katyal? >> the question is whether cities can sue under the fair housing act. our answer to the that question is, yes, sometimes. and i mean three things by that. first, the answer can't be yes always because that would eviscerate two key doctrines proximate cause. and third, this lawsuit fails both zone of interest and proximate cause because the injury it seeks to remedy is related and because it is is several steps removed from any alleged acts of petitioners. if i could start with zone of interest. this court -- >> before you do that, mr. katyal, you have said, yes, cities can sue under the fha but not in this matter in this scenario. can you tell us what -- under what circumstances could a city sue. >> absolutely, justice ginsburg. it identifies two places where cities can sue. one is a havens like situation in which a city like the ngo in havens is combatting secrete instances of discrimination by a defendant and outlaying things so testers or something. took the allegations in this complaint and made them out to be the banks were engaged in some sort of

katyal.fore she changed schools she might have been entitled to something related to her i.d.e.a.. but at the moment this complaint was filed, on its own face, where's it asking for any change potentially or otherwise to the i.d.e.a. that is no longer in effect? >> and that is my second answer to you. so the second answer is the complaint asks for a declaratory judgment, and that's what we were talking about at the beginning. to ask for a declaratory judgment under this court's decision in golden and city of lyons, the only way they can invoke article iii jurisdiction is by saying there's a reasonable prospect that the situation would occur. there is not a word in the complaint that says she won't return to the school. and, indeed, the 6th circuit grapples with this all the time when children leave the school and file these lawsuits. there's a case called woods which is at 487 federal appendix9 79, and what that case says is even if you leave the school, the school has an ongoing obligation t

katyal. maybe before she changed schools, she might have been entitled to something related to her idea, but at the moment this complaint was filed on its own face, where is it asking for any change potentially or otherwise to the idea that is no longer in effect? >> and that is my second answer to you. so the second answer is the complaint asks for declaratory judgment. and that's what we're talk about at the beginning. to ask for declaratory judgment under this court's decision in golden versus wycheler and city and lyons by saying there is a reasonable prospect where the situation would occur there is not a word in the complaint that says she won't return to the school. and indeed the 6th circuit grapples with this all the time. when children leave the school and file these lawsuits, there is a case called woods which sat 487 federal appendix 979. and what that case is even if you leave the school, the school has an ongoing obligation to keep an iep current in case the person comes back to

katyal, you have four minutes. >> with respect to this point, paragraph 86 we agree, page 33 says they do identify an interest, but they have to plausibly address some impact on segregation in order to survive. they haven't done that, said whether segregation was increasing or decreasing as a result of the conduct. second, the damages here they seek are way, way broader than what they paint it out to be. just the taxes and complaint are bad enough. indeed, the bank of america petitioned page 34 cites one of the complaints same counsel against cobb county seeking hundreds of millions of dollars. 19d,300 cities in america. if you adopt their theory you'd be allowing all of them to bring complaints just like this. we said if you accept their interception you'd be opening the door. attorney general says probable cause is a limitation on that. their probable cause test as our brief explains eliminates directness requirements. i think it will be hard. that's why i don't think he had an answer, justice briar, on mag sooebs and things like that. his answer was look at gladstone. gladstone has

katyal, it was only looking at individual acts of discrimination to particular persons, but the fha is a very peculiar and distinctive kind of administrative -- antidiscrimination statute which really is focusing on community harms and we talked about this a lot in a texas housing case a couple of years ago. it's not just individuals that are harmed, it's community that is are harmed and that's the basic idea of the entire statute, why congress passed it and here the cities are standing up and saying, every time you do this redline and this reverse redlining essentially a community is become inflated and who better than the city to recognize the interest and assert it. >> we should recognize that is something at issue and one of the goals of the fair housing act but i think the way congress dealt with that is not by saying cities are empower to have standing. that's why they gave the justice department and hud and congress empowered state and local enforcement over housing discrimination to deal problems that you're talking about. in here they are not using any of that. they are, quote

katyal. >> thank you and may it please the court, the question is whether the cities can sue under the fair housing act. my answer is, yes, sometimes. first, the answer can't be yes alls because that would eadvice serrate approximate cause and zone of interest and the answer can't be, no, never, because cities can identify concrete harms that fall within the zone of interest such as discrete expenditures to combat a particular defendants racial misconduct. this fails both zone of interest and approximate cause, because the injury it seeks to remedy is unrelated to the purposes and because that injury is several steps removed from any acts of the petition ners. if i could start with zone of interest. >> could you please tell us, where you said, yes, cities can sue under the fha but not in in scenario. can you tell us under what circumstances could a city sue? >> absolutely, justice ginsburg. our position is to preserve existing law exactly where it is, existing law identifies two places where cities can sue. one is a havenslike situation where they are combatting discrete m examples of