the system from lehman's failure. back now, saying, i still believe we had no options? >> i very much believe that. >> do you believe, looking back, that maybe if we had gone to the united kingdom and convince the regulators there that they ought bankt berkeley -- parkway -- barclays bank do this -- i am assuming you did not talk to them and say, we need you to let these guys do this, it has otherwise lehman is going to fail. >> that friday night, we brought together the leaders of the people running the largest firms in the world, together at the new york fed, sitting around the table with hank paulson. thing one of the bankers said in that meeting, which was the correct thing, was to say, this is not just about lehman. this is about merrill lynch, aig . the perception was, they were all going to fail by monday or tuesday if nothing was done. if they had failed, the rest of the system would teeter over. in retrospect, people look at lehman as the spark of it the fire. not quite true. the fire had a lot of momentum. i

it had no relevance to lehman. in lehman's case, the problem was we had no willing buyer. financial crisis aren't like national security. we don't equip the government, president of the united states or the central bank with the standing power to protect a country immediately from exotential threat. we do it in wars for obvious reasons, but in the income, we don't do that because we don't want the markets to live with the expectation we're going to protect them from their sins. so we went into this crisis is very limited tools. if there had been a willing buyer for lehman, we would have had better options. >> clearly, you would. that's basic and fundamental. >> but what happened was, because the world was so fragile and lehman appeared to have so much risk is in the end we had no willing buyer so, at that point, we had no option and that's why ultimately president obama and hank paulson went to congress and said we need bigger fire power. until that weekend we had no material difference on strategy and our basic common limitation was in the absence of a willing buyer no go

>> those two weeks after lehman, what is called lehman weekend -- >> people worried about morgan stanley, goldman, and everybody. >> it was an existential moment. we believed, and i think we were right, that what was going to happen in the absence of effective action from the government was the complete failure of large parts of the financial system. money market funds were already experiencing -- trillions of dollars of business were experiencing massive runs. the commercial paper market, businesses making real things across the country depend on to finance themselves, was shutting down. you are seeing the failure of the core of the financial system. hank paulson said we were three days away from atms not working. >> three days away? >> three days away. people were buying gold and talking about burying it in their backyards because of the expectation they would have to rely on that. >> what did europe and asia say? >> in some ways, it was worse around the world. we are a very strong country. the panic we experienced was being replicated around the world. you saw trade finance stopped, j

on its lehman investment.isa abramowitz looked into this and joins me in studio. thanks for your time. why has this been such a good trade for the hedge funds? >> this is hard to value stock, talking about credit derivatives, contracts, and real estate but back in the heart of the crisis which had a very difficult value. property values were disappearing. that werehe banks let's say the counterparties for these trades or other people owed money from lehman just wanted out. they wanted to be able to evaluate claims. somebody comes and does the work and due diligence and buys them from us and we will be ok. then the hedge funds had the capabilities and man power, the intellect, the ideas, the experience to evaluate these claims to go in, get them, and then as the federal reserve is program, th they were the beneficiaries. >> exactly how good has this trade then? onpretty amazing depending which assets you are talking about. there are different entities of lehman brothers. the european entity, claims were enterin

lehman deserved to collapse.parts of it because barclays had the ability to buy it, and now barclays is about to go under. stuart: governments make decisions at times of extreme crisis. they should make decisions in the best interests of their society, their country and the voters. had they stopped the collapse of lehman, we would be better off now. >> but this is a government of limited powers that exists under the constitution, and it may only do what the constitution authorizes it to do, and the constitution, most respectfully, does not authorize the federal government to borrow money and incur the debt of the taxpayers in order to bail out failing bankers. stuart: so take them to court, have it reversed, and let's reverse the whole situation. >> it's a very interesting book in which he makes a bunch of revelations. stuart you're trying to change the subject. it is only unconstitutional in your reeding of the constitution -- reading of the constitution. >> yes, of course, in my reading of the constitution. stu

reporter: you could have found a way to save lehman. >> yeah.re was no buyer. >> the end we worked very, very hard to try to make it happen. >> reporter: that fall when president-elect obama approached geithner about succeeding paulson as treasury secretary, his wife, carol, who he met at dartmouth, strongly opposed it. >> i really had a sense of dread about that. >> reporter: was it worse than you thought it would be? >> it was worse than i could have imagined it would be. >> reporter: what was the hardest part? >> having a person that you really love and care about being beaten up and criticized when they are doing their best to solve a problem that had no easy answers. >> you gave lame excuse us then. i believe you're giving lame excuses now. >> reporter: geithner would become a lightning rod and carp the $7 million rescue package he helped push through to save the banks would take much of the heat. banks have paid back the loans with interest, but the cheap money they were lent allowed them to reap billions in profits as homeowners struggled

had to buy back the property from lehman brothers. >> still ahead at 6:00, firefighters in san diego county get a helping hand from mother nature, but the firefight is far from over. >>> a boating trip on the bay takes a scary turn. you'll fine out what it took to rescue eight people of their canoe spring a leak. >> could this be the summer of delays? runway closures at sfo begin today and will last for months. >> i'm in the accuweather center. some coastal low clouds moving in. i'll have your beer. dog. music. yikes. skip track, please. i'm hungry. impossible? maybe, but honeywell's latest innovation gives me hope. hello, thermostat? "hello. please say a command." i'm feeling hot. "changing set point to 68 degrees" the wi-fi thermostat that listens, learns, saves. from honeywell. thank you! thank you! dedicated bankers born to go the extra mile. you've been such a big help. it's what i like to do. so you can choose a bank where helping people comes first. chase. so you can. >>> calmer winds have helped firefighters get a handle on wildfires in san diego county. this week nine separa

had to buy back the property from lehman brothers. >> still ahead at 6:00, firefighters in san diego county get a helping hand from mother nature, but the firefight is far from over. >>> a boating trip on the bay takes a scary turn. you'll fine out what it took to rescue eight people of their canoe spring a leak. >> could this be the summer of delays? runway closures at sfo begin today and will last for months. >> i'm in the accuweather center. some coastal low clouds moving in. i'll have your neighborhood >>> calmer winds have helped firefighters get a handle on wildfires in san diego county. this week nine separate fires burned almost 20,000 acres. thousands of people had to evacuate as flames spread through canyons and into neighborhood. there are three fires on camp pendleton forcing families to leave. >> hopefully we can come back to a house in one piece and not burned down. >>> so far these fires caused more than $20 million worth of damage, and one man has ban arrested. the pleaded not guilty to arson charges. witnesses told police they saw the man put dried brush on a smolder

walked throughle the lehman brothers investigation. what i think ultimately happened was, there were not adequate resources put into it by the department of justice. they got overwhelmed and there was a lack of coordination. it was assigned to three different offices. push,uggests an enormous but broke up the investigation and rendered it inadequate. to onemately came down woman in the u.s. attorney's office in manhattan. she was very confident and smart. that is not the kind of resources to bring to such a complex calamity. i don't think the ceo was adequately investigated. i don't think they adequately investigated the cfos who misrepresented the state of lehman brothers in the months leading up to its failure. the ceo still a multimillionaire. he's living a fairly quiet life, trying to stay out of the limelight. feeling for the good about himself because he is a free man. host: what's the role of the securities and exchange commission? guest: they blew it as well. i don't think they adequately sanctioned firms. they certainly did no

you have a perspective on lehman brothers.ll, left barclays. >> left barclays. >> who took -- >> my question is, is the old lehman, that is over with? what's going to happen to barclays now? >> yes. the lehman legacy, other than maybe two senior people, i think eric feld is one of the last senior people -- >> skid magee yesterday. paul parker left. >> the legacy of lehman brothers and what was acquired that weekend of 2009 is now basically gone. i mean basically if you want to go back and look at the history, barclays will say they did buy lehman cheap, did get the real estate on sixth avenue but -- >> do they get the investment banking business? >> the re-aug is developing right now. they're shrinking the business to grow. >>s who's going to take that business? is there somebody -- natural person out there sp. >> the business is not taken unfortunately. >> look at the lead tables. you seen it across the street. the equities business, look at our equities business. you saw what we reported a couple weeks ago. >> did -- >> othe

really lehman brothers that did. bear stearns was saved, citigroup, which many folks thought was going to go under was also saved, and other banks on wall street. there is a suspicion that no matter what these guys do the government will be there to bail them out. in dodd frank the idea was to eliminate that, that notion that some institutions were too big to fail. , in his book, put a bit of reality on that and said you can never really actually thatnate the possibility you might have to bail out a large institution. he just do the best you can to prevent that from happening. it is one of those contentious , youg with -- arguments bail out these bags can believe creates this moral hazard, and they feel like they can never go under. geisler has certainly -- with the book of and with his statements, has fed into that because he has supported the notion that you should not allow these huge institution to fail what you just want to set up a situation where you do not have to make that choice down the road. let me ask yo

deep trouble, and they were bigger than lehman. the financial system as a whole was at risk of collapse. the question was, how to stop it. gooeithner recounts the extraordinary events in his new book "stress test: reflections on financial crises." it is part depp racating memoir and part decision to bail out the banks in 2009. we sat down to talk about it all. tim geithner, welcome. >> nice to see you. >> one of the things that will surprise people about this book is to learn some of the details about you, because you're sort of one of these blank slates under which people have projected whatever they want. >> some hopes and fears. >> geithner, the self-pro claimed backstage guy served as president of the new york reserve from 2003 to 2009. during the bush administration and the beginning of the obama white house. before that, geithner worked at the treasury department and the imf. besides a brief stint at henry kissinger's consulting firm, geithner never worked in the private sector. yet the rumors persisted. he was one of them, a

class that the lehman brothers could deliver hedge funds out there. completely. catalyst that's bird the fed to start this unprecedented program this isrted $3 billion. really part of what is really driving the increase in asset racist here all of these hedge funds invested in, and delivered these lean dollar returns. who do they buy the debt from? some of the biggest banks were counterparties from the derivative contracts, realistic contrast, all of the different businesses lehman was engaged in. morgan emmy, the royal bank of scotland, credit suisse. they could not hold hard to as hasssets easily funded. to really review bankruptcy claims. these are incredibly complicated claims and they rely on bankruptcy judges to make decisions that may be fickle. prices, for asset example real estate. in 2009, that was not as clear that as it might seem in retrospect. the hedge fund could come in and bush -- it off your books, and it is an incredible trade or them. these are liquid pieces of securities. hedge funds are in a better position to make good or dabble on that. >>

i assume it's below lehman. to what maximum size if we were going to take that position should we allow a financial institution to be? >> glass steagall, i agree with barney on this i voted in support. the issue in that bill had to do with the community reinvestment act, was a huge debate during that bill. it was the general adoption of the notion that somehow we can create fire walls in the 21st century and we don't need to have the kind of separation hat glass steagall called for. >> dodd-frank deliberately pushes risky activities out of the banking system like the volcker rule. we have seen some assets move out of the banking system because of higher capital which is directly aligned with dodd-frank and compelled. does the act sufficiently address the buildup, the potential buildup of risk outside of the traditional banking system such as through fsoc and is it the right way to go in the long haul? >> i believe so. with fsoc and the consumer protection bureau, particularly fsoc, is the idea that every time so

he basically admitted he didn't deal with it until the last minute, until lehman imploded and that's when his staff said, oh, god, we've got something else coming. i would say this, neil, you can talk a lot about lehman's implosion, citigroup being impaired, but american international group was probably the biggest linchpin of the fanl crisis. it was the company that insured the bad debt on the books of the other banks. if aig goes down, everything else goes down of the one of the things with geithner is not knowing his exposure and what it was causing, aig's risk-taking, if you're the new york fed president, you're the chief regulator and don't understand this part of the financial business, should you be in that job? >> well, that was that and this is now. aig also, and greenburg kbla complained about this, was a filtering to bail other institutions and that's what stuck in his craw. whether they used aig and the rescue of aig to rescue others. >> well, that's the contention that greenburg said. remember, greenberg was out of there, he was forced out in 2005 by eliot spitzer. new m

>> lehman brothers europe has been a good subsidiary.re've been some that have gone from initially trading at $.20 on the dollar, two raider than 100 cents on the dollar -- to greater than 100 cents on the dollar. >> really. amazing. thank you so much. >> we are approaching 26th at the hour, so it is time for on the markets. one particular stock, green mountain is soaring about nine percent after coke boosted its stake in the company to 16%. they are now the largest the one hand you have them desperate for some kind of business that might rely on sugary drinks, and on the other hand they will produce and sell coke brands at their brewer. the synergies for these two companies might be in place. >> a terrible day for david einhorn, whose green light a is short. >> coming up, why google calls this really disappointing. ♪ is "marketis makers." >> welcome back. tuesday. europe's highest court has served a major slap in the face to the internet giant google. the european court has ruled that they have the right to be forgotten, and say they ha

thought you could have done lehman and didn't do lehman.ke the point saying aig had the definitive assets away from the finance business to make it where it was credit worthy. didn't have any idea what lehman was doing. i say wait a second lehman, dick foal on the board of the new york fed, you were supposed to be regulating. wasn't a tense conversation. there's issues. >> another part which you talked about lloyd blankfein. take a listen to that. >> there's another call where you say to lloyd blankfein who runs goldman, lloyd, you cannot talk to anyone outside your firm or inside your firm you until you get the fear out of your voice. so on the one hand i have been told never to mention goldman sachs never needed the government's help and a lot of bankers are calling [ inaudible ]. >> anybody who was smart in finance at that point, was scared to death. if you weren't scared to death at that point, you had no idea what was going on. >> yeah. cow being his wife and there's a funny moment in the -- carol. i don't know carol. geithner saying -

sun cal had to buy back the property from the lehman brothers estate. in 2005 the land sold for $100 million. sun cal is not saying how much they paid this time around. >> there is a move in san francisco to improve relationship between two groups of renters and owners. >> you and i are neighbors and friends. >> you and i are neighbors and friends. >> yesterday members of the group "better housing policies" marched to a protest at city hall. some of the rental laws intimidate mom and pop landlords. they want changes that will encourage small landlords to rent space. more units on the market will help drive down housing costs in san francisco. >> elderly residents of a century old convalescent home in san francisco wonder where they will live come july. another company wants to take it over but at this point they are planning to close. >> you may not have heard of university mound ladies home but it's been here in san francisco's bortola neighborhood since 1884. a gift from james lik, once one of california's wealthiest >> it's goal is affordable, compas

the crisis in 20008 hits and dice sat and watched the crisis unfolded and watched bear stearns and lehman brothers collapse a.m. of footage at night only to discover their offices were just across the street that all cbo and bundles were worthless. i said this is that we will have an amazing discussion about accounting. why it works when it doesn't do we will hold that the accounts and discuss them because that is what happened in the 18th century with the bubble. in france later it never happened. i thought that was an interesting disconnect is there a story? i started to think of the financial crisis and a cultural way. with the financial crisis and income inequality people look to economist at least for this conference i would just bring max back into the picture because it started to think about culture and things like a six. i was very interested in why people overlook accounting. so i started to look not just as states that work to the other moments where accounting failed. it was an odd tripp. so i went to the archives to looked at the accountants and i saw the books and they were

jessica lehman, executive director, senior and disability action. >> public comment is pensacola. item 8. information item. report from the disability disaster preparedness committee. >> item 9. pensacola comment. items not on today's agenda but within the jurisdiction of the mdc. each speaker is limited to 3 minutes. >> item 10, information item. correspondence. item 11, discussion item. councilmember comments and announcements. >> item 12, adjourn. >> >> thank you. next we proceed to agenda item no. 3. public comment. items not on today's agenda, but within the jurisdiction of the mayor's disability council. i have three cards here. we'll start with john lowell with the safety and advisory council. >> good afternoon, my name is, thank you derek for the introduction. my name is john alex lowell. i hold the seat no. 4 on the disability organizations. i come to you on my public comment on this section to make some announcements regarding p sac. the acronym for the selected advisory committee. it selected a new chair to carry out the rest of the term for 2014. her name is sonya kauf

sun cal had to buy back the property from the lehman brothers estate.n 2005 the land sold for $105 million. sun cal is not saying how much they paid this time around. >> a senior care wants to take over a university ladies home, but at this point the facility is planning to close. >> you may not have heard of university mound ladies home. but it's been here in san francisco bartolo neighborhood since 1884. a gift from james lik, once one of california's wealthiest's men. it's affordable, compassion national care for seniors. but now the 134-year history of this residential facility may be coming to an end. >> they said they would close. it's a very, very nice facility. >> bonnie has lived here for three years. she and 52 other residents were notified the home will close its doors july 10th. >> since the beginning of the mission of this home, the ability to generate enough revenue from the resident fees were not adequate to cover the operating costs. >> bill is the interim executive director. >> our number one primary concern is finding new homes. >> i d

is that the same as arthur andersen or the lehman brothers? guest: i'm sorry to hear about your case. i'm not familiar with it. government wildly failed homeowners who were deeply underwater in their homes and were foreclosed on. this was a policy disaster from the obama administration were they implemented program after program after program that was wildly inadequate. they refused to fix it -- did not address it to fix it quickly enough. there was a big concern that fixing that and helping homeowners would hurt the banks. i think this is a scandal, a tragedy for the country. individual homeowners were deeply harmed by it. host: jesse eisinger's piece in the new york times. it is called only why -- why only one top banker went to jail for the financial crisis. thanks for your time. guest: thank you for having me. jim oberstar died this morning at his home in potomac, maryland at the age of 79. termsngressmen served 18 in the house and became chairman of the transportation committee in 2007. he was defeated in a reelection bid in 2010, and aft

lehman takes a long-term asset, does the repo back to the bank. fertility only builds, and the crisis becomes explosive when it occurs. what we had last year was a terrible crisis, but we didn't have the entire economy shrinking. only after we allowed the safety an to expand to almost unlimited basis did we create an environment that nearly brought the global economy down. >> the banks have said the rationale for having multiple business units is they can shave off cost from corporate clients and ultimately the end consumer. while that is perfectly legitimate, that has resulted in a secondary debate, which is the subsidy. the bigger you are the more benefit you get from being a. to 100c have been this billion. they put a study estimating it ,ver 500 billion globally taking into account an implicit government backstab, which we apparently don't have, and also a range of other things you get from these synergies. areh of these costs legitimate? >> we have to look at the premise. done to datetudies on the issue of subsidies take a our crisisime that

walked throughle the lehman brothers investigation. i think ultimately happened was, there were not adequate resources put into it by the department of justice. they got overwhelmed and there was a lack of coordination. it was assigned to three different offices. push,uggests an enormous but broke up the investigation and rendered it inadequate. to onemately came down woman in the u.s. attorney's office in manhattan. she was very confident and smart. that is not the kind of resources to bring to such a complex calamity. i don't think the ceo was adequately investigated. i don't think they adequately investigated the cfos who misrepresented the state of lehman brothers in the months leading up to its failure. the ceo still a multimillionaire. he's living a fairly quiet life, trying to stay out of the limelight. feeling for the good about himself because he is a free man. host: what's the role of the securities and exchange commission? guest: they blew it as well. i don't think they adequately sanctioned firms. they certainly did not ref

countrywide, very small banks, verse that says x, various banks, other non-bank institutions, bear stearns, lehman brothers, and conclude ha, there's one distinguishing feature around wrist or complexity that we can now drill into that as a panacea in response to the concern and then control the debate going forward. the crisis clearly reveals that it is more comprehensive in that regard, so we cannot just make a dent -- a declaration. it is an important combination of all of that and there is nuance involved as to how to best approach that. of course, the response to that at the time was the dodd frank legislation. you just heard from the authors of that legislation. the best policy thinkers of the time, or at least those charged with the responsibility of responding to the crisis -- that was not dispositional inclined to be generous to the industry came up with the dodd frank approach. the paint is not your drive on that framework. it is not even fully implemented, so we can certainly have a debate about what it six -- about what it six facts might be, but the matter of fact is that is not yet c

freddie, long-term capital, various small banks, midsized banks, big banks, non-bank institutions, lehman brothers, the list goes on, and conclude -- there is one distinguishing feature around risk or complexity that we can now drill into that is a panacea in response to the concern and control the debate going forward. revealed thatarly it is more comprehensive in that regard. we can't just make a declaration. it is an important combination of all of that. there is nuance involved as to how to best approach that. the response to that at the time was, the dodd frank legislation. you just heard from the authors of that legislation. the best policy thinkers of that time or at least those that were charged with the responsibility to responding to the crisis in a congress that was not inclined to be generous to the industry. the dodd frank framework. the paint is not yet dry on that framework. it is not yet even fully implemented. we can certainly have a debate about what its affects might be, but the fact of the matter is it is not yet complete. any declarations on how it does work at this p

they write when you worry about your loved ones and how they would go through the same code of the lehmanbrothers went through that took down the rest of the system when it was triggered and how at least four times bigger than the lehman brothers depending on the accounting system a lot more of the derivatives and a lot more trillions of dollars with no other company in the world to manage how this would be through the bankruptcy course. so they spent a lot of time and money writing these things and then the regulars are supposed to check these things and tell us somehow that j.p. morgan chase at the time when maybe other companies would go down as well would go down through bankruptcy without harming us and what they submitted to the answer is there is no way in the world that is what happened so they would say yo see read my lo more bailout. >> in other words if you let them drive 90 miles per hour, so the point is not all of these regulations are effectively useful. there are things to do and they are not that complicated. >> the dodd frank act is the bullshit. it's true. you can drive

and, just days later, the decision to let lehman brothers go bankrupt.sury secretary, he faced bailout backlash, especially when word broke that a.i.g. planned to pay executives $165 million dollars in bonuses. >> i share the anger and frustration of the american people, not just about the compensation practices at a.i.g. and in other parts of our financial system, but that our system permitted a scale of risk-taking that has caused grave damage to the fortunes of all americans. >> ifill: critics also charged geithner did too much to help the banks and too little to help underwater homeowners. elizabeth warren, then-chair of the "tarp" oversight panel, led the critique here on the newshour in june, 2010: >> it's as if we had a boat that's taking on gallons of water, and they're trying to bail it out with a teaspoon. it is a badly designed program that, from the beginning, was too small, too slow, couldn't be scaled up. >> ifill: geithner left government last year and became president of warburg pincus, a wall street private equity firm. he's now telling

my name is janet lehman, and i'm a behavioral therapist and a mom. i know what it's like when the child that you love becomes a defiant, out-of-control child who disrespects you. that's why my husband james and i created the total transformation, the program that tens of thousands of moms are now using to turn around their child's behavior. if you've heard about the total transfor

really lehman brothers that did.ear stearns was saved, citigroup, which many folks thought was going to go under was also saved, and other banks on wall street. there is a suspicion that no matter what these guys do the government will be there to bail them out. in dodd frank the idea was to eliminate that, that notion that some institutions were too big to fail. , in his book, put a bit of reality on that and said you can never really actually thatnate the possibility you might have to bail out a large institution. he just do the best you can to prevent that from happening. it is one of those contentious , youg with -- arguments bail out these bags can believe creates this moral hazard, and they feel like they can never go under. geisler has certainly -- with the book of and with his statements, has fed into that because he has supported the notion that you should not allow these huge institution to fail what you just want to set up a situation where you do not have to make that choice down the road. let me ask you

of course we look at that, and timothy geithner says he would support a low to help barclays buy lehman brothers back in 2008 but then resulted in the biggest bankruptcy in history. the former u.s. secretary feels divisions between officials safehaven. british lawmakers do oppose the deal. andrew ross-sorkin sat down to talk about this and you can see the interview at 8:00 a.m. on "squawk box." >>> european foreign ministers are arriving for talks in brussells this morning. where they are expected to step up sanctions against russia. in the lance few minutes, the kremlin responded to the referendums in ukraine saying the results should be treated with respect and implemented without violence. pro-russian rebels declared victory in the referendum on self-rule for the east of the country. organizers said 90% voted in favor of a break from authorities in kiev. the eu, meanwhile, declared the vote illegal. we have a ukraine risk analyst from control risk joining us, stephen, however much we look at the results and suggest that the votes have been rigged, right now what we are looking at is

will we see a lehman brothers style follow-up as some have predicted.t is next. ♪ >> time for today's global outlook. china could surpass the u.s. of the world's largest economy this year. that is an attention grabbing headline. comes from a new world bank study. the trouble is, michael mckee says it is ridiculous. everyone talks about 2027 as the key year they take over as the world's largest economy. measure itis how you and whether it means anything. gdp obviously is the sum of all the goods and services, the value sold in a year. something else called purchasing power header -- parity. this is what it cost to live in a country given the differences for what you buy in what you pay for it for exchange rates. the world bank compared ppp to gdp. they recalculated the numbers it, sayingnd updated it could happen this year. the problem is, that is nonsense at this point. no one believes the chinese economic data are any good, not even the chinese leadership. a cousin that, hard to use the numbers. were good, they do not use them for a couple of reasons.

crisis,since the lehman a lot of work has been done conceptually. we have been thinking through things as much as we can. a failure of ae bank if it is too big to fail without making taxpayers pay? we are not quite there yet. >> not quite there yet. that is a clear signal that too big to fail is still with us. that is one of the reasons, perhaps, white when they look at harmonizing these risk models, he is against that. he does not want to have a herd mentality in the bank. if you have a single mechanism, you could have more herd thinking. regional and national banks should go buy their own metrics and that could provide more stability. in other ecb news, the bank may also decide to hold an interest rate meeting every six instead of four weeks. what is behind that move? >> it will give the bank time to release their minutes. this would mean greater transparency. remember, bank of england has their meetings every four weeks. the u.s. federal reserve is every six weeks. if the ecb goes to a six-week schedule, they can release their ferro can getonny v

our next guests made millions, including enron, worldcom and lehman brothers, sharing his thoughts onis chris pucillo, the asset management ceo and officer of solas. the fund has 23% annualized returns since inception. that's pretty good. i assume i can't ask you that question. >> that's correct. >> that is correct. >> for how long? >> i can't tell you that. >> what does that mean? >> when did you start the firm? >> 2002. >> okay. help us try to understand, a, you work at the bankruptcy market right now. there aren't nearly the same types of bankruptcys we had before. where do you see opportunity in all of this? >> right now we have tsu one of the largest obos. there is lots of moans in the tsu complex. the bank that will get most likely the majority of the equity there. >> that can be extremely attractive. i think it's one of the lower risk bankruptcy plays because of the valuation through the bank debt. >> so if are you playing at home to the extent you are. is there a way for you to play there, to participate in this? >> you could buy tsu bonds, but they're going to be more of a ga

wondering if would-be repeat of lehman brothers type of scenario. push --u are going to and olivia, you know this. it,ou're going to push for but you don't know what the consequences are going to be, that is a bit difficult. >> it has come quite political in the u.s.. eric holder seem to be under pressure that you were not in a criminal convictions. are some banks too big to deal? he is under a lot of pressure to get some scalps. it does seem like a bit of an about-face for brady dougan. he went to congress and he told the congress that this was not systemic. >> he told them it was a few swiss bankers that skirted. if they plead guilty today, what would matter is what they plead guilty to. that is quite development. there are some quarters that of putting a lot of -- that are putting a lot of pressure on him to step down. when you have been at a bank since 1990, when you've been on the executive board since 2003 and a ceo since 2007 and you have this massive issue and you are asked if you know about it and you say no, that is a question of oversight

i'm not sure they're necessarily was a lehman brothers culture.the u.s., but theas a cultre oure of investment bank, built from the ashes. a global positioning when everybody outside said they could not do it. everybody outside the bank and said downsized, downsized. this is barclays giving in. >> how much of this is tied to the rate environment? the building up of the investment bank and then the rolling back of that now? ys andbarclas deutsche, if you look at the 12 month forward roe, you get a cost of capital very similar for both stocks. both of those built their global businesses at a time when fixed income was booming. that was the obvious place to build it. so they are more exposed than some. this rate is facing environment. every bank is facing this situation. this is to do with regulatory pressure. this is to do with high-cost space. this is to do with not quite d enough spread of businesses to handle that slow down and rates and stay at the top table. >> this change that he's reducing theay is investment bank, and reducing the risk weigh

the jobless rate plunged to the lowest level since the collapse of lehman brothers. employment gain in with the biggest since january of 2012. dropped to six point three percent. the lowest since september of 2008. but get some analysis. we have peter cook standing by. and michael mckee. thanks. we have a tale of two jobs reports. one index shows job creation and the other, job losses. break this down for us. >> the establishment survey which creates -- rates businesses divided the good news. the household survey from which we derive the on implement rate paints a different picture. 800,000 people dropped out of the labor force, pushing down that unemployment rate. -- net job loss during the month. the household survey says 73,000 jobs lost. there is a real dichotomy there somesuggests that there is worry about how strong this recovery actually is. maybe a bit of a weather snapback. but not a real acceleration into the spring. >> there is a big difference between quantity of jobs and quality of jobs. how my today's numbers impact the minimum wage debate on capitol hi

the lehman's collapse it was a tough time. we worked hard. that was the linchpin. dawn kopecki written a story about the long hours that people in the banking industry are typically logging. would you typically work 90 hours a week? >> yes. some worse. it is a different type of work. i love what i do. day?at is a typical >> early. and it goes late. i rally the team, speak to customers, going to accounts, traveling to stores. meeting my team at the plant. everything. >> what goes into making great yogurt? >> source the right milk. work with the right farmers. reduce in the right location. >> what characterizes that? does it have to be chemical free? >> grass fed is the best. we don't source only breast-feed >> thank you. the founder of maia yogurt. >> read about other people leaving the wall street life. stock" onaking bloomberg. >> live from pier 3 in san francisco, welcome to "bloomberg west." innovation, technology, and the future of business. i'm emily chang. a deal rocking the tech world today. it is not even done yet. apple is in talks to bite -- by beats elec