all of the sudden, everybody is talking about jsoc. it is everywhere.spent so much time embedded in the story when there were so but little been written about it except a small circle of journalists. and all of the seven people whose journey we have been tracking have become national -- all of this sudden, people whose journey we have been tracking have become national heroes. hollywood producers got in bed with the cia to make their version of the events the official history. >> and that is the film -- >> "zero dark thirty." the relationship between hollywood and the cia over this issue needs to be thoroughly debated. i am thankful we are debating it. one of the great films -- people are talking about torture after "zero dark thirty," but for us to see mcraven and jsoc been talked about publicly was really an incredible experience because we had seen this other side. our film is about all of these things that these same units did that almost never get talked about. what americans know about jsoc is overwhelmingly limited to what happened in the raid th

and, of course, the last decade jsoc, the joint special operations command which is the home of the tier one special operator, the seals delta force and so forth, headed by for many years by somebody who is now a yale professor, stan mcchrystal, has become a finely honed killing machine, kill and capture machine i should say although we don't do much capture these days because we don't have a legal framework for holding terrorists. at the cia has also gone into that business. really helped along i general petraeus when he was its director. and together, those two organizations, jsoc and the cia, have been very, very good at killing or capturing a large number of leaders of al qaeda and various other allied organizations. that's, i'm all in favor of the. i'm not against those rates. i'm not against those drone strikes but i think it's necessary. i also believe it's insufficient and the analogy that i would try would be to the kind of campaigns we have waged in iraq and in afghanistan. in iraq we're doing an excellent job of going after individual bad guys from really from the start of the

in the course of the last decade, jsoc, joint operations command, the seals delta force and so forth, headed by, for many years, by somebody who is now a yale professor, stan mcchrystal, has become a finely honed killing and capturing machine. we don't do heaven capture because we don't have a legal frame work for holding terrorists, but the cia got in that business, helped along by regime petraeus when he was its director, and, together, those two organizations, jsoc and the cia, have been very, very good at killing or capturing a large number of leaders of al-qaeda and various other allied organizations. that's -- i'm all in favor of that. i'm not against those raids. i'm not gons drone strikes, but i think it's necessary, and i also believe it's insufficient, and the analogy i draw is to the kind of the campaigns we have waged in iraq and afghanistan, and in iraq, we did an excellent job of going after individual bad guys from, really, from the start of the war up until the end. there were notable successes like capturing hussein, and so forth, joint special operations command beca

was helped along by general petraeus when he was its director and together those two organizations jsoc and the cia have been very good at killing or capturing a large number of leaders of al qaeda and various other allied organizations. i am all in favor of that and i'm not against those raids and i'm not against drone strikes. i think it's necessary but i also believe it's insufficient and the analogy that i would draw what the to a time in the campaigns we have waged in iraq and afghanistan. in iraq we were doing an excellent job of going after individual bad guys really from the start of the war up until the end. and there were notable successes to capturing saddam hussein and it became this amazing machine conduct king a dozen raids at night in iraq. it was really not such asian to win the war so we did some other things. so we had what would be known as a full spectrum counterinsurgency which involves more than killing and capturing enemy leaders. it involves many lines of operation and security operations. also, dealing in a limited place with some of the economic and social conc

this is what he takes on along with jsoc. >> the producers of this took this found to meet early on in we want to do this. so many of us know jeremy's work. his a from a nomina he is a phenomenal reporter. we funded them very early on to go and find the story and understand how jeremy himself could become a character and his own story and recreate in a way that are the course of the 75 minutes you watch the film, it is a journey of a lifetime that jeremy has gone through and sort of create a portrait that is so human around international issues that people do not understand. that 75 minutes, people walked out of the feeder absolutely transformed to. i have never seen a film screen as sundance were people are so stunned that nobody claps when the first credit comes up. at the end, they just leave. it is astounding the fact the film have since we will be seeing it on the screens around the country. screenings -- the book will be released in the film will be seen in theaters around the country. it is very exciting. >> talk about other films. >> there are 12. you just had "after tiller" an

i met several of the jsoc folks and others who risked their lives to save others.i know there were systemic sufficiencies, and i know you know that. and i would like you to just speak to that for a moment. to my knowledge, no one has been held accountable. and our staff had a meeting with one of the state department officials and i hate to use this word again, but it was nothing short of bizarre as they talked about the communications. these officials were screaming out for more security. and i'm just wondering if you might mention one reform that would be helpful, so that you would have known of the needs there of security, that went undone. >> well, obviously, i have thought about this almost constantly since that date, senator, because, you know, i do feel responsible. i feel responsible for the nearly 70,000 people who work for the state department. i take it very seriously. the specific security requests pertaining to benghazi, you know, were handled by the security professionals in the department. i didn't see those requests. they didn't come to me. i didn't

i met several of the jsoc folks and others that risked their lives saving others but i also have to sayeading all the cables that many of us have done there were systemic deficiencies. i know you know that i would like for you to just speak to that for a moment. to my knowledge no one has been held accountable. our staff had a meeting with one of the state department officials and i hate to use this word again, but it was nothing short of bizarre as they talked about the communications. these officials were screaming out for more security and i'm just wondering if you might mention one reform that would be helpful, so that you would have known of the needs there of security that went undone? >> well, obviously i have thought about this almost constantly since that date, senator, because, you know, i do feel responsibility. i feel responsible for the nearly 70,000 people who work for the state department. i take it very seriously but the specific security requests pertaining to gauze dpauz -- benghazi, were handled by the security professionals in the department. i didn't see those reque

but jsoc became 80% intelligence. we got up in the morning thinking about intelligent. that's what i worked on the that's what the focus became. operation for something we did to get more intelligence. and intelligence is what i would say that intelligence operative is what our forward operating became the people who were traditional shooters, by 2005 and six, i thought of themselves as intelligence people who carry the guns. it was an amazing difference. >> you described with a formula at one point. five, six finish, explode and analyze. explain how that cycle worked. >> if i was to describe it in a sequence commute to find a target, know about it, you have to fix it in real-time. you have to give at a certain place now. you have to finish, capture or kill the target. you have to exploit would've you get from it and yet to analyze what you have gotten. it's sort of like a progressive assembly line idea. and it makes sense because you start with it and do whatever you get the analysis, if you broad in a circle that takes you back to the fine. the problem we found is tha

currently the head of the cia, and previous director of intelligence in jsoc in afghanistan and iraq said in the cyber era, intelligence and maneuver are our fire. the act to be able to generate data from vast distributed services to aggregated and share effectively create actionable items is a huge advancement responsible for, for example, the ability to interdict ied networks in iraq before they were anal -- able to form, okay? that same kind of cross disciplinary analysis made possible by the fusion of data and analytical systems is exactly what would solve the problem of attribution. it doesn't matter where you are. the ability to correlate data at scale through a variety of means makes the difference. i think attribution is doable. from a legal point of view and ethically is a different question. >> that's where i want to go next. elisa, so canada and the u.s. both affected by this hypothetical scenario, and there are rumblings about possible retaliation. rumblings of possible drone strike because, in fact, they traced this to aqap in yemen. do they have the legal basis to retal

couldn't have the information, could never have gotten close enough to the trust to say, ok, we think jsocnd reportedly it was a c.i.a. commanded and controlled operation. all the pieces there were in 2004 but we didn't have the cultural right to do that. what we had to do was start to pull task forces together that had all the elements in them and you start by bringing people forward and operating in a single location and that's far from d.c. which is good and the young people typically young people tend to meld. but they're always getting pulled by their home offices and not just the c.i.a., but every different participant. we had some participants that would come and we'd form this joint interagency task force and who they had send to -- sent to contribute were who they wanted out of their offices, wherever they were. i mean, literaly, there were some pretty amazingly poor talent. on the other hand -- [laughter] on the other hand, other agencies would send superstars. some agencies would send people and say, whatever you do, don't give any of our information, secrets, don't negotiation