>> mcgurk: yes. >> kroft: or use their own version of the code. >> mcgurk: something similar-- "son of result, what was once abstract theory has now become a distinct possibility. if you can do this to an uranium-enrichment plant, why couldn't you do it to a nuclear power reactor in the united states or an electric company? >> oÓ murchú: you could do that to those facilities. it's not easy. it's a difficult task, and that's why stuxnet was so sophisticated, but it could be done. >> langner: you don't need many billions, you just need a couple of millions. and this would buy you a decent cyber attack, for example, against the u.s. power grid. >> kroft: if you were a terrorist group or a failed nation-state, and you had a couple of million dollars, where would you go to find the people that knew how to do this? >> langner: on the internet. >> kroft: they're out there? >> langner: sure. >> kroft: most of the nation's critical infrastructure is privately owned, and extremely vulnerable to a highly sophisticated cyber weapon like stuxnet. >> i can't think of another area in homeland securit