she said marlon brando, mumbled , and julius caesar. >> i raised my hand and said excusepdí me, juliussar is playing at that the it right now. i bet you $100 you will apologizeghk to this class. she sent me out of the room and kick me out of school. >> marlon brando gave what robert schaub later told me%<#Ñs the platonic ideal%s of performg shakespeare. he said he saw it in the same room at the same time with the turbo guard -- dirk bogardu"9 ad laurence harvey. they looked up and looked at one another and realized that this american had achieved perfection, because he not only played it with emotion, he played with rhythm, poetry -- it was the perfectsú synthesis of everything anyone had ever wanted. tavis: so that is brando. why was dreyfuss in that class? how did you know that with your gift? what convinced you that you belong to there? >> i have opinions about everything on earth. when i have that rare occasion when i do not have an opinion, it is like a blessing. i don't have any idea, but i know that when i was eighth, i said to my mom, i want to be an actor. she said, don't just

i call this the julius caesar strategy. as in his time, we divide fannie and freddie into three parts. my addendum is that, counter my recommendations, if the gse does survive, we must make sure the -- leveraging is -- double- leveraging is fixed. they should own preferred stock. this ran up the leverage. -- the real leverage of the system of the biggest fault of the system -- the real average of the system. the real fault is that these were key in using excessive leverage. we need to use the banks to finance these, should they form -- should they somehow survive. thank you. >> thank you. >> i have one overarching thank you. that covers all of you. i want to focus on one point -- the nature of the federal guarantee. i have been grappling with this question of the future of the gse. we concluded that a carefully designed government guarantee is critical in maintaining and creating a stable, liquid system that provides long-term, safe financing for borrowers. that said, guarantees are tricky business. it is pretty clear that

i call this the julius caesar strategy. as in his time, we divide fannie and freddie into three parts. my addendum is that, counter my recommendations, if the gse does survive, we must make sure the -- leveraging is -- double- leveraging is fixed. they should own preferred stock. this ran up the leverage. -- the real leverage of the system of the biggest fault of the system -- the real average of the system. the real fault is that these were key in using excessive leverage. we need to use the banks to finance these, should they form -- should they somehow survive. thank you. >> thank you. >> i have one overarching thank you. that covers all of you. i want to focus on one point -- the nature of the federal guarantee. i have been grappling with this question of the future of the gse. we concluded that a carefully designed government guarantee is critical in maintaining and creating a stable, liquid system that provides long-term, safe financing for borrowers. that said, guarantees are tricky business. it is pretty clear that

i call this the julius caesar strategy. we divide fannie mae and freddie mac into three parts. my addendum is that should it survive, we must make sure that the double leveraging is fixed. banks had special regulatory encouragements to zero preferred stock index to fannie and freddie. it ran up the leverage the biggest fault of the system was excessive leverage. we need to eliminate disability by using the banks to finance should that forms arrived. thank you. >> thanks, alex. ingrid? >> i want to focus this on one point which is the nature of the federal guarantee. i have been grappling with this. we have come to the conclusion that carefully designed government guarantee is critical in maintaining and creating a stable liquid system that provides safe financing for borrowers. that said, guarantees are tricky business. it is clear that the implicit guarantee provided by the government in the past encouraged excessive risk- taking and overbuilding of the portfolio. how to do this careful design of the guarantee? that is the challenge. we want liquidity maintained and the moral