but soviet leader nikita khrushchev sent in the red army to crush the revolution. 1957, he did, however, send troops to lebanon to support that pro-western government from the pan-arab revolution led by soviet ally egyptian president abdel nasser. >> each time, when americans tried to press soviet union, soviet union reacted very strongly. 1957, americans try to overthrow the new regime in syria. and soviets make the exercise. and americans step back. it was too crisis around the berlin -- it is about recognition. >> in berlin, administered by the allied forces since the war, khrushchev threatened to force out us, british, and french troops stationed in west berlin if soviet-run east germany was not recognized. >> my father told, "you have to recognize east germany as a state." and of course, americans answered, "no, we don't -- don't recognize you as a state." in berlin, he told, "i will kick you out of berlin." >> the standoff ultimately led to the construction of the berlin wall. >> the epical scientific achievement by soviet russia in beating the united states

. >> gorbachev went much further than khrushchev, because he was going farther than khrushchev and because he knew very well what happened to khrushchev, who was ousted in october 1964, he was worried from the word go about being ousted, and in fact that's why he kept the hardliners so close to him so they wouldn't move against him. and many would say that was a fatal mistake; that he ooh have bren with them. we interviewed, alexander and that what he said. he said gorbachev should have kicked them out. they were afraid of him him was the soviet leader. they would have gone whimpering, but in the same interview, alexander say, of course you had to be cautious and this expressed the complexity of the situation that gorbachev faced. constrained by hardliners, fearful of them, was tempted to get rid of. the but afraid to move against them, and in the end they moved against him. >> gentleman right there. >> how does gorbachev feel about putin and his obvious contempt for what gorbachev did and the way putin is moving the country? >> i think that question was about putin, right -- i -- [inaudib

khrushchev loved that line. he looked at me and said, how tall are you? i said, i'm six cent meters shorter than peter the great. well, he loved the line. it brought the house down and, from that time, even when i came back later here for cbs, he always remembered me as peter the great, it was a great access. >> woodruff: you had access in a way no other american journalist had, but, marvin, what did you learn about them as a people? >> more than anything else is how similar they are to us. i remember once being on a train with a young bajani woman, probably 22, 23, and we were traveling together and she said, where are you from? she said, the united states. she said, i don't believe it. she said you speak russian. i said, yes, but even an american can learn russian. and there was an awkward five or ten minutes where things were the americans are very bad and this is very bad, and then, when she felt she knew me and i felt i was getting to know her, everything sort of dropped, and we were two people, and we were sharing experiences and insights, and i fou

his theory, khrushchev -- he was a smart man, actually. his theory w was, they canan't h miami.hese are only tactical, short range missiles. they can only blow the invasion fleet out of the water.. kill 100,000 americans and let it stop there. it won''t escalate further. when mcnamara learned that 3030 years later he said, that is insane to think we can lose that many men and not go to war? it was insane. kim jong-un seems to have a similar believe that he could initiate war in south korea and keep it limited. that is insane. but it is no more insane that our plans to initiate nuclear war against russia, which would kill nearly everyone in the world. amy: we're going to go to breaek and come back to our conversation. we're talking with daniel ellsberg. yes, he leaked the pentagon papers in 1971, but his new book is called "the doomsday machine: confessions of a nuclear war plannerer." he was involved in planning for nuclear war. ellsberg reveals he also made copies of top-secret reports on plans for nuclear war. stay with us. ♪ [music break] amy: "no more weapons" by steel pulse

and crew chef then had a -- khrushchev had a choice, let them do it, all of eastern europe would fallrt, or crush them. he decided to crush them. that was a terrible moment for the russians. but, you know, the idea of russia and freedom is still a possibility. i think the fact that russia lived with a dictatorship or autocracy for most of its life doesn't mean it always has to live with an autocracy. it is possible that people can learn about freedom and appreciate it. >> could you see the fear in their eyes literally? >> oh, absolutely, absolutely. as a matter of fact when khrushchev delivered that speech at the 20th party congress, what we learned later, there were no foreigners allowed at the time. but what we learned later was that many russians were popping night glycerin tablets. some of them had heart attacks on the spot. several of them committed suicide on the spot because they were all stall stalin's people. if stalin was suddenly being attacked as murderer, they felt they would be attacked also. they were terribly frightened. you could see it literally in their eyes, but co

they were grandstanding, nixon and khrushchev. they were just sort of playing for their audience.ns eat meat while you russians eat cabbage". it was just a way of nixon saying that we are well off and rich and you are miserable and poor. the russians have two parades a year where they display their might. may day, the worker's day, and the revolution. i happened to be there for the latter one. i was well positioned by virtue of going through three rings of security, together with a soviet tv group. somehow, i blended in — i must have been badly dressed or something. sportswomen was one of the pictures taken there. at the beginning of the parade, they have the... they display their military might and then they have the spontaneous worker's parade. the spontaneous parade, it generally lasted five hours. nothing spontaneous about it, of course. in 1964, i went to cuba for about a week or ten days and i spent it in havana. i spent it with fidel castro and che guevara. it was fascinating. fidel castro, he liked to be photographed, like any celebrity. i could sort of compare them to cow

khrushchev of the seven and the ayatollah khomeini in one nine hundred seventy nine so it's not always like good people or people who think but this is a person who is not the prince is not prince is not a moderate his not awoke salmon as he was just reportedly taking a billion dollar bribe to let corruptors go free so i don't know how i should feel that the voters picked on the women. yeah it is shocking it is pretty girls i. think it's a very odd behavior every year will get them all right yes that's true maybe they can do better. let's listen oh say one thing for sure and since this a professor of history at yale had written a really great washington post piece and she made this point about why this whole thing why you know the princes it is a little odd even in those western governments and media outlets sing his praises the young crown prince is viewed domestically as in comp as an incompetent and corrupt ruler who hides behind liberalism tolerance and anti-corruption rhetoric so . far i don't know as we go to break card watchers told her good to let us know what you think about t

in history when to tell you terry and regimes had you know their past misdeed investigated the khrushchev or after ma died in china but for that to happen you have to have real casualties inside the elite so that part of the in order to mitigate it seems that has not yet cut it hasn't happened yet i mean i don't know if people like the use of the phrase the low lying fruit but we have really high ranking people are they going to sacrifice one as proof or maybe somebody that was peter struck i mean we're going to get rid of somebody here to be the fall guy for all this because it's they're not careful a whole thing is going to collapse but what is awful is that no one is immune joined question and might be a jewel and for israel but he's also not in you so that they can everyone in their crosshairs and that's a situation that no illegal what it does it looks like it's going to be a mutually assured slaughter and so then there where it's going clearly russia and russia when it was barely arrested when the guys in there put it bureau simply got tired of fearing here you know they were all un

they take a huge hit in 1956 when khrushchev comes to power in the soviet union. he was a monster who conducted show trials of political enemies and people he thought might be political enemies. that has a huge effect turning people away from the communist party. there is substantial dissent in the ranks of the fbi in the late 1960's, because hoover will not let this go even of the party is well past the point where it poses any remotely conceivable threat to the united states. planting evidence to suggest party leaders are informants, right? plant evidence and hope somebody comes along and leaves they are -- and believes they are an fbi informant, creating a fake communist party organization in order to attack the party from the left -- are you a marxist or a trotsky-ite, they foster that descent. my personal favorite of these, operation hoodwink, send walls -- false documents to provoke a fight between the communist party and the sicilian mafia. the fbi is well aware of how cosa nostra deals with threats. here is their suggestion how to deal with this. uhh, let'

they take a huge ship -- a huge hit when khrushchev comes to party. and reveals the rumors about stalinist behavior are totally true. he is a toronto, monster who murdered millions and consent -- had political show trials. nonetheless, hoover's up session with the party keeps us going cpusa is point where relevant. hoover will not let this go when the party is well be on the point that it is a conceived -- . conceivable threat to the usa planting evidence to suggest the party leaders are informants in helps of someone else comes along and sees it and believes , creating a fake on organization to attack the party -- are yourxist left a marxist or a trucks yet that story trucks he -- or a trotsky-ite. false documents to provoke a fight between the communist already in the sicilian mafia. of fbi is well aware threats. here is the suggestion they have or how to deal with this. this is an agent asking permission to prepare the following letter, which will be sent to the same teamster local in the philadelphia area. the first anonymous letter, dear union bo

he advised bringing in turkish missiles in as negotiation and answering first letter from khrushchev. he also was the one that went to the xcom group, top advisors to the president. we can't be like japanese and we don't believe in sneak attacks. we can't have a big raid on cuba and killcu a lot of cubans and t of russians. he is a moral compass. you ask me why i wrote the book in final end, final drafting, he is what we don't have, he is what we don't have, empathy, unitynd and a moral compass. cspan: before we go too far i want to street state from here, i overstated what you do write up there, for me an important personal moment that long weekend came as i sat on a park bench several blocks up from st. catherine street studying a list of notes to myself. these were my options on what to do now that my student deferment was turning into a pumpkin. the one that jumped out at me promising adventure, patriotism and good values was the peace corps. my preference, africa. that is chris matthews. >> i was thinking of vista. i was thinking of teaching high school. becoming a national healt

you could see when he met with khrushch khrushchev, an important meeting at camp david in september of '59, "the stranger" by bud and bert arthur, a father and son team and "the trembling land" by robert christie. he goes to afghanistan. he takes "cash in saddle." by l.p. holmes, and then to relieve himself from the tedium of the republican convention, "ft. deception" by cliff farrell. i'm trying to assemble as many of these as i can where i can correlate events and books. it was fun to see what he was reading when. favorite authors. we know this because of that great record from '67 to '69 of the 206 books he read. ike graded the authors. and his favorite was ernest haycox. he wrote some books that became well-known movies. he wrote a short story, and i think the title was the last stage to lordsborg. it came a well known movie called "stage coach." its a movie that made john wayne a star. haycox was of that caliber, also considered the best of the writers in that genre among the best of the western writers. eisenhower clearly had good taste in westerns no matter what other people tho

then theyy realized if he and hs brother jack, if we moved on cuba, that khrushchev was ready to move on west berlin. if he moved on west berlin we were outnumbered on conventional forces we would have to go nuclear. he could see the chain reaction it would have started. then jack said you have to calm down these hawks. you know what he did? he went into the room of hawks, bundy and curtis lemay, things like that, you know what? we're not empire of japan. we don't pull sneak attacks. we don't go in and kill everybody without notice just because we want to gain a strategic advantage. we're not like them. unfortunately george w. bush never got that memo. [applause] so, he made a lot of great call. he made a lot of mistakes in his youth. joe mccarthy, then he turned on him. the thing iob liked about bobby was his character. when he turned against joe mccarthy, he thought mccarthy went way too far fighting communism and abusing witnesses and demagoguery, he wrote the resolution condemning him on behalf of democrats that down. bring him when mccarthy drank himself to death, took him three

you can see when he met with khrushchev at an important meeting at can't david -- camp 1959, he goesin to afghanistan, he takes a book by lp homes. to relieve himself from the tedium, for deception like cliff deception byrt cliff ferrell. i'm trying to assemble as many of these as i can to correlate events and books because it is fun to see what he was reading when. favorite authors, we know this because of that great record from 1967 to 1969 of the 206 books you read during that time -- that he read during that time period. he graded the authors. his favorite is haycock's, who is not as well-known today. he wrote books that became well-known movies like "the wild bunch." the sam peckinpah movie, and he wrote a short story called "the last stage to lawrenceburg." it became a very well known it iscalled stagecoach, what made john wayne a star. so he was of that caliber. he was considered the best of the writers in that genre, among the best of the western writers. and so eisenhower really had good taste in westerns no matter what other people thought about them. we have louis l'amour. f

on the soviet missile readiness that president kennedy needed to go eyeball to eyeball with chew khrushchev. he served from 1953 to the late 1950s and reported on soviet military organization, policy doctrine, strategy and tactics. finally colonel klinsky who served from 1972 to his immigration to the united states in november of 1981, reported on soviet actions leading to the declaration of martial law in poland that same year. i wanted to talk a little bit about from an analysts' point of view what these documents mean. if you could give me a couple minutes to talk about that. so access to how the navy debated key issues about their own naval theories and practices, as well as their view of u.s. naval strength made the difference between knowing facts and more importantly, understanding and gaining the intuitive edge to determine the other side's intentions. from collected intelligence, the analysts will know things, however collected intelligence that helps us understand things contributes to making accurate analytic projections. understanding provides a context that allows the stitching

i believe you made the statement that khrushchev was the first to blink during the cuban missile crisis. now, the publicly available documents state that the united states also withdrew quietly its nuclear missiles pointed at the soviet union at the time from turkey. is that a viable statement? >> i'm not the expert on the cuban missile crisis, so i can't comment on that. there is, however, and i believe that david mentioned there is an analytic document from 1964 that gives a lot of analytic detail on what we knew at the time. so it's a very in-depth study, and it's probably the definitive study that i've ever seen, and it's released and part of this collection. so i would commend that to you to take a look at. i'm not sure. maybe somebody else can talk to the turkey issue if that was brought up. >> there was a excellent book published called "operation a anader" which was the russian code name for sending troops and missiles to cuba. "operation anader" is an excellent book written, co-authored, the first half written by an american general who was involved, the back second half writte

i was part of that and i have concluded after 40 years of research that neither kennedy nor khrushchevended at all to carry out their threats of armed conflict. i believe they both believed in their own minds they were bluffing and that they would back off if necessary. and yet events got away from them. i think we came within a hand's breadth of blowing up the world. so this problem didn't start with donald trump and it won't really end with it. the system that puts everything on the decisions of one man or it's crazy. >> brangham: in addition to his book, ellsberg is back in the public eye again because of this: steven spielberg's new movie details the "washington post's" decision to publish parts of the pentagon paper, the ones ellsberg leaked, and the which the nixon administration tried to stop. the legal fight went all the way to the u.s. supreme court. the movie is called "the post" and it's in theaters this month. i'm just curious why you think the story of the pentagon papers is still resonant today. >> we've had a war going on against the media and it didn't start with donald

that influenced khrushchev's decision to put missiles in cuba. >> the mixed message is vietnam. one that is again mixed. it seems to me on civil rights, the administration was very cautious for a good long while, so it's again a sort of split, in a sense or not a particularly -- i wouldn't necessarily give it particularly high marks for the administration, there were challenges. let's finally remember that the cold war in that first year of 1961, it's a very tense time. i don't think john f. kennedy or anyone else in his administration knew precisely how that was going to turn up. >> that's a wonderful answer. we all want to hear from fred about vietnam, which is a tragedy that unfolds across about four presidential administrations. that's a reckoning all historians have to come to terms wi with. you asked about challenges, i think -- i said earlier that we all feel today we live in a kind of fractured country. politics is really tough, it's tough whether you're a democrat or republican. neither party is very united. in fact, and -- about the only thing they're united on, they h

when i read it, all i can do is think of nikita khrushchev taking off his shoe and saying ."e will bury you this deserves a national response. this is the key competition and technology. with to develop new organizational constructs for overmatch. look, what this means is it is not about technology per se. in 1975 come the u.s. army said "we are going to call it a night ." and if all that was was a bunch of night vision goggles, that would've ended in 1966. but once you bring those and you have to train your squadron leaders, company commanders, others on how to operate and what are the control measures you need to keep a cohesive unit going. it is not about the technology, is about the operational concept in the organizational cause trucks that give you the advantage. what makes it a programmatic issue is with too many of our forces out and about doing silly things without question. we need to build up some slack so we can design new systems and test them, new organizations. what is the carrier strike route of the future? what does it look like? you have to do more gaming an

that we know influencedd khrushchev's decision to put the missiles in cuba. so i think that the record there is mixed. vietnam, on which i have spent a good deal of time, i would say is again mixed. i mentioned earlier that it seems to me that on civil rights, the administration was very cautious for a good long while. so it's, again, sort of split in a sense, or not a particularly -- i wouldn't necessarily give it particularly high marks for the administration. so there were challenges. and let's finally remember that the cold war in that first year of 1961, it's a very tense time. and i don't think john f. kennedy or anybody else in his administration knew precisely how that was going to turn out. >> that's a wonderful answer. i think we all want to hear from fred about vietnam, which is a tragedy that unfolds across about four presidential administrations. but, you know, some of it belongs inside the legacy of john f. kennedy, and that's, you know, a reckoning all historians have to come to terms with. you asked about challenges. i think -- i said earlier