george mcclellan also has something to do with this. firstly, he does pursue the confederate army to the potomac river, and at the two-day battle of shepherdstown, mcclellan is able to put enough of a force in lee's rear that lee has to put the brakes on his movement towards williamsport and turn the army around to shepherdstown to make sure that george mcclellan isn't going to try any tricks there, and mcclellan at the same time will send portions of his army north to williamsport and will basically kick jeb stuart out of williamsport back into virginia, so lee loses his bridgehead. so, lee will decide on the morning of -- excuse me, in the afternoon of september 20th, that this thing's over, the campaign's done. he's run the wheels off his army. it's time to give it up. we've tried our best. so, what is lee's reaction to all of this? there's the movement south to try to strike the arm of the potomac. october 2nd of 1862, robert e. lee writes a general order to the army of northern virginia, to the soldiers of the army of northern virg

mcclellan has put them in a no-win situation. lee's reaction to this letter is written the next day. he says the feasibility of the proposition has been the subject of consideration with the president for some time. as far as advancing a column to the potomac with all the troops that can be made available. he conquers in the reviews as to the benefits to be obtained by taking the offensive and is very desirous of being able to carry it into effect. one month later joseph e. johnston is wounded at the battle of seven pines or fair oaks and of course robert e. lee is the one who is sprung to take into command of the army of virginia. and look what he does just three weeks after he takes command. of course, as you all know, lee strikes and lee attacks. but look at where lee does that. lee knows that his army, for the most part, throughout the war the confederacy is going to be out numbered. lee knows one main thing. he's got to keep the initiative. but also in order to win decisive battles, he has to use a tactic used by napoleon. m

george mcclellan also has something to do with this. he does pursue the confederate army to the potomac river. at the two-day battle of shepherdstown, mcclellan is able to put up enough force in lease rear that he has to turn the army around to make sure george mcclellan is not going to try any tricks. at the same time, mcclellan will send portions of his army north to williamsport and basically kicked jeb stuart out of williamsport into virginia. lee will decide on the morning -- the afternoon of september 20 that this is over. the campaign is done. it is time to give it up. we tried our best. reactions all of this? -- reaction to all of this? october second, he writes a general order to the soldiers of the army of northern virginia. it recounts everything they had done through cedar mountain, second manassas, and sharpsburg. says about that quick, incredible turnaround that the army of northern virginia was able to start in the eastern theater of war. "history records fewer examples of greater fortitude than this army has exhibited, a

george mcclellan has something to do with this. first he he pursues the confederate army to the potomac river and at the battle of shepher shepherdstown p lee has to put the brakes on his movement towards williamport and turn the army around to shepherds town to make sure that george mcclellan won't try any trick there is, at the same time he'll send portions of his army north to williamsport and will basically kick jeb stuart out of williamsport back into virginia so lee luges his bridge head. so lee will decide on the morning of -- excuse me, the afternoon of september 20 that this thing is over, the campaign is done. he's run the wheels off his army, time to give it up. so what is lee's reaction to all of this? there's the movement south to try and strike the arm of the potomac. october 2 of 1862 robert e. lee writes a general order to the army of northern virginia, the soldiers of the army of northern virginia and basically it recounts everything they had done from the seven days through cedar mountain 2nd manassas and sharp's

where mcclellan is going to throw in and attack. lee is going to throw in a counterattack to maintain his lines. but look at what happens starting at 8:30 in the morning. here's the situation. 8:30. watch where the center of power in the confederate army shifts, g.t. anderson's brigade goes north. two divisions of the confederate army will swing north to the west woods and the third, anderson's division will help out in the sunken road. again that may be seen as lee is simply masking where mcclellan is massing most of his troops. but let me offer this to you. 6:00 in the morning, here is the disposition of lee's army on the antietam battlefield. roughly half of it is north of sharpsburg. 9% is in the center, you have about a quarter each on the southern end of the battlefield and a quarter left in reserve. here's the situation by 10:00 a.m. 90, nine out of every ten infantrymen in robert e. lee's army is north of sharpsburg. 90%. to look at that and think that this is simply robert e. lee getting involved in a heavyweight boxing mat

george mcclellan also has something to do with this. first he does pursue the confederate army and at the battle of shepherds town lee has to put the breaks on and turn the army around to shepherds town to make sure that george mcclellan isn't going to try some tricks there. and at the same time mcclellan will send portions of his army north to williams port and basically kick jeff stewart out of williams port. so lee will decide on the morning of -- excuse me, the afternoon of september 20th this thing is over, the campaign is done. he's run the wheels off his army. it's time to give it up. wave tried our best. so what is lee's reaction to all of this? there's the movement south. october 2, 1862 whereby robert e. lee writes a letter to the soldiers of northern virginia. and it basically recounts everything they had done through the seven days. and at the end this is what lee says about that very quick, incredible turn around that the army of northern virginia is able to start in the eastern theater of the war. it says history records f

now what happens is we know the conservative war that mcclellan wanted comes to an end after telling lincoln to his face that he wants a war without emancipation. lincoln reluctantly allows him to continue because he has no better options in the antietam campaign and, again, his failure as a -- to take aggressive action is what brings him down and the aftermath of the antietam campaign brings down mcclellan and that leaves custer without a patron and he's floating free and his own future is in doubt because, again of that personal politics of patronage and supplicant. again, here's antietam. but custer comes back from his own exile long leave in which he met a young lady in monroe, michigan, named libby bacon and he comes back and he manages to find a second patron. this becomes key in his life because he, again, he's got a lot of merit and he's also somebody who has really put himself out there, again playing that dashing daring role, being able to roam the battlefield as mcclellan's right hand man and he spent a lot of time scouting and reporting back to mcclellan with the cavalry.

mcclellan appoints him to his staff. and this is a key moment because on the one hand here's this young man who has professional education, a technical well-educated officer, what we might call in a very unprofessional way, you know, part of the wave of the future. but he also rises and he rises through merit but he also rise through patronage. and a combination of merit and knowledge and ability with old-fashioned patronage who you know who's watching out for you. that combination plays a key role in custer's life and his rise during the civil war. so he takes part in the battle of the peninsula campaign as right hand man to mcclellan and this involves him in another side of the civil war which doesn't spell mcclellan's doom but plays a part in the troubles he faces. and this is the question of the politics, the meaning of the civil war. we see that actually visually after fair oaks, seven pines, pretty much everyone these days when he meets an old friend now on the confederate side, lieutenant james v. washington and w

he still all eyes on mcclellan. as further intelligence continues to flood in to lee's headquarters, lee begins to feel that mcclellan is less of a credible threat on the virginia peninsula. and i'll contend that the reason why he sends jackson in an offensive maneuver is because of pope's advance. towards the confederate capital. if lee does not go on the offensive to stop pope from moving further south against the confederate line of supply, but against confederate line of communication towards the confederate capital it squeezes lee from two directions. so the aggressive movement by pope moving south forces lee to go on the offensive. to stop pope from moving further towards the supply line, towards the route of the capital and towards placing him in a position of a classic pincer movement. if he sends jackson there defensively and pope continues to push forward, it gives lee less room to maneuver out of a possible pinser movement. >> thank you very much. [ applause ] >>> american history tv on c-span tv focuses

lincoln has this wonderful battlefield conference with mcclellan. who sets up the first set of photographs. in his tent with an american flag draped over the table. mcclellan is fascinating, his forehead is white, his cheeks are red. he's been out in the sun in the september sunshine, he's got the white brow. always wore a cap. and they're looking face to face, mcclellan should have said okay, i'm done with the press, clear the room. gardner convinced everyone to take this picture as well. as you see, lincoln is monumental. and he makes little mac look like a very little napoleon. that's the tent where they had their initial meeting. he said mcclellan had a perfectly good headquarters there. you see the house in the background. which is not really noticed in most pictures, they could have easily had their conference indoors, but it wasn't as photo generic. here is lincoln slouching, you can see him bending at the knee. he does not stand very straight. but he is a totem and it's mcclellan is forced to lift his eyes upward at his leader. like it or no

i will endeavor to keep general mcclellan quiet until this is over if rapidly executed. clearly this next campaign for jackson was to be one of an offensive nature. lee's hope for a quick offensive action by jackson against pope in the army of virginia and the return to his army was quickly dashed. jackson was slow, careful, and cautious during this time period. he had heard of federal forces concentrating in fredericksburg which if true posed a serious threat to richmond and the line of communications with the confederate capital. he was also struggling, as he told lee, to find a way to turn pope's position north of the rapiddan river. lee concurred with jackson's assessment to avoid frontal assaults against the position to use maneuver to get pope out of his strong position, bring him out into an open field and participate in then one of the classic assaults and hopefully victories. on august 8th, lee received a dispatch from jackson dated the previous day suggesting that he would attack the vanguard of pope's army as they concentrated at culpepper. they moved the divi

mcclellan should have said, i have done with the press, cleared the room. but gardner convinced everyone to take this picture as well. as you can see, lincoln is monumental. looked liketle mac a little napoleon. that is the tent where they had their initial meeting. mcclellan has a perfectly good headquarters there. do you see the house in the background? had their have easily conference indoors, but it was not as photogenic. there is lincoln slouching. you can see him ending at the knee. he is a totem, and mcclellan is upwardto lift his eyes at his leader, like it or not. this picture was influential in a way. lincoln, as was successfully argued a few years ago, this is lincoln putting himself in danger, in the inrendered city of richmond 1865, being greeted people -- african-american people whose freedom was actually commenced when the union army entered the city, because this was before the 13th amendment became official. by terms of the proclamation, when the troops occupy confederate territory, they had liberated. here is lincoln with his son clinging

mcclellan should have said, i'm done with the press, clear the room. but gardner convinced everyone to take this picture as well. as you see, lincoln is monumental. he makes mac look like a little napoleon. the thing that is amazing, and that's the tent where they had their initial meeting. mcclellan has a perfectly good headquarters there. you see the house in the background? which is not really noticed in most pictures. they could have easily had their conference indoors but it wasn't as photogenic. here is lincoln, by the way, slouching. you can see him bending at the knee. he does not stand very straight. but he is a totem and mcclellan is forced to lift his eyes upward at his leader, like it or not. as this picture was influential in a way. >> so we have time quickly for one more? >> again, the body of lincoln, as richard whiteman fox so successfully argued in his book a few years ago. this is lincoln putting himself in danger. in the surrendered city of richmond on april 4, 1865. being greeted by people, african-american people whose freedom was

mcclellan, the union joe johnston. i mean if the war had been up to johnston and mcclellan, they would still be retreating from each other today until they sort of bumped into each other from behind somewhere near taiwan. in the end, they are completely human. neither grant nor lee ever could or would, that the other was his preeminent adversary. thank you all for listening. [ applause ] >> we got time for a couple of questions and we'll break for lunch if you want to take a microphone, your name and your question. >> yeah i have a brief question. >> i have a long answer. >> you have a long answer. my name is david kinsle, i teach up in prince william county. grant always gets that -- that slur against him that he's a butcher. even though if you looked at robert e. lee overall in casualties. he sustained more casualties from the beginning of the war to the end of the war. and he couldn't afford to sustain those casualties. and they were both aggressive in their own way. but i mean, i wonder if, i don't want to say that

mcclellan. mcclellan who had little good to say about anybody, other than himself, i suppose, become positively lyrical in his disdain for halleck. quote, of all the men who have encountered in high position, says mcclellan in his autbiography, halleck was the most hopelessly stupid. it was more difficult to get an idea through his head than anyone who ever made the attempt. i do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end. well, you know, those kind of condemnations when added with the condemnations of historians, you know, bad enough. but they still don't reach the level of invective displayed by halleck's political contemporary, the people he d t dealt with in washington. bluff b. wade, quote, put halleck in charge of 20,000 men and he will not scare three sitting geese from their nests. adam gurousky, the senning polish born described it as, quote, the strangling pressure of an incubus. i had to look incubus up. and that's an evil spirit. so that says something. but t

mcclellan should have said, okay, i'm done with the press, clear the room. but gardner convinced him to take this picture as well. and as you see, lincoln is monumental and he makings little mac looking like a very little napoleon. and that's the tent where they had their initial meeting. he said mcclellan has a perfectly good headquarters there, you see the house in the background? which is not noticed in most pictures. they could have had their conference indoors, but it wouldn't have been as photogenic. and you can see lincoln lending at the knee, but he is a totem, and mcclellan is forced to lift his eyes to his leader. >> do we have time for one more? >> again, the body of lincoln, as richard whiteman flax told in his book a few years ago. this is lincoln putting himself in danger in the surrendered city of richmond, on april 4, 1865. being greeted by african-american people whose freedom was actually commenced when the union army entered the city, because this was before the 13th amendment becomes official, but by terms of the emancipation, when the tr

or at least mcclellan. but by the time gettysburg came along, the army's identity was not wrapped up in the commander, unlike the army of virginia which identified wholly with lee. and the army of the potomac came to identify with itself. it is one of the most remarkable organizations we've ever seen in our nation. they had a very powerful sense of identity. and the reason, in my view, gettysburg is so important to the nation is because it was so important to the army of the potomac. it was that justification of their self perception as a remarkable army which they called themselves before the battle and then afterwards, you see a rush within a matter of months to memorialize by the army, to memorialize the service here at gettysburg. the reynolds monument. other discussions of monuments at gettysburg. the creation of the national cemetery here. all of these things are a reflection of how important gettysburg was to the army. and it was a reflection of the fact that the army identified so strongly with itse

and also mcclellan's politics, how was that combined to how he was viewed? >> so meade was a democrat. he seems to have been sympathetic to the more cautious limited war policies of 1862. but he also shows signs clearly that he knows ultimately the determination of policy as it relates to confederate civilians and the abolition of slavery in the areas the army goes is not really his business in that he is not part of the process of making that policy. mcclellan very much saw himself as the part of the process in making that policy. pope saw himself as a process of making that policy. meade did not. and by the time he assumes command, he has managed to dodged the political pit falls of engaging in that battle of the debate which sunk men like mcclellan, sunk men like franklin and many others. but by the time he assumes command, the union's debate over the nature of war, over the aims of the war is largely resolved. the emancipation proclamation, although very controversial stimilates months of debate within the army and beyond all possible doubt, by the time

one was the ride around mcclellan. it was mosby who found mcclellan's flank was in the air. and mosby was one of the men who rode, or led stuart's ride around mcclellan during the peninsula campaign. he did a couple of other things for stuart that gained stewart's trust in mosby. he knew that mosby reported something, it was accurate, it was true. he could count on him to get the job done, and somewhere along this time as mosby, a scout for stuart, began to prove his worth, mosby began to espouse this idea of going behind union lines with a small group of men and annoying the union forces, disrupting their lines of communication. stuart would continually stiff-arm mosby saying, i don't have the people. i can't give you any men to go off and do this. but eventually very late december 1862 after the -- what was known as the christmas raid when stuart was up in northern loudoun county, mosby with him as a scout, stuart told mosby, i'm going to leave you behind. now the quote here from mosby says six, but it was actually nine men that stuart left with mosby. and he told mosby, y

mcclellan is ill and would not see the president. ged it at first. not justlans, he was putting out fires. he began planning what became the brown water navy. he started doing drawings of these ships, these riverboats, and they had to -- technology was changing and they were rifled and they could obliterate wood. meigs started designing iron covered riverboats that ultimately -- damn the torpedoes -- farragut used to turn the tide. the boats were not ready until later, actually. in any case, they made a big difference. michelle: does he ever see the battlefields? so much of his activities were legit to goal. did he get a chance -- were logistical. rolet: meigs relished his and he welcomed it. i get the sense he knew this was a match he was feted for. the 1840's andin 1850's, he is air again and boorish -- arrogant and boorish, he came to realize that he was genius.a logistical he had the support of the supportt and he had the of another cranky man, the secretary of war stanton. .eigs never served in battle he had gone out to bull run and saw the shoo

so helamati pushes his commande mcclellan had been fired right after the election. and there's some evidence lincoln had waited until after the election to fire mcclellan because of the political impact it wouldthe have. now he as ambrose burnside, and out on the mississippi river is ulysseses s. grant. he pushes them to engage in hard, tough fighting that will hurt something. so all three men will undertaket campaigns. which is unusual by the standards of 19th century incoln warfare. but this is p why. his it's the political imperative of lincoln, pushing his commanders in the field to go forward. well, what happens this december of 1862? let's take it chronologically. first, december 18th, 1862 burnside's crossed the river. robert e. lee's easiest victory, i agree with that. in one portion of the field they actually break the line. but for all intents and purposes it's a one-sided fight and burnside is sent scurrying back across the river from whence he came. grant starts moving over land. he goes pretty well until december 20, 1862, earl van dorn raids the depot

mcclellan had been fired right after the election, and lincoln had -- some evidence lincoln had waited until after the election to fire mcclellan because of the political impact it would have on the north, to kind of mitigate that. now he's got ambrose burnside with the army of the potomac in virginia, rosecrans in tennessee with the army of the cumberland, and out on the mississippi river is ulysses s. grant, and he pushes all of them to engage in "hard, tough fighting that will hurt somebody." and so, all three men will undertake campaigns in september of 1862, which is unusual by the standards of 19th-century warfare to have december campaigns, but this is why. it's the political imperative of lincoln pushing his commanders in the field to go forward. well, what happens this december of 1862? let's take it chronologically. first, december 13th, 1862, burnside's crossed the river the evening before, they hurl against fredericksburg, called robert e. lee's easiest victory. i certainly agree advivictory. i agree with that. for all intents and purposes, it's a one-sided fight and burnsi

and with replacements, mcclellan had been fired after the election and there was evidence that lincoln waited until after the election to fire mcclellan because of the political impact it would have on the north to mitigate that. now he's got the mississippi to cumberland and now on the mississippi river is yulysses s grant to engage in hard, tough fighting that will hurt somebody. so all three men will undertake campaigns in december of 1862, which is unusual. unusual by 19th century, to the standards of 19th century to have political campaigns. it's lincoln pushing command fors in the field going forward. well, what happens, this december of 1862, we'll take it chronologically. first december 1st, 1862, burnside's crossed the river two days before, the army of the potomac hurls itself against the heights of fredericksburg. robert e. lee's easiest victory. i certainly agree with that. in one portion of the field they break the line, but for all intents and purposes, it's a one-side fight and burnside is sent scurrying across the river. it's a complete bummer for the north. then moving

and so he pushes his commanders and with some replacements now, mcclellan had been fired right after the election and there's some evidence lincoln waited to after the election to fire mcclellan because of the political impact it would have on the north, to mitigate that, now he is ambrose burnside with the army of the potomac in virginia, he has rosecrans and on the mississippi river is ulysses s. grant and he urges them to engage in hard, tough fighting that will hurt somebody. so all three men undertake campaigns in december of 1862 which is unusual by the standards of 19th century warfare to have december campaigns but this is the political imperative of lincoln pushing his commanders in the field to go forward. well, what happens, this december of 1862, let's take it chronologically. first, december 13, 1862, burnside has crossed the river two days before, the army of the potomac hurls itself against the heights of fredericksburg, it's been called robert e. lee's easiest victory. i certainly agree with that. in one portion of the field they break the line but for all intents and

mcclellan is ill and would not see the president. would not even see him. oh, the general is not feeling mcclellan'sesident, aides would say. meigs just winged it at first. he made plans, he was not just putting out fires. he began planning what became the brown water navy. in his first day in office as a quartermaster, he started doing drawings of these ships, these riverboats, and they had to -- technology was changing in the non, and they were rifled and they could obliterate wood. they could have wooded this thick and they would just blow it off. meigs started designing iron covered riverboats that ultimately -- damn the torpedoes -- farragut used to turn the tide. >> so -- robert: i'm sorry. the boats were not ready until later, actually. in any case, they made a big difference. michelle: since we are in washington, does he ever see the battlefields? so much of his activities were logistical. did he ever have a chance to command troops, for example? robert: meigs relished his role had, and hehat he welcomed it. i get the sense he knew this was a match

mcclellan certainly did not. joe johnson didn't. macarthur didn't. mcchrystal didn't. they understood it. grant repeatedly declared that he would carry out any order, whether he agreed with it or not if he came up against an order he could not in conscience obey, he would resign. leee left no such declarations, but i think his actions spoke loudly that he harbored virtually identical sentiments about duty and about subordination. neither had any evident ego getting in their way, though they had human blind spots. grant would never admit he had been surprised on the first day at shiloh. he is about the only one who did not admit it. you will note the wonderful saying that's probably attributed to sherman. surprised? hell no. we were astonished. [ laughter ] grant will never admit lee baffled him when he crossed the james. let me add a bit of dimension to the story of lee's final campaign towards appomattox. what is little known today in large part because i think a lot of the sources that we might have had went up in flames with richmond and also many of the people simp