military. >> host: some of the things you criticize most like the interrogation of detainees was credited by obama administration officials like director pennsylvania panetta at the cia having produced crucial information to fight terrorists to find bin laden. >> guest: okay, i don't think the record shows that pee -- penetta said water boarding did that. >> host: i believe actually he did say that the -- well, i think he was asked about the enhanced interrogations, and he said, yes, what we learned -- i think perhaps he mentioned mohamed. >> guest: let's say he did, there's the tradeoff of doing something like that and the larger tradeoff of our rep dation and whether that created more terrorists than not, and i also think that if there was indication that these enhanced interrogations actually produced evidence that couldn't be gotten otherwise, then we would have seen it because reporters have been after that for a long time, and the funny thing about classification is that administrations often every administration selectively declassif

in the particular i write about jsoc and how they have killed so many -- >> host: jsoc is the joint specialperations command. >> guest: we know them as delta force and seal team six, they're the very secret military organization that does a lot of, does the targeted killing for the military, and it's much bigger than the cia's operation. it does ten times as much as the cia, and, you know, of course, we've all looked at -- we've all concentrated our attention on the cia. ironically, this military unit has maintained a level of secrecy that the cia hasn't even been able to pull off. but these two organizations in particular, and i'd argue the fbi, too, the counterterrorism, the very focused organizations that have experts that have been looking at this subject for a long time; not reinventing the wheel and doing broad sort of dragnet type approaches to counterterrorism analysis, they have been successful in killing off most of the 9/11 organization, most of the al-qaeda that perpetrated 9/11. we see things popping up, you know, al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula. but in general, nobody, no on

they were not called in, but jsoc was into this all the way hand in hand with the cia. candy?> so i think -- i have this feeling, barbara, like so many things, we'll be hearing more and more details coming out. thank you so much for that. joining us now to mull this over from a political point of view. i have been fascinated all day by this dancing on the head of the pin that the administration is doing. which is, we got him, we got him, but really the yemenis did this. it was our drone, so we killed him with our drone. but even that you get on background about tell me why? >> i think part of it is they want to keep some distance from the yemenis, this could be perceived inside yemen by the people of yemen as foreign intervention. well, it kind of is. >> we're all winking and nodding. they must know too. >> there's a concern about political instability there. and then there's this line about not acknowledging covert operations. there's, i think the instability inside yemen is the big concern. and then there's the fact that we killed an american, and it gets into the legalities

they are the cia, the nsa that changed dramatically to help that fight and to target individuals, jsoc come special liberation's another tree. >> host: but some of the things that you criticize most like the interrogation of the detainees was credited by the obama administration officials like director leon panetta at the cia was having produced the crucial information that allowed us to fight terrorists -- it to define bin laden. >> guest: i don't think the record showed that leon panetta felt that waterboarding people or the harsh interrogations' did that and that is -- >> host: i believe he did say that -- i think that he was asked about the enhanced interrogations' and he said yes, what we have learned from -- i think perhaps he mentioned khalid sheikh mohammed. >> guest: let's say he did. let's say you are right there are so many different things to talk about, one which is the cost of the trade-off between doing something like that and the larger trade off with a reputation with whether that created more terrorists than not, and i also think that there was indication that the enh

jsoc, special operations. >> host: some of the things you criticize most, like the interrogation of detaineeswas credited by obama administration officials like director panetta at the cia, was having produced crucial information that allowed us to fight terrorists, including to find wanted. >> guest: i don't think the record shows that panetta said waterboarding people or harsh interrogations did that. and that is a great -- >> host: i believe he did say -- i think he was asked about the enhanced interrogation and he said yes, i think perhaps you've mentioned khalid sheikh mohammed. >> guest: there are so many different eggs to talk about these, one is the trade-off into it not in a larger trade up with the reputation, whether there is a terrorist and not and i also think if there is indication that the enhanced interrogations optionally produced evidence that could be got that we couldn't seem to have the funny thing about classification is that ministration -- often every administration selectively declassify this information that would make its case. she never actually came out -- >> host

assure that level and i can assure you with secretary leon panetta and admiral craven with of the new jsoc commander and where i am with other commissions to the to positions this is going to be very much a team effort and the coordination of cooperation has been the essential to some of the past successes and would be augmented and improved in the months and years ahead. >> i would simply add to that that i think that there is a great strength in having both capability resident in both places simply to give the president the commander chief as many in his quiver as possible with the arnove spurring we have done a lot of introspection on that. i have some pretty direct guidance from the president on that as a matter of fact, and i think that what it has shown as you mentioned it has served a messy as it is marginalized the al qaeda missiles come al qaeda is in the position of trying to catch the train after it's already left the station was up in the nineveh spring isn't consistent with al qaeda as has been advocated how will it change us? i think what it is reinforced something we knew it

assure that level and i can assure you with secretary leon panetta and admiral craven with of the new jsoccommander and where i am with other commissions to the to positions this is going to be very much a team effort and the coordination of cooperation has been the essential to some of the past successes and would be augmented and improved in the months and years ahead. >> i would simply add to that that i think that there is a great strength in having both capability resident in both places simply to give the president the commander chief as many in his quiver as possible with the arnove spurring we have done a lot of introspection on that. i have some pretty direct guidance from the president on that as a matter of fact, and i think that what it has shown as you mentioned it has served as messy as it is marginalized the al qaeda missiles come al qaeda is in the position of trying to catch the train after it's already left the station was up in the nineveh spring isn't consistent with al qaeda as has been advocated how will it change us? i think what it is reinforced something we knew it

assure that level and i can assure you with secretary leon panetta and admiral craven with of the new jsoccommander and where i am with other commissions to the to positions this is going to be very much a team effort and the coordination of cooperation has been the essential to some of the past successes and would be augmented and improved in the months and years ahead. >> i would simply add to that that i think that there is a great strength in having both capability resident in both places simply to give the president the commander chief as many in his quiver as possible with the arnove spurring we have done a lot of introspection on that. i have some pretty direct guidance from the president on that as a matter of fact, and i think that what it has shown as you mentioned it has served as messy as it is marginalized the al qaeda missiles come al qaeda is in the position of trying to catch the train after it's already left the station was up in the nineveh spring isn't consistent with al qaeda as has been advocated how will it change us? i think what it is reinforced something we knew it

assure that level and i can assure you with secretary leon panetta and admiral craven with of the new jsoccommander and where i am with other commissions to the to positions this is going to be very much a team effort and the coordination of cooperation has been the essential to some of the past successes and would be augmented and improved in the months and years ahead. >> i would simply add to that that i think that there is a great strength in having both capability resident in both places simply to give the president the commander chief as many in his quiver as possible with the arnove spurring we have done a lot of introspection on that. i have some pretty direct guidance from the president on that as a matter of fact, and i thinkthat what it has shown as you mentioned it has served as messy as it is marginalized the al qaeda missiles come al qaeda is in the position of trying to catch the train after it's already left the station was up in the nineveh spring isn't consistent with al qaeda as has been advocated how will it change us? i think what it is reinforced something we knew it