henry kissinger. oh, by the way, most of the conversation between dobrynin and kissinger was to nuclear arms control, the balance of power, the arms race, berlin, things like that, the paragraphs on vietnam were at the end. they were short. we then turned to kissinger reporting nixon we then turned to vietnam. i said to dobrynin that we had read kosygin interview with the japanese newspaper with great interest. we had notice kosygin had listed the usual unacceptable hanoi demands, but he had also indicated it as soviet willingness to engage itself in the process of a settlement. this was stated, it seemed to me more emphatically than had been said in the past. was i correct? dobrynin merely said that he noticed the sentence also, i asked whether the two statements were linked, in other words, whether the soviet willingness to engage itself was linked to our prior acceptance of hanoi's demands. dobrynin then said, wanted to ask me a hypothetical question if hanoi dropped its demands for a coalition gov

henry kissinger. oh, by the way, most of the conversation between dobrynin and kissinger was to nuclear arms control, the balance of power, the arms race, berlin, things like that, the paragraphs on vietnam were at the end. they were short. we then turned to kissinger reporting nixon we then turned to vietnam. i said to dobrynin that we had read kosygin interview with the japanese newspaper with great interest. we had notice kosygin had listed the usual unacceptable hanoi demands, but he had also indicated it as soviet willingness to engage itself in the process of a settlement. this was stated, it seemed to me more emphatically than had been said in the past. was i correct? dobrynin merely said that he noticed the sentence also, i asked whether the two statements were linked, in other words, whether the soviet willingness to engage itself was linked to our prior acceptance of hanoi's demands. dobrynin then said, wanted to ask me a hypothetical question if hanoi dropped its demands for a coalition gov

that he had with kissinger.he soviets reciprocated they could get an advantage of the united states they did as you mentioned. they tried to be fair. so it is aab big question whethr it was a fundamentally sustainable in the long term simply because the relationship remain competitive. >> yes, kissinger is better known for the gambit with nixon to take advantage of the soviet split it is in the middle east or he has a more enduring legacy of squeezing the soviets out successfully from there. yet another episode that resonates with us today very deeply from the book the questions are coming in from the zoom audience the wonders off zoom. iil see a number of hands in the room. we will take one or two more from the room and then i'll go to resume partners. that i seeth a hand in the back there orin died not see a hand n the back there? no? well take professor catherine. >> thank you. so congratulations. i'm looking forward to reading it and you know i will read it. i wouldn't just two questions having not yet read

kissinger. he he thought that kissinger was tricky. and he he tried to cut him of conversations with nixon, which is hilarious because, for example, we have this records at camp david where. if you look at the russian and the american versions, they're very different but you can see basically brezhnev procrastinate eating for the first time for the first part of the conversation. the moment kissinger walks out of the room. he right to the middle east. okay let's about the middle east you know so it's really, really interesting. so so brezhnev if you're brezhnev was really unhappy, but he thought that he could perhaps strike a better relationship with nixon, that he had kissinger but then, you know, the soviets, the soviets were superseded in angola, the the certain when they could get advantage over the united states, they did in vietnam, as you as you mentioned. absolutely did not help the united states to an exit from vietnam. well, they they tried a little bit. they tried to be fair. so so, y

kissinger. he he thought that kissinger was tricky. and he he tried to cut him of conversations with nixon, which is hilarious because, for example, we have this records at camp david where. if you look at the russian and the american versions, they're very different but you can see basically brezhnev procrastinate eating for the first time for the first part of the conversation. the moment kissinger walks out of the room. he right to the middle east. okay let's about the middle east you know so it's really, really interesting. so so brezhnev if you're brezhnev was really unhappy, but he thought that he could perhaps strike a better relationship with nixon, that he had kissinger but then, you know, the soviets, the soviets were superseded in angola, the the certain when they could get advantage over the united states, they did in vietnam, as you as you mentioned. absolutely did not help the united states to an exit from vietnam. well, they they tried a little bit. they tried to be fair. so so, y

brezhnev was really unhappy about kissinger. he was unhappy about kissinger. he thought that kissinger was tricky, and he tried to cut it out of conversations with nixon, which is hilarious because, for example, we have the records at camp david where if you look at the russian and american versions they are very different but you can see physical brezhnev repressed and 80 for first time, for the first part of the conversation. the moment kissinger walks other people try to middle east. let's talk about s the middle east, you know? is really, really interesting. so brezhnev was really unhappy but he thought he could perhaps strike a better relationship with nixon thenki he had with kissinger. by then the soviets were super jaded in angola they were certain they could get advantage over the united states. they did. in vietnam as you did absolutely. did that help the united states to find an exit from vietnam. they tried a little bit, they tried to be fair. so yeah, it is a big question about detente in its nature with it was fundamentally sustainable in the lon

it's hard to imagine the opening to china without henry kissinger. it's hard to imagine the good friday agreement on northern ireland without george mitchell or the camp david accords without jimmy carter or the accords solving in dayton the bosnia war without decobra and they brought a monoset of skills which i discuss each chapter and conclusion and these are as follows, fierce to termination to succeed, to seize the historic moment as georgia h w. bush and jim baker did when the berlin wall fell. second, his courage, not the courage to have battlefield but the courage to c take risks for peace and negotiations, we saw that going to jerusalem with the crown prince to have uae and the abraham accords. we saw that in northern ireland with the catholic and protestant communities, the nationalists and unionists, finally decided that enough violence was enough, broke from the political bases to make peace.ra third is preparation. there's no substitute for being prepared for b knowing more abot the issues than anybody else at the negotiating tablele so y

a kissinger secretary and and we're working we we were always working. i mean it's almost impossible to underscore the amount of energy, we put into everything that we did. 24/7 this is a meeting of my we picked up some chinese leaders on the way into beijing and i am sitting at a table aboard air force one going through what would be our plans upon arrival and beijing? and here's the president this this is a great shot because it's so so representative of what this man was all about. he's got the briefing books in front of him. he's working. he's studying this picture is on air force one, and he i find it. he's in that blue sport code and he would always take off his suitcode and put on a sport coat or something when he when he was in work mode in your book you you write nixon worked as a non-stop machine work was his hobby. yes, i believe that that sports. he loves sports and he would go with dave and i said, how are his son-in-law to to baseball games? and but but for the most part. work was not work. it was it was a combination of loving what he did.

i have a feeling kissinger knew about all of this. but in your research, does this story have merit? all the cast was started in that area, and the people who could have been avoided -- host: all right. we will get you an answer. guest: i don't think there was a lot of expectation among historians that the lbj plan would have led to a peace deal in the fall of 1968, but i will tell you who believed it would, and that was lyndon johnson and his aides. they really thought they had an opening here. what makes historians doubt it, as we look at the stubbornness of the borough in hanoi, but at that moment, this was not a dirty trick to get hubert humphrey reelected as nixon thought it was, this is a legitimate peace proposal. along the way, nixon opened up a channel to south vietnam. at that time, the channel was used by someone who was telling south vietnam that you will get a better deal if you wait for nixon to get elected, and there is a set of notes in the nixon library by hr haldeman, in which nixon is recorded as saying that the nam

i went with henry kissinger in october to beijing. went with henry kissinger in october 1971 and we used that kind of to give ourselves a little bitmore cachet with the chinese . >> so this is part of the planning, this was in hawaii but this includes col. brennan who was here. >> this picture was taken, general hey went in january 1972, head of the nixon trip in february and there's jack brenn sitting there, myself, general go croft, general redmond and my spectacular general gates. this was onedof our planning sessions on the way to china . >> this is air force one. >> you see a picture of bob haldeman and next to him is his chief lieutenant lidia higbee and they obviously are drilling me with questions and haldeman has this skeptical look on his face like are you kidding me? and to his left is doctor henry kissinger and back is winston lord who later became amb. to china . julie nolan of the secretaries andwilliam howe and on the far back from the right is mariette hartley who is kissinger's secretary . and we were always working.

should note that henry kissinger wrote the introduction, and james baker wrote the foreword they did to the book to republicans. exactly. and because i wanted to show the bipartisan nature of diplomacy and with kissinger, i have a chapter on his negotiations in in the vietnam war. his opening to china and his negotiations for the disengagement after the 1973 young kippur war in the middle east, where jim baker, i really highlight his engagement with george h.w. bush on the first iraq war. what i think is the good iraq war, but also his fantastic accomplishment, along with george h.w. bush of reunifying germany under nato. and he had convince not only the soviet union, which had a deathly fear of germany for obvious reasons of that, but he also had to convince our own allies, the french and the british. margaret thatcher said, i love germany so much. i want to of them. so it was huge lift. and what jim baker showed was the importance of personal relationships. he developed a personal kinship with the foreign minister of the soviet union, shevardnadze took him to jackson hole for sever

so let me first quote the late henry kissinger from his foreword to the book.reat statesman and diplomat develops a vision and takes a people from the present to a future that they have neither experi ence nor imagined. the process by which the statesman, the statesman that is diplomacy diplomacy. and he, of course, urges us people to read this book as a as a valuable and necessary primer. there's also a forward from secretary of state james baker. i don't know anyone still that has a a forward from kissinger and a preface from baker. so congratulations alone that and now let me quote myself in the endorsement to stu's book. my reads a brilliant analysis the ins and outs of diplomatic dealmaking from one of our country's finest public servants and global affairs practitioners. eizenstat superb writing sharpened and in-depth interviews offer unique insights into what diplomacy works? when it fails and when the use of force becomes necessary. it's a must read for anyone with an interest in how diplomacy leadership works and how it doesn't. so over the past eight

truly one of the secretaries and kissinger aide william howell and marriott hartley was the kissinger secretary. >> and we are working. we were always working. it's almost impossible to underscore the amount of energy we put into everything that we did 24/7. this is a meeting when we picked up some chinese food and i'm sitting aboard air force one going through what would be our plan upon arrival in beijing. and here's the president and this is areat shot because it's so representative of what this man is all about. as this briefing books in front of him and he's working and studying. this picture is on air force one and i find it, he's in a blue sport coat and he would always take off his suit coat and put on a short coat when he was in woonstop machine. work was his hobby. >> yes and i believe that. that bad in sports. hee loves sports and he would go with david eisenhower his son-in-law to baseball games but for the most part work was not work. it was a combination of loving what he did and loving being an incredible patriot's. want to have time for questions so we are going to hav

i will take you to incident, remember that criminal american agent called henry kissinger visited africa at the height of the upperted regime in south africa and remember the border regime had already said that they... can they can crush the african continent from cape to cairo and with advanced military equipment that the united states of america was supplying to the to the apparted project regime in south africa kissinger was actually geared towards defeating the spirit of the african people that for moment they must accept colonialism as a permanent you know uh part of their lives but comrade julius nyrere will tell kissinger at that time that as long as people are so determined to fight for their natural right to exist as human beings and with dignity, no advancement in terms of military hardware or no advancement in terms of the most powerful army at that time the united states and as of now the zionist army can defeat their faith. "in fact, the zionist army is not invincible, several events since the eight incident has proven that indeed zionist is can be defeated and they will be

i think it's five or six people henry kissinger. notably not being one of them who understand these were these conversations are being recorded and this fact comes out in the midst of the urban committee hearings in the summer of 73 where alex butterfield who's one of the aids is asked on camera whether there's a recording system in the white house and says to everyone surprised. yes, there is and then this whole battle shapes up this titanic battle that will consume the lot next year over access to the tapes, but it's just this incredible insight into you know how nixon views himself in history and again the paranoia that permeates almost all of his decision-making that he installs. incredibly suicidal recording system out of the hubris of i'm not going to get credit and my staff is stealing all of my good ideas. and actually it is one of the things about the book that you know, somewhere in the in the middle of what it's a it's a it's a it's a the story some in the middle you begin to realize that you know, and when there may not

i don't know anyone still that has a a forward from kissinger and a preface from baker. so congratulations alone that and now let me quote myself in the endorsement to stu's book. my reads a brilliant analysis the ins and outs of diplomatic dealmaking from one of our country's finest public servants and global affairs practitioners. eizenstat superb writing sharpened and in-depth interviews offer unique insights into what diplomacy works? when it fails and when the use of force becomes necessary. it's a must read for anyone with an interest in how diplomacy leadership works and how it doesn't. so over the past eight years, major international agreements spearheaded by american diplomats, negotiators from the marshall plan to the opening china to more recently the accords have transformed the world and advance peace and prosperity and security. familiar in the past and today u.s. diplomats and negotiators and foreign policy practitioners have worked behind the scenes and the klieg lights of the global stage to advance values and interests through these and other groundbre

still old, i don’t know, it’s some kind of, probably, soviet joke about shuttle diplomacy, henry kissingerd what shuttle diplomacy is, he says, well, let's say, let's say i need to marry off rockefeller's wife to a simple siberian guy, i go to a village in siberia, i find a healthy guy there, i say, do you want to marry him to my daughter? yes, well, i beg you, we have plenty of our own girls here, cool, why do i need some newark girl, yes, but she's the daughter of a billionaire, so she gets rid of me, and then i go to the board of a swiss bank, i say, do you want a simple siberian guy to be a member of the board, are you crazy, yes, but he's taking rockefeller with me, that's my business, then i... go to rockefeller, i say, do you want your daughter to marry a simple siberian man, in our family everyone is financier, jews, yes, but he is a member of the board of a swiss bank, he says: wait a second, seusie, come here, mr. kissinger has found you a groom, he is a member of the board of a swiss bank, she says, ugh, these financiers, they are all weaklings, yes, but he is a siberian man, wh

if you could answer this, it involves lbj, kissinger, and nixon. this concerns the vietnam war.derstand the story, and correct me if i'm wrong or elaborate or corroborate, that lbj had a peace plan early on for vietnam, but then nixon had envoys around his back and say

reportera: maÑana uno de los oradores principales serÁ el ex representante kissinger que se convirtiÓaque al capitolio. >> [habla en inglÉs] [habla en inglÉs] reportera: la portavoz de la campaÑa de donald trump exhortÓ a los republicanos que asisten a la convenciÓn demÓcrata. pensamos que se suponÍa que tmz estaba lleno de celebridades, no de colaboradores paridos del cnn. los demÓcratas cortejan abiertamente a los republicanos descontentos con donald trump. y hay que reconocer cÓmo algunos peligros de multas dicen que los beneficios de atraer a los votantes mÁs conservadores superan el posible riesgo de ofender a los votantes mÁs liberales, pero para este convenciÓn y preocupados por esta incÓgnita han invitado a los representantes del Área mucho mÁs liberales del partido demÓcrata. me refiero a ocasiÓn cortÉs y bernie sanders, ambos se han referido a un momento mucho mÁs amplio que en la convenciÓn anterior. jorge: donald trump siguiÓ con su estrategia de hacer eventos polÍticos y esta vez fue a california donde hablÓ por primera vez desde que sufriÓ el atentado. reportera: por pri

henry kissinger even pushed the white house into organizing a my light task force task with discrediting witnesses, and engaging and dirty tricks to control the narrative. it took a year and a half for seymour hersh to finally get the story out. winning a pulitzer prize and shocking the international community. the intelligence was bad as it always is. and they gather people. there was no fire at all. really just the old women men and children about making their mo, heating of water for their morning rice and a m. and gather them eventually into 3 large digits and begin to execute them. cali was became infamous, but there were 5 of 6 1st and 2nd lieutenants that were also organizing it. and this group was assigned to the american. all the vision, all were flying over to you and out of the area at one time. and pretty much everybody knew pretty much what was going on. as for what became of lieutenant calley, he was the only one involved sentenced to life in prison, but served a mere 3 years of house arrest, a helicopter pilot, who testified against cali hue. thompson junior witnessed the

the necessary cordon for the west, and about the fact that today's political theory was created by kissinger that moment, when nixon came to the white house, it was necessary to somehow get out of the vietnam war, somehow react to the europeans, who were then trying to play their game, tried to the strength of both nato and the eu, because these were completely new rules of life for them, and most importantly, they were very scared of falling under american domination, of being left without american money, of being left alone with the soviet union, because at that time kissinger had a rule of blaming us and the chinese for the fact that the americans could not get out of vietnam because we were not helping to solve the problem, unconditional discipline was required among american allies, all our attempts to build a warsaw bloc were called soviet... adventures, on the slogans of the free world resisting the communist invasion, the whole picture was built, and the rejection of this prism was not allowed. and the next step kiisshen proposed to perceive all who made up the soviet union as coloni

as he says to kissinger at one point nobody will ever know. what they put a president through in a time like this. um, so i think we can talk about whether or not nixon is a true tragic hero we can talk about, you know, some of the of watergate. um, you know, i loved the line from that holdeman says to dean dean will do once the toothpaste is out of the tube. it's going to be very hard to put it back in. which described their problem they faced because once the aid started, you know talking and dean started talking in particular was very hard to put that toothpaste back in the tube. then there's nixon to david frost. actually, this is after the after his resignation. he says i gave them a sword meaning his enemies. which they twisted with relish into my wounds. if i had been in their place, i would probably have done the same thing. there's nixon on his own. downfall where he says he tells his staff always remember? others may hate you but those who hate you don't win unless you hate them. and then you destroy yourself. and i think that pretty

a republicanos que han decidido apoyar a kamala harris, como en este caso el ex congresista adam kissingeren este momento. julio, te confirmo. no cabe un alfiler. no cabe un alma mÁs en este united center de chicago. sellado. no entra, no sale nadie. pero todos quieren quedarse aquÍ hasta el final. julio. >> y por lo menos ahora que se escucha la voz de pink en este united center pintado de rosa, vamos a escuchar un poco. de what about what about? >> hablamos de. >> bueno, mientras esto se lleva a cabo aquÍ en el united center, al interior, a la espera de escuchar a la vicepresidenta kamala harris, tambiÉn en las calles de chicago se vieron protestas por cuarto dÍa consecutivo, manifestaciones que exigen el fin de la guerra en gaza. lourdes hurtado ha estado siguiendo estas protestas. lourdes. asÍ es, julio. >> hemos estado acompaÑando esta marcha desde que comenzÓ en union park. >> y en este momento en la ruta se han frenado. estÁn ahora avanzando mucho mÁs despacio de lo que estaban avanzando inicialmente. te puedo decir que esta es la manifestaciÓn mÁs multitudinaria que hemos visto des

as he says to kissinger at one point nobody will ever know. what they put a president through in a time like this. um, so i think we can talk about whether or not nixon is a true tragic hero we can talk about, you know, some of the of watergate. um, you know, i loved the line from that holdeman says to dean dean will do once the toothpaste is out of the tube. it's going to be very hard to put it back in. which described their problem they faced because once the aid started, you know talking and dean started talking in particular was very hard to put that toothpaste back in the tube. then there's nixon to david frost. actually, this is after the after his resignation. he says i gave them a sword meaning his enemies. which they twisted with relish into my wounds. if i had been in their place, i would probably have done the same thing. there's nixon on his own. downfall where he says he tells his staff always remember? others may hate you but those who hate you don't win unless you hate them. and then you destroy yourself. and i think that pretty

nixon was his closest friend and was obsessed with making iran strong, but the telegraphs by henry kissinger and are kept in richard nixon's library and museum. in one of the telegraphs, it's written, we've set the unity. and cooperation between saudi arabia and iran as a basis for our policies in the region, but iran's power and ambitions might cause trouble. britain can prevent any friction or conflict in the region by its presence, but britain had major concern that had targeted their historical dominance in the persian gulf. the... uk was no longer the british empire. if it wanted to insist on keeping the persian gulf, it would lose control over management of its own citizens. in the declassified telegraph, it's been noted that iranians are the most important issue, they are hopeful to become a major power in the region, but the us was hesitant to provide the shaw with military equipment. in his memoirs dated january 24th, 1976. alam has written the shaw wanted alam to tell the us ambassador that this is algeria state with a big horde of russian weapons. further down in angola, russians

in it, he locked himself with kissinger to discuss negotiating tactics.enry alfred kissinger is rightfully considered, i believe, one of the greatest politicians of the 20th century. this is true, he is a master of american politics, american diplomacy, the architect of relations between the united states and china, which for us almost turned into a war with china, and the building of relations with the soviet union exclusively in favor of, as they say, the united states, all his positive and positive statements about the soviet union are statements: of a man who treats his mortal the enemy, that's exactly how it should all be assessed, but he really is a major politician who made a huge contribution to the development of soviet-american relations, including relations, to the easing of international tensions, of course, the americans did not go for it because they had a good life, the war in vietnam seriously undermined them, they actually lost the arms race, and something had to be done urgently, hence the easing of international tensions, arms reduction

i mean the president's man to me was bob haldeman or henry kissinger or john ehrlichmann the more senior men, but then they added they came back to me and they said but we're going to modify that and say the memoirs of nixon's trusted aid and that that made me feel a lot more comfortable and i became happy with that title. we have a few slides here tonight some that are from dwight's copiously illustrated book illustrations, which is rare in a book both in black and white and in color and but i'm going to begin with one that is not in the book. that's a favorite of mine in case there's any doubt about who dwight shape. i who do i shape in his or the role? he played pictures worth a thousand words and this picture tells me this is the this was the phone. the president's desk. so it has the white house number four five six one four one four, and then it has a couple of outside lines. it has a signal core line and that has chapin and haldeman and then up above it has chapin rosemary woods and bob haldeman. that's the buzzer and the buzzer when the president pushes the buzzer. you go in asap