when they captured kabul and set up their government. and had this uneasy yet peaceful coexistence with shelter now. yes, sir. >> we've been in afghanistan for eight years now. you all are, obviously, familiar with it from the first part. what advice would you give the white house now while they're trying to assess the future of our, our future in vietnam, in afghanistan? [laughter] >> yeah. interesting you had the freudian slip of vietnam. [laughter] you and i are, we're of that same generation. yeah. would you like to take a stab at geopolitics? >> wow, that's crazy. [laughter] >> i'll help you. >> yeah, i'll need a lot of help. [laughter] basically, one thing that i realized when i was there is that in their memory, the afghans, it's almost like they kicked the british out, i don't know, a couple years ago, and the russians were, like, last week. yeah, we got them out of here last week. so they had, their sense of time is very, very here and now and current, but they, they remember. and they were hoping when i was, when i was there in

. -- up here in kabul. host: general, we're going to let our viewers call in with their thoughts and ask questions of you. we will get to that in just a moment. let me ask you, general, about the different roles that the afghan national security force and the afghan police take under. can you define that more clearly for us? guest: we call it the afghan national security forces, but the two main components are the afghan national army and the afghan national police. i will just start with the army. the army is about 100,000 soldiers strong right now and our goal is to grow them here in this year until october 2010 to grow them from 100,000 to about 134,000. that will improve both the quality and quantity of the security force. moving over to the police, the police currently are about 95,000 across the country. we are shooting toward a goal of about 109,000, again, by october 2010. there are several the different components in the police. you have your unit police, which are essentially your cops on the beat

ahead of us, that the institution building, particularly at the governmental level and outside of kabul at the subnational level is a substantial challenge. i don't think it is quite the same as starting from scratch. if you look at the government that president karzai has, with all the problems that we spend a lot of time discussing, there are a lot of ministries and ministers who have been doing quite a good job. if you look at their agricultural program and where we're coming into to support their agricultural program, there is an agriculture minister who has a five-year plan that is a good plan. he's relight on the international community and usaid to be supporting their plan. that's not to say that it is easy. but the work is building on a foundation that is an afghan-driven agriculture plan, that's true in other ministries as well. not true in every ministry. in terms of the level of u.s. civilian presence, when we started at the beginning of the year, there were roughly 320 civilians on the ground. by the end of january, we're going to be close to 1,000. that's a very big differe

>> center, the city of kabul -- senator, the city of kabul has already transferred. they're not coalition forces operating in other areas. the legal mandate that might be executed to debt -- to do that is a formality. they have the lead in most of those areas right now. >> senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ambassador eikenberry, during the decisionmaking process, there were several tables that you sent back that were classified yet revealed to the media that indicated you had strong reservations about the search. -- surge. have those reservations been resolved in your mind? >> center, i am 100% behind the decisions and the resources, absolutely. >> general mcchrystal, secretary clinton said today that we are in this thing to win. you agree with that statement and you have what you need to win? >> i agree with the secretary's statement. i think we have all we need to win. i think the ultimate winners will be the afghan people. >> what do you expect we will have achieved by 2011? i understand there will be a major review of the plan by december 2010, and what

. -- up here in kabul.general, we're going to let our viewers call in with their thoughts and ask questions of you. we will get to that in just a moment. let me ask you, general, about the different roles that the afghan national security force and the afghan police take under. can you define that more clearly for us? guest: we call it the afghan national security forces, but the two main components are the afghan national army and the afghan national police. i will just start with the army. the army is about 100,000 soldiers strong right now and our goal is to grow them here in this year until october 2010 to grow them from 100,000 to about 134,000. that will improve both the quality and quantity of the security force. moving over to the police, the police currently are about 95,000 across the country. we are shooting toward a goal of about 109,000, again, by october 2010. there are several the different components in the police. you have your unit police, which are essentially your cops on the beat at the

>> the city of kabul has already transferred.here are areas where they in fact have executed, because there are not coalition forces operating in those areas. so the legal mandate that might be executed to do that, i think, is really a formality. >> thank you very much. senator mccain. >> ambassador, during the decisionmaking process, there were several cables you sent back that were classified, secret, and yet were revealed to the media indicating you had strong reservations about a surge. have they been resolved in your mind? >> 100%, with the refinement of the mission and clarification on ways we are going to move forward. absolutely. >> secretary gates said today that we're in this thing to win. do you agree with that statement, and do you have what you need to win? >> i think we have what we need to win. but the ultimate winners are the afghan people. >> what do you expect we will have achieved by 2011? what you think we will have achieved as a firm date for beginning withdrawal of u.s. troops? and we will have benchmarks, i

we know that there are divisions within the embassy and kabul.e know that cables were leaked that the ambassador there was against any increases in troops there. we know that relations within the embassy -- we also know that the ability will of state department personnel has been significantly limited, as it was prior to the surge in iraq because the environment is not safe for them to go out and operate. i have great confidence in the military . operational planning. i am confident it can succeed. but as i said earlier, i do not see the bill component id, and i would like for you to submit to this committee a very specific plan, just as we are receiving a very specific military plan, on exactly how we are going to achieve the build part of it, which i think there is an adequate model for it in the case of iraq. appreciate your statements, and i agree with you about the quality of personnel. i have yet to see a comprehensive, convincing plan to implement the essential civil side of any successful surge. >> senator mccain, first let me say we are

we were physically dealing with this in kabul.e actually were running fiber optic cable off the telephone poles down the street to connect my office with general mcneil's so we had a nato communication. he had separate net, so we could talk, but the headquarters didn't. we had to go out and buy computers not in the state system, run fiber optic cable off telephone poles and connect. then we had to physically handle data. you can't electronically move it from one system to the other. i think this is ridiculous. >> so the point is that there needs to be a lot more coordination that you would have secure computers and they are probably going to have to talk with the military part of this. >> exactly. but it is a bureaucratic issue of what standards are acceptable. >> so you would try to have uniform standards so you have quin consistency there and you can talk. it gets back really to the other thing -- i will never forget when i was in iraq, we went out to one of the camps and i don't even know if there were state department people t

and regardless of the situation in kabul, the approach in afghanistan is that there is a bit of a cultural disconnect. afghanistan has never had a strong central government but powered in the provinces. and the afghany's in this complex of the central government that is weak, and that's out of sync with their history. we have to move more to a provinceable level, they look to local province leaders and tribal leaders. and part of the strategy of general mcchrystal is to align our efforts with the culture, and that makes sense. >> does that mean at a local level we need to empower tribes to provide their own security? is there going to be some provision that you would have something like the sons of iraq where you play locals? >> i think there is something to a response fund or something comparable to that, to provide security , it may be more cost effective and may be better. since afghan's have more insight into that. i think there is an effort to be practical and innovative and try different approaches. much that was done in iraq with the army and marine colonels and saying that we can u

i basically take packs and equipment to different basis in the alr of kabul. host: we are going to take some calls from viewers as we will be talking to a number of service members. the numbers to call are on your screen. sergeantsstiffarm is the first -- sgt stiffarm is the first of this morning. what will the troop increase mean to you in afghanistan? guest: that would mean to me that i get another chance to come over here and make a difference. that is what is important to me. host: sargent, tell us about what motivated you in the first place to join the marine corps. guest: what motivated me was when i was in third grade, had a sponsor. these send me some gifts from korea. he was a marine. since the third grade, that is when i made my decision i wanted to be a marine. i was a sophomore in high school again when i decided that was the route i was going to take with my life. host: in doing your duties as leading convoys in afghanistan, there as been a lot written here in the states about the difficulty of getting supplies through into afghanistan. what can y

the resources all come from kabul. we have to ensure that they have the resources. if we are restructuring the police, they have to have the ability to pay the police. those are the first that. they also have to begin to recognize that they have to build this infrastructure, bill the economy. -- build the economy. they have to be competent, not corrupt. >> we do support including some kind of benchmarks in the bill? >> i would expect that there would be benchmarks. those benchmarks were generally helpful, because they establish a framework. there is a clear understanding. in the iraq experience, even when we were unsuccessful, they were able to communicate to the iraqi government that we were very serious. if you do not see any outcomes of increased productivity -- this dynamic is helpful. what is fundamental to counterinsurgency operation is that military operations will buy time to develop civilian capacity. >> how concerned are you about the strain on u.s. forces for repeated deployments of 89 years? >> the strain has been significant. -- deployments of eight or

mission in kabul. they do not have responsibilities outside of kabul. we are going to be, we, the u.s. government, are going to be opening up to u.s. consulates in afghanistan this year, next year i should say, in 2010. one in sharif and other fire in the west. those consulates will be protected by the ds agents. the civilian personnel that are further in the field mostly in the south and the east are under the protection of the military. >> ambassador, the state department just announced its intention to find a new contractor to provide security at the u.s. embassy in kabul after reviewing allegations of misconduct in security lapses by the current contractor. a prominent government watchdog group questions whether embassy security in a combat zone should be handled by the private sector instead of bye government and we use. has the state department considered whether these positions and combat zones should be performed in-house? >> yes, sir, we have. that contract, which allows you mentioned we, the department has decided not to exercise renewal in op

in 2007 i spent my time in kabul. this time i headed out to one of the agricultural district south kabul to see a different facet of the war effort. >> heidi make the arrangements to get there? >> you can buy commercially into kabul -- you can fly commercially into kabul. >> october was the deadliest month for u.s. servicemen and. how concerned are you for your own personal safety and what measures do you take to protect yourself? >> if you are in bed, if you are required to wear much of the same protective gear that the u.s. troops duke, a helmet and a best with armor plates and it. and you write in the same vehicles that they do. you can get it online at some use military supply dealer. it is basically law enforcement gear. but you have the same protective measures that u.s. troops do, and it is sophisticated stuff. i do not worry too much about my own safety. the logistics of the trip are far dicier than their physical danger. it is tough moving around afghanistan. it does not seem to get easier overtime. it is a b

army patrols as they patrol the look our province, south of kabul -- the logar province, south of kabulnintelligible] >> you guys had right there -- head right there. it was right there. this is the shrapnel that we got from our house. >> that hit where? >> all the houses, but right here in our house. >> and you pull that from where? your house? >> [unintelligible] >> was anyone injured? >> [unintelligible] >> three weeks ago some animals are killed. >> the know where we're located and barki ba -- do you know where we are located in baraki barak? >> [unintelligible] >> you called travis. do you have is #now? -- you call travis. to had his -- do you have his number now? >> [unintelligible] >> the shrapnel got into his home. >> i will bring that up to our commander. it was not our intent to get anywhere near the local population, i am sure. >> [unintelligible] >> we've forgotten the russian regime, but whenever we get ahead, we are remembering that situation again. >> i apologize for that. it was not our intent. we are not perfect but i will bring your concerns up to my commander and make

how did the speech go down in kabul?er: what's interesting here, larry is many afghans don't know what president obama said. they're not going to know until tonight's evening newscast. even the days leading to president obama's address, i asked afghans if they're going to watch. they said no. they said they heard the promises. they have yet to see tangible actions being made. many afghans, if there is a timetable they're afraid at the moment just because the taliban had time an time again said that they will wait it out, that they will not leave. >> larry: what was the reaction as you garnered it from our troops there? >> reporter: well, when you talk about the u.s. troops on the ground here in afghanistan, the majority of them welcome extra troops. they say they need them. when you go to the volatile areas in the south, such as canakandahar province, these ar areas they couldn't secure and hold because they didn't have the manpower. now they're going district to district trying to convince the afghans that they're here

i've made a point of getting out of kabul to see conditions firsthand. con cure with general mcchrystal's assessment that the security is critical. it's critical to regaining t additional troops will also permit us to expand our work with the afghan army and the police so that they can take a larger role in providing for the security of their own people. as president obama said, the transition to afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of 2011 when we expect afghan security forces to assume lead responsibility for defending their country. moving on from security, the second pillar of our comprehensive strategy focuses on governments at the national and sub national levels. our overarching goal is to encourage and improve governance so afghans' see the benefit of supporting the legitimate government and the insurgency loses support. as general mcchrystal has pointed out, one of the major impediments to our strategy is the afghan government's lack of credibility with its own people. to strengthen its legitimacy, our approach at the national level is

we will have those back in kabul as well as here. i will probably put some 25 people or more who do nothing more than contract management. >> in general formica, -- general formica, i would go over the numbers again. i want to be as clear as i can be. by november to the house and nine, we have about 96,000 army. by october 2010, we think we will have 134,000 and that has been projected and approved. it is proposed that by the end of 2013, the police now have 96,800. it is proposed 160,0 propose00 by the end of the year as well? >> yes. -- it is proposed to have 160,00 by the end of the year? >> what is the goal of police by october 2010? is there a goal? >> there is not at this point because we do not have approval. i do not having never in my head. if we get approved to go to 160,000 then there would be a brand to get you to that number. -- a ramp to get you to that number. >> it to go from 96,000 to 134,000, that is a ramp. if you kept that in existence, what would your number's been by the end of 2013? -- numbers be by the end of

we will have those back in kabul as well as here.who do nothing more than contract management. >> in general formica, -- general formica, i would go over the numbers again. i want to be as clear as i can be. by november to the house and nine, we have about 96,000 army. by october 2010, we think we will have 134,000 and that has been projected and approved. it is proposed that by the end of 2013, the police now have 96,800. it is proposed 160,0 propose00 by the end of the year as well? >> yes. -- it is proposed to have 160,00 by the end of the year? >> what is the goal of police by october 2010? is there a goal? >> there is not at this point because we do not have approval. i do not having never in my head. if we get approved to go to 160,000 then there would be a brand to get you to that number. -- a ramp to get you to that number. >> it to go from 96,000 to 134,000, that is a ramp. if you kept that in existence, what would your number's been by the end of 2013? -- numbers be by the end of 2013. >> 96,000 in november 2009. 134,000 by

sir i appreciate your statement but i would like more specifics, we know there are situations in kabul and the increase of troops there. and we know that relations within the embassy at least three fractions. and we know that the ability of the state personnel is limited as it was in the surge of iraq because the environment is not safe for them to go out and operate. i have great confidence in the military operational planning. and i am confident it can succeed. but as i said earlier, i don't see the build component yet. and i would like you to submit to this committee a very specific plan. just as we are receiving a very specific military plan on exactly we are going to receive the build part of it. and in which i think there is a model for it in iraq. so i appreciate your statements and i agree with the quality of personnel. i have yet to see a comprehensive, cohesive plan to implement the civil size of any successful surge. >> well, senator mccain, first let me say we are more than happy to submit a plan. we have obviously been working with our committee of jurisdiction and authori

in the case of the, of the kabul powerplant the latest figures i have is now producing 105 megawatts of power. >> is any of it getting delivered? >> yes, it is. and we are also concerned about the sustainability, mind you the intent addition to the economic need for kabul was certainly to demonstrate that the government of afghanistan as we were into this hearing with the war was able to deliver services. so there were certainly a short-term political need, but at the same time were looking at sustainability of it. we had negotiated with the government that they would pick up the cost of this, but with the understanding that we were also building a transmission lines coming from the north and integrated with central asia to provide power to kabul said the powerplant that becomes a backup system rather than the main primary means of power. the other plants i believe you're referring to is the dam which is now producing 33 megawatts of power. kandahar now have power 24 hours though there are some areas that is uneven in some areas. we have to turbines running. the third, it needs to be

i've made a point of getting out of kabul to see conditions firsthand. con cure with general mcchrystal's assessment that the security is critical. it's critical to regaining the initiative. i'm confident as these troops arrive the situation will stabilize and will turn in our favor. we can work with the afghan army and police to take a larger role in providing for the security of our people. moving on from security, the second pillar of our comp rehence i havive strategy focuses on governance, or overall goal is to improve to afghans see the benefit of supporting the international government and the insurgency loses support. as general mcchrystal has pointed out. the afghan's government's lack of credibility with its own people. our approach at the national level is on improving key ministries, by increasing the number of civilian technical advisers and providing more development assistance directly through the ministries budgets. by focusing on money ministries that deliver official services and security we can celebrate the building of the afghan gove

we will have those back in kabul as well as here.le or more who do nothing more than contract management. >> in general formica, -- general formica, i would go over the numbers again. i want to be as clear as i can be. by november to the house and nine, we have about 96,000 army. by october 2010, we think we will have 134,000 and that has been projected and approved. it is proposed that by the end of 2013, the police now have 96,800. it is proposed 160,0 propose00 by the end of the year as well? >> yes. -- it is proposed to have 160,00 by the end of the year? >> what is the goal of police by october 2010? is there a goal? >> there is not at this point because we do not have approval. i do not having never in my head. if we get approved to go to 160,000 then there would be a brand to get you to that number. -- a ramp to get you to that number. >> it to go from 96,000 to 134,000, that is a ramp. if you kept that in existence, what would your number's been by the end of 2013? -- numbers be by the end of 2013. >> 96,000 in november 2009.

they are also in kabul working with government ministries.fying ministries to determine which ones are a transparent enough to receive additional funds from us. so they are truly working at all levels of the afghan government and in many different sectors of society. but security is a key element s to whether they can be effective. a lot of our civilian workers are veterans of other very difficult security environments. they are willing to go places that a lot of folks are not, and i give them great credit for that. i think we just have to come to you with our best estimate as to what will be required to have the kind of civilian upsurge you just referred to. as we put additional troops in, we want to have more civilians embedded with them. we want to have them right there on the ground when combat is over to begin the building process, a partner in with their civilian counterparts. we are tripling the number that we found when we got there, and we are changing their mission and requiring much more of them. the numbers are going to have to g

out in kabul, we work with ambassador dwaine and ambassador eikenberry -- and ambassador wayen. ne.your agency strategies on agriculture, with the u.s. department of agriculture and the national guard. how do we go forward on implementing agricultural programs in afghanistan? when you go to the provincial level, the planning level there, aid does participate in cerop decision making, but also with the state department. it is a close relationship. two different organizations. there are areas that we continue to work on to improve that coordinationrrr@ @ @ @ a@ @ rr the field, who is the coordinating director for development and economic affairs since june. he oversees all u.s. government, non-military assistance. we have created a counterpart in pakistan to have the same coordination. he directs and supervises a wide range of sections, programs, agencies. there are 15, national-level working groups. not only do we believe we have to work towards as a coordinated injure agency to be successful. >> inter agency to be successful. >> i have another subcommittee to go to, so i am at your

the leaders are appointed by kabul. our state department insisted on a centralized structure that's totally contrary to afghan tradition, and we expect that the afghan people are going to swallow it? especially when their government is so corrupt, they can't even have an honest election? how can we expect our men and women to go over there and put their lives on the line when we haven't been willing to actually be tough with karzai and force the restructuring of that system so it's more consistent with what the afghan culture is all about? >> we have to build con sew nant with the afghan culture, and one of the things we talked about is focusing our efforts in dealing with the existing tribal and other local structures and trying to strengthen them rather than building something new. a figure part of the president's strategy is frankly training up the afghan army as quickly as possible so they can take over responsibility -- or security from our troops. >> the time of the gentleman has expired, the gentleman from new je

secretary clinton when they was in kabul in november she heard from a u.s. army colonel, woo he is thousands of outstanding service, none had 40 years of agriculture law or govern of expertise. but the usda, usaid and state department experts serving alongside his battalion. he told her he was happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need and he said we need more of them. the president's strategy with congressional support will make that possible. now, i'd like to take a few moments to address how the recently completed strategic review impacts u.s./pakistan relations. as the president made clear in his speech last week our partnership is linked to our efforts in afghanistan. we're committed to a partnership with pakistan that is is built on a foundation mutual interest, mutual respect and mutual trust. we're not only strengthening pakistan the capacity to target the groups that threaten our countries but providing substantial resources to support democracy and development in pakistan. the president said going forward the pakistani people mu

diminished some in kabul. same would go for kandahar to a certain degree, although kandahar not being quite as stable or safe. and the sense you get in kabul itself. that tells me we made some progress. 2/3 of the population of afghanistan can be influenced around those urban zones that i have mentioned, cities in afghanistan. the balance of that is out there in the country side. people that live in the valleys and mountains and those that have agricultural base and foundation whether they are raising a crop out of the soil or whether they are herding their sheep or goats, that rural agrarian afghanistan is the hardest part to reach out to. they have never had a centralized powerful government in afghanistan. they have never been able to project power out of kabul out to the corners of afghanistan. and today that's our challenge. our challenge that's been laid out by the president is to rebuild and some cases just simply go out and construct the institutions in afghanistan that are necessary to get government

they affect people's lives significantly in much of the south, kandahar, up to kabul -- they do so in the east, and then in the patches and north and west. a little bit -- in the north, it does not change the pattern of life significantly. except in selected areas. in the south, because of their ability to impact things like the road and commerce, is a significant impact on everything -- the way everyone lives. >> is every taliban a' pa shtu? >> the vast majority. >> that is the reason because that is where they live. how big is their air force? they do not have one. i do not mean to beat you. they do not have an air force or navy. the biggest weapon system would be what? >> they have rockets -- ground- launched rackets. >> how have they been able to accomplish what they have been able to accomplish, but thousands of coalition forces, 90,000 afghan army post, 90,000 afghan police -- have they been able to come back so strongly? >> several reasons. the first is there weren't that many coalition forces or afghan security forces. >> that is a good point. if you had your rate the reasons

we do have six ambassadors in kabul, but we feel extremely well served by having them there given thecritical nature of our mission and the talent that they bring. ambassador eikenberry is charged with all of our work coming out of the embassy. i'm just looking for the actual organizational chart that i brought with me and i am happy to share. >> that is fine, you can get it to us for the record. the reason i ask the question is not to try to -- i am sure that there is a valid, substantial reason for all of the work that all of them are doing. i'm trying to focus on this just because i have learned the hard way that the accountability peace never happens if you do not know who is in charge. i'm trying to determine among these ambassadors who is the ambassador that has the authority and accountability and responsibility in terms of the contract and that is going on -- the contract iing that is going on. >> ambassador eikenberry runs much of what is going on. ambassador wayne, as we said, is the coordinating developed -- director for the economic development and assistance. he oversees

in 2007, i spent most of my time in kabul. this time i headed out towards the agricultural districts, south of kabul to see a different facet of war. >> are there commercial flights that go into afghanistan? >> you can fly commercially into kabul or, less frequently, in to kandahar. so that is not as efficient as the u.s. air transportation system, but is it -- it is a typical commercial flight. >> how concerned are you -- the deadliest month was october for servicemen? how concerned are you for your personal safety and what measures to take to protect yourself? >> if you are embedded with u.s. forces you are required to wear the same protective gear, being a helmet and a vest with armored plates in it. you ride in the same army vehicles they do. >> they provide you with that year? >> no, they don't. you buy it and get it online at use military supply dealers or you get new. law enforcement here. -- law-enforcement year. the logistics of the trip are fight date -- far dicier. >> why is that? >> moving around afghanistan does n

i commented on respect to establishing a full-time presence in kabul. we have access to our own vehicles and a wide amount of capabilities to get out. that was done purposely because of the oversight i have in that region. we established a capability that allows us to move independently and do the oversight required. the types of support they will provide in terms of building for personnel. the transportation involved to ensure we can move personnel back and forth. establishing a rotation so they don't become too embedded in a camp, so there are fresh eyes and an ability for lessons learned. we spent a lot of time to make sure we can operate in the environment. >> thank you very much. >> there is an irony in this hearing. we are on thin ice not for significant reasons. the life and death issues we should be talking about are ignored while we tread so carefully on the contract issue and the fact there is a protest. i will tell you what my observation is. you have come to our office and made us feel this transfer can happen like that. you had made us feel

out in kabul, we work with ambassador dwaine and ambassador eikenberry -- and ambassador wayen. ne.. department of agriculture and the national guard. how do we go forward on implementing agricultural programs in afghanistan? when you go to the provincial level, the planning level there, aid does participate in cerop decision making, but also with the state department. it is a close relationship. two different organizations. there are areas that we continue to work on to improve that coordination. >> mr. feldman? >> the success of our mission would be impossible without a cooperative working relationship usaid. -- with usaid. it was part and parcel of ambassador robert's and 10 when he created this office to make it -- of ambassador holbrooke's in 1020 created this office. -- when he created this office. dod has three represent atives. i would also amplify the point about ambassador tony wayne in the field, who is the coordinating director for development and economic affairs since june. he oversees all u.s. government, non-military assistance. we have created a counterpart in pakis

after these hearings, washington must step aside and let kabul once again become ground zero in this conflict. general mcchrystal and ambassador ikenberry, the task before you is enormous. i know i speak for the entire committee when i say you are the best people to take on this challenge. this country is blessed to have leaders like you in its service. in september, your written word when we received your assessment, we read your written word when we received your assessment. today we need to hear you speak about the unwritten words between the lines of the assessment. this is your opportunity to speak to the citizens of this country and interested parties across the world. i think when they hear from you they'll be convinced of the soundness of our strategy and optimistic about the chances for our success. fortunately much of your assessment seems to have been internalized in washington and by members of this committee. on tuesday night, the president agreed to provide you with additional troops to execute a counterinsurgency strategy. the commander in chief responded to the urgenc

the road is now complete from kabul to candle daughter and jalalabad to kabul so that's about 60% down. as i mentioned a lot of women are filing titles for landownership, so if you put this all together, you know, we're about 60% of the way there where the people feel they can run on their own and it's, and so, you know, i think that has always happened during the six years we were off in iraq. we went into afghanistan very vigorously to, one find osama and defeat the taliban al-qaeda but we also went there to help the people out. but then, unfortunately in a year and a half we ran off to iraq and the media the military the humanitarian groups then. for six years afghanistan and pakistan were kind of left on the back burner, and now to me it's very exciting to see that finally the country that we first went into to help and where we were trying to fight the taliban now it's taking, again, a priority. so i don't know where i'm headed -- >> i like it, keep going. you're always one of the most fascinating people to listen to, and clearly if lessons learned from afghanistan in the past and

i give -- every time i go to kabul i ask is you and you are always in some remote area. but you remember, we are in our agricultural meeting in kabul when we discuss these issues. and i'm glad to see you here. first of all, you talked about, this is is an interesting phrase, i never heard it before. i've even seen it in the united states, pam. [laughter] >> the venue alluded to the fact that some afghans hate us more than they hate the taliban, but you know as well as anyone that that is not universally true that every single public opinion poll, and there are polls in afghanistan and afghanistan is a poor country with a high literacy rate. but very sophisticated politically. they have lived in politics for centuries without quite realizing that's what they lived. they don't like the taliban. they know what the black years were about and they don't want to return to it. at the same time, what next afghans together, is their sense of being afghans whether they are pashtun, or turkmen. there's never been a separatist movement in afghanistan, whereas its neighbors, pakistan

and we were physically dealing with this in kabul.we actually were running fiber optic cable off the telephone poles down the street to connect my office with general mcneal's so that we had a nato communication -- he had super net so we could talk to each other but the headquarters didn't. so we had to go out and buy computers that aren't in the state system, run fiber optic cable off telephone poles. and connect and then we had to physically handle data because you can't electronically move it from one system to the other. i think this is ridiculous. >> so the point is is that there needs to be a lot more coordination to start off -- that you'd have these secured computers and they'd probably are going to have to talk with the military part of this? >> exactly. but it is a bureaucratic issue of what standards are acceptable. >> so what you try to do is have uniformed standards. you've got consistency there and you can talk. it really gets back to the other thing about -- i'll never forget when i was in iraq, we went out to one of th

the horse they know, which is the afghan taliban, they want an anti-indian government in power in kabul and they want a stable afghanistan. so what the u.s. has to do is to convince them that the best way for stability is the way that we are going. and also, to mediate between india and pakistan which we have indicated some willingness to do but we haven't taken on in any way seriously yet. host: every sunday we welcome our listeners on xm channel 120, and also to our c-span listeners on channel 132. and for our international audience watching on a sunday afternoon, scott wilson is joining us, trudey ruben and bruce is joining us from north carolina. good morning. caller: good morning. host: go ahead. caller: ok. first of all, the reason i'm calling is in support of not necessarily the war but the men and women that are fighting and dying over there every day. i think we all need to wake up and realize that our wars and our conflicts and our interests to want to be in the middle east for years to come, and more and more women and men are going to die because of that. and it's up to our

security coordinator and chief of the office of military cooperation in kabul. and then as commander of the combined forces command in he served as director of the two staff in 2009 and as commander of joint special operations command from 2000 to to 2008. the operation of lead in the death of the leader of al qaeda in iraq. we are honored to have you here. wide view not begin? -- why don't you begin? >> thank you for the opportunity to present my views on that can stand today pitta i would ask of my full statement be submitted for the record. last week, president obama presented the administration strategy for afghanist an and pakistan. i am honored to be part of that process. it offers the best path to stabilize afghanistan and establish that al qaeda cannot get in difficult to plan attacks against us. i can say that i fully support this approach. i consider myself privileged to serve as the united states ambassador and to represent an amazing team of diplomats, development specialists, and civilian efforts to form the most capable and dedicated the netted sta

we will soon have increased our presence in cobble -- int kuehl -- in kabul. the united states foreign assistance is a small fraction of the total amount spent in afghanistan over the last eight years. additional resources will be necessary if we look forward to sharing more details on our anticipated needs in the coming days and weeks. mr. chairman, afghanistan is a daunting challenge. with additional troops and other resources, and with the help the united states congress, we will work tirelessly to ensure that al qaeda never finds refuge in afghanistan and threatens our country and homeland. >> thank you so much for being with us. if there are any photographers in the immediate -- >> mr. ambassador, thank you so much for being with us. if there are any photographers in the immediate front the witnesses, please, move to the side. i believe some already have, if not all. thank you for that. general mcchrystal. tell us what your mission is. >> mr. chairman, i believe that our mission is to do two things. first, al qaeda is a threat to the united states and to

i commented on respect to establishing a full-time presence in kabul.s and a wide amount of capabilities to get out. that was done purposely because of the oversight i have in that region. we established a capability that allows us to move independently and do the oversight required. the types of support they will provide in terms of building for personnel. the transportation involved to ensure we can move personnel back and forth. establishing a rotation so they don't become too embedded in a camp, so there are fresh eyes and an ability for lessons learned. we spent a lot of time to make sure we can operate in the environment. >> thank you very much. >> there is an irony in this hearing. we are on thin ice not for significant reasons. the life and death issues we should be talking about are ignored while we tread so carefully on the contract issue and the fact there is a protest. i will tell you what my observation is. you have come to our office and made us feel this tra you have made us feel like it would be an easy process. we go to afghanistan and

it has been most stable when there's been pashtun rule in kabul. and so, yeah, you do want pashtun representation and even leadership in the government, but not taliban leadership, and the question is how do you get that? >> host: to read more of tom ricks' works go to foreign policy, go to his blog at ricks.foreignpolicy.com. he writes a progress called the best defense, he's also the senior fellow at the center for new american security. we thank you for your time this morning, we appreciate it. >> guest: you're welcome. great phone calls. >> american icons. three original documentaries from c-span now available on dvd. a unique journey through the iconic homes of the three branches of the american government. see the exquisite detail of the supreme court through the eyes of the justices. go beyond the velvet ropes of public tours into those rarely-seen spaces of the white house, america's most famous home. and explore the history, art and architecture of the capitol, one of america's most symbolic structures. american icons, a three-disc dvd set

there will be a conference in kabul that will focus on finalizing and working two new compacts. it will set forth mutual expectations and responsibilities between the afghan government and international partners. a second compact between the afghan government and the people to recommit the government to provide better governance, fight corruption and improve the life of the afghan people. a third conference could take place in tokyo to focus on deficiencies and funding. we heard clearly your message about the need to improve the government's and -- to improve the governmentnance. if our government was functioning there would not have been [unintelligible] there would have been no taliban and no international efforts to rebuild afghanistan. therefore, improving the government is our responsibility. the government of afghanistan is committed to taking measures to fight corruption and improve the government. the president said that individuals involved in corruption will not have a place in the government. 600 officials have been arrested lately, and many are high- ranking official

security coordinator and chief of the office of military cooperation in kabul. and then as commander of the combined forces command in afghanistan. general stanley mcchrystal is the current commander, international security assistance force, and commander u.s. forces afghanistan. previously he served as director of the joint staff from the april 2008, to june 2009 and as commander, joint special operations command from 2003 to 2008. where he led the operation that resulted in the death of abu musab al-zarqawi, the leader of al qaeda in iraq. ambassador, general, we're honored to have you here. and ambassador, why don't you begin? >> thank you. chairman berman, ranking member lehtonen and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to present my views on afghanistan today. i'd ask that my full statement be submitted for the record. last week in a speech at the united states military academy at west point, president obama presented the administration's strategy for afghanistan and pakistan. his decision came after an intensive deliberati

i was in kabul. host: what has been the reaction so far since the president gave his speech from the people you have talked to? guest: it is a mixed reaction. perhaps the correct message has not gotten out here. [inaudible] it has not really reached the afghan people. host: in talking with the afghans on the street, how confident are they the the americans will be able to train the afghan security forces to take over in 18 months? guest: i do now and there's any doubt among many afghans that the american military is extremely competent and capable -- i do not think there's any doubt among the afghans that the american people are competent and capable. [inaudible] increasing power to the afghan national army. general mcchrystal said earlier that this will probably take about four years. no one is expecting it to happen overnight. host: julius cavendish of the christian science monitor, thank you. guest: thank you. host: this is the headline in "the guardian" allen of london this morning. back to the p

that's significantly expanded our footprint around kanduhar and the kabul province.nt realize these forces were not their only to secure the elections but they were going to stay. that had a huge impact on the insurgents because we put much more pressure on the leadership and their chain of command, their logistics, they're safe havens which made it difficult for them to concentrate and project their power. they are more in a survival mode now than they are able to gain the initiative. i think that is one reason we did not seek well-synchronized attacks happening in southern afghanistan and the last 12-16 months. -- in the last 12-16 months. >> general mcchrystal talked about an 18 month schedule. >> he is taking a regional approach including pakistan and the whole of the afghanistan. i am in the position that i took it regional approach focusing on southern afghanistan. we proved that the concept is right. if you deployed more forces in july and august, you will see the effect that you expect to say. that led to the initial assessment that we need more forces to com

i flew out of kabul, afghanistan a week and a half ago.m there i was in delhi and dubai to washington, d.c. how much oversight do you think homeland security has or the president has when it comes to these issues? we're dependent on a lot of different people. we still shouldn't lose sight of exactly how many flights are going out. over the last ten years the bureau of transportation estimates about 99 million flights that have touched the united states, sort of coming and going over the last tennessee years. only six are tied to terrorism-related issues, four from 9/11, richard reid was one of them and this one. if you think about it statistically the chances are to say unlikely doesn't do it best. the sky is not falling. we need to be careful about that. >> larry: is there a dangerous we're overreacting based on the statistic jack just gave us? >> i think it's lessons learned, and we need to examine at all times if there was a failure. we don't want to say that because the statistics are in our favor that we can't look at the incident and

troops as they patrolled the district in logar province south of kabul.ing in native tongue] >> translator: four days ago you guys hid right there up mr. the graveyard. >> yeah. >> translator: so the people -- [speaking in native tongue] >> translator: it was right there. here is the shrapnel we got from our house. >> can you set that down? [speaking in native tongue] >> translator: he said there is shrapnel right in our house. this is our big e problem. [speaking in native tongue] >> you pulled that from where, your house? [speaking in native tongue] >> was anyone injured? speak -- [speaking in native tongue] >> translator: no injuries right now, but like three weeks ago -- >> yeah? >> translator: some animals dead. >> do you know where we're located? [speaking in native tongue] >> and do you come there with us with any concerns you have at any time? we're there for you. [speaking in native tongue] >> call travis. you have his number now. >> translator: we are very -- [speaking in native tongue] >> translator: if any shrapnel got -- [inaudible] [speaking

i think one the ways that we're going to achieve this is by reviewing individual ministries in kabul and sharing these ministries that we have lock solid accountability to keep it in place, and minimize the risk of anyone be desserted or not. >> is there a time on that? >> you know, that's a good question. i'm not sure that -- again, what we have here is no confirmed timetables. this is a real big priority. we are going to work with afghan to develop accountability procedures that any democratic government should have. we are going to be certificated already on a number of things. one more? >> is it possible with these numbers of poland and italy and much heralded announcement to say these are caveat three or sought to be? >> you know, i don't know. i think that we'll have to see how exactly what kind of troops are provided, what roles we'll have. i'm not sure of the answer. >> next step. >> yeah, i said the secretary spoke with lady ashton about the meeting. about having a discussion. >> when will the secretary have discussions with the chinese and russian counterparts? >> well, she

and e this corruption that every step along the way, not just in the palace in kabul. when we are so dependent upon long supply lines as we are in afghanistan where everything has to be imported it is much more difficult than it was in iraq where we had kuwait as a staging ground to go into iraq. you offloading ship in karachi and by the time whatever it is, muffins for soldiers breakfast couric inside ied equipment it gets to where we are headed, it goes through lot hands and one of the major sources of funding for the taliban is the protection money. that does nothing to do with president karzai so i think we owe you a more careful and pecking of a lot of the concerns and we will endeavor to provide that. >> i appreciate that. >> senator webb. >> thank you mr. chairman. i would like to welcome all three of you again after a brief exchange yesterday. it has been interesting to hear how different committees approach the same situation. welcome to the formulations committee. it like to say first of all i think we have pretty broad agreement about the concerns that were