have been saying, and one of the things that really knocked me over is that this is sort of where korea iraq, two or three as opposed to 20 years, it just blew me away, and dr. marshall is right, what brings us here is that it is happening a lot right now, and that is because either our training is wrong or perhaps we have had a rash of extraordinary incidents, and so, when i see those kinds of statistics after the research you have done, both in officers being injured, which means a lot to us, and it ought to be a lot to everybody, and that people are being hurt less and shot less, that is a winner, so it is powerful, extraordinary, and that is what made me invest myself even more in this process. i have a couple of questions and then some comments. have the response times been negatively impacted? >> it is interesting, mr. supervisor. we have not found matt as a complaint. if they need additional time, they can take it, but we have not seen an additional impact with capacity, so i will be honest. we will look at supervisor responses. >> i just want to say he is correct on that. the level o

2004 and all of a sudden the pentagon realize the iraq war was not going very well and they might need some extra troops so they were suddenly call from korea and sent to the worst part of iraq at the time. they were in the sunni triangle, right between ramadi and fallujah. i am going to tell you -- i have a few of vocabulary words. i had to learn a whole language when i was talking to these guys. one of them the active duty folks know, i refer to something called a saw. is not what you could down trees with. it is squad automatic weapon, in medium-sized machine gun that soldiers carry. i will also refer to something called loop, michigan. this is the four lane highway just like an interstate that connected ramadi and baghdad. they would do highway patrol. highway patrol was so full of firefights and burnout cars on the side of the road that they nicknamed it my last vocabulary word, operation bad bags. they named all their operations after 80s movies. i will read to you a particularly bad day on mad max and afterwards briefly explain how it echoed throughout time. excuse me for using some names i haven't introduced you to but when every pi

i had no difficulty about president bush highlighting the problems of iraq and north korea, although i wouldn't have used the axis of evil analogy because i didn't eat it was an access. i have profound objections to him bracketing iran with iraq and north korea because i didn't think it was justified, and because it undermined the reformist president khatami's efforts to reach out to the west it profoundly damaged his standing within his own country. >> what you said to us last year was exactly that. you said i was concerned about the way that he had sought to link these three very different problems together. so they are problems. iraq is a problem, north korea is a problem and iran is a problem and they are not the problem some like the one interrupting your christmas dinner. there are other ones you have to deal with that particular moment. now, on the third of december in a letter that he was quoted in your latest statement to us and which is being classified call your office, you told us previously that he personally approved this briefing to the prime minister, your office repli

the wonderful thing i found from the armed forces they are there whether serving in korea or bosnia or iraq or afghanistan, they know what they're doing, they understand it, proud of what they're doing and thanks to modern communication and e-mails, they can communicate with their families and they end up having a sense of what they're doing and why they do it. when there is a loss of life it is heartbreaking. a loss of limb, it is heartbreaking but yet you talk to those families and they don't ask why was i there? they know why they were there and they are proud that they are there and we're very fortunate country. >> for sure. >> you are also a leader yourself. [applause] and you have seen a lot of leaders and i guess what i was the game of. >> and the leading scholar as presidential leadership he will ask me a question on leadership. [laughter] >> i feel like i am back in school. >> when people write about george w. bush, what do think is the shortcoming? >> i am 78 years old. i have lived one-third of our country's history. almost every republican president was considered not very swift

there was has never been completely isolated from the outside world it's not north korea it's not saddam hussein's iraq it's a much more peaceful civilized country and i would give you an example you know the way the russian activists travel to the west they first go to law school because there is a visa free regime between belarus and moscow. and russia and then from more school they travel to a new country of the world i think what we need is for the west on the stand there we should more drawn you are and soon you will which is not isolated anyone. opposition in belarus democracy in belarus rule north wind bench the isolation it will win thanks to openness in there and all of these. political analysts from russia to musicians who thanks for being on the line from chile central moscow to. the u.s. may be the self-proclaimed land of the free but it also jails more people than any other country in the world next artie's innocence a church that meets a former inmate who's calling against a prison system which he claims is built for profit. the parking lot where the prison cell where the man inside it th

do remember there were three -- iraq, iran and north korea. ell, 12 years later, there is iraq, iran and north korea so i want to ask a question about each and get mohamed to tell us a little bit about his own reflection. now there are so many things to say about the iraq story, but i'm going to just try to focus on one. the business proposition i mentioned before a fierce independence, the u.s. government or specifically the bush administration was arguing that saddam hussein had weapons of mass destruction and specifically nuclear weapons, so secretary or vice president cheney focused on iranian nuclear weapons as the premise as the u.s. going to war. when this question came to the authorities, the experts, the iaea, and to its director general, he said, and here is january 2 of 2003 report to the u.n. security council, dr. el-baradei wrote no evidence that iraq has revised its nuclear weapon program since the elimination of that program in the 1990s and two, from our analysis to date, it appears that the aluminum tubes would be consistent wi

i had no difficulty about president bush highlighting the problems of iraq and north korea, although i wouldn't have used the axis of evil analogy because i didn't eat it was an access. i have profound objections to him bracketing iran with iraq and north korea because i didn't think it was justified, and because it undermined the reformist president khatami's efforts to reach out to the west it profoundly damaged his standing within his own country. >> what you said to us last year was exactly that. you said i was concerned about the way that he had sought to link these three very different problems together. so they are problems. iraq is a problem, north korea is a problem and iran is a problem and they are not the problem some like the one interrupting your christmas dinner. there are other ones you have to deal with that particular moment. now, on the third of december in a letter that he was quoted in your latest statement to us and which is being classified call your office, you told us previously that he personally approved this briefing to the prime minister, your office repli

i had no difficulty about president bush highlighting the problems of iraq and north korea, although i wouldn't have used the axis of evil analogy because i didn't eat it was an access. i have profound objections to him bracketing iran with iraq and north korea because i didn't think it was justified, and because it undermined the reformist president khatami's efforts to reach out to the west it profoundly damaged his standing within his own country. >> what you said to us last year was exactly that. you said i was concerned about the way that he had sought to link these three very different problems together. so they are problems. iraq is a problem, north korea is a problem and iran is a problem and they are not the problem some like the one interrupting your christmas dinner. there are other ones you have to deal with that particular moment. now, on the third of december in a letter that he was quoted in your latest statement to us and which is being classified call your office, you told us previously that he personally approved this briefing to the prime minister, your office repli

i had profound objections to him bracketing iraq with iran and north korea. i didn't think it was justified, and because it undermined the reformist president's efforts to reach out to the west and profoundly damaged his standing within his own country. >> yes. what you said to us last year was exactly that. you said "i was concerned about the way in which he had sought to link these three very different problems together." so these are problems. iraq is a problem, north korea is a problem, iran is a problem, but your point is these are different problems and they are not like the problems unlike the one that interrupted your christmas dinner, one you had to deal with at that particular moment. now, on the third of december in a letter from which you've quoted in your latest statement to us, which has been declassified, your office -- and you told us previously that you'd personally approved this briefing to the prime minister -- your office replied to a request from the prime minister for a note on the options for. and if i can just pick out four points from

expressed to sir roderic by concern about the inaccuracy as well as the wisdom of lumping iraq, iran and north koreatogether in a single pot and labeling them the axis of evil. and i thought if we were to publish a four country analysis, how we would be seeing is just adding another country to the axis of evil. instead of having one hand running, we'd have four heads running and he would become unmanageable and then we be asked for we've got to attack libya or north korea? i just didn't think he was going to add anything to a strategy for dealing with those problems. >> there is another argument. there is another argument which is the material on iraq would look thin by comparison on some of the other countries. >> yes, i understand that. i wouldn't use the word sin. it certainly didn't necessarily look stronger than the other countries. if you take north korea that has to be dealt with as was often at lord, the intelligent which above all of that developed to be not as accurate, underestimating the scale of bolivians nuclear weapons program. we were in the event able to deal with that study. by the

the men and women of the armed forces is that they are there whether they are serving in korea or in bosnia or in iraq or afghanistan. they know what they are doing. they understand it. they are proud of what they are doing, and thanks to modern communications, e-mails, they are able to commute it with their families and their families end up having a sense of what they're doing and why they are doing it. and when there's a loss of life, it is heartbreaking. when there's a loss of limb, it's heartbreaking. and yet you talk to those families and you talk to those people, and they don't ask why was i there. they know why they were there, and they are proud to say they were there. and we are a very fortunate country. >> that's for sure. you are very close to do leadership as well as leadership yourself. [applause] >> indeed. and you seem a lot leaders. i guess what i was thinking of -- >> here's the leading scholar on presidential leadership and he's going to ask me a question about leadership. >> some do -- >> i feel like i'm back in school. >> some just write about it. but when people in my line of wor

already expressed to sir roderick my concern about the inack as says and wisdom of lumping iraq, iran and north korea together in a single pot and labeling them the axis of evil. and i thought that if we were to publish a four-country analysis, how we would be seen as just us having another country to the axis of evil -- adding another country to the ax it of evil rather than having one head running which was iraq we'd have four heads running. and it would become unmanageable. and then we'd be asked were we about to attack libya and so on, were we about to attack north corey yeah. i just didn't think it was going to add anything to a strategy for dealing with the problems and to be clear wouldn't. >> there was another argument around that argument certainly in the papers there was another argument which is that the material on iraq would look feeble by comparison with that on some of the other countries. >> yes, i understand that. and i wouldn't use the word thin. it certainly didn't necessarily look stronger than the other countries. but if you take north korea, that had to be dealt with on a differ

committee and on the senate that have argued the united states should remain in iraq in the same way it has stayed in korea as a protection force. some arguments were made that we should be there for another 50 years. there really are two different questions when it comes down to whether our military should remain in iraq. the first is whether they are needed in the domestic terms, which is what a lot of this discussion has centered on today, but the second one, and the most important one, is beyond this transition, should we, or are we discussing the notion of providing bases in a rock as a projection of force that could be -- as -- bases in a rock as a projection -- iraq as a protection force that could be used? ambassador, have you had any discussions on that level? >> we have not, but to go back to 2008, i was involved in the negotiation of these agreements when i worked on the national security council. the iraqis made it clear at that time, and it is in black and white in the agreement, summer between articles 24 and 27 -- some where between articles 24 and 27 that we are not to have permanent basis.

iraq. you could argue that the price we pay it was too high. i would ask if the price we paid in korea was too high for half a peninsula. >> i thought israel was of functioning democracy in the middle east. >> yes, it is. it has been an interesting winter so far. >> i was inside out with my neighbor for almost seven hours. >> that gentleman spent a night trapped in his truck on the lakeshore drive, along with other motorists. if global warming is a problem, why are we having such a tough winter? al gore told gail collins of "the new york times" that there is 4% more water vapor now than there was in the summer. it returns to earth as heavy rain and snow. >> if godzilla appeared this afternoon, al gore would say it is global warming. [laughter] look, everything is -- it is our religion, and in religion, everything is inexplicable bit in science, you cannot deny or falsified of a -- you can deny or falsified. finding a single piece of evidence -- >> al gore is a red herring. there are scientists who are looking about the question of the jet stream. that what that kept it up there is brok

syria and libya and we need it fast if they mess up iraq it will delay bringing our troops home we also need to solve the pakistan problem and korea doesn't seem to be going well are you coming up with proposals for me to send around thanks now i don't know why he didn't just throw in a request for proposal so all the whole mideast peace process while he was at it i really just love this because i think it truly gives you a look into the mind of donald rumsfeld not only does it sound like it was written by a fourth grader but it also shows an utter disregard for i don't know the complexity of international issues oh that little pakistan problem solve it korea yeah that sucks too. the world according to neo cons black and white good and bad now unfortunately for romney the little pakistan issue was solved korea well that's still bad too and as for libya i think we know that isn't going so well so far rumsfeld blahs a casual attitude towards issues that are complex serious and very real we're giving him tonight's tool time ward. now this is a story of he said she said and the presidential palace of afghanistan according to reports g

it's noticed the united states used military force against iraq, but not north korea.s made the strategic assessments ab the nuclear program. it's way beyond israel. there's no programs in the middle east until peace and israel felt secure. the last i checked that is not in the immediate future. and the reality is the timeline of iran's nuclear program is far, far, far faster than any diplomacy about the nuclear weapon free or p5 plus one. that's the danger. the hope that whether it's regional diplomacy, or more narrow diplomacy is going to solve the problem for us is unlikely. because 24/7, the iranians are busy in their laboratories with their center fuses. >> may i go? >> yes, i made the proposition. richard thinks it's not going to happen soon. i think it's not going to happen soon because the united states and the western powers don't want it to happen soon. not because israel doesn't have the security that it seeks. because it could be an incentive for the israel and the arab countries to reach the kind of peace that we are all seeking. if you have the zone with

the united states used military force against iraq, but not north korea. it goes way beyond israel. if there is any chance for a nuclear free zone in the middle east, at last i checked that was not in the immediate future. the time line for iran's nuclear program is moving far faster than any diplomacy. that is the danger. this hope that whether it is a regional diplomacy or more narrowed the policy is going to solve this problem for us is unlikely. the iranians are busy in their laboratories with their centrifuges. >> richard thinks it is not going to happen soon. i think it is not going to happen soon because the western powers do not want it to happen cent, not because israel does not have the security. it could be an incentive for israel and the arab countries to reach the kind of peace that we all seek if you have the zone with the sanctions. it is from that context, i think, that the zone should be an issue that takes precedence over other alternatives when it comes to the issue of nuclear threats in the area war between iran and israel and other arab countries. >> taking the

committee and in the senate who have argued the united states should remain in iraq in the same sense that it has remained in korea, as a projection force. some arguments were made to the we should be there another 50 years. there really are two different questions when it comes down to whether our military should remain in iraq. the first is whether they are needed in domestic terms which is what a lot of the discussion has centered on today. the second one and most important one is beyond this transition period, are we discussing the notion of providing basis -- bases in iraq as a projection force that could be used externally from iraq in a situation the other than the domestic concerns you are talking about? have you had any discussions? >> to the back to 2008 i was involved in the negotiation of these agreements when i worked in the national security council. the iraqis made it clear in black-and-white in the agreement somewhere between articles 24 to 27 that we are not to have permanent bases. we are not to use our presence in iraq to project power of any sort or in any way out side of iraq. that was the exp

iraq that kind of swath right down the middle, was because egypt drifted. and had egypt really adopted a really aggressive forward-leaning... i mean like korea, taiwan, singapore economic innovation and human development policy, that would have led the whole arab world. egypt's always been a leader. but an arab world where egypt-- which is a bedrock of stability, maybe it was too stable, maybe it was too slow-- but it was a bedrock that everybody could count on whether you are a gulfy who... someone from the persian gulf who wanted to spend your summers in cairo, you're a business person, you needed someone to mediate between israelis and palestinians. you know, egypt was kind of that bedrock. i don't think anyone here can quite imagine what it would be like to have a middle east where egypt is not that bedrock but is kind of spinning out of control. i think that's very frightening to people and i really hope that doesn't happen but i think the fear of that is now... i sense here in jordan really starting to creep into people's consciousness. >> rose: it spins out of control. >> yeah. i mean, you just see these scenes from cairo. i mean, aga

iraq. in europe and the republic of korea because of a long-term army station, you army station, you could take addition of expertise and a host nation, law and languages, the army for the delegates overseas suspension and department authority for contracts in those areas. as the army suspension and debarment official i am an independent decision-maker. i report directly to the judge advocate general. i do not supervise the attorneys and the procurement fraud branch or the program attorneys who monitor and develop procurement fraud, waste, and abuse cases are every pair for suspension and debarment cases for my decision. i received the recommendations, providing guidance, and i render decisions on the disposition of cases. earlier in my career i served as a litigation attorney in the procurement fraud branch. for the past several years the army has been at or near the top of the department of defense and the number of suspension and debarment actions in fiscal year 10, we took over 400 actions. 309 in 2009, 301 in 2008, and again 350 in 2007. since 2005, we've taken over 350 actions in cas

iraq, where he tried to save the life of the marine when they were caught in an ambush. in the give me tomorrow he has written a book that captures george company's experiences in korea. i was a member of torch company, and i waited 60 years for this man to come along because nobody told our story. i couldn't understand why in the battle like chosin reservoir, which i'm sure all of you know, because it isn't taught anywhere, and if you know when it's because you want to find out about things, but the chosin reservoir had the most number of medals given enough for any battle, and it is a two week battle with the chinese that just came into the korean war, and they surrounded us with 150,000 against 15,000 of us and they were sent there to annihilate us. well, i am here said they didn't complete their mission. i would like to introduce you to pat o'donnell. [applause] >> thank you. i'm so thrilled so many people are here tonight that i know. i really appreciate that support for me it is a really personal kind of day. about six years ago almost to the day, i returned from iraq from the battle fallujah and that's the genesis of this entire book. for me, it was a very pers

should remain in iraq in the same sense it has remained in korea as a projection force.e arguments were made during the past campaign we should be there for another 50 years. there are two different questions when it comes down to whether our military should remain in iraq. the first is whether they are needed in domestic terms which is what a lot of the discussion has centered on today. but the most important one is beyond this transition period, are we discussing the notion of providing bases in iraq as a projection force that could be used externally from iraq war -- or the domestic concerns we are talking about. >> we have not but to go back to 2008,i was involved in these agreements when i worked at the national security council. the iraqis made it clear at the time, and it is in black and white in the agreement, articles 24 and 27, that we are not have permanent bases. we are not used our presence to project power of any sort outside of iraq, and that was the understanding that the administration at the highest levels, and i was present, that our presence in iraq b

korea, it was haiti, it was a shootdown of aircraft in bosnia. from the outside you cannot see any of this. i had no idea. we were still recovering from the war in iraq. we were doing precision strikes, high-technology -- if you could see the ground, you could control it. we were also wrestling with the bad memories of vietnam. there were two bad memories in particular. one was the so-called weinberger doctrine, which general powell could up in the early 1980's which said you had to emphasize your force. we call it overwhelming force at first. that was too much. we had a tendency to worst case with the opposition would do. there were se people saying it would take a couple hundred thousand of troops to solve this problem and that we should stay out of it. there was ao a sense that there was an idealistic strain in the american political scene. but when the going got tough and you started to take casualties, the ideas would not be with you. we had to be very cautious. that was the military posture. they were by standing. >> it was not so much reactive as resistant. >> i have to say that colin powell and i a very close. what happened was, and i think p

korea, it was haiti, it was a shootdown of aircraft in bosnia. from the outside you cannot see any of this. i had no idea. we were still recovering from the war in iraq. we were doing precision strikes, high-technology -- if you could see the ground, you could control it. we were also wrestling with the bad memories of vietnam. there were two bad memories in particular. one was the so-called weinberger doctrine, which general powell could up in the early 1980's which said you had to emphasize your force. we call it overwhelming force at first. that was too much. we had a tendency to worst case with the opposition would do. there were some people saying it would take a couple hundred thousand of troops to solve this problem and that we should stay out of it. there was also a sense that there was an idealistic strain in the american political scene. but when the going got tough and you started to take casualties, the ideas would not be with you. we had to be very cautious. that was the military posture. they were by standing. >> it was not so much reactive as resistant. >> i have to say that colin powell and i are very close. what happened was, and i t

korea and arizona, i got a chance to get into carpentry. what happens now is the union's have lost so much of a part of the workforce, the young guys coming from afghanistan and iraq and getting out of the service, they really don't have a place to go anymore because now the unions have started allowing illegals to work in the trade. i know because i worked the trade 22 years and i was involved in the vocational training program and for the union in santa ana. what is happening is our unions really need to, also, straighten themselves out, just like the republican party needs to get their stuff together and stop worrying about the little people. host: let's look at some union members from the bureau of labor statistics. host: 1 last e-mail, from seattle -- thanks for the e-mails and tweet. we will speak with the mayor of charlotte, north carolina, and from the city of -- in oklahoma. we will be right back. >> this weekend governors will talk about how to grow their states' economies, education, and cyber security in washington for the annual winter meeting. we will have live coverage throughout the weekend on c- span. >> this weekend on "book tv" on c-span 2, the

korea, it was haiti, it was a shootdown of aircraft in bosnia. i had no idea. from the outside, you could not see this. inside the military institution, we were recovering from the war in iraq. we were digesting the lessons learned and we have precision strikes and high-technology. if you could see the ground, you could control it. we are also wrestling with the bad memories of vietnam. there were two bed memories in particular that stock. one was the so-called weinberger doctrine which general powell put up in the 1980's which says you have to have decisive force. we call the overwhelming force at first and that was too much and it became decisive. we had a tendency to worse case what the opposition would be. people would say it would take hundreds of thousands of troops to solve this problem and we cannot afford it so let's stay out of it. there was also a sense that maybe there was an idealistic strain in the american political scene but when the going got tough and you started to take casualties, the idealists would not be with you and the military would be blamed. we want to be very cautious about getting committed. that was the military posture. >> you are describing

in north korea and iran in which the security council has acted forcefully in recent years, imposing the most comprehensive sanctions ever on these regimes. u.n. missions in afghanistan and iraq, which play crucial and growing roles in both countries, supplementing u.s. efforts and reducing our burden. u.n. peacekeeping operations which are an indispensible tool have saved untold lives, averted wars, help establish democratic rule in more than a dozen countries. the broun amendment would put the u.s. on a dangerous path to isolationism. we learned on september 11, 2001, that we are not immune from events that take place halfway around the world. there are enormous challenges that we all must face together. and united states cannot close its borders and think that we can protect our own security. i urge my colleagues to vote no on this amendment to effectively withdraw from the u.n. because it would endanger our national security. i reserve the balance of my time. the chair: the gentlelady reserves. the gentleman from georgia. mr. broun: i continue to reserve. . mrs. lowey: i yield one minute to the gentlelady from texas, ms. jackson lee. the chair: the gentlelady from texas i