i ago difficult to restraining president clinton did was right to go all the way on kosovo and he wasposition. the american people were saying to him, look, displaces thousands of miles away for america. let the europeans deal with it. it's on my doorstep. >> spitzer christopher my year he did say you were saying yes, but it was not being listened to. >> i don't think he was there at the critical meeting your >> any other correspondence. >> you as i can read it wider. in 2002, not just the meeting. >> yes, but the fact is that that meeting and there are other evidence given to you particularly by david manning. but i was just explaining about the american alliance because it's important in understanding my thinking on this. so i've been through this process with resident clinton. when he, with a lot of courage had committed america. had committed america. september the 11th hbrbrb@ @ rbb him now is absolutely clear because as i've set up publicly, not privately we have to confront this issue. it could be confronted by sanctions framework that would affect this. for the reasons i've gi

and in a -- and just a quick question of kosovo is being asked to compromise. can freedom be compromised on a return to oppression or do you consider that the word compromise. >> you ask me successful question. -- successive question and each one is a chapter in the book. it's as if you advertised a set of advertisements because exactly i'm dealing with those questions. i'm talking about exactly about compromise for the sake of lasting peace. and against the element and keeping the element as an option. and giving up namely even if you have just claims for territories or something, giving it up for the sake of a permanent piece. -- peace. not about truth or ceasefire. and what is the difference and actually -- and obviously the case of kosovo was very much on my mind. so i think -- all i can say now is you have to read the book. [laughter] >> there's a lady -- yeah, you had your hand up before. >> i hope this comes out well. i'm from new york city. what i'm thinking of is the what and the who. and how you began. and what i'm thinking of is, how do we really ult

we have people in coastal -- kosovo. it was not mentioned as much as it should be, but i am really proud of the young folks who are being deployed to haiti, for the work they will be doing. it will bring water and relief to a very sad country. the american military base will be there. i am very proud. >> do you have any sense of how long the commitment will be? >> it will change. right now, it is a rescue, 3 --, triage, and in the long- term, there will be reconstruction. if the american engineers could give advice, i am sure they will. >> you issued a statement on friday saying that a number of red flags were ignored. what is it about the culture in the the military that allowed these things to go unchecked? >> it is the coulter of not wanting to say unkind things. oer's or fitness reports -- so many of them say that the officer is outstanding. i think that is in so many of them. there are magic words that convinced the promotion board that this person really is outstanding. for instance, this is the top officer i have.

we have people in kosovo. and it was not mentioned as much as it should be, but i am really proud of the young folks now today being deployed to haiti for the work they are going to be doing, to bring order and relief to a very, very sad country. the american military face will be there to be of help to these folks. i am very proud. guest: any sense of how long that commitment will be in haiti? guest: it will change. right now it is a rescue, clean up. longer term, it will be in a sense of reconstruction. it is up to the haitians to do that. the american corps of engineers could be advised of them. guest: you issued a statement on friday saying that a number of red flags within the pentagon were ignored. what is it about the culture and the military that allowed these things to go unchecked? guest: it is the culture of not wanting to say unkind things. in the oer's or fitness reports, so many of them say the offer -- the officer is outstanding. i think that is in so many, many of them. but there are magic word

it started with relation to kosovo and what happened in the communications of kosovo there came a point when president clinton and tony blair fault although the ministry campaign was clearly made to against molosovich, there was a very strict in terms of military balance, communications and public relations if you like, and public opinion that we were losing that particular battle because milosevic had complete control over his own over the media systems of those joining from those countries that were their britain and america and elsewhere. and so, i was asked to go and help me to put together different communications which we did. and we took elements of that and we've recreated a form of the different communications post september 11th and then adapted that began in iraq and the cic first incarnation was post september 11th, and that was about having all the different nature time zones at the plant could be in islamabad, washington, london, information centers where we were linked up all the time understanding everything that every leader involved in the coalition was doing and sayin

if you think of kosovo, essentially an administration conducted by serbs, who left, to some 83 extent sunnis left the south and certainly abandoned their positions. even if they didn't go north, they went home. so you have got a vacuum, not of a military kind, but of an administrative kind, and i think there is actually a role for some kind of what i would describe as civilian reservists, the counterparts of military reservists. people who are not going to wear uniforms, but they are perhaps trained, give up a weekend or two weeks or something, so that they 0 their commitment would be that they would be ready to go into a situation as and when needed, so that, you know, they would be people who would expect to be called upon in precisely this kind of situation, because the real problem is that i think all 5 >> but that is something dfid could do. >> exactly. all departments of defence, in a sense are used to the concept that you have got to get people quickly into a conflict, even if some of the countries that i can think of can't do it quite as well as we can, that is part of the mod

really hasn't been that much violence against them since the kosovo became independent. because their numbers don't threaten the albanian majority. that's one example. although you'd u.s. should try to negotiate such a decentralization, to a loose confederation in iraq on its way out, the iraqis don't want to do this. that's fine but i think the u.s. should pull out anyway because i think this will be iraq's last hope of more ethnosectarian violence. and certainly bush is arming and training of the wakening into long-term. is a good short-term strategy to reduce the violence but in the long term it may make to support more intense because there will be a third sidearms, the u.s. already armed the kurds entering those forces. now contrary to conventional wisdom, and in spite of its oil, iraq is not really strategic to u.s. interest. this is a subject which you really can't get too much into in this seminar, but i don't really believe that we need to defend oil with armed forces because the market will deliver the oil. that's a subject of my next book. now, as for afghanis

it started with relation to kosovo and what happened in the communications of kosovo there came a pointwhen president clinton and tony blair fault although the ministry campaign was clearly made to against molosovich, there was a very strict in terms of military balance, communications and public relations if you like, and public opinion that we were losing that particular battle because milosevic had complete control over his own over the media systems of those joining from those countries that were their britain and america and elsewhere. and so, i was asked to go and help me to put together different communications which we did. and we took elements of that and we've recreated a form of the different communications post september 11th and then adapted that began in iraq and the cic first incarnation was post september 11th, and that was about having all the different nature time zones at the plant could be in islamabad, washington, london, information centers where we were linked up all the time understanding everything that every leader involved in the coalition was doing and saying

started in kosovo. what happened within the communications on kosovo is there can a point where both president clinton and tony blair felt although the campaign was clearly nato against milosevic there was a strict in terms of military balance but on the communications and public relations if you like and public opinion we were losing that particular battle because milosevic had complete control over his media systems and that gave considerable control over the media systems of those countries that were there including britain and america as well and so i was asked to help me to put together different communications which we did. and we took aliments of that and recreated a different form of the same communications post september 11th and then adapted that again with iraq and the cic was post september 11th and what was about was having different -- all the different major time zones that would be in islamabad, washington, london, information centers that were linked up all the time understanding every

missions in kosovo and in other places, they have been successful but they've had difficulties. mean, this is not easy to do. so i do tend to think that a supportive role, clearly the international community is going to be providing most public services in haiti. in fact, they already were before the conflict. but whether you would want to formalize that, i would be a little skeptical, senator. >> i think that given the extremity of the circumstances, you know, i wouldn't be surprised if you here support of haiti on the streets, they say, in the same way that you did among haitian americans. that said, i think there must be another way to do this. accompaniment of an extremely fragile civil service and government. and the problem as you and i have discussed a number of occasions, all this seesawing policy, you know, that is the thing, especially the last two decades, and it has taken a told. he does if the policy is, okay, we're going to bypass completely the public infrastructures and only support, if you made this point in 2003 in this very room, that we are harvesting some of

i can remember for example during the kosovo crisis, clear did an awful lot with pretty extraordinary work at the time but it is no secret. she was very difficult to handle the times. i think sometimes the military and i think that emerged in the evidence of witnesses, i think the bond it for quite difficult to deal with. i think sometimes they are probably work concerns at times about whether a very, very sensitive and tightly held conversations as to whether in a political environment, whether sometimes you may be a little bit worried that things would get out into the public demand you wouldn't necessarily want in the public domain. >> because she was difficult, her department couldn't therefore be included fully in the work. they didn't receive, as we have heard from earlier witnesses, the iraq options paper of march 2001. she heard about it later and complained. >> i found that surprising. >> you found that surprising? it was sent out from number 10 but they were not on the distribution. that wasn't a sensitive document. she says in her book in september of 2002 and initially was

that all started with kosovo. what happened with, in the communications on kosovo, there came a point where both president clinton and tony blair felt that although the military campaign was clearly, i mean nato against milosevic. strictly in terms of military balance, but communications and public relations if you like, and public opinion we were losing that particular battle. because milosevic had complete control over his media systems. that gave him complete control of media systems in those countries were there, britain, america and elsewhere. and so, i was asked to go and help nato put together a different communications model, which we did. and we took elements of that, and we recreated a different form of the same communications september the 11th and adapted that iraq. and cic its first incar was really post the 11th. that was the, -- post-september the 11th. all the major different time zones, at that point, islamabad, washington, london, information centers where we're all linked up all the time, unders

in cosimo, and in water to other situations like that -- in kosovo and east timor. we have done that in cases where there were -- were there was no government. i don't know of any case where we have displaced an existing government that was universally recognized. i think it would be controversial and difficult to simply impose an international administration in haiti, unless there was a pretty clear demand within haiti for that kind of -- there is a clear demand in the haitian american community, but that is a little different than a clear demand in haiti. there are precedents, it has been done, but frankly, we do not do this all that well. the un missions in kosovo and east timor have been successful, but they have had difficulties. this is not easy to do, so i do tend to think that a supportive role, clearly the international community will be providing most of the public services in haiti. they already were before the conflict, but went -- whether you want to formalize that, i would be little skeptical. >> i think that given the extremity of the circumstances, i

missions in kosovo and in east emore. they have been successful but they've had difficulties. i do tend to think a supportive providing most public services in haiti. but whether you would want to formalize that i would be skeptical, senator. >> paul, have you talked on this? >> i think given the extremity of the circumstances i wouldn't be surprised if you'd hear support in haiti on the streets, as they say, in the same way that you did among haitian americans. that said, i think there must be another way to do this companyment of an extremely fragile civil service in government. the problem, as and i have discussed a number of occasions, the see sawing of politics and it las taken a toll. -- it has taken a toll. if the policy, ok, we are going to bypass the public infrastructure and only support the aid with the n.g.o.'s, then we're harvesting some of that now. there is -- that's why things were -- the government was weak before january 12. so i think -- i'm not really qualified to comment on receivership. i just don't know enough about it. i know there are other people here

in bosnia, kosovo, kuwait, afghanistan, and iraq under sudan. then after the atonement, after the catharsis of confession comes reconciliation, the extended hand to the clenched fist. we have now had a year of this as well. what is clear is that reconciliation, the resetting of relations starting from scratch with adversaries has its consequences. why? because these conflicts did not come out of nowhere. they did not arise capriciously. they have their roots in a crash of interest and values.

previous occasions on which he had been involved in regime change, the taliban, sierra he krone and kosovoand so i don't really accept this analysis that at crawford there was this fundamental shift of approach in policy by the prime minister. and on your point about did i support the prime minister in relation to his pursuit of disarmament of saddam hussein and the way he was doing it, yes, i did. >> you did support it. >> i did. >> and what were the others in the close circle, were they of the same o view? >> well, i think you'd have to ask them. short answer is, yes. i think it's unfair to expect me to put their position when i know they're part of the inquiry as well. >> in your diary i think on the meeting on the 7th of march in 2002 you say that the cabinet was mainly about iraq. not executive division, but a lot of concern where it is going. what were the concerns? >> march the 7th. so that was pre-crawford. yeah. i can't -- look, i can't remember the discussion in any detail, but i do remember there was a sense of people just raising concerns. concerns in relation to is this happen

the un missions in kosovo and east timor have been successful, but they have had difficulties. this is not easy to do, so i do tend to think that a supportive role, clearly the international community will be providing most of the public services in haiti. they already were before the conflict, but went -- whether you want to formalize that, i would be little skeptical. >> i think that given the extremity of the circumstances, i would not be surprised if you would hear support on the streets in haiti the same way he did among haitian americans. i think there must be another way to do this accompaniments of an extremely fragile civil service and government. the problem as we have discussed is all the seesawing policy over the last two decades. it has taken a toll. if the policy is we are going to bypass completely the public infrastructures and only support -- we are harvesting some of that now. that is why the government was week before january 12. i am not qualified to comment on receivership. i do not know enough about it. i think there'll be resistance to that, and i think w

i do know from other conflicts, particular problem, for example, in kosovo we had similar difficulties in afghanistan. it is quite hard to find the right people with the right skills to go into what very recently has been a war zone. so it may be that we did not provide sufficient timelines for identifying those people and getting them into, into southern iraq. >> that very much corresponds with what others have said to us. now, you've reflected the fact that you were concerned for a long time about the aftermath, other ministers likewise. why at cabinet level did we not take more vigorous action to insure that the aftermath planning was done properly, as you say it's very complicated, and in sufficient time? >> to the best of my recollection, we did. i think that a lot of work went into -- i'm sorry to repeat myself, but into the humanitarian part, into looking at how we dealt with the infrastructure. i think there was a lot of thought. we had people, for example, that we were going to deploy very quickly who were experts in, in oil pumping and delivery because part of that was concer

young democracies, like liberia, east timor, kosovo, they need our help to secure their improvementsheir welfare. we must stay engaged to nurture democratic development. we stand ready, both in our bilateral the ships and through international institutions, to help governments who have committed to improving themselves by assisting them in fighting corruption and helping to train police forces and public servants. we will support regional organizations and institutions, like the organization of american states, the african union, and the association of southeast asian nations, where they take their own steps to protect their democratic institutions. even as we enforce the successes and conscience demands so we are not cowed by the overwhelming difficulty in making inroads in hard places like sudan, combo, north korea, zimbabwe, or on the hard issues, like ending gender inequality and discrimination against gays and lesbians from the middle list to south america, africa, and asia. in sudan, ongoing tensions threaten the devastation oand the genocide of doodarfur. we can focus our effo

we have set a provisional administration inco's a vote, -- in kosovo and one or to other situations like that. we have done that in cases where there was no local government but where we overthrew the local government. i do not know of any in which we displays an existing government that was universally recognized, so i think it would be controversial and difficult to simply impose an international administration in haiti. unless there was a pretty clear demand within haiti for that kind of -- . oooooooooooooooo ooooowoooooooooo the international community is going to be providing public services in haiti. they were before the conflict. whether you want to formalize that, i would be skeptical. >> any thoughts on this? >> >> i would not be surprised if you heard support in haiti on the streets as they say in the same way that you do among haitian americans. that said, i think there must be another way to do this the problem, as we have discussed a number of occasions, are the policies that are flipping back and forth, especially over the past two decades. i

when i first arrived in the mod in october 1999, we were simultaneously deployed in bosnia and kosovo. many, many particular support staff were simply being rotated from one to the other. we lost a lot of people during that period. they said look, that's not right. aye not doing that. it's the same thing over and over again. iraq and afghanistan, certainly the war-fighting part actually is popular is not quite the word i suspect. but that's what a lot of people join up to do. >> but are you then saying -- i mean there have been no opportunities to learn the lessons? >> there were quite a detail as with any operation as detailed lessons learned process inside the ministry of defense. >> but you identified those. what was the lesson learned during the course of the time you were there? >> well, i think there's probably longer term consideration by lesson in 2005. but i'm sure that work would have fed into and continued to feed into the kinds of judgments that are being made. i think it's clear that that's going to be some sort of defense review after the next election, and i'm sure thes

it was bill clinton who led a unilateral nato action in kosovo. it was bill clinton who undertook a number of air strikes on iraq in a very matter that many considered to be a violation of international law at the time. i think president bush took certain things to a fundamentally new level, but in many respects, he was building upon a foundation that had been laid by the clinton administration. another aspect of this irony is that obama, to some degree, harkens back to george herbert walker bush. in my view, he was one of the masters of working multilateral diplomacy. when iraq invaded kuwait in 1990, it was george herbert walker bush and his team that put together a major multilateral coalition through the u.n. to use force against iraq. that was a great example of multilateral diplomacy. i think george w. bush was not very good at that and i actually do not think bill clinton was very good at that. the irony is that obama may be returning us to a diplomatic style, which i think to a large degree was reflected in george herbert walker bush. host

demonstrate that they believed force could be used not just in a humanitarian context like in bosnia or kosovobut in clear defiance of our own national security principles. that must have driven so many of them -- in clear defense of our national security principles. that must have driven so many of them to vote in favor of this. so many of them have discovered unexpected dangers, that things do not work out the way you thought they would. now there is a hard-headed realist mentality you find among many of those same democrats. it is a long and bumpy road they have trouble. host: delaware is next on the republican line, good morning. caller: i am not a reagan republican, by any means. i have a greedier -- a great deal of respect for former president eisenhower. however, i must say the vice- president biden has been outstanding for our state. we have quite a few republicans are very complementary of him. those are the progressive ones. i must say that chaney, rumsfeld, i wish there was an estimate of how many millions these people made due to the wars they created. these were incredibly damagin

demand on the regime change had been cemented if you like by the fact that it appeared to succeed in kosovoelly down and indeed with afghanistan at this stage. did he told a different view on the regime change to the one that you've expressed? >> the best way to find that out is to ask -- >> we obviously will but you were having a debate with him about it. >> we are two different people. >> but in one government. >> and we came -- >> i'm trying to figure out a government policy. >> there's no great surprise to no people at senior levels of government holds strong views and debate those and what i had to offer the primm investor which i hope i fulfilled was my best judgment coupled with my loyalty because that is what i expected anybody else that i don't mind people to disagree, i do into rigid but i ask them to be loyal because otherwise you can't operate any kind of governmental system. can i make two points if i may. first of all but the chicago speech to chicago speech was important and what the prime minister was seeking to do in chicago in that speech was to alert the world to the fact

we spent something like 18 times more per capita in bosnia and kosovo. we got what we paid for. we did it on the cheap. we know what the result is. we will make six or seven points about what we are doing in afghanistan. this is not the graveyard of the vampires. it should be retired of the graveyard of cliches. every class was involved in that interaction. it was written as the best account of the afghan war. he calculated that there were one and a 75000 -- 150,000 full- time soldiers on the battlefield. even if you take the largest number, it is 20,000. we are facing a small insurgency compared to what the soviets faced. these will not be obama's vietnam. it might be his afghanistan. that is a separate issue. it cannot be his in vietnam. it is a different issue. it was a major problem for the united states. another thing they can talk on, afghanistan is a nation [unintelligible] in 1747, the federation was founded. that makes it an older nation than the united states. it is not a lack of nationhood. it is that it has had a weak central state. there is nothing really wrong with

we have set a provisional administration inco's a vote, -- in kosovo and one or to other situations like that. we have done that in cases where there was no local government but where we overthrew the local government. i do not know of any in which we displays an existing government that was universally recognized, so i think it would be controversial and difficult to simply impose an international administration in haiti. unless there was a pretty clear demand within haiti for that kind of -- . oooooooooooooooo ooooowoooooooooo the international community is going to be providing public services in haiti. they were before the conflict. whether you want to formalize that, i would be skeptical. >> any thoughts on this? >> >> i would not be surprised if you heard support in haiti on the streets as they say in the same way that you do among haitian americans. that said, i think there must be another way to do this the problem, as we have discussed a number of occasions, are the policies that are flipping back and forth, especially over the past two decades. i

when iraq came along they believed force could be used in a humanitarian context like in bosnia or kosovos was driving many of them to vote in favor of the war that they may have had doubts about. and now we are in another phase where some many people have discovered unexpected dangers that when things do not work out the way that you thought that they would there is a realist mentality that you find and this is a long road that they have traveled. >> we have more from the republican line. >guest: i am not a regular republican, i am at an eisenhower republican. i have to say that joe biden has been outstanding for this state. we have quite a few republicans that complement -- are complemented by him. i have to say about dick cheney and donald rumsfeld, i wish we could find out how many millions of dollars they made. was an estimate of how many millions these people made due to the wars they created. these were incredibly damaging to the u.s. and the world. somebody needs to look into their finances regarding how much money they made on the blood sweat and tears of our soldiers. guest: a d

we spent something like 18 times more per capita in post knee i can't and in kosovo compared to what we did in afghanistan. we got what we paid for. we did it on the cheap and we know what the result is. so let me just -- having given you those sort of data points, let me just make seven or eight quick points about what we're doing in afghanistan, because there are -- i think there are a lot of myths out there and bruce very ably already sort of addressed the soviet issue. this is not the grave yard of vampire. this idea should be retired to the grave yard of cliches. all sorts of empires have gone into afghanistan. but on -- unlike most of those other invasions, the of afghans do want us to perform and to compare us, our occupation to the soviets, is poor history on so many other levels. bruce mentioned the fact there was a countrywide insurrection. every ethnic group and every class was involved in that insurrection. the best account written of the afghan war in the early years, he calculated at any given moment, there were 175,000 or 250,000 approximately full-time soldiers on the

we spent 18 times more for capital and -- and in kosovo compared to what we did in afghanistan. what we paid for. we did ton the cheap and we know what the result is. let me just -- having given you data points, let me make 7 oar 8 quick points. about -- about what we're doing in afghanistan because there -- i think there are myths out there and bruce april ably addressed soviet issue. this is not a vampire. this idea should be retired at the graveyard of cliches. all sorts of empires have gone into affing but unlike, most of those other invasions, the afghans do want us to perform and to compare us, our -- our occupation to the soviets is poor history on so many levels. bruce mentioned there was a fact that there was a cund witt insur regulars. -- insurrection. every ethnic group was involved. and it was calculated that at any given moment, there 250,000 approximately, full-time soldiers on the battlefield fighting the soviets. if you take the largest number and the taliban full-time soldiers at 20,000 we're facing a small insurgency compared to what the soviets faced. this wil

we have 400 members of the guard right now overseas in places like iraq, afghanistan, and kosovo. since september 11th, 2001, more than 12,000 kentucky national guard soldiers and airmen have deployed in the defense of this country. [applause] [applause] seventeen of these men and women have died. our troops have been in the thick of the fight. the 201st engineer battalion, which returned last march, tip are in 467 and gauge meant with enemy forces. and our guard has done this in a year in which i had to order up the largest call up in history in response to last january's devastating ice storm. ladies and gentlemen, their courage and their commitment demand our gratitude. [applause] [applause] my second priority is to help beleaguered kentucky families survived this economic upheaval with immediate safety net health. our approach has been multidimensional, with help from the federal stimulus, we closed the deficit in our medicaid program, allowing us to fully provide all benefits to the increasing number of kentuckians who through no fault of their own, qualify for needed medical

then get to rwanda, kosovo and the second term. momentous lean with the george w.ush and george h. w. bush to have a 9/11 and the fall of the berlin wall and a pattern that was not easy to identify. -- that was easy. we are searching for a pattern rather than reacting. that only the frame of the discussion today. i would take note that the lack of gender balance because i am sensitive to this issue. i would point out that the issue as a better performance than the random acceptances of our invitations. these two women could not make it even by telephone but their essays are in the magazine. some of you will note them quite well. immediately to my right, the henry a. kissinger senior fellow and a bed -- and a board member of the new american foundation. he is a distinguished fellow at yale. that is a big title. he writes regularly for "the new york times," "the l.a. times," and others. his most recent book is "god and gold." "american foreign policy and how it changed the world" receive the prize in 2002 and "god and gold" to him that last year or the year before. j

operations with which it became associated, including somalia earlier in the decade, and bosnia and kosovon opportunity to reflect on that experience and a dozen or more un and other operations with which the united states was not closely associated. i would like to offer a number of proposed guidelines for assistance to haiti that is based on that broad experience of the last 60 years in these kinds of missions anin fragile states. first, in the absence of security, any positive changes will be washed away. the bad news is that an international security presence in haiti will be required for a long time. the good news is that haiti is not a particularly difficult societe to secure. the haitian population is neither heavily-armed nor inclined to violence. one is only to regard the patience with which the people of port-au-prince has waited over the last two weeks and recognize that itits peaceful n. american troops are unlikely to be required once the immediate emergency passes. i think the united nations should be able to secure haiti successfully with the- reinforcements that have alread

we spent something like 18 times more per capita in bosnia and in kosovo compared to what we did in afghanistan after world war ii. we got what we paid for, we did it on the cheap. let me make seven or eight quick points about what we are doing in afghanistan. i believe there are a lot of myths out there. bruce very ably are the addressed the soviet issue. this is not a graveyard of empires. all sorts of empires have gone in net -- into afghanistan, but unlike most of those other invasions, the afghans do want us to perform. and to compare our occupation to the soviets is poor history on so many other levels. bruce mentioned the fact that there was a country-wide insurrection. every group of our request was involved in the insurrection. at any given moment there were 175,000 or 250,000 approximately full-time soldiers on the battlefield fighting the soviets. even if you take the largest numbers of full-time taliban soldiers is 20,000. we are facing a relatively small insurgency compared to what the soviets face. this will not be obama's vietnam. this is a crazy comparison. it might be his and a

security forces in kosovo. he also served several tours in iraq as a security officer before his assignment in support of u.s. efforts in afghanistan. members of scott's family reside in my district. when i had the deep honor of attending his mehmet ali talat service some days ago, as i -- his memorial service some days ago, i listened to his family and friends speak of his character and his unwavering commitment. by all accounts scott was an exceptional person who along with his selfless colleagues sacrificed beyond measure to protect us. he left behind a loving wife expecting their first child, a child who will know her father through our hero's family and friends and through this resolution passed in honor of the service and sacrifice that he and his colleagues have given on our behalf and on behalf of our great nation. for those families who cannot publicly mourn their loss, please know that our hearts, our thoughts and our prayers are with you. and to all of the families, know that the sacrifice of your pa

know the specific problems were, i do know from other conflicts, particular problem for example in kosovo, we have similar difficulties in afghanistan. that is quite hard to find the right people with the right skills to go in to what a very recently has been a war zone. so it may be that we did not provide sufficient timelines for identifying those people and getting them in to southern iraq. >> very much corresponds with what others have said to his. now, you've reflected the back to your concerned a long time about the aftermath, other ministers likewise. why at cabinet level did we not take more vigorous action to ensure the aftermath planning was done properly, as you say it's very complicated, and insufficient time? >> to the best of my recollection, we did. i think a lot of work went into, i'm going to repeat myself, but into the humanitarian part, into looking at how we dealt with the infrastructure. i think there was a lot of thought. we had people, for example, that we were going to deploy very quickly who were experts in oil pumping and delivery. because part of that was concer

was that war in bosnia and kosovo compared to afghanistan. we got what we paid for. we did it on the cheap. we know what the result is. let me make seven or eight points. it is about what we're doing in afghanistan. i think there are a lot of myths out there. bruce already addressed the soviet issue. this is not the graveyard of empires. this should be retired to the graveyard of cliches. all sorts of empires of gone into afghanistan. unlike the others, the afghans do want us to perform. to compare our occupation to the soviets is poor history on so many other levels. bruce mentioned that there was a countrywide insurrection. every ethnic group was involved in that. it has been calculated that at any given moment, there were 250,000 approximately full-time soldiers on the battlefield fighting the soviets. even if you take the largest number of full-time taliban soldiers, it is 20,000. we're facing a relatively small insurgency compared to what the soviets faced. this will not be obama's in vietnam. it may be his afghanistan. that is a separate issue. it is a very dif

demonstrate that they believed force could be used not just in a humanitarian context like in bosnia or kosovobut in clear defiance of our own national security principles. that must have driven so many of them -- in clear defense of our national security principles. that must have driven so many of them to vote in favor of this. so many of them have discovered unexpected dangers, that things do not work out the way you thought they would. now there is a hard-headed realist mentality you find among many of those same democrats. it is a long and bumpy road they have trouble. host: delaware is next on the republican line, good morning. caller: i am not a reagan republican, by any means. i have a greedier -- a great deal of respect for former president eisenhower. however, i must say the vice- however, i must say the vice- president biden has been due to the wars they created. these were incredibly damaging to the u.s., a round the world, and someone needs to look into their finances, regarding how much money they made. host: delaware, republican towns like a democrat. guest: you can find plenty

intended to defend the defenseless muslims against and to deliver them from their oppressors in bosnia, kosovo, and iraq. after the catharsis of confession, that comes reconciliation, the extended hand to the clenched fist. we have now had a year of this as well. but is clear is that reconciliation, the resetting of relations, starting from scratch with adversaries has its consequences. why? these conflicts did not come out of nowhere. they did not arise capriciously. they had their roots in a clash of values and we had allies in these clashes. that is why starting the world anew, as obama imagined, pressing the reset button on over the world has consequences not the least of which is among our allies. for example, recent relations with russia and caving in on the missile defense meant the train the czech republic and poland which had taken risks in joining us this venture -- joining us in this venture. it left them wondering about american reliability and their own post cold war independence. were they returning to the limbo where their sovereignty is constrained by moscow? hence, obama's 3 d

previous occasions on which he had been involved in regime change, the taliban and, sierra leone, and kosovoi don't really accept this analysis that at crawford there was this fundamental shift of approach and policy by the prime minister. and we point out to the prime minister in relation to his pursuit of disarmament to saddam hussein, the way he was, yes i did. >> you did support it likes and what were the others inconclusive to john powell? worthy of the same view? >> i think you have to address them, but i think it's unfair to expect me to put their position but i know they were there as well. >> and your, i think the meeting on the seventh of march in 2002 you say that the cabinet was mainly about iraq come and not exactly division but a lot of concern where it is going. what were the concerns? >> march 7th, so that was pre-crawford, gal. i can't remember the discussion in any detail but i do remember there was a sense of people just raising concerns in relation to is this happening? is there some sort of rush to war which there never was. but i think just the periods where the issue o

should we be committed to war if the russians move against bulgaria or if the serbs move against kosovo. why should we care about that? i think that's a good question. israel is not the only country that we are committed to with blood and treasure in a way that's not in america's interest. >> host: staying in the neighbor a bit. an e-mail viewer writes us. was there a saudi hand in any of this, do you think? >> guest: i have no idea, sir. i know the saudis are probably in the world today the most dangerous government to the united states? >> host: why? >> guest: because first of all they control next to the israeli lob by, the saudi lobby is the most powerful. they control the swing production of oil. they probably own the most of our debt. and so the idea that somehow we're the boss in that relationship is incorrect. when i was running operations against osama bin laden, they continually refused to help us. they really -- they don't mind terrorism, as long as it doesn't happen in the kingdom. and the final point i would make is they pay for an enormous amount of proselytizing in the un

i can remember for example during the kosovo crisis, clear did an awful lot with pretty extraordinary work at the time but it is no secret. she was very difficult to handle the times. i think sometimes the military and i think that emerged in the evidence of witnesses, i think the bond it for quite difficult to deal with. i think sometimes they are probably work concerns at times about whether a very, very sensitive and tightly held conversations as to whether in a political environment, whether sometimes you may be a little bit worried that things would get out into the public demand you wouldn't necessarily want in the public domain. >> because she was difficult, her department couldn't therefore be included fully in the work. they didn't receive, as we have heard from earlier witnesses, the iraq options paper of march 2001. she heard about it later and complained. >> i found that surprising. >> you found that surprising? it was sent out from number 10 but they were not on the distribution. that wasn't a sensitive document. she says in her book in september of 2002 and initially was

and the reason i was so strongly in favor of action in kosovo, action incidentally to rescue and essentiallymuslim population from persecution by a country that was a christian country, the reason was not simply that i felt affronted as i think people shouldn't and did to about the prospect of ethnic cleansing but also because i was convinced the consequences of allowing such action to go unchanged would never stay at the borders of the balkans. that is the basis. when we come to the texas speech it is all that i suddenly say now is the regime change rather than wmd. on the contrary you quoted a passage and i then go on to say we cannot of course intervene on all cases but where countries are engaged in the wmd business we should not shrink from confronting them. some can be offered a way out, route to respectability. i hope in time syria, iran and north korea can accept the need to change their relationships with the outside world. the new relationship is on offer but the most note sponsoring terrorism or wmd is unacceptable and then i go on to do with iraq. as for iraq i know some precipit