i went to kabul and met general mcchrystal and senior officers in the u.s.. peoples view of what happened to them and what this was all about in their experience changed at the time. i was able to get very large number of documents from the welsh guards and from the ministry of defense documents which meant i could we then these incredibly detailed summaries and incident reports and signal traffic and the night watch keeper's logs and transcripts. all sorts of stuff and i was able to weave all that in. also there was the aspect of ptsd and there were casualties that happened long after they got back. that was unexpected in a narrative i wasn't expected to examine. dan collins who is one of the heroes of the book he had been blown up twice by ieds. he seemed like he was on top of the world. i was almost envious. you are here or india been through this experience and you are and you were tested and you are tested and you stepped up to the plate and prove yourself. also dan took his own life on new year's eve 2012. so was an extended reporting and getting to kno

we also started to see this concept of courageous restraint and this slowdown from general mcchrystal. it was all about the doctrine and need to take risks to avoid civilian casualties even if that meant that you might actually take more american british casualties. during this period certainly there was one sergeant who said to me you know mcchrystal seems like a bit of a tree hugger to me. a former head of jsoc with a campaign as he described industrial scale killing of al qaeda in iraq and people in iraq not used to being called a tree hugger but this was the early signs. the edict was overinterpreted down the chain within enthusiastic low-level office who is making the troops take too many risks on the basis that avoiding civilian casualties were any military person knows he cannot fight any kind of war without causing civilian casualties. there was some resentment to the british about what was seen as this american political correctness ruled by the come and which actually meant some of the comrades could be killed but that was very much the feeling amongst the u.s. marines and t

so during this period there was certainly -- one sergeant said to me mcchrystal seems like a bit of a tree hugger to me. which former head of -- who was sort of oversaw a campaign, he described it as industrial scale killing of al qaeda in iraq. people in iraq that not used to being called a tree-hugger. this was the early signs -- i think the edict was overinterpretted down the chain and you had some enthuseasic lower level officers who were making the troops take too many risks. on the basis that avoiding civilian casualties where any military person knows you cannot find any war without civilian casualties. there was some resentment from the british about what was seen as this american political correctness rule, which men that some comrades could be killed. that was very much a feeling amongst u.s. marines and other u.s. military. they were losing them because this doctrine. >> host: very much. so definitely hear the rules of engagement being almost like curse word. around that time frame. and i'd seen similar things as well. on the flip side, the book touches on several times som

he previously served as top intelligence advisor to general stanley mcchrystal in iraq and afghanistan. he is credited with revolutionizing how intelligence is done inside the military. in 2010, you wrote a similar report called "fixing intel, a blueprint for making intelligence relevant in the military." it examines the military's inability to understand fundamental questions driving extremists. that paper proves relevant today. i'm pleased to have mike flynn at this table for the first time. welcome. >> charlie, thanks so much for having me. i know we've been trying to do this for a while. >> we have indeed. i met you as i mentioned in this top colleague of stanley mcchrystal in afghanistan. >> remains a great friend of mine today. >> the man knows something about leadership. >> big time. and he's an exceptional leader across the board and doing some amazing things today for a lot of organizations. and i think that that is going to carry on to a while. >> we want to talk about isis. and we had one more example today. when there is on the internet video of the burning, in a cage -- >>

unfortunately, general mcchrystal didn't have the opportunity to. but it did swing too far and it really retarded some of our efforts. i mean, in that part of the world, peter, you know, people respect strength. and when they see the taliban and insurgent and the haqqanis pushing and pushing their limits and constantly attacking whether it was our base or what have you and they see a tepid response because of this bureaucratic wrangling, it sends a message. >> yeah. you sketched out you had four being reasons why a lot of things have to to go right if things are going to go right. but, you know, what is going right? i think a lot of americans, you know listening to this perhaps on c-span -- >> yeah. [laughter] >> have a drink. >> millions of americans watching this on c-span, you know, i think they tend to bracket iraq and afghanistan together unfairly. iraq, the violence was 12 times greater, the civilian casualty rates just off the charts. >> right. >> you spent a lot of time in afghanistan. what has gone right in afghanistan, you know accepting a

mcchrystal, i think, was right to issue the edex that he did. the problem was the lectionary and to follow next line the next layer. each layer got more and more cautious because no one wanted mcchrystal's finger and their bosses bosses just they over interpreted and it tied our hands so that in situations where we really didn't support him and you saw this from the middle of our winner, what have you handwringing. unfortunately he did not have the opportunity. it did swing too far. in that part of the world theater people respect strength. when they see the taliban insurgents pushing and pushing the limits they constantly attacking nac a tepid response because of this bureaucratic wrangling. >> you have big reasons why a lot of things have to go right. but what is going right? americans listening on c-span. >> the.of them together. civilian casualty rates are off the charts. he's been a a lot of time in afghanistan. >> first a lot of things are gone right. my intent was to learn from the lesson in this book in the last ten years looking at it f

general mcchrystal i think was right to enter what he did here the problem was then the next layer of command, each layer of command he went down and were more and more cautious. they won in the crystal singer in their boss' boss' chest. so it overinterpreted and really tied her hands so in situations where the really did need support and you saw from the medal of honor winner, what have you, in the middle of firefights was frankly egregious. it was an overreaction. petraeus try to kind of break the pendulum when he came in the general mcchrystal did not the opportunity, but it did swing too far. that part of the world, people respect strength and when they see the taliban and insurgent and haqqanis pushing and pushing their limits and constantly attacking the basis of what have you and you see a very tepid response because of the bureaucratic wrangling, it sent the message. >> you have reasons why afghanistan -- a lot of things have to go right. but you know what is going right? i think a lot of americans listening perhaps on c-span. >> i think they tend to bracket iraq and afghanist

>> well you're talking about -- i'll go back to something general mcchrystal said some time ago. he said a decade. i think you could say decades. this is not all about just eliminating pockets of isis. you really actually have to control the time. so using munitions firing from the air and trying to knock out individual groups of enemy is one thing. but that won't get you long-term success. it really requires you to be on the ground a long time. >> sobering. thank you very much, colonel jack jacobs. appreciate it. >> you're welcome. >>> a massive fire at one of the world's tallest apartment buildings in dubai. two buildings nearby were also evacuated. so far no reports of deaths or injuries. ironically this building is called the torch. >>> frigid temperatures are moving to the northeast adding to the misery for syria's refugees. tents collapsing in one camp from the snow. aleppo is already in clashes. the u.n. is taking a cease-fire which is entering its fifth year now >>> a break through to get america's west coast docks back up and running after a slowdown. there are 29 ports

. >> civilian casualties, general mcchrystal really tightened up the rules of engagement. were you down they're? and i think i think that he was -- he really -- was it a sort of miscommunication? it made them overly risk-averse. >> it needed to swing. but. but i was they're in 2006 often times we would get engaged by relatively small or minor insurgent elements and colin the air force. it was too heavy handed. part of that was how few forces we had on the ground and how isolated we were, but part of it was we needed a shift in mentality terrorism focus to a counterinsurgency focus. the pendulum would too far. he far. he was right to issue the edicts that he did. the problem was the next layer of command. command. more and more and more cautious. they wanted his finger in their boss's boss is just it over interpreted and tied our hands so that the situations where we did need support and he saw this from the captain medal of honor winner what have you where it was frankly egregious and an overreaction. petronius tried to write the pendulum when he came in. unfortunately mcc

the commander of joint special operations command that proceeded who led the raid stanley mcchrystal given a flag taken on the mission. these are people instrumental in making this happen not people who were just completely not even involved in any way. none of this adds up. >> all right. peter bergen appreciate you being with us. thank you so much. >> thank you, john. >>> all right, let's dig deeper now. we're joined now by a retired member of seal team six, who spent a dozen years in the navy. author of the last rescue how faith and love saved a navy seal sniper. also joined syracuse university robert thompson center for television and popular culture. howard i want to start right with you. you heard what peter bergen just said. giving brian the benefit of the doubt, maybe not embedded with seal team six, any way he was on a helicopter with seal team six on invasion plus three as he said into the airport in baghdad? >> i would say absolutely not. there's certain things in a helicopter ride you have to consider. one of which is procedures. if the helicopter crashes, you have to know

>> i think what you saw, when general mcchrystal took over years ago, he tried to put them in place,lose air support and artillery strikes. those safeguards in some respects protected afghan civilians at the cost of putting u.s. troops at risk. they were very controversial america you are measures, an uptick in fighting also because afghan troops are going head to head with the taliban. >> let's look at the quality of troops on pt ground. combat operations formally ended this year but still troops there to train essentially supposed to be the focus of the mission. how equipped are afghan national security forces to ent counter the taliban. >> i think all military, especially infantry ground forces, they are built out around cultures military cultures. and we've been trying to as americans build that within afghanistan, with mixed effect and with mixed effect in iraq. but central to the strategy of this idea that you can create a truly national security force that holds in afghanistan, so one way or another for the u.s. to succeed there that's ha to work. >> which has proved to be a f

so i do think that you know general mcchrystal and other folks like that will tell you cannot kill your way to an end to this battle. there has to be another kind of countering that happens and that's what the white house is focused on toernlgtsdday. >> that may be true but the fact a lot of these countries have societies that do feel slighted but the very rich oil-rich nations. syria has oil. libya has oil. and they have a political system that doesn't work but it's not as though it's poverty only that causes these people to turn against us. >> yeah. i think that's actually the key question, right? there's a report out today saying that actually one of the biggest contributors to youth violence and youth disaffection in terms of extremism is actually injustice and poverty. so i think that injustice and corruption are huge issues in the united states that's facing a very strange balancing act in terms of how do you attack those issues while not disaffecting allies who you will need? and by the way, those allies are now leading their own air strike against isis targets. >> amber, getting