. >> mark kimmit joins me. can you give me a background ton discrepancies in the death toll, u.s. saying 150 killed but the somalis putting that figure at 27? >> well, i think there is a little doubt that the united states had eyes on the target, had pretty good idea how many people were on the ground just simply by the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that's necessary before you can conduct one of these missions. that said, it could very well be that the somali authorities were able to get out to the camp, but i doubt that. so i would say the number is probably closer to 150. because of the actual eyes that they had before and after the strike, versus an announcement that came out of the government. >> how would the decision to target this particular camp have come about? >> to conduct a drone strike takes a number of layers of authorities and approvals. in this case, they were very clear that there was an imminent risk to the amasom and the u.s. forces in there. so that probably accelerated the decision making process. on the ground, the intelligence indicated they

. >> earlier i spoke to mark kimmit. he says there's debate over the effectiveness of these types of strikes. >> there's a great controversy as to the ef ceation an efficact these types of strikes. government authorities would say this allows us to attack leadership targets that will eventually cause the downfall of these organization he. on the other hand, some would say that there's very little evidence that cutting off the head of the snake causes the collapse of these organizations that in fact they're able to replicate leaders very, very quick and replace them. so in fact the efficiency of these drone strikes doesn't really bear out in the long run. to conduct a drone strike conducts a number of layers of authorities and approvals. in this case, they were very clear, that there was an imminent risk to the amasom and the force necessary there so that probably affected the decision making process. on the ground, the intelligence indicate id they were going to attack, very quickly the information would have gone up to

let's bring in bob baer who is a former cia operative, and also mark kimmit. partying in -- how do two men in eighth months go from partying to religious extremists, to blowing up a cafe in paris? >> you know, carol, this is the problem, trying to profile these people, even the 9/11 hijackers were out partying before. these people take a selective reading of the koran. they're in and out of jail. they're at loose ends. all of a sudden they find new believes, and they turn radical quickly, and it's influenced by neighbors, by friends, and the rest of it. they're looking for a meaning and purpose in life, and it happens to be martyrdom, and secondly, they identify with the conflicts in the middle east, the bombings and the orthodox sunn. it's a distant conflict, but all of a sudden in their minds they decide they have to contribute and do something and make something of their lives. it's a huge radical jump. it happens so often. >> general, there is no profile, though, of who exactly will be turned on by these extremists overseas. how difficult does that make it