i do not know what president karzai made this decision. the explanation given by his former intelligence chief, which we read in the newspaper this weekend, seems to have a ring of truth to it. president karzai no longer believes that the and not a states will succced and he is shifting his results as a policy of accommodation with the taliban and the pakistani military. if true, this could be very dangerous. that is the larger trend that underlines all the others. a loss of confidence n it seems to be shared by both our friends and enemies in afghanistan as well as its neighbors. as our witnesses know, this is a battle for the false and allegiances of people. it demonstrate those sitting on the fence that they should throw their lot in with our partners and us because we're going to win. no matter how much has been explained, the decision to begin withdrawing our forces from afghanistan arbitrarily in july 2011 seems to be having exactly the effect that many of us predicted it would. it is convincing the key actors inside and outside of a

in early april, president karzai presented his interim plans for reintegration. in may, a concept of peace jirga it gave president karzai a conditional mandate to move forward in this area. the u.s. supports an afghan-lead process that will break ties with al qaeda and live under the afghan constitution in all of its requirements. let me conclude by underscoring -- underscoring that our overall assessment is that we're heading the right direction in afghanistan. of the 121 key districts identified last year, if you were assessed at that time to be sympathetic or neutral to the afghan government. by march of this year, that number had climbed to 73 districts. this and other indicators suggest that we are beginning to regain the initiative and the insurgency is beginning to lose momentum. that said, the outcome is far from determined and these are still earlier days. his only a matter of time since the president's announcement. and i briefed this committee in february, i said that we will face setbacks even as we achieve progress. none of what we're doing in afghan

he's clearly spent time with karzai. mcchrystal had the main relationship there and mcchrystal and karzai had a very warm relationship. you know, the petraeus/karzai relationship may not be as warm. i think petraeus may use his influence to push karzai to do things that may not be as comfortable for him. i think... you know, petraeus is very savvy in managing that relationship. so it may not be as smooth from the outside but it may be more productive . >> woodruff: kimberly kagan, picking up on what you started to bring up a moment ago, the skills that served him well in iraq. because people look at the two wars and say they aren't necessarily at all the same kind of war. so what skills that were useful in iraq do transfer to afghanistan? >> although afghanistan and iraq are different conflicts, the truth is that counterinsurgency fight has certain shapes. you have to take care of the problem in a very specific way. as general petraeus was quoted as saying in the opening segment, you actually have to defeat the enemy in

karzai did go there recently, very recently. he hadn't done that enough, in my opinion. but he went, had a meeting with the kandahar leaders, senator levin and i did a couple of years ago, met with a lot of their people, and they all are serious individuals, respected in their local areas, and he called on them for support and a majority of the audience raised their hands when he asked for their support. i think general mcchrystal saw that as a strong, clear call for unity and that karzai displayed extraordinary ownership of the operation. how would you evaluate that and does that indicate that we're not doomed in kandahar, but actually maybe laying the ground work for successful operations? >> that was, indeed, one of the most important of the political shaping operation. there was also another shia counsel that president karzai held about 15,000 to 20,000 of local elders and leaders. it was so inclusive a number of them felt no reluctance in standing up with the tv cameras rolling and criticizing the afghan government and in some cases president karzai who turned and p

karzai and his government? >> with respect to the very last point of that, senator, having talked with president karzai indeed about the meeting of july 2011, just as i started out today's session by explaining as precisely as i could what that means. that it's a message of urgency that went along with the huge additional message of commitment. senator lieberman reminded us of the words vital national interest used by the president with respect to afghanistan. and again, july 2011, the point at which a process begins that is based on conditions to begin the responsible drawdown of the surge forces at a rate to be determined by those conditions at that time. based on advice and so forth. and also a process to begin transitioning some tasks to afghan forces and officials. but i am not sure that i share the characterization of the headline at least of -- about president karzai's feelings. i base that on conversations with president karzai. a number of them in the past month and a half or so in kabul, from kandahar

one could argue that karzai's been more of a problem than the solution. and so it seems to me that what we ought to hope for is not a continuation or better implementation of the counter-insurgency strategy but, rather, some fundamental changes. and i think one of them has to do with our relationship with the karzai government. >> suarez: gurg, you just heard professor desch, can things happen quickly? you were on the inside in both this and the last administration. were there very high-profile personnel changes, but changing one person's portfolio sometimes means months of adjustment after that, doesn't it. >> again, potentially, and that was a potential here. first, can things happen quickly? the answer is a resounding no. nothing is going to happen quickly. some weeks guilty well. some weeks will go poorly. and the one thing dave petraeus said when he testified last week was it's a bit of a roller coaster ride, and you want to keep things more or less on an upward trajectory, but this is going to take time. and this is the toughest, toughest period . w

in all of our efforts, we and president karzai are emphasizing the importance of include city on the part of the afghan government and its leadership. especially in linking local governing structures to the decision making in financial resources in kabul. much more needs to be done to help the afghan government as irresponsibility for addressing the concerns and needs of afghan citizens. the national consultant of peace held at earlier this month was a constructive step in this effort, providing an opportunity for president karzai to address some of the political tensions that fueled the insurgency and promote reconciliationnand local reintegration as means to contribute to a politicall resolution of some of the issues that exist. the council he conducted on sunday further this process, and the effort to set political conditions for progress. another critically important part of our joint civil military campaign in afghanistan is promoting broadbased economic infrastructure development. we have seen improvements in the government's ability to deliver basic services such as electricit

karzai and his government?> with respect to the very last point of that, senator, having talked with president karzai indeed about the meeting of july 2011, just as i started out today's session by explaining as precisely as i could what that means. that it's a message of urgency that went along with the huge additional message of commitment. senator lierman reminded us of the words vital national interest used by the president with respect to afghanistan. and again, july 2011, the point at which a process begins that is based on conditions to begin the responsible drawdown of the surge forces at a rate to be determined by those conditions at that time based on advice and so forth. and also a process to begin transitioning some tasks to afghan forces and officials. but i am not sure that i share the characterization of the headline at least of -- about president karzai's feelings. i base that on conversations with president karzai. a number of them in the past month and a half or so in kabul, from kandahar and

the karzai government has yet to deliver services to win local allegiances. and recent reports suggest that afghanistan is minorities are concerned about president karzai is overtures to taliban leaders through pakistani intermediaries. at our hearing two weeks ago, general petreaus emphasized that "a counterinsurgency operation is a roller-coaster experience, "but in his view, the trajectory has been generally upward, despite the tough losses. i have long believed that the number one mission in afghanistan is building the capacity of the afghan security forces to be able to take increasing responsibility for their country's security. general petreaus said that increasing the size and capacity of the afghan security forces is central to achieving progress in afghanistan. u.s. and isaf forces need to focus their resources and energy on this effort. there is a significant shortfall of trainers and of mentors. building capacity of the afghan security forces to provide security is not simply what we seek. it is what the afghan people seek. that is what we were to

well, do you agree with the comment of president karzai's former intelligence chief that karzai has lost confidence in the ability of the united states and nato to succeed in afghanistan? >> i do not, senator. as i mentioned earlier, we just did a video teleconference, weekly via teleconference, with general mcchrystal. he spent the bulk of the sunday with president karzai in the process of conducting the shura council in kandahar, going to and fro with him as well. in that process, there was certainly no sense on the general mcchrystal's part, nor on those of the others who were with him, that there was a lack of confidence in the united states commitment to afghanistan. as i mentioned earlier, the fact that we have -- will have more than tripled our forces from january 2009 to the end of august, 2010, is of enormous signnficance. the same with the civilian force structure, the funding, and others. >> let me reiterate my admiration and respect, in general, for you and our military leaders -- admiration and respect, general, for you and our military leaders and the task before you. you a

karzai nine years ago? anything, these eight or nine years have produced opportunities that others have grown into credible political positions that can create systems that can sustain and last beyond personalities. >> on the need to question. with other countries have made a commitment. >> there are two or three things that were going on three years ago. people should not misinterpret that. the media is talking about u.s. withdrawal in 2011. it is -- we have to be careful how we phrase that. it is not a u.s. withdrawal. it is the beginning of probably a long process and yet australia, canada, and holland have had a schedule of withdrawal long before that. in 2005 or 2006, they announced the schedule. one of them was leaving the end of this year and one is living next year and two of them are leaving next year -- one is leaving next year and two of them arliving next year. there is no relation between that and what mr. obama announced a few months ago. >> any other questions here? please. >> [inaudible] i a

the karzai government has yet to deliver services to win local allegiances. and recent reports suggest that afghanistan is minorities are concerned about president karzai is overtures to taliban leaders through pakistani intermediaries. at our hearing two weeks ago, general petreaus emphasized that "a counterinsurgency operation is a roller-coaster experience, "but in his view, the trajectory has been generally upward, despite the tough losses. i have long believed that the number one mission in afghanistan is building the capacity of the afghan security forces to be able to take increasing responsibility for their country's security. general petreaus said that increasing the size and capacity of the afghan security forces is central to achieving progress in afghanistan. u.s. and isaf forces need to focus their resources and energy on is effort. there is a significant shortfall of trainers and of mentors. building capacity of the afghan security forces to provide security is not simply what we seek. it is what the afghan people seek. that is what we were told

the karzai government is in place. it is the government of afghanistan with all its imperfections.from my observations, not just from the article, there is a lot of tension on the civilian side that makes it very hard to move forward in a coherent fashion when it comes to why the president had to act, the statements of the general, not only were outside the norm, they really put in question military subordination to civilian control. to have "rolling stone"follow you around for a month as a judgment question. [laughter] >> to these officers who were on named -- understand lawyers have been shot at and you are brave and but you let your army down. the cavalier attitude, the disrespect, even though you may have disagreements, this is unacceptable. this is a low point for the armed forces in a long time. i am glad the president made this decision and some other officers need to be looked at and they need to be replaced. >> it has been said that general petraeus has been set up for failure. >> we have repeated our position on many occasions that we have the right strategy, but we canno

that is the strategy that all of our allies have fully endorsed, as has president karzai. now, it is tough. it is a tough challenge, for reasons that have been amply recorded. as i said, this is the third poorest country in the world. it has an extraordinarily high illiteracy rate. it has suffered through 30 years of war. and so, this is going to be tough. but what i expect is that by the end of this year, we will have seen progress on the strategy that was laid out. we will conduct a full review. those things that are not working, we will fix. those things that are working, we will build on, both on the civilian side and on the military side, as well as on the diplomatic side. because, ultimately, as was true in iraq, so it will be true in afghanistan. we are going to have to have a political solution, not only a military solution. now, with respect to the efforts of reintegration, i think it is too early to tell. we have to view these efforts with skepticism but also openness. the taliban is a blend of hard core ideologues, tribal leaders, kyd said basically sign up beca

moreover, as president karzai has recognized, and a number of allied leaders that knowledge, it will be a number of years before afghan security forces can handle the tasks on their own. the commitment to afghanistan is necessarily an indoor in one, and neither the taliban, nor afghan and pakistani partners should doubt that. our efforts have appropriately focused on protecting the population. this is of considerable importance, for in counter insurgency operations, the human terrain is the decisive terrain. the results have been notable. the number of civilians killed has been substantially lower this year than last year. i will continue the emphasis on reducing the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute minimum in the course of military operations. focusing on securing the people does not mean we do not go after the enemy. in fact, it inevitably it requires killing, capturing, or turning the insurgents. our forces have been doing that, and we will continue to do that. our troopers and our afghan partners have been very much taking the fight to the enemy in recent months. sin

president karzai went to new delhi, beijing, and washington and tokyo. these contacts are significantly narrowing the gap , the historic gap which is over 60 years old, between afghanistan and pakistan. please remember-- and your viewers-- please remember that on the day pakistan was-- declared independence, afghanistan opposed its entry into the u.n. in 1947. they have a disputed border. they are a pashtan ethnic group. there are massive historical issues here and president obama has sought to help the two work together for the simplest of reasons-- if they work together, there's mutual benefit for them and for the rest of the world because that is the area of the world , that border area, where the great threat to our national security, homeland security, that of our european allies, and indkra all lie. the last few months have seen a real dialogue, encouraged by but not guided by the u.s. that's what we do. that's what i think should have been years and years ago, and that's the policy i'm part of. >> ifill: ambassador richard holbrooke, special envoy

were these significant cabinet posts, significant losss to the karzai team?ere very significant cabinet posts. this is two of the three security ministers, and they were very strong and very powerful ministers. i think people in kabul are talking about little else these days except what the reasons are for the removal of these two men. of course, their resignations were forced. they were quite open about this. karzai apparently had a very acrimonious meeting with both of them, at the end of which they tendered their resignations which were immediately accepted. the announced reason for this was the attacks on the jirga, but very few people in kabul are giving this any credence. we've heard versions ranging from the ministers have been plotting against karzai to american involvement that they wanted one or both of the ministers gone to british involvement that they wanted one or both of the ministers gone. everyone has got an explanation but none of these explanations seem to jibe with each other. >> suarez: it's interesting that you mentioned the british and

will the support president karzai in seeking thatt -ppresident karzai in seeking a compromise? >> i support the prospects for political settlement and reintegration. this is, in the end, combined with the military surge, vital to securing the future of afghanistan and enabling us to in the end, the people in southern afghanistan have got to feel that they are part of the government, that it represents them. that procees of reintegration -- that have been laid down -- that issa vital part of making this couutry more secure. >> i m grateful for thh commitment to afghanistan and this house. it has been clear that our forces there were in demand. we've been fighting instead of 15-year war, 51-yeer wars. -- one five-year war, five one-year wars. i would ask you to commit to counterinsurgency. we've always been good at that. we've been the problem by the americans. >> i'm grateful for the question. -- we have been leapfrooged by the americans. >> i'm grateful for the question, but i do not agree that this is a repeat. what is happeeing in terms of counterinsurgency is making sure tha

the karzai government is the government of afghanistan. from my observation, not just from the rolling stone article, but there's a lot of attention that makes it very hard to move forward in a coherent fashion. and it comes to what the president had to back, -- had to act, the statements of the general were not only outside the norm, but they've put into question military insubordination of civilian control. letting a reporter from the rolling stone all your round is the first question. [laughter] and these officers that are named, i understand you were warriors and you have been shot at in your brain. but the language used, the cavalier attitude, the disrespect -- even though you may have disagreements -- they were unacceptable. this is a low point for the armed forces in a very long time and i'm glad the president made this decision. and some other officers need to be looked out and they need to be replaced. >> some people are saying that petreaus is being set up for failure. >> i think our position is and we have repeated it many occas

we can't do anything about karzai. he was elected, right, james? >> you know, again, i think if there was a dispute and i think some people thought that we could deal with him, i think sometimes you got to go around him. i promise you this guy is fundamentally corrupt and as long as we're stuck with him, we won't do very much with him. not at all. and, look, the president doubled down. he doubled down on a bush strategy. it's not working so far. who knows. maybe general petraeus will think of something. i know i would vote for him. i wish to take general mcchrystal coming to louisiana and head up the state coordination of the oil spill. this guy needs to change his view in history. he's a competent guy who talked too much and he has a lot to offer this country and general mcchrystal, come on down here and we'll put you to work and you can help a lot of people. i think you're a talented, brave guy. >> i agree with james on a lot today. >> we'll even let you talk to the press. i'm serious. we should do it. i told the governor's office said you ought

the karzai government is the government of afghanistan. from my observation, not just from the rolling stone article, but there's a lot of attention that makes it very hard to move forward in a coherent fashion. and it comes to what the president had to back, -- had to act, the statements of the general were not only outside the norm, but they've put into question military insubordination of civilian control. letting a reporter from the rolling stone all your round is the first question. [laughter] and these officers that are named, i understand you were warriors and you have been shot at in your brain. but the language used, the cavalier attitude, the disrespect -- even though you may have disagreements -- they were unacceptable. this is a low point for the armed forces in a very long time and i'm glad the president made this decision. and some other officers need to be looked out and they need to be replaced. >> some people are saying that petreaus is being set up for failure. >> i think our position is and we have repeated it on many oc

karzai or no karzai, we should -- the last question i was asked in india was do you think there is anternative to mr. karzai? it is a very insulting question to ask a nation that has 30 million people, who was mr. karzai nine years ago? no one asked that question. nationally, there are people -- if anything, these eight or nine years have produced opportunities that have grown into credible positions that can create systems that can sustain and last beyond personalities. >> specifically, with other countries have made a commitment -- >> yes, unfortunately, there are two or three things going on three years ago, the people should not listen to that, because the media is talking about u.s. withdrawal in -- the people should not misinterpret that, because the media is talking about u.s. withdrawal in 2011. it is the beginning of probably a long process, and yet, australia, canada, and holland had scheduled withdrawal from afghanistan long before that. in 2005 or 2006, they announced the schedule one of the -- they announced the schedule. one of them was leaving this year, two next year.

karzai nine years ago? if anything, these eight or nine years have produced opportunities that others have grown into credible political positions that can create systems that can sustain and last beyond personalities. >> on the need to question. with other countries have made a commitment. >> there are two or three things that were going on three years ago. people should not misinterpret that. the media is talking about u.s. withdrawal in 2011. it is -- we have to be careful how we phrase that. it is not a u.s. withdrawal. it is the beginning of probably a long process and yet australia, canada, and holland have had a schedule of withdrawal long before that. in 2005 or 2006, they announced the schedule. one of them was leaving the end of this year and one is living next year and two of them are leaving next year -- one is leaving next year and two of them are living next year. there is no relation between that and what mr. obama announced a few months ago. >> any other questions here? please. >> [inaudible

today a spokesman for karzai justified the move. . >> this could have been a national chaos.a national crisis. someone has to take responsibility for this. while we understand that this was a loss for the government, losing two important people, in the meantime it's a gain for the people of afghanistan. >> holman: u.s. defense secretary robert gates reacted to the removals while en route to london. he said they do not signal trouble for the afghan government, but urged karzai to appoint successors "of equal caliber." officials in egypt today declared israel's blockade of gaza a failure. an egyptian security official said his country will keep its border with the palestinian territory open indefinitely. meanwhile, the israeli navy shot and killed four palestinian divers off the coast of gaza today. they were believed to be planning a terror attack on israel. the militant group al-aqsa martyrs' brigades said the men were members of its marine unit training for a mission. chrysler recalled some 600,000 minivans and jeep wranglers in the u.s. and 100,000 abroad. the vehicles have

as i agreed with president karzai, we must start working to a wider reconciliation process, leading to a political settlement that works for all the people of afghanistan. we're seeing a good example in canada are canadakandah -- kandahar. it includes several hundred local elders, and it includes a major drive by the afghan government with ur support to improve public ervices and the rule of law. from now on, what is happening there should reflect a deeper understanding of the influence of trouble sections in afghanistan. we have not paid enough attention to this and to the unintended results of some of our policies. i want you to take a look,ensuro the local economy from the huge contracts has a positive impact and does not help fund local militias for the insurgents. this is a vital year. we have the forces needed on the ground. we have our best people, not just military, but on the diplomatic and development front as well, but i do not pretend it will be easy. we must be ready for further casualties over the summer months as the sole guard -- so- called fighting season resumes. i sa

>> is important that president karzai have confidence in the entire team.nd i think many people enjoy, at a number of different levels on that team, good relationships with president karzai. >> so what would not be inaccurate for us to assume that from the president's perspective, general mcchrystal 's capability and maturity are now open to question? >> i think there are open questions based on actions that reported in that article that the president seeks to speak to general mcchrystal about. >> one of the underlying themes of the article, separate from general mcchrystal's more controversial comments, is the frustration that rank-and-file soldiers have with the rules of engagement and the frustration -pof deallng with the realitiesf trying to prosecute the counterinsurgency strategy on the ground on a day-to-day basis. separating mcchrystal from that analysis and that theme in the article, how concerned is the president about that, that rank- aad-file soldiers find themselves -- if they are being accurately represented in this article -- trapped by limit

he spent most of sunday with general karzai -- with karzai conducting the council in canada are -- kandahar. in the process, there was no sense on the part of general mcchrystal nor on those of the others with him that there was a lack of confidence in the united states commitment to afghanistan. as i mentioned earlier, the fact that we have more than region will have more than tripled our forces from january of 2009 to the end of august of 2010 is of enormous significance. it is the same with the civilian force structure, the same with funding, and the same with others. >> let me reiterate my admiration and respect for you and our military leaders and the difficulty of the task before them. i think you are one of america's great heroes. but i continue to worry a great deal about the message we are sending in the region about whether we are going to stay or not and whether we are going to do what is necessary to succeed rather than set an arbitrary time line -- timeline. [unintelligible] >> we are going to recess now for a few moments. we will recess until the call of the chair. [applause]

i agree with president karzai that we need to work toward a wider reconciliation process that works for all the people of the afghanistan. we are seeing a good example of that in canadkandahar which is largely afghan lead. there is a major drive by the afghan government with our support to improve public services and the rule all law. from now on, what is happening there should reflect a deeper understanding of the influence of tribal structures in afghanistan. paid enoughhattention toothisot- and to the unintended consequences of our policies. i want us to take careful look at the contrast in policy and ensure that the oney going into the ocal economy from this huge contract has an impact does not help fund local in it -- militias or worse, the insurgents. we had the forces needed on the ground and our best people on the military and diplomatic fronts. i do noo pretend it will be easy. i must warn the house that we must be ready for further casualties over the summer months as the fighting season resumes and as isaf extends its activities. they are putting thousands of miles away to pr

that is what all of our allies have fully endorse, as has president karzai. now it is tough. it is a tough challenge. for reasons that have been amply reported. as i said, this is the third poorest country in the world. it has an extraordinarily high illiteracy rate. it has suffered through 30 years of war. this is going to be tough. but what i expect is that by the end of this year, we will have seen progress on the strategies that we have laid out, we will conduct a full review -- those things that are not working, we will fix. those things that are working, we will build on, on the civilian side and military side, as well as on the diplomatic side. ultimately it is true -- as was true in iraq, so will be true in afghanistan, we will have to have a political solution, not simply a myth -- a military simpler -- a military solution. it is too early to tell. i think that we have to view these efforts with scepticism, but also openness. the taliban is a blend of hard core ideologues, tribal leaders , kids that sign up because it is the best job available to them. not all are go

karzai all the way down to the u.s. units part nerd with trying to improve perrormance and accountabiliiy with their afghan partnees. this is a high priority for us. >> let me say that we hear it on the top. we hear the statements that'ss in the report. secretary clinton read the statements in the report that president obama has said. we see this report, all of these findings, this overwhelming evidence from this occurriig, yes, in the middle, from those who have authority, to address the situation, actually on the ground, by stripping somebody of the contract or making sure that this is is not occurring, we couldn't see any activity there and that's where the information lies. i ran out of time. >> a particular contractor that you raised by name a couple of times, large contractor, private security contractor in afghanistan in part the reason that the next twist contract, which is going to be the large private security contract, bundled contract, if you will, which would have made it easier for the contracting agency t

karzai nine years ago?if anything, these eight or nine years have produced opportunities that others have grown into credible political positions that can create systems that can sustain and last beyond personalities. >> on the need to question. with other countries have made a commitment. >> there are two or three things that were going on three years ago. people should not misinterpret that. the media is talking about u.s. withdrawal in 2011. it is -- we have to be careful how we phrase that. it is not a u.s. withdrawal. it is the beginning of probably a long process and yet australia, canada, and holland have had a schedule of withdrawal long before that. in 2005 or 2006, they announced the schedule. one of them was leaving the end of this year and one is living next year and two of them are leaving next year -- one is leaving next year and two of them are living next year. there is no relation between that and what mr. obama announced a few months ago. >> any other questions here? please. >> [inaudible]

then the leaders of the jurga will be reporting to president karzai, and all that will be taken intoccount. we have been very clear in our approach that we think that there is basis for reintegrating taliban fighters back into society, but we do not believe anyone should be either reintegrated or reconciled on a political basis without renouncing al qaeda, renouncing violence, committing to live by the laws and constitution of the nation of afghanistan. there is no military solution to most conflicts. this is not unique in that regard. there has to be political decisions that go along with military actions. we have told president karzai, most recently on his visit, that we understand that, and we support his efforts, but of course we want to be kept fully informed and we want to be able to work with him. it is clear that there are some people who call themselves taliban who already are coming off the battlefield. they want to return home. they have no ideological commitment, and then there are others to try to blow up the peace jurga. this is not something that you can have a blanket

karzai was crowded, we did, and wrong from the beginning. how can you get someone who is wrong and expect them to do something right? america is choking on its own vomit whether you realize it or not. these people over there talk about khan, caesar, russia, but this is a trap that ameeica is been right now. host: this article from the front page. a reminder that britain was paying a high price for keeping our country save. kansas city, missouri, justin, an independent color. caller: hi, thanks for taking my call. i think it is completely ridiculous. the first reaction -- we got into this for money, and now we're spending money and getting troops killed in general. it is ridiculous that 50 years ago people would be marching hundreds of thousands of people protesting the war like this, and now we just have to sit back and make the dollar just to survive. it is ridiculous that people are living homeless and starving here -- what can we help them? it is blasphemy have people have gotten so used to bloodshed that we just sit back and take it. hos

with people in the state department, the people he was complaining about, excellent relations with karzai who made a bid for him stay. in his performance of his duties he did a very good job. he just happened to shoot his mouth off in front of a reporter sometimes while drinking. the president handled it very well, did what he had to do, got petraeus in there. but i have trouble believing that getting rid of a very successful general is in any way a good thing. it's a bad thing in that he had a very effective decision-making process in kabul, and petraeus is a great general and it's a great act of service for him to really accept the demotion to do the job for the country's need. >> woodruff: but, mark, you're saying you don't think this changes anything in terms of afghanistan. >> no, i think the policy, the policy differences between them are negligible. i disagree with david on general mcchrystal. i think what -- first of all, the president had to act. he didn't have a choice. he looked unable to act in the gulf, and understandably so, to cap that well. so he had to act here. and gener

do you agree with the comment of president karzai's chief that he has lost confidence in the ability of the united states and nato to succeed in afghanistan? >> i do not, senator. as i mentioned earlier, we just did a video%% teleconference, a weekly conference. general mcchrystal spent the time conducting the council in kandohar, going to and from with him as well. in that process, there was certainly no ense on his part nor on those of the others that were with him that there was a lack of confidence in the united states commitment to pfghanistan. as i mentioned earlier, thh fact that we have more than tripled our forces from january 2009 to the end of august 2010 is of enormous significance. the same with the civilian structure, the sameewith the funding, and the same with others. >> let me reiterate my admiration and respect, general, for you and our military leaders and the difficulty of the task before them. i think your one of america's great heroes. i continue to worry a great deal about the message we're sending in the region about whether we are actually going to stay or no

karzai earlier today. also acting minister of the director of sscurity and then side planning for the kabulhan conference. we also talked about the parliamentary elections. i know, jazz, and a. i think that they did. >> all three of those? >> yes. and the president karzai meeting, he was with general mcchrystal and ambassador eikenberry. >> did he take part in the meeting with karzai? >> i think that that was a separate meeting of the security council. susan rice was in that meeting. >> they were in the same room with karzai? can you tell us about the atmosphere there? >> my understanding is that prior to the meeting, general mcchrystal reached out to both ambassador holbrooke and his apologies for the article. >> what does this building make of the comments that have been so widely discussed? >> i think our focus is on the ongoing strategy. as robert gibbs just said, all members of the national security team feel that general mcchrystal has made us sit in it -- a significant mistake. he will be coming bac

he won the argument about president karzai. he has gotten most of what he wanted.re still seems to be the sense on his inner circle that they cannot trust the civilian masters to back them up. they have been supported. you can see it as being -- some of the uestions he will be asked this morning. we have been backing you up at some great cost to our own political base. most americans are tired of this war. we have back to you. why this contenmpt? host: james kitfield, for being hhre. we turn next to a new water. a judge has blocked a ban on deep-water drilling. we will speak to a shadegg john about will drilling, but -- talk about oil drilling, but first headlines. >> and indian american woman has been back to run for governor. an incumbent congressman loss. so did a hopeful washington state democrat. this propped p -- the government agency overseeing offshore oil drilling will have an internal team assigned to do with the performance. the investigative team will look into allegaaions of misconduct and respond quickly to emerging problems. there will be a senate su

the karzai government has yet to live -- yet to deliver services in regions locally.nd news reports suggest that minorities are concerned about karzai's overtures to taliban leaders through pakistani intermediaries. at our hearing two weeks ago, general patraeus emphasized that "a counterinsurgency operation is a roller-coaster experience." but he said that in his view the introductory has generally been upward despite the tough losses. i have long believed that the number one mission in afghanistan is building the capacity of the afghan security forces to be able to take increasingly -- increasing responsibility for their own security. general patraeus said, two weeks ago that increasing the size and capacity of afghan security forces is "central to achieving progress in afghanistan." u.s. and isaf forces need to focus their resources and energy on this effort. there is a significant shortfall, still, of trainers to provide basic instruction to afghan recruits and mentors to imbed with afghan units in the field. building the capacity of the afghan security forces to

they strongly suggest you repair the relationship between them and the karzai government. do you think the president should consider replacing the ambassadors? >> i do not think it would be helpful for me to be speculating on that kind of change. i think one change per day is enough. >> what about the criticism about the relationship with the civilian leadership? >> the afghan leadership or ours? i do not think it is dysfunctional, but obviously i think there has been some disagreement which has been pretty well known before the article between general mcchrystal and the ambassador. i think that was pretty well known before then. now there will be a different commander in the field than i do not know what the relationship is or will be. i hope it will be much stronger. i have to hope the friction that did exist between mcchrystal and eikenberry will dissipate. >> last time there was some real criticism by fellow democrats in the senate. senator clinton, senator henry read both suggested he had been cooking the books. do you think he has overcome that? how broad support is

i spoke to president karzai today about a political solution where everybody feels that the government of afghanistan is a government for them. >> is my right hon. fend aware of the concept of the sovereign bridgehead. that could meet our needs in afghanistan for a fraction of the cost in life, limb, and expenditure, and would he consider taking a briefing on this subject in the present and, if possible, of thservice chiefs of staff? >> i am grateful to my hon. friend for asking that question. i know he has great expertise about this area. i understand the idea of a bridgehead. i think that while it is worth examining, there are difficulties with it, which is the current strategy of counterinsurgency is about trying to protect the public in afghantan from the insurgency and to enlarge the area of the country where normal life can continue. what is in our national interest? that is what we should focus on, afghanistan that is stable enough and secure enough to bring our troops home. i will listen to his ideas, but the strategy we have -- we have got to give it time to wk. >> i am surpri

go to the brother of the president of the country, to kandahar and you find karzai -- a massive drug dealer, grabs massive amounts of land -- to call a corruption is an understatement. that is the u.s. proxy government in afghhnistan. the policy will not work by any measuree unfortunately, one of the defining characteristics of the obama administration has been that the president maps out as he did in his west point speech about afghanistan last december a very clear, shrewd analysis of history. then he proceeds to announce a policy which is often nearly a 180-degree departure. many people looked at his language and say this is a smart guy making a lot of sense, then at the policy and it is very different. i have gotten to know the pentagon papers whistleblower and he talks about afghanistan in similar terms to the vietnam war. some very smart people in the administration can do very stupid things. that is a good summary of this escalation of the afghanistan war. host: why do you think the policiee have continued? some say they're similar to the bush policies. is it because of robert

government over hamid karzai now. it is fair to say that the afghan government does not have a lot credibility with some segments of the afghan people because of the way he was elected where there was clearly a lot of fraud and ultimately it was questionable whether hamid karzai got the most votes. the fact that there was a lot of fraud in the elections after they were promised democracy -- even if hamid karzai did win, he is still playing by the old rules and does not necessarily believe in democracy. >> host: indiana on our democratic line, good morning. caller: the caller was right that in 1979, you had a working relationship with the shah of iran "was overthrown by the ayatollah khamenei. the relationship with the u.s. was that we tried to plan and have our guy in there. when the president first called this the good war, i wrote him a letter and i told him no, this is not a war we should be involved in. 1108 u.s. deaths, that is a complete tragedy. that is the reason why you will never ever get to your objective i