. >> my first awareness of mike flynn was probably in the jsoc when he joined jsoc as the j2.jsoc was the premier command in the u.s. military, without question. >> smith: doug wise is a veteran of the cia who worked >> i spent three decades undercover cia as an operator, as a stati chief, service south asia, iraq. chief of operational training for cia, and ultimately, appointed as the deputy director of the defense intelligence ency-- mike flynn then the incumbent director. dr. evil was my call sign. >> smith: wise wasart of the invasion force that entered baghdad and says he saw flynn's impact in iraq firsthand. >> at that time in iraq, they had built an operational machine in jsoc to literally triple and quintuple the number of raids and operations that the force could undertake. once they got that set in motion, it was lightning fast. iohiovgh iest order. >> i went to iraq in 2005. it was hard and fast. i can't even count, i lost count, we all did, probably did 150 raids in a three month span that summer. >>mith: jack murphy served in one of michael flynn's jsoc units in i

and the oda were the jsoc guys were the first one on the ground. they had a relationship with cause loon and the special forces guys worked out enough when they came in, the green berets being all about the relationships said we're not going to sever any relationships , we're going to build on it and supported, wrap around and that's what they did. very effectively so i think our special opportunity found ways to make it all work without confusing them. which tried of special forces are you, what am i talking to you now instead of you. and they figured it all out. i think exceptionally well and that was really a commitment to teamwork by the special ops folks to each other and the many of the conventional guys that really smooth out a lot of the peculiarities of the c2 arrangement. >> another question in the back. >> thanks michael, great to see you again. my question is about the efficacy, i was a co-author of the army's history of the iraq war and i think there's no question that there's unanimity about the tactical success of my with and through

fingerprints of qassem soleimani of the plans put forth by the iraqi general officers.h going into jsocround falluja and by having a strong voicehe who could bring the most resources to bear to help the iraqis, we were able to keep a lot of the iranian inflow. so, you know, at an acceptable attempts, at an acceptable level, you know, for some time around missoula, it got a lot more complicated. and, you know, and so and i can't really talk to that because steve townsend had replacement by then. but leading up to that, you know, talking to how to deal armory, you know, he wanted pmf, you know in tal afar and places like that and it was a real challenge trying to keep but keep them at bay. but because we could provide more help to iraq than iran could. iran could cause more trouble for iraq. we could provide help. you know, there was sort of a balance there that we were able to strike with prime minister abadi. and so the by with and through provides, you know, a way to mitigate those kinds of situations not to say it's perfect, but it's better than nothing. yeah. can i just please, pleas

making that wasn't the ultimate outcome of the discussion that there was a lot of agreement because the jsocbuddies and we would work well together. so we were committed to make sure all this works in commanding the special opsth is supporting commander in syria and then the supportive commander in iraq and each one supported the other the gym had the operators running around but it was jen's job to sort that out so the strikes were all happening based on what level of delegation i gave them. and that enabled them to make their own strike decisions with that levelel of authority. it all worked out. from new york so i believe that yogi berra was right if its ain't working and don't break it and then with the special forces guys and the nggreen berets said he will not suffer any relationships people build on that and supported and wraparound and that's what they did. so the special ops community found ways to make it work without confusing muslims then they figured it out and it was a commitment to teamwork by the special ops folks to each other that smooth out the peculiarities. >> another qu

the defensively to six agency, the defense reduction agency, and the university antisocial branch of jsoc. the water affect that base. camp lejeune, we saw the effects of water on those families. recently in hawaii. i don't think the deity will stand by to allow the watershed -- dod will stand by to allow the watershed to affect fort bellmore. dr. farnsworth: next question goes to candidate cao. what is your position on extending the washington subway system metro into prince william county? mr. cao: sir, i used two measure all the time when i worked at the pentagon. it's a great way to get commuters out there for -- with very little impact on the environment. the problem is we extended the railway all the way to ashburn. it's been sitting there for about three years empty. as a federal legislator i would be concerned about stepping in and allowing this to happen and not having the oversight we need. we will work with the prince william county and surrounding counties to make sure it does not become a debacle like the aspirin center. -- ashburn center. rep. wexton: we need better transit