let me turn it over to kelsey davenport. then we will move on to our other speakers. kelsey: thank you for being here this morning. i think it is morning. i am not sure what time zone i am in. i will talk about the nuclear elements of the deal. while i cannot touch on all 158 pages, during the question and answer, we can certainly explore the areas i did not touch on. from the perspective of the arms control association, this is a strong agreement from a nonproliferation next -- perspective. it exceeds the expectations of what we thought an agreement would need to achieve to block the pathway to nuclear weapons and put in place and intrusive monitoring regime that would ensure quick detection of code are -- covert activity. it is not perfect, but it needs -- meets nonproliferation goals and is good for regional security. to get into some of the details, the parameters agreed to in april on uranium, they were strong. from our assessment, with the parameters, it would take iran more than 12 months to produce enough material for a nuclear weapon. about 25 kilograms of ura

let's bring in kelsey davenport, director of the non-proliferation arms control ocean, and you hear the critics, and are their points valid? >> from a non-proliferation standpoint the deal is strong. right now, if iran wanted to get enough fluke lar material for a bomb, they could do so in two months and with this deal, it would take them over 12. and with the monitoring mechanisms so ensure that if iran diverts from the deal being it would be immediately decked and restricts could be put back in place. >> but you know iran is known for cheating, and there are a lot of loopholes that would allow them to get around the safeguards. >> but the beauty is it puts in place a multilayered verification regime. if iran wanted to cheat, they would have to reconstitute their entire supply chain from mining to enriching a bomb. and the chances of them doing that without detection are miniscule, because if the inspectors have concerns, they will be able to access the sites and. >> but the concerns are that the inspectors will not have enough power and leverage. in some cases, they can only visit aft

we will start at the arms control association director for non-proliferation policy kelsey davenport, author of our major research report and policy briefs on the issue and she's been closely monitoring the talks for more than four years or so when i think she is still recovering from her latest tour at duty two and half weeks in vienna at the site of the final round of talks. next-line you hear from richard nephew was former principal deputy warden at her for sanctions policy at the u.s. department of eight and director for event on the national security council's bath. one of the negotiators up until the beginning of this year. he is not a program director for economic statecraft sanctions and energy markets at the center for global energy policy at columbia university in new york and as a non-resident senior fellow at the foreign policy center at brookings. and then we'll hear from yvonne goldenberg, middle east security programs at the center for new american security and foreign policy defense expert with extensive government experience covering iran's program. after their openin

kelsey davenport and she has been very closely monitoring the talks for more than four years or so. and she is still recovering from her latest tour of duty in vienna. and next, we will hear from richard nephew. and he is see center of global energy policy and resident fellow at the fellow. and i want to hear from senior fellow for middle east security for american security and foreign policy with extensive government experience. so after their opening comments and remarks about the agreement and impacts, we will take your questions. i want to make a final observation. talk about the nuclear nonproliferation elements of the agreement. like any politic agreement it is one of give and take. we think it is very strong and many ways stronger than the framework that was reached in early april. yet it is clear already just a couple of days after this agreement was concluded that many critics believe that by rejecting the agreement, by increase ink sanctions the u.s. can convince the leaders of iran to dismantle its nuclear programs. i think, i think the president thinks that this is basic

and we'll start with the arms control association director for nonproliferation kelsey davenport. she is the author of the policy report and policy briefs on this issue and she's been very closely monitoring the talks for more than four years or so. and i think she's still recovering from her latest tour of duty, 2 1/2 weeks in vienna the site of the final rounds of the talks. and next we'll hear from richard nephew who is coordinator for sanctions at the policy of state and director for iran on the national security council staff so he was one of the negotiators up until about the beginning of this year. he is now the program director for economic state craft and energy markets at the center on global policy at columbia university in new york and nonresidence senior fellow at the foreign policy center at brookings. and then we'll hear from ilan goldenberg from middle east security programs at the center for new american security and foreign policy and defense expert with extensive government experience covering iran's program. so after their opening comments and remarks about the

so with that let me turn it over to kelsey davenport and then we move directly onto our other speakershanks. >> thank you, turn one and thank you all for being here. i think it's morning. i'm still quite sure what time zone i'm in. so want to talk to the most about the nuclear elements of the deal and unblockable able to touch on all 150 pages of the agreement, during the question and answer we can certainly explore the areas that i don't touch on and will be happy to take any questions. but from the perspective of the arms control association this is a very strong agreement from and nonproliferation perspective. in many ways exceeded expectations of what we thought they could agreement would need to achieve to block iran's pathways to nuclear weapons and put in place an intrusive monitoring and verification regime that would ensure quick detection of any covert activity. know, this deal is not perfect but it is good enough and needs the u.s. nonproliferation goals to safeguard u.s. national security and it's good for regional security as well. to to get into first of some of the detai