and one day he got a call from maliki and maliki said i have some visitors coming to your unit, i want you to put them to work embed them in your staff, and they'll help you achieve the stardom. and the division commander -- or the commander, not division. he was above division. said who are you sending to my staff? they knocked on the door and they were from asaab al hak. and the commander said, hmm you're with prime minister maliki. he said yes. you have orders from the prime minister. where would you like us to go? and the great patriot shia iraqi said not here. i don't have a place for you. and they said well, that's great. we love your opinion but you don't get to decide. this commander got on the phone with maliki and this is a story related by him, and i've had it corroborated once. i don't have complete 100% faith but i talked to him. i put him in power in 2003. got on the phone to maliki and for 45 minutes was arguing back and forth saying look i can put them in the rivereen patrol, i can have them doing food duty but there cannot be in my general staff headquarters and they c

but we laugh maliki -- we have malikis all over the middle east and there are worse people out there. >> you make a very good point. there's this assumption in large chunks of the world we're somehow omnipotent and we most certainly are not. thank you. >> we go to mr. lees of new york. >> thank you mr. chairman. i believe personally that's good that the president has brought an authorization for the use of force against isis. my litmus test is going to be very simple. are we doing absolutely everything in our power to ensure that we win? i have some questions and concerns. the president in his original strategy back in september, when he gave a speech, he was talking about dropping bombs and a reliance on iraqi military and law enforcement to finish the job. when i was in iraq which 2006 it was an accomplishment to get them to show up to work. expecting no threat that day. to get them to show up to a precinct a quarter mile from their house. so relying on elements on the ground who have no morale new orleanser peat detroit tisch, don't have the training and will, something we have to

maliki was basically the head. or a kurdish coalition that for its own reasons in the end wanted to form a coalition with that shia coalition. that led to maliki being in power. it was a democratic legally done thing although people argue about it. it's about as democratic and legal as anything gets in the middle east. the question is were we going to withdraw our support overthrow it? how were we going to do that? i didn't have an answer and i was there. i tried as long as i could to find alternative candidates. i was to the extent i could getting involved in the internal machinations of that society because we all saw problems with maliki. but we have maliki all over the middle east to do business with. >> well, you make a very good point. there's this assumption in large chunks of the world that we're somehow omnipotent. and we most certainly are not. thank you. >> we go to mr. lee zeldin of new york. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i believe personally it's good that the president has brought an authorization for t

likewise former pm maliki, vice president maliki now, meeting up with senior leadership in hezbollah. likewise on the bottom side u.s. mrap i think it is a bit after stunt, u.s. m-1 abrams with flags attached to it. i wish our information operations was as good as these guys. everything we do when we achieve something, what do we do? we like to fall into the background. better iraqis take credit for the things they have achieved. well you know what? 100% wrong. when they when the irgc quds force guys have any involvement even if they have no involvement in a successful operation they get their most senior leadership right there and plaster their faces across every media outlet and social media outlet they can find. i think we need to be doing more to demonstrate what the u.s. and the international coalition is doing to stablize iraq because we're really on our back foot when it comes to information operations. so, you know, these guys are ambitious is. they are not some kind of minor small, group of concerned local citizens former satwa, et cetera. in 2009 when the satwa was being set

likewise, former pm maliki vice president maliki now, meeting up with senior leadership in hezbollah. like wide on the bottom side u.s. enrap, u.s. abrams with flags attached to it. i wish our information operations was as good as that's guise. everything when we do, when we achieve something, what do we do? we like to fall into the background. it's better the iraqis take credit for the things that they've achieved. well, you know what, 100% wrong. when the iogc kurds force guys have any involvement, or even if they have no involvement in a successful operation they get their most senior leadership right there and plaster their faces across every media outlet and social media outlet they can find. i think we need to be doing more to demonstrate what the u.s. and the international coalition is doing to stabilize iraq. because we're really on a back foot when it comes to information operations. so these guys are ambitious. they are not some kind of minor, small group of concerned local citizens, former satwa, et cetera. in 2009 when the satwa was being set up these guys never disbanded.

one evening he got a call from maliki, and maliki said i have visitors coming to you for work. want you to embed them in your staff and they will help you achieve stardom. he was above division. he asked who was being sent? they knocked on his door and the commander said you work from mr. alec he and have orders from the prime minister. they said yes where would you like us to go? the shia said not here. he said i don't have a place where you. they said you don't get to decide. this commander got on the phone with maliki. this is a story relayed by him and i have had it corroborated once. i put him in power in 2003. i got on the phone with maliki and he said they can be on food duty or individual but they cannot be in the general staff headquarters or on the streets with my soldiers. maliki says thanks for your opinion. two days later i got a call and he was and is stumble -- he was in hisistanbul. he left his family and everything. that is how intensely he took it. the rest he is working out right now. the cr did not think that was the way to go -- the she did not ia did not t

and wendy got a call from maliki and maliki said i have visitors coming and i want you to put them towork, embed them in your step and they will help you achieve stardom. the division commander, the commander, not division, said who are you sending to my staff? they knocked on the door and they were from -- and the commander said, prime minister maliki? yes. where would you like us to go? and the great patriot shia iraqis said, not here. i don't have a place for you. they said that's great, we love of your opinion but you don't get to decide. this commander got on the phone with maliki and this is a story really by him and i've had cooperated with the have complete 100 faith. i put him in power in 2003. i got a phone to maliki and for 45 minutes was arguing back and forth single, i can put them in the patrol, have them do food duty but there cannot be in my general staff headquarters cannot be on the streets with my soldiers. maliki says thanks for your loyal opinion. take them or else. two days later i got a call and he was in istanbul. i got very mad at him. what he doing in istanbu

maliki was basically the head. or a kurdish coalition that for its own reasons in the end wanted to form a coalition with that shia coalition. that led to maliki being in power. it was a democratic, legally done thing, although people argue about it. it's about as democratic and legal as anything gets in the middle east. the question is, were we going to withdraw our support, overthrow it? how were we going to do that? i didn't have an answer, and i was there. i tried as long as i could to find alternative candidates. i was to the extent i could getting involved in the internal machinations of that society because we all saw problems with maliki. but we have malikis all over the middle east that we have to do business with because there are even worse people out there. >> well, you make a very good point. there's this assumption in large chunks of the world that we're somehow omnipotent. and we most certainly are not. thank you. >> we go to mr. lee zeldin of new york. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i believe personall

we all saw problems with maliki. we have problems with people in the middle east that we have to do business with says there are other people that are worse. x thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think it is good that the president has brought a use of force against isis. my litmus test will be absolutely simple. . when he was talking about dropping bombs and iraqi enforcement's -- to get them to show up to work. expecting no threat that day, to get them to show up on a precinct that is a quarter-mile from the house relying on elements from the ground that has no morale, no patriotism, no training node will for something that we have to take into account. in that speech the resident said that it would be different from past is because there will be no boots on the ground. in the same speech, he said i am sending additional true to iraq. someone shows me a picture of the grandson and he is wearing boots. those boots are on the ground. use of boots on the ground here in washington, the reality is we have done the

part of the problem is maliki poe poe made it political. they get into contact with isis. every foot soldier will run away. we saw an epic failure of the iraqi military. doesn't mean i have confidence. >> the military largely sheeiite. let's get back to the 400 marines and u.s. troops at the air base. isis is moving closer and closer and closer to them. if they have to fight, would you call them combat ground troops if they have to fight to defend them service or would they be advisers? >> i think that would be combat ground troops. i think they are, even if they are advising. i think we parse words too much on the idea of boots on the ground. every marine every military person is trained to fight and may be called upon to do it. we hope that's not the case in this situation. it very well may be. i tell you, if there is an engagement with isis by our marines, it will be one-sided in favor of the united states. >> i wouldn't rule out the possibility the u.s. starts sending in planes to airlift them out of there as quickly as possible. i have limited confidence in the iraqi

it has not recovered from the dictatorship or almost dictatorship of maliki. it's going to require at least months more before it can have even limited offensive capability. and when we come to syria we need to remember a lot of the fighting is there. the fact is that it isn't just the islamic state. the force that defeated the rebels that we had backed most and shipped arms to is the al noussra front which is allied to al qaeda. almost all of the movements that are rebel movements that are active in the field have some sort of islamist character. so the problem there is it isn't just the al noussra front, it's both the rebels and to some extent, of course, the assad forces. it's not just one threat we're dealing with. >> anthony cordesman, thank you so much for your analysis. >> a pleasure. >> sreenivasan: and now to our signature segment. our original in-depth reports from around the world. last month's terror attack at a kosher store in paris called attention to rising anti- semitism in france and the growing number of incidents throughout europe. in respon

got on the phone with maliki. i can have them do food duty but there cannot be in my general staff on the streets with my soldiers. thank you for your loyal opinion. take them or else. two days later, he was in istanbul. i got very mad at him. what are you doing in a stumble so fast -- istanbul so fast? the recipe is trying to work out right now -- the rest he is trying to work out right now. i think these fundamentals don't fail. the question is if so, how do we work in that environment? operating in the religious environment are all happening under the guise of a religious breakup which is bigger than what we started with. we will have a tough time because we work in fundamental ways on earth. ok as it went more into religious dialogue after that we had two ways to respond. we are ready to help you. we are. or i cannot go there. we will have to bow out because i don't speak for my guy. if you're willing to come down a level or whatever, i'm not going to speak to you. let us begin. i don't know where you go. we h

think about our allies there, the royal family in saudi arabia the prior leadership in yemen, al-maliki prior in iraq sisi, these are governments that in many cases are amongst the most corrupt or venal or repressive in the world. and yet they are our allies in this fight. how do we pursue a strategy in that region and be consistent to the advice that you gave us, which i think is really good advice? and i think those repressive regimes and our relationships with them complicate our ability to be effective in the middle east. >> yeah. so thanks very much for asking that question. this is the essence of the problem. this is not a military phenomenon that a we are facing -- that we are facing back to the ranking member's, you know, missive ant what he was talking about with boots on the ground, and everybody sort of throws that a phrase around. we need to stop using that by the way. we need to really understand what does that mean. this is a social a cultural and a psychological phenomenon, particularly in the arab world and the arab -- the potential breakdown of sort of arab world order

and it's seen as for some, a more appealing alternative, like you mentioned, the maliki government in baghdad. >> and one final point on guantÁnamo, conversation back and forth about that. i would not take series lead in the argument that we don't need to detain enemies. we do. the question is do we need to detain them at guantÁnamo? nor would i argue with the point that look, you're not going to close guantÁnamo and have the file the islamic extremists it okay, we are good. i understand that but it is not necessary, use it to detain them at guantÁnamo? the entire reason that guantÁnamo was set up was the belief that made we've somehow sidestep habeas corpus, but the supreme court has shut that down. is there any reason that we couldn't take these people, as we have in many instances and detained him here in the united states? >> so we definitely need to be able to capture because if we only kill that can is a more problem. >> got that, but we're? >> when you look at prior to 2003, there were many non-afghans detained in afghanistan. i'm not going to argue with you where because i thi

think about our allies there, the royal family in saudi arabia, the prior leadership in yemen, al-maliki prior in iraq sisi, these are governments that in many cases are amongst the most corrupt or screenal or repressive -- venal or repressive in the world and yet they are our allies in this fight. how do we pursue a strategy in that region and be consistent to the advice that you gave us which i think is really good advice? and i think those repressive regimes and our relationships with them complicate our ability to be effective in the middle east. >> yeah. so thanks very much for asking that question. this is the essence of the problem. this is not a military phenomenon that we are facing back to the ranking member's you know, missive about what he was talking about with military and boots on the ground and everybody sort of throws that phrase around. we need to stop using that, by the way, we need to really understand what does that mean. this is a social, a cultural and a psychological phenomenon particularly in the arab world, and the potential breakdown of sort of arab world order

by the maliki government. is that accurate? >> that's accurate, yes. >> so we are now in a position of -- of trying to essentially contain the regional ambitions of the iranians and kinetically defeat the sunni radical islamists, is that the strategy? >> yes that sounds right. >> and you understand that and that to you is a coherent strategy? >> it is. yes. >> now, that means that, you know, you're prioritizing or the administration is prioritizing these actions you've talked about, and building over time capability in syria. in terms of using your resources in addressing the most serious threats is that a coherent response in your mind? >> i think it is the beginning of a strategic response. i think that as i noted on the syrian side of the border the assembling of the force that is going to keep isil defeated there is -- we're in an early stage of trying to build that force. we are participating in the building of that force. but i think it's fair to say that we're at an earlier stage there. on the iraqi side we have the exis

important move, which is, which was a change in the government of iraq and the removal of prime minister maliki who, in my opinion, had carried out a campaign of sectarian misgovernment and corruption which had lost and squandered all of the gains of the previous years by managing to then get new iraqi prime minister willing and able to reach out to iraqi sunnis and then to use air power and limited military support. the momentum of isil has been, has been halted. they're no longer able to advance, they suffered a serious defeat in kobani thanks to coalition air power, and they've now seen a significant reversal in the eyes of arab public opinion after the brutal murder of a your dane ya pilot -- jordanian pilot. and momentum matter for them because their appeal was rooted in the idea that they were a winner, and now people aren't so sure. and i think we might actually see people jumping off the bandwagon faster than we think. >> i appreciate it. i, obviously, hope the optimistic scenarios prove of right. i worry that we see momentum through our eyes not necessarily through their eyes. but at t

sadr retired from the battlefield mainly because maliki took the gloves off a us. and the iraqis came forward with us, and we did a lot of fighting. special groups did not play in that fight. special groups were being guided from a different place. i think that is the key to understand, between the nationalist point -- get to the second. what he said in his speech gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, great americans, great iraqi patriot. today's the first day in the battle against iran. okay? okay, we are very much so, to include would walk out of this building. or i can go there. i'm not at that level, with all due respect. we are going to have to bow out of this part of the negotiations because i don't speak for my god. this could get rather complicated. now, if you're willing to come down a level or whatever level you want to call it, come up a little, i'm not going to speak to you, let us begin. but at the point of dealing at that level i don't know where you go. we had a chaplain in one of the units in baghdad. great guy, 6'6" -- crucial to the reconciliation coun

it's a coalition led by a former prime minister al-maliki state of law group, and has a majority 73 members. it is the other main group with 62 seats. we go to the london school of economics. there'd been a glimmer of hope until now. is it rite that the two sunni blocs withdraw? >> they are not saying that. they are saying that parliament will suspend, why the vice president, the other ministers are continuing in the government. nothing about wrong declarations. >> tell us what impact would the suspension have for them? >> well i doubt whether it will have any impact on the government. unless this suspension was joined by the kurdish block which made the numbers, suspending the participation. well, around half of the parliament but without the participation of any other group, this does not stop the work of the parliament. or put stops to their work >>> prime minister haider al-abadi promised a unity government when he came into office. in your opinion, is he doing enough to include the sunnis in the democratic process. >> his word is not much or his actions. i think the killing of the day

and wendy got a call from maliki, and maliki said i have visitors coming and i want you to put them tobed them in your step and they will help you achieve stardom. the division commander, the commander, not division, said who are you sending to my staff? they knocked on the door and they were from -- and the commander said, prime minister maliki? yes. where would you like us to go? and the great patriot shia iraqis said not here. i don't have a place for you. they said that's great we love of your opinion but you don't get to decide. this commander got on the phone with maliki and this is a story really by him and i've had cooperated with the have complete 100 faith. i put him in power in 2003. i got a phone to maliki and for 45 minutes was arguing back and forth single, i can put them in the patrol, have them do food duty but there cannot be in my general staff headquarters, cannot be on the streets with my soldiers. maliki says thanks for your loyal opinion. take them or else. two days later i got a call and he was in istanbul. i got very mad at him. what he doing in istanbul so fast

efforts in those regions should have been to counteract maliki earlier on. the line in the sand and saying, if you cross this we are going to take action, was not a good effort. also, not maintaining a presence in iraq to make sure we countered with maliki was doing which we knew was counter to u.s. interests, was also not a good thing. now, we are saddled with trying to fix the problem as it exists today. what i hope we learn is the lesson from those decisions and not doing the same in afghanistan. and i believe our presence in afghanistan and to date the train advise and assist mission is where we need to be to make sure we help afghanistan get on its feet. to ensure we help president gotti as they form a government there. as they assured that the long-term government stability in that nation. in order to do that, they need a military that functions. we are training, advising, and assisting them in doing that. they still have a ways to go, so i think our presence will be critical to make sure that in the long-term, afghanistan is successful in governing an

they have been angry about us giving control to persians, putting maliki in there who is getting his orders straight out of tehran. they said you got to get rid of him. you'll never have peace if you don't do that. the person we put in is now--he's always a member of the same party. so we still have too much connection to persia for most iraqis whether sunni or shia. and i think that what's going on in isis is simply a war of convenience. >> i love that we're talking in these terms. isn't it ultimately going to take a true government of reconciliation in iran to bring about in essence a new awakening. you can call it a sunni awakening, but an awakening in iraq to stamp out the isil threat? >> that's my view. it will be a non-sectarian government. it will be a secular government that comes in and says we're not going to make decisions on whether you're sunni or shia. we're going to make decisions on how we can make this country work together for all iraqis. the iraqis think of themselves as when people in those people who talk about splitting it up in three pieces and making one part

and at the same time maliki the prime minister of iraq, fired all of the general officers and led down a major level in the army we trained. and a few isis soldiers -- terrorists came across the syrian border. and five divisions with iraqi military ran and left everything from tanks to drones to unit bombs to everything $17 billion worth of gear was left. and then the towns that isis took were full of money and banks. and they control, as you pointed out, a territory that's as big as jordan. and iraqi military that's not capable and now we're fighting again back there for the 26th year we're back in bombing iraq. >> so, ben collins here you have 320 marines at this 25-mile-square base. and they're basically surrounded by isis who are within close to striking distance. i mean, how can we rescue these guys if it came down to it? are they as endangered as they seem to be? >> certainly. look, i think we've got an issue here seems like this administration we seem to wait to a point of crisis before we generate a plan and get to this. the reality is 320 surrounded by what? 1,000, 2,000, 3,00

situation in eye being ra for example, if we had moved in too precipitously, we'll still have nuri al maliki of iraq and there was the massacre where after liberation of a particular town sunnis may have been massacred by shia militias. if that's the case, it's not really going to help the situation. yes, i'm not surprised to hear some of our air partners call for a greater military presence. that's always going to be the easier way for them to go. at the end of the day, this really is their fight and it's also their ideological fight and there's obamanly so much we can do and we have to be concerned about taking steps that would be counterproductive because it removes the obligation for them to step up their war efforts. >> so if that's the case, is this going to continue to be a stalemate with isis grabbing hostages executing them brutally grabbing more territory and why would the present claim on the state of the union that we're winning this thing? >> well, i don't think it's going to continue to be a stalemate and i think in iraq we're making progress with the aid of the peshmerga force

because it was never clear to us whether maliki intended to support them or not. in this case, we seek in every possible way, both to encourage and support the central government to bridge those elements now by supporting them, being present in the training process and ultimately ensuring that the linkage between the shaiks and the sunni leaders is effective with the government not in a handoff later. one of the most important messages or lessons that have come from this. >> and does that include financial resources from the iraqi government to these tribes. >> yes, in the context, for example, of the 2015 budget by the iraqis and there is a way for the recruitment of tribal elements and into the national guard organizations. those organizations will belong to the governor and support and be nationalized in the event of a national emergency. that entity will belong to the ministry of defense and paid by national funds. so the mechanism is under way right now where we are training tribal elements in anbar right now, they are being trained by the iraqi government. w

because it was never clear to us whether maliki intended to support them or not.n this case, we seek in every possible way, both to encourage and support the central government, to bridge those elements now by supporting them being present in the training process and ultimately ensuring that the linkage between the shaiks and the sunni leaders is effective with the government not in a handoff later. one of the most important messages or lessons that have come from this. >> and does that include financial resources from the iraqi government to these tribes. >> yes, in the context, for example, of the 2015 budget by the iraqis and there is a way for the recruitment of tribal elements and into the national guard organizations. those organizations will belong to the governor and support and be nationalized in the event of a national emergency. that entity will belong to the ministry of defense and paid by national funds. so the mechanism is under way right now where we are training tribal elements in anbar right now, they are being trained by the iraqi government. we'

by the maliki government. is that accurate? >> that's accurate, yes. >> so we are now in a position of -- of trying to essentially contain the regional ambitions of the iranians and kinetically defeat the sunni radical islamists, is that the strategy? >> yes that sounds right. >> and you understand that and that to you is a coherent strategy? >> it is. yes. >> now, that means that, you know, you're prioritizing or the administration is prioritizing these actions you've talked about, and building over time capability in syria. in terms of using your resources in addressing the most serious threats is that a coherent response in your mind? >> i think it is the beginning of a strategic response. i think that as i noted on the syrian side of the border the assembling of the force that is going to keep isil defeated there is -- we're in an early stage of trying to build that force. we are participating in the building of that force. but i think it's fair to say that we're at an earlier stage there. on the iraqi side we have the exis

maliki was terrible, but the sunnis still look at the baghdad government as shiite and basically sectarian. we've had, you know massacres of sunnis by shia militia groups here recently. i mean i think that has more to do with the fact that sunnis are unwilling to break away from al-baghdadi and isil than it does that they're governing better. am i missing something? is there some evidence that they're not doing the same sort of violation against their vzs -- violence against their citizens that al-qaeda in iraq did before? or the taliban did, for that matter? >> ranking member smith if i may, thank you for the question. i think the biggest difference is that they're, they are governing. even if they're governing poorly, most of the al-qaeda and it associated movement have never really tried to establish formal governance -- >> that's a separate point. we're talking a little bit about what al-qaeda in iraq -- al-qaeda in iraq did control territory before the anbar awakening, and they did run shadow governments. taliban did as well. so where they have gored was the -- governed was the compar

there was a prime minister in maliki and that goes down to the tribal factionsment and you don't touchair power in pakistan and how resurgent the taliban are in kabul, the iraqi army didn't have that last year. there was no good air power so if they are going to train 5,000 troops now, they need to have the air power to go along with it. and then the final aspect is the social economic problems and where they are training in the first place. is it because they want to train their homeland or because they need money. and i think there are aspects we need to address before going into the training aspect. it is a holistic approach. >> it is easy in a political speech to say no troops on the ground. but as you both laid out it is difficult to put into action. thank you evan coleman and mikey kay. and we want to pay a monument to pay tribute to kenji goto who was killed by isis. he paid homage to difficult places in the world, especially to children. our thought are with his family today. thank you from the rf daily. up next "the reid report." >> up next we'll get a live report from the icy

don't know if it's worth spilling their blood if the alternative will be shia malitia and a return to maliki-styletics. >> it's great getting your insight and thank you very much from the middle east center. now the snow just keeps coming for people in parts of northeast of the u.s. piles of snow blanketed many parts of massachusetts, maine and new hampshire, freezing temperatures and strong winds caused road closures and major flight cancellations and especially hard hit is boston which got its fourth major snowstorm in two weeks. in chicago a snowstorm caused multiple accidents on roads near lake michigan and 38 car pile up on kennedy expressway and 12 people were injured. let's take a check on the weather now with rob and it doesn't look like the snow is letting up at all in the u.s. >> no it is already a record-breaking winter in boston and will be for many states and we are not there, we are middle of february with more to come. at the moment the driving storm is off shore, the back edge of the cloud is where the cold air is coming out of the cloud and briefly, think about it it hits warm wat

important move which was a change in the government of iraq and the removal of the prime minister maliki who come in my opinion carried out a campaign of sectarian misgovernment corruption which had lost and squandered all over the games of the previous years by managing to then get the new iraqi prime minister willing and able to reach out to the iraqi sunnis and then to use air power and limited military support. .. this notion that it's all falling apart, these guys are as you said superman they will take over everything. i think the analysis of isil was interesting. you watched the news reports and the chairman comment about how they're still spreading that was silly not the case. several months ago i might get my timeline wrong when they were rolling through out of syria, went rolling through iraq, everyone was saying they will be in baghdad next week well, they're not and they're never going to be. they were as you mentioned rolled out of -- have not taken any territory since the initial surge and they have given back territory. they were also within miles of herb you. my timeline

the reason that it became possible was, of course, because our ally, prime minister maliki didn't dot he should have done which is to forge a pluralistic governing structure there. >> you can make the argument whatever you can also make the argument that barack obama pulled the soldiers out of there and his military advisors, most of them said don't do it because you are going to leave a vacuum that was filled by isis. again, what you are saying to me. >> you could say that but i disagree. >> correct me if i am wrong barack obama doesn't see at this juncture in history he doesn't see that his strategy to fight isis and the other jihadists is failing he doesn't see that he believes it's succeeding is that what you are telling me. >> look, i'm not in the white house right now. i only know what the president has said publicly, i think it's what he believes. he said from the beginning that this was going to take a long time to degrade isis. >> >> we needed to involve partners in the region that he we needed to build a collision that america couldn't be and shouldn't be the point of the s

yet another example of isis using social media to reach out these young men, one who worked at a maliki ossing the other texting his boss saying that he wasn't going to be at work this weekend, not mentioning it was because he planned on getting on a plane, flying to syria and joining isis. >> will ripley reporting live from brooklyn thank you. >>> online postings from two of those suspects have provided critical clues. congress says social media sites need to do more to crack down on terrorists. >> free speech has its limitations, just as there are no constitutional protections for child pornography. terrorists should not have access to an american controlled social media platform so they can kill rape pillage and burn. >> congressman poe joins me from capitol hair chairman of the house subcommittee on terrorism. welcome, sir. >> good morning, carol. >> good morning. congressman, i know you're passionate about this issue. recently you wrote an op ed for cnn called "it's time to silence terrorists on social media." it sounds great. facebook and twitter might say that's not to easy. do y

military and the confidence of its government in a multisectarian approach so that we don't revisit the maliki experience, which led to the disintegration of the experience. so on that side of the border, the lasting defeat will be made lasting by an iraqi security forces and associated forces in iraq that are rebuilt. one enemy, two locations to get to the other location syria i believe the approach there similarly needs to be to inflict a lasting defeat and in order to do that, we need a partner and we are trying to build that partner in terms of a moderate syrian force and local forces from the region that can -- with our air power and other kinds of assistance inflict defeat onnist skpis then make it a lasting defeat. that's how i would characterize what i see. i'm not in the counsels of government, but that's what i infer. >> i appreciate that very much. when you were in my office we talked about having just returned from ukraine and also when i first walked in senator heinrich was talking about lithuania and that area. their concern was all of our attention seemed to be in that part of t

offense, they weren't sure whether isis was worse than the shia who have taken over iraq in the form of malikiink the sunni arabs were appalled by what went on. i think we will so more robust reaction from other sunni arabs. >> the reaction has been louder, but to speak of the facts on the ground, the jordanians are flying or sorties flying more jets, but other than the numbers which could be replaced by american numbers, there's no practical change on the ground. there's more talk and it seems more united but there's not any more action that i can find. >> well, i think the liberation of mosul if you will i'm not sure that's a year away. i think it's somewhat sooner. but clearly the iraqis want to go after mosul. and the american advisers are being very cautious, because they know that to start a campaign in this huge urban area. remember, second largest city in iraq they want to make sure the campaign is successful. but i found it also interesting that it was a sunni deputy prime minister in baghdad who was complaining about the level of support from abroad. so it's refreshing to see a sunni

not surprising given the leadership at the time of the iraqi prime minister maliki. who really had politicized the military, he had replaced the competent commanders with his cronies, and basically not funded the military for training, and you know when we saw the islamic state start to make their move towards mosul, you know, the state of the force there, they weren't willing to risk their lives for that prime minister. now, he's been shown the door. there's new leadership in iraq. there's a collaboration between the iraqi armed forces and the kurds. and i would say that now our role is to help them to defeat the islamic state in iraq. i think we've taken some actions here in recent months to better prepare ourselves for that and i look forward to seeing that be successful. >> congressman, you're one of the real leaders, the thinkers down in washington. you've taught national security policy at both west point and stanford. you've written a book about that. last year, you voted no on arming the syrian rebels and this past week, you wrote an op-ed, i read it it was a

iraqis to make their own decisions about their leadership for the future to transition away from maliki prime minister of by the and an inclusive -- prime minister abadi. we got as you know last year all the chemical weapons out of syria. no small feat particularly when you consider if we hadn't done that they would be in the hands of isil today. we have been leading the effort to curb ebola. we took the risk president obama took the risk sending 4000 young and untruths to build infrastructure so we could deal with it. it was risky at the time he did it because nobody had all of the answers that it worked. and america led an effort to bring people to the table to keep this from providing the 1 million people dying that were predicted if we didn't have the response that was provided. in ukraine we have worked hard to hold together a complex array of partners in the sanctions, if the sanctions have had a profound affect. the ruble is down 50%. russia's economy is predicted to go into recession this year. there's been a capital flight of $151 billion. you know, they may be able to pursue t

prime minister maliki alienated large parts of the population. >> charlie: i had the egyptian foreign minister here. heare coalition partners prepared to provide troops because i.s.i.s. is that kind of an emergency? >> i think you have in the iraqi millet r military once retrained and reequipped, i think there's the potential to roll back i.s.i.s. as a gains there. syria is a much bigger challenge. there's the long-term train and equip program for the syrian moderate opposition but it's important to look to other arab coalition partners as well as took to see what contributions they can make over time. >> charlie: do they recognize the threat of i.s.i.s. not being stopped? >> i think they recognize the threat. what you've seen many terms of their air forces participating is an encouraging sign but it will require that kind of sustained coalition effort to succeed. >> charlie: it comes down to the ground troops doesn't it? >> yes. >> charlie: in iraq you at least have the iraqi army. i understood susan rice had everybody's nose because of some of the language she used. i understood her

. >> thanks to maliki the sunnis were being alienated.t is nothing we had anything to do with. >> that's shadowing hillary clinton. >> we'll get to that after the break. >>> now the power house puzzler. inspired by the 35th anniversary of the miracle on ice. here's team usa captain mike eruzione. >> hi, george. here's the question. in the 1980 olympic games in lake placid, after the united states defeated the soviet union, what country did they have to play in order to win the gold medal? >> okay. we'll have the answer in two minutes. introducing light & fit protein shakes the new way to help make temptations shrink away. with 12 grams of protein, 5 grams of fiber and 0% fat. new light & fit protein shakes. taste the power of satisfaction. >>> okay, which country did the u.s. beat to win the 1980 olympic hockey gold medal? bill? sweden. sweden. you copied off of bill. >> i was gonna copy bill. >> you weren't everyone born. >> sorry. >> you're all wrong. close though. finland. >> finland. >> we'll be right back. .. enthusiast. mmm, a perfe

steps, for example disbanding the office of the commander in chief, which had been prime minister maliki's way of having control over the military outside the chain of command. that was disbanded. dozens of generals were dismissed who were either ineffective or had very sectarian agendas. we've seen legislation that had been stalled start to move including on debathification. the council of ministers sent it back to the council of representatives a couple of weeks ago, there's back and forth there. then very significantly legislation to form a national guard that would allow members of sunni tribes to be part of a security force defending their own communities but attached to the state through training and equipping and salaries. that legislation is probably going to take time, about but in the interim, the abadi administration agreed that it would try to train and pay for and integrate with the iraqi security forces tribal fighters. and they made a commitment to do that with about 7,500, primarily in anbar and innua, and they've reached that number. so on all of those fronts we're seeing

most important move, which was a change in government of iraq, and the removal of prime minister maliki who carried out misgovernment and corruption which lost and squandered all of the gains of the previous years by managing to then get new iraqi prime minister willing and able to reach out to iraqi sunnis, then to use air power and limited military support the momentum of isil has been halted. they're no longer able to advance. they suffered a serious defeat in kobani thanks to coalition air power. and they have now seen significant reversal in the eyes of arab public opinion after the brutal murder of jordanian pilot. and momentum matters for them, their appeal was rooted in the idea they were a winner. now people aren't so sure. i think we may actually see people jumping off the band wagon faster than we think. >> appreciate it. obviously i hope the optimistic scenarios prove right. i worry we see momentum through our eyes, not necessarily through their eyes. at this time i yield to mr. smith. >> thank you just following up on that rather key point, there's problems all over the wor

steps, for example, expanding the office of the commander in chief, which had been prime minister maliki's way of having control over the military outside the chain of command. that was disbanded. dozens of generals were dismissed who were either ineffective or had very sectarian agendas. we've seen legislation that had been stalled start to move, including on debaathification. the council of ministers sent it back to the council of representatives a couple of weeks ago, there's back and forth there. then very significantly, legislation to form a national guard that would allow members of sunni tribes to be part of a security force defending their own communities but attached to the state through training and equipping and salaries. that legislation is probably going to take time, but in the interim, the abadi administration agreed that it would try to train and pay for and integrate with the iraqi security forces tribal fighters. and they made a commitment to do that with about 7,500, primarily in anbar and innua, and they've reached that number. so on all of those fronts we're seeing pro

needs to be rebuilt needs to be retrained, because maliki, the former prime minister of iraq, you know by putting political people in charge of it by disenfranchising sunnis, really destroyed the army. so you're talking about rebuilding it again. that is a long-term process. meanwhile, these shi'a militia that i was talking about built trained by, supplied, equipped by the iranians, 100,000 strong now. so somebody's got to take this territory back from them in iraq. you know i'd put more money right now on the shi'a militia doing it than the iraqi army eventually doing it. one of the possibilities here is that we defeat isis in iraq but we lose iraq to iran, essentially, because -- >> is that a price worth paying? or a risk worth taking? >> i don't know. we should talk about that when we talk about iran in a second. >> rose: all right. >> but not only do you have to take the territory from them in iraq. you have to take the territory from them in syria. because if you don't do that if you only take the territory from them in iraq, what happens is is they go back across that border they

>> the unfortunate reality is that as a result of the policies of the former prime minister maliki thealizes and excludes the political process, and his anti-kurdish policies created a situation that the iraqi army was a sectarian army not an iraqi army and it collapsed within ten hours. therefore, we have to build that kind of confidence in the iraqi army, so the people of mosul feel it's an raker army coming not a sectarian-led army coming. therefore the sunnis play an important role in this equation. the sunnis of mosul, the tribes of mosul, the sunni political figures have to be on board and we have to be working together was the situation is such it cannot afford failure. >> does the u.s. have the right strategy in terms of fighting islamic state at the moment? because there are those who say, it's far too limited militarily to ever succeed. >> well we are grateful to the u.s.-led international coalition. we are thankful to the air strikes. but we need to see a clear-cut strategy to end isis not to limit and contain isis. because isis continuing like now, would be a dangerous thre

officers has had additional training is better motivated, there's no question that the change from the malikiernment to the abatty government has led to better oversight of the army. that said it strikes me that this plan for a quick attack on mosul ignores precisely the questions that jim miklaszewski raises in his report. first, the idea that this iraqi army force would be joined by the kurdish peshmerga, it goes contrary to everything i heard in my travels from the kurds. they feel that entering this largely sunni arab city of mosul outside of kurdistan would create political problems for them and for the iraqi government. that's just for starters. the strange thing is they're in a position now to squeeze mosul. they've cut off much of the road access to the city. isis can't resupply. they're being ground down. it's a strange time to rush this operation before according to the people i talked to it's really ready. >> if this is the timetable, if we're looking at six weeks from now there's this aggressive attempt to retake the city, it does raise the question if this iraqi army is not up to