most so you've also you know i mean the debate the debates are dated and everybody knows this from mcchrystal to betray us to the current perception of the navy to the secretary of defense everybody coming and we need to make sure it happens if congress doesn't work together with the department of defense to make this happen then we'll see something like what happened with d.d.t. where it went through the courts. and it was pushed you know this is this is it over here well stephanie over to you are especially if we consider the fact that our national security is something that's constantly used as an excuse to push so or so many things that often will you know a fringe on our rights will violate the constitution and yet here when we just talk about some basic equality and some respect that's not being an agenda thank you so much for joining us tonight. i don't go anywhere there's still much more to come tonight after recent al jazeera port shows proof of boots on the ground in libya i want to give you my two cents on the progression of this unofficial war and all raise a glass in tonight's ha

after pioneering kill/capture operations in the iraq war, mcchrystal increased their use in afghanistan. and when general david petraeus took command last summer, he stepped them up further. petraeus has doubled the number of kill/capture missions, and issued hundreds of press releases announcing the death or detention of taliban leaders. >> the taliban had the momentum, and when you're faced with a serious, deteriorating situation, you have to do something about it. and the best way to do something about it is to use every tool available to you, and that includes everything from the very soft end of things all the way to the hardest of the hard end, which is, of course, targeted raids. ( explosion ) >> go, go, go, go, go! >> narrator: the kill/capture campaign against the taliban is waged by both special operations forces and conventional troops. but leading and directing the program is a secretive counterterrorism unit within special forces known as joint special operations command, or jsoc. >> let me know when you got a target, five. coming up now. >> narrator: it was jsoc that carri

i'm mcchrystal. >> i'm acre acre. >> we begin with breaking news out of iraq. >> five american troops have been killed near the entrance to baghdad's green zone. single largest loss of life for the american military in iraq in the past two years. military is with holding the name of the killed soldier and details. >> they officially ended combated operations last august and they currently have 46,000 troops in the country. >> police on the peninsula say they will put every resource they have in a gunman that killed a three-month-old baby. the shooting also wounded the parents. tomasramon has the latest developments. >> reporter: good morning. this morning, the mother and father are mourning the shooting death of their three-month-old baby boy as they themselves recover from gunshot wounds at stanford medical center. yesterday, local religious leaders gathered at the site where the shooting occurred. shots rang out at 1:00 a a.m. as the couple left a baby shower with their two young sons. witnesses say two young men opened fire on the couple's car wounding the mother and father and kil

you remember stan mcchrystal leaked his recommendation. it became very difficult for a democratic president to overturn it. but obama has started his presidency saying we are too committed overseas, we are too militarily engaged, we have too large a footprint, we've got to rebalance, we've got to focus on nation building at home. we've got to focus on asia. and he sounded all those themes. it was a remarkable speech for an american president in the caution, the strategic emphasis rather than the idealistic emphasis. he says things like, we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate, as strategic as we are resolute. people would have america overextend itself, confronting every evil that could be found abroad. this is reminiscent of a very different strain of america, in many ways a strain that goes back before the cold war. >> he also talked about building international partnerships for military action a la libya as opposed to going it alone. dave, i want to play a little bit more of what the president said tonight. >> already this decade o

him on how he's winding down afghanistan. >> do you both agree this is a movement away from the mcchrystal counterinsurgency and counter terrorist style operation? >> i think it clearly is a movement in that direction. it may not happen in the next few months because they will clearly want to show the taliban that they are not drawing down. but there are two signs of that. the first is of course the nature of the troop withdrawal. the second is, who is going to prosecute the counterterrorism strategy for the united states of the next three or four years? david petraeus. the movement of david petraeus to become head of the cia is very significant in this respect, because what he is doing is saying to petraeus, you make counterterrorism work as well as you have made counterinsurgency work in iraq and afghanistan. >> yes. but in the process he got undercut. i mean, let's face it. >> you see this as a victory for joe biden? >> there's no question about that. general petraeus and secretary clinton and bob gates all have been reported tonight to have reluctantly accepted this outcome. they wante

if you remember, back then, he said to general petraeus and general mcchrystal running the war you can have the troops you want, not all the trooms but 30,000, it became -- troops but 30,000, it became 33,000, we'll put a time limit on it, a surge, and we'll start drawing down in july of 2011. in a sense, why now? because this is the calendar he set. the kind of broader piece of that and it connects exactly with what martha was saying, though, is -- and why didn't he give them a waiver from the calendar? they were saying ok, we've had these successes. can we have a few extra months? gwen: not only that, they didn't get all of the troops in there until last september. so they may say this is 18 months. but it isn't really 18 months. >> right. and there was a palpable desire, a yearning on the part of the president and his staff to draw that line, to make sure number one, one of the themes you heard from him in this announcement was promise made, promise kept. i said we would start to draw down in july 2011. we're starting to draw down. but there was also a fear of getting nibbled to dea

effort that was started under general petraeus and was done extremely well in my view under general mcchrystal has now changed where the united states is mine is now we have abrams a one tanks in helmand province we have launched more air attacks more night attacks on houses more civilian deaths than at any time in the ten years that the united states and its allies have been in afghanistan you are right in two thousand and one october two thousand and one afghans were almost universally happy that the americans had come and rid them of the taliban in the same way what we've had now is the united states initially went into afghanistan not to fight the taliban hundred under president bush we were there to prevent the united states or excuse me from the united states from being again attacked from afghanistan our goal was to dismantle destruct destroy in any way al qaida that war has evolved over a period of ten years into not a war against al qaeda there are maybe according to all intelligence estimates are all talks coming from the white house and so forth of about fifty maxon to one hundred a

. >> and i'm mcchrystal. topping our news, police throughout the bay area are looking for a baby killer a three-month-old was shot to death right in front of the parents who was also hit by bullets. live in palo alto headquarters with more. >> reporter: they are mourning the death of three-month-old child and recovering from wounds from the shooting. the couple were leaving a baby shower here in east palo alto when they say two men opened fire. the shots wounded the mother and father and three-month-old boy was killed. they gathered where the shooting occurred. denouncing the violent that took the young life. they have raids two juveniles on weapons charges. city is putting out a major effort in order to solve this crime. >> it's too early to say those were tied to this case. >> a captain will not stop until we find the perpetrators of this heinous act and until we bring them to justice. >> these two sketches were released of the suspects sought in the shooting. they have promising leads in this possible gang

they feel he has a harsher edge than general mcchrystal did.intment was seen as bad news in islamabad. general petraeus has a stronger force of will than any military officer i think i've ever encountered. we saw this in a iraq. he really bent that story around his determination and president bush's. he has had less success frankly in afghanistan. one thing that petraeus is very good at, i've seen this over many years of traveling with him, is using often unlikely back channels. he's good at finding people who can get him access to people in places that are important to him as a commander. it's a skill that's quite unusual and in truth it's a skill that is not found widely in this administration, so i think the ability to be operational, to head out on quiet missions, to meet with heads of state, heads of other intelligence services, to get business done on that level, i think general petraeus will be quite good at. >> david ignatius, thank you so much, great pook. i thoroughly enjoyed it. >> thank you fareed. >> we will be right back. when you

i always had the impression, david pet us from and stanley mcchrystal before him, on counter insurgencyresident was never committed to that. if you send in 33,000 search troops based on something the military wants but then pull them out before the military wants them to. why did you send them in to begin with? yet, there are parts of the country where counter insurgency is working but certainly not all of them. they talk about, look, we're not changing our strategy, we can do it with fewer troops. it's like ditch diggers, if you have four ditch diggers, and you're going to build two ditch, that's fine, get it done. it will take longer and the ditch that you first built might be abandoned and falling part by the time you get to the second and you do not have enough people to go back and do that. i'm not sure what the strategy is at this point. >> it's an interesting question and we'll all talk about it. what you are talking about is risk. risk is what admiral mullin and general petraeus talked about this week. let's listen to how they reacted to this drawdown. >> the president's decisio

so it wasn't until president obama's speech, december 7 i believe, 2009 after mcchrystal's ultimatum essentially in august of that year when suddenly everyone realize we're about to put more troops in that country, the whole america woke up and said what's going on? i was a little bit annoyed to be frank because i was following this, and it's a problem that we created to our own intention. it's a statement more than an answer to your question. >> one thing we look at what we want, what we have tried to impose on this nation, maybe its different perspective what's realistically achievable. do we need to ask the question a different way as opposed to an imposition of what we won't? >> one of the unspoken undertone here is that they really has been a struggle between conventional army and unconventional army about what to do in afghanistan, and essentially the conventional side one. although counterinsurgency in some ways as many unconventional warfare things built in, and i remember early on talking to people doing my research what we should do in afghanistan is go after the powers, th

>> mcchrystal cloud.like you, like, are not going to be paying a gazillion dollars for microsoft office. however, what we could do is just get the patch. microsoft--this answer mccal the call answering the call of consumer demand for fast internet. >>catherine: thank you, rob black. (music) >> jacqueline: storm trucker for is showing lingering storms also in the inland valleys through livermore, the delta, also rainfall. certainly it is heavier in sections of the south bay. san jose has moderate rainfall. in fact through morgan hill, gilroy. as we go towards overnight this situation and system will continue to bring more rain than expected. it will stay that way through this evening. shores to the south. showers behind that and tomorrow at eight plantat a glance, with partial clearing by noon--this will increase the risk for thunderstorms to the afternoon. a 20 percent chance of isolated storms. temperatures rebounding into the 70's in most places some of concord returning to the 70's the same through san

gerald mcchrystal be forum has been successful -- general mcchrystal. host: john in atlanta. caller: i heard the guest said -- [unintelligible] host: keep going, caller. caller: that is all i have to say. host: general petraeus is moving on to the cia. who'll be replacing him? guest: general allan. host: let's go to randy, kentucky, independent caller for nora bensahel. caller: i was wondering what they do not spend the billions of dollars to rebuild this country when we are spending billions in other countries. parts like joplin. katrina was never rebuilt. new orleans. rebuild this country. they export, what, heroin? rebuild to what? corruption and the taliban. host: not an uncommon theme. put it in terms that people may be able to understand in terms of nation building. i am not asking to defend all of that. guest: the argument the administration has made -- both administrations -- some amount of stability in afghanistan is crucial for u.s. strategic interests. if afghanistan collapses, if it becomes an govern territory, it would provide a fertile ground for terrorist to op

it was the request of general mcchrystal andeneral petraeus one, to put in place a counterinsurgency strategy and then to have the appropriate level of forces thus the additional 30,000. the return to that 70,000 as prematurely as we're doing it will give the taliban the opportunity, i think to retake some of the territory that they'd lost. and also at least with the qqani network... if that's not the case, at least wh the haqqani network to continue the stalemate we have with them which protract it is war. counterterrosm in and of itself will not bring the taliban down to the levels that we need to to be able to mov to a political solution. >> rose: there is finally this, and it was articulated at this table last night by richard haas and the council on foreign relations and others have made the argument that our economic circumstances need... demand we do nation building at home, i think president may have eluded to that. secondly, they look at so much evidence that karzai's corruption, they look at the haqqani network, no ability yet to have the pakistanis engage them because they

gerald mcchrystal be forum has been successful -- general mcchrystal. host: john in atlanta. caller: i heard the guest said -- [unintelligible] host: keep going, caller. caller: that is all i have to say. host: general petraeus is moving on to the cia. who'll be replacing him? guest: general allan. host: let's go to randy, kentucky, independent caller for nora bensahel. caller: i was wondering what they do not spend the billions of dollars to rebuild this country when we are spending billions in other countries. parts like joplin. katrina was never rebuilt. new orleans. rebuild this country. they export, what, heroin? rebuild to what? corruption and the taliban. host: not an uncommon theme. put it in terms that people may be able to understand in terms of nation building. i am not asking to defend all of that. guest: the argument the administration has made -- both administrations -- some amount of stability in afghanistan is crucial for u.s. strategic interests. if afghanistan collapses, if it becomes an govern territory, it would provide a fertile ground for terrorist to op

i don't want to get wrapped up in the numbers game. >> mcchrystal was talking about troops. this is two to three years ago. it's changed dramatically on the ground since then. clearly something we look at all the time. it's interesting in overall numbers because -- i spend a lot of time looking at who is there and who is making a difference and who isn't. and we have a culture of putting a lot of numbers in, historically we have. all of us. we have learned a lot with respect to that. in a meeting as recently as yesterday we were talking about what we learned with respect to iraq, and we had excess forces in iraq just because we were moving them so fast. so we literally take those lessons into account as we look at how we do this. despite the pressure on numbers, that also forces us to not adjust our strategy but look at how we focus this. prioritize, and still achieve success. you talked about the military. it's an unbelievably innovative, creative, capable military that we have. and again i talked about more risk and quicker than i had originally anticipated, but it hadn't

and let me note this particular slide is drawn from the time i spent working with general mcchrystaland the team that was developing the strategy that was recommended to bruce and others in washington. pakistan fits into a set of problems that are ones we will or will not solve in the course of the afghan war. one is whether we can defeat the insurgents tactically, and there we are making, i think, very significant progress. another is whether we can eliminate their control and influence over the population which is more problematic. at this point in time, the idea of creating an effective nato approach with integrated isaf approach is moot. it isn't going to happen, departing caveats are not being reduced. we are seeking to build up an effective afghan national security force. those of you who have seen the papers over the last few days probably realize that there is a major gap between 2014 as a date and the fact that that particular build-up can't occur before 2016 to 2018. we have the way of finding a legitimate afghan government. it is, perhaps, a warning to all of us that karza

. >> weir at the lowballed end that general mcchrystal ast four. i don't want to be wrapped up in the numbers game. >> he was talking about troops. this was two or three years ago. it has change dramatically on the ground since then. but i spend a lot of time looking who was there who makes a difference and who is and and we have the culture historical eight all of us with what we learn with respect to iraq we have excess forces and iraq just because we were moving them so fast. we literally take those lessons into account and despite the pressure, that is also forcing us too not addressed the strategy but how we prioritize and to achieve success. is a capable military that we have. >> again, more risk and quicker than i originally anticipated but to get this done rorer has some point* in time but the strategy still is a counter insurgency focus without question properly resources to and get into a debate about that given the mission and the objective right now if it is not working in a year or two my recommendation would be to be reassessed. >> it

last year. -- a leader of centcomm to replace general mcchrystal last year. i know this well and i know senator lieberman will view this in greater detail. he has a ph.d. and a master's from princeton, which believe will serve him well. following the abu ghraib scandal and interrogation policy, general petraeus wrote an open letter to all soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen under his command in iraq. "our values and the law of governing warfare teachers to respect human dignity, maintain narrett integrity, and do what is right. adherence to our values distinguishes us from our enemy." i fully agree. is enormously important to have a director of the cia who is guided by these values and has a sense of right and wrong and not only what may or may not be possible. let me just say one more thing. the senate confirmed director panetta to be secretary of defense by a vote of 100-0 on tuesday. even if and when confirmed, general petraeus will not resign his commission and come to the cia until he is able to transition the mission in afghanistan to

. >> we're at the low ball numbers of mcchrystal asked for. >> mccrystal was talking about troops. this is two or three years ago. it's changed. it's changed dramatically on the ground since then. clearly it's something we look at all the time. it's interesting in overall numbers 'cause -- i mean, i spend a lot of time looked at who's there and who's making the difference and who isn't? and, you know, we have a culture of putting in a lot of numbers, all of us. we've learned a lot with that. i was with a meeting with general odierno and we had excess forces in iraq just because we were moving them so fast. so we literally take those lessons into account as we look at how we do this. and despite the pressure on numbers, that's also forced us to not adjust our strategy but look at how we focus this, prioritize and still achieve success. you talked about the military. i mean, it's an unbelievably innovative, creative, capable military that we have. it hasn't put me out of the risk envelope if you will, of getting this done. if it's not working we'll have to, would on the strategy. >>

. >> mcchrystal was talking about troops two or three years ago. it has changed dramatically on the ground since then. clearly it is something we look at all the time. it is interesting in the overall numbers. i spent a lot of time looking at who is there and who is making a difference and who is not. we have a culture of putting a lot of numbers in. historically we have. we have learned a lot with respect to that. in a meeting yesterday we talked about what we learned with respect to iraq. we have access forces in iraq -- excess forces in iraq because we removing them so fast. we take those lessons into account as we look at how we do this. despite the pressure on numbers, that also forced us to not adjust our strategy, but look at how we focus this, prioritize, and still achieve success. you talk about the military. it is an unbelievably innovative, creative, capable military that we have. we talk about more risk. it has not put me anywhere close to getting this done. at some point in time, if it is not working, we will have to adjust the strateg

general mcchrystal recommended to the president that to win in afghanistan we need 80,000 additional troops. mr. president, at a bear minimum, we need 40,000 additional troops. the president gave 30,000. and in giving the 30,000 he immediately gave a timeline for withdrawal. now, i will tell you the taliban are used to fighting for long periods of time and they know if they have to simply wait another couple of years that's an encouragement to them. but i supported and support what the president was doing in afghanistan up until last night. even though i believe he should have given the troops required for victory, victory, but last night i saw that all troops are going to be pulled out, all the surge troops are going to be pulled out of afghanistan magically by election day. as a military pilot, i can tell you, as an air national guard pilot still, i can tell you the soldiers are weary of war. the american people is weary of war. but leadership is not about saying we're tired, we're going to quit. it's about standing up for freedom and standing against those that would destroy our w

let me know this particular slide is drawn from the time i have spent working with general mcchrystal and the team that was developing the strategy that was recommended to bruce and others in washington. pakistan fits into a set of problems that are once we will not solve in the course of the afghan war. one is whether we can defeat the insurgents tactically. i think we are making progress. the other is whether we can limit their control and influence over the population, which is more problematic. the idea of creating an effective nato approach is moot. it is not going to happen. they are not being reduced. we are seeking to build up an effective afghan national security force. those of you who have seen the papers over the last few days probably realize there is a major gaps between 2014 as a date and the fact that that particular build up cannot occur before 2016-2018. we have the problem of finding a way of creating an effective, legitimate afghan government. it is perhaps a warning to all of us that karzai is supposed to leave office in 2014, the transition year. we have the sear

. >> mcchrystal was talking about troops two or three years ago. it has changed dramatically on the ground since then. clearly it is something we look at all the time. it is interesting in the overall numbers. i spent a lot of time looking at who is there and who is making a difference and who is not. we have a culture of putting a lot of numbers in. historically we have. we have learned a lot with respect to that. in a meeting yesterday we talked about what we learned with respect to iraq. we have access forces in iraq because we removing them so fast. we take those lessons into account as we look at how we do this. despite the pressure on numbers, that also forced us to not adjust our strategy, but look at how we focus this, prioritize, and still achieve success. you talk about the military. it is an unbelievably innovative, creative, capable military that we have. we talk about more risk. it has not put me anywhere close to getting this done. at some point in time, if it is not working, we will have to adjust the strategy. the strategy is still

general mcchrystal submitted his report in 2009 so if he defined the young state in afghanistan as one in which the insurgency no longer threatens the viability of the central state income. you heard division described by lt. general rodriguez embraced by general eikenberry and others in the u.s. government's that calls for very active start at the sub national level the district delivery program the embassy of kabul have to give a call when the district disaster program and getting the ministry representatives down to district levels. what is -- what should that level be going forward and how mincy can we tolerate, and i would like to hear from the rest of you in terms of how mincy can afghanistan get with regard to trying to ensure that al qaeda doesn't come back and that it doesn't fundamentally destabilize pakistan. let me start with you. >> i will start with i used to go to northern kunar. we are of the now. we were posted. the fundamentally just pushed us out. so can you have a mess and still continue on? yes. our issue should have been do we want transnational terrorists who can

the role has been demonstrated by both general mcchrystal and after him general petraeus was to seek ways and opportunity across the border with the pakistani military to try to have effect upon the nature of the border, the safe havens, those elements of the insurgency where we can focus or efforts. general pa petraeus has establid a productive relationship with general kayani. i hope to follow where leverages the role of the isaf commander, we can continue to place the kind of emphasis that we need to with the pakistani government and military to continue to pressurize those safe havens. in the end, it's a decision that they will make. but they -- in my role as the operational commander, i'm going to leverage every possibility that i can for cooperation across the border to build habits of cooperation, habits of partnership, and hopefully from there as we continue to evolve our relationship overall with pakistan, this will be a mechanism that can provide a bright spot for additional cooperation later. and i think here is an important opportunity with pakistan. >> thank you, sir. ad

service to this country, agreed to step down from commander of centcom to replace general stanley mcchrystal in afghanistan. at that time, the senators in your records speed with the armed services committee holding a hearing and reporting out the general's nomination on the same day and the senate confirmed within 9190 vo. i notice well and i know senator lieberman will do this in more detail. he's also earned a phd as well as a masters from print and, which i believe will serve him well. following the abu ghraib scandal and into a debate over detention and interrogation policy, general petraeus wrote an open letter to all soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen sharing under his command. here's what he wrote and i quote, her values and the loss and welfare teachers to respect human dignity maintain our integrity and do what is right. adherence to her values distinguishes us from our enemy, end quote. i fully agree it's enormously important to have a director of the cia who is guided by these values and has a sense of right and wrong and what may or may not be possible. the s

general mcchrystal submitted his report in 2009 so if he defined the young state in afghanistan as one in which the insurgency no longer threatens the viability of the central state income. you heard division described by lt. general rodriguez embraced by general eikenberry and others in the u.s. government's that calls for very active start at the sub national level the district delivery program the embassy of kabul have to give a call when the district disaster program and getting the ministry representatives down to district levels. what is -- what should that level be going forward and how mincy can we tolerate, and i would like to hear from the rest of you in terms of how mincy can afghanistan get with regard to trying to ensure that al qaeda doesn't come back and that it doesn't fundamentally destabilize pakistan. let me start with you. >> i will start with i used to go to northern kunar. we are of the now. we were posted. the fundamentally just pushed us out. so can you have a mess and still continue on? yes. our issue should have been do we want transnational terrorists who can

first, general mcchrystal, and then general petraeus made very clear that increasing and making sustainable and electricity supply for the city of kandahar was an essential part of our campaign plan, and in order to defeat the taliban, we needed to do it militarily, and with the population itself. so, the first up, as mr. derr said, was the provision of these temporary power plants that will be fuelled by diesel fuel. that is very expensive, and as mr. their said, it is not sustainable. >> mr. sedney, i hate to interrupt you, but i understand all of these projects somebody thinks are important to the success of our mission. what i'm trying to do is pull some thread on accountability. i am trying to figure out why the department of defense's building prudential justice centers? why is dod in the construction right now? i do not understand that. how was that decision been made, and where is it being made? >> the recommendations, senator, come from the field, for the chain of command. on the provincial justice centers, there are some areas where the provision are so important to the success of

. >> with the adviser to general stanley mcchrystal and the author of this man's army.tration be somewhat conflicted about how to respond to events in the middle east. where to support stability of autocratic regimes and democracy. on which america stands provide suspect we have all been conflicted because not all middle eastern regimes are the same there areth gradations of authoritarian is some and all strategic importance of these countries to the u.s.. which allianz is something we can draw people. i would argue that is not strategicallye important to the u.s. but syria it is equally but is far more and then a call if only because it serves as the iranian proxy. whether we and right egypt and ignore syria. it was relatively important but we helped reebok from saudi arabia which is paternalistic cleese mothering regime and by farfar the most important country in the region and our president could not even under its u name in the latest speech which i feel very interested. butr the "wall street journal" which has no responsibility has abdicated the strategy ought to b

let me know to that this particular side is drawn from the time i spent working with the general mcchrystal and the team that was developing the strategy that was recommended to bruce and others in washington. pakistan fits into a set of problems. there are ones we will or will not solve in the course of the afghan war. one is whether we can defeat the insurgency tactically, and there we are making, i think, very significant process. -- progress. at this point in time, the idea of creating an effective nato approach, an integrated approach, is moot. it will not happen. countries are departing. and we are seeking to build up ineffective afghan national security force. those of you who have seen the papers of the last few days probably realize that there is a major gap between 2014 as a date and the fact that the particular buildup can occur between 2016- 2018. one of the problem of finding a way of creating an effective, legitimate afghan government. it is a warning perhaps to all of us that karzai is supposed to leave office in 2014, the transition year. we have the search for an integrated

the role has been demonstrated by both general mcchrystal and after him general petraeus was to seek ways and opportunity across the border with the pakistani military to try to have effect upon the nature of the border, the safe havens, those elements of the insurgency where we can focus or efforts. general pa petraeus has establid a productive relationship with general kayani. i hope to follow where leverages the role of the isaf commander, we can continue to place the kind of emphasis that we need to with the pakistani government and military to continue to pressurize those safe havens. in the end, it's a decision that they will make. but they -- in my role as the operational commander, i'm going to leverage every possibility that i can for cooperation across the border to build habits of cooperation, habits of partnership, and hopefully from there as we continue to evolve our relationship overall with pakistan, this will be a mechanism that can provide a bright spot for additional cooperation later. and i think here is an important opportunity with pakistan. >> thank you, sir. ad

one year ago to this day, the senate confirmed general petraeus to replace general stanley mcchrystal as the leader of american and international security assistance forces in afghanistan. since then, he has shifted the strategy, implemented the troop surge, kept our coalition together, and today military and intelligence analysts point to gains in the security situation and in the afghan military and police's ability to secure their nation. general petraeus' willingness to take on the afghanistan mission also demonstrates his extraordinary commitment to public service. at the time, he was serving in tampa, florida, as a combatant commander for central command. no longer directly in charge of the war zone but with the responsibility for not just afghanistan but for 19 other countries as well. he agreed to what was a step down in the military -- quote -- org chart, end quote, to take on the hard errs military challenge in the world and to deploy from tampa to kabul. the nation certainly owes general petraeus a debt of gratitude for 37 years in uniform, but when he is confirmed, general

army in both afghanistan and iraq and was an adviser to general stanley mcchrystal. he is the author of "this man's army, a soldier's story from the front lines on the war on terror." he has a degree in middle eastern studies on the american university in beirut. he was in egypt after the revolution. i think all of us have watched the administration be somewhat conflicted about how to respond to events in the middle east this spring. whether to support stability of autocratic regimes and where to support democracy for which america stands. i suspect some of us have also been conflicted precisely because not all middle eastern regimes, while authoritarian, are the same. there are gradations of strategic importance of these countries to the u.s. where do we draw which lines, is one of the things i hope we can draw people out on. syria in my view is an equally nasty regime but is far more in them a goal of u.s. interest. why do we fight libya and largely ignored syria? egypt had a relatively progressive rumor and relatively important to us, but after some hesitation, we