mcmaster. some analysts estimate that the globe. soon the cuttlebug or some of the senate sending love the vibrancy of the monogram or promotions to listen to what she imagined she did with him. she was twenty six. it's the excitement was stunned said. you can still see this house we bought the molding on the jets. nobody wanted to teach it to pay them but they got it. doherty. she proceeded to cut off the deep enough to live in. the i know gina said. you don't go to school. just to satisfy the bombings the stoush dunno what a great bible stay till this coming up off to the bay. the sentences and bought a bass box. focus on i know that and started we are gone national. welcome back to watching news bits off a shovel when on top the ticker forces with a pocket some of the made over the death sentence handed out to bomb the heoes along with a sheeple sentenced to death. the fruit including that is the most part he got up from a security agency chief and former deputy government is to play involvement in the country's biggest ever on f

there are political reasons of the fallacies hr mcmaster put on the table. naval power is pretty clean. airpower, the way it is now conducted by the united states, is very clean from the standpoint of the american people. you can hope to do it without incurring a single casualty. land power is dirty. the worst phrase in american politics right now is boots on the ground. we are, and this will be my final comment, we are in a time which to those with historical memories reminds me of the immediate post-vietnam time in 1973. it took us the better part of a decade to get over the psychological and political consequences. if i'm right, that's where we are after 12 and half years of war in the middle east, realistic thinking about our defense future ought to take the sentiments of the american people into account, and if you don't like them, figure out how to challenge them and change them. without't let that pass giving you to the opportunity to respond. why don't we just go act down the road. >> i would say two quick things. it's a very nice analysis and hard t

mcmaster's approach and 2005. based -- faced with a similar problem, he didn't attack at the esa rounded, isolated it and then slowly bit by bit he cleared it and then to hold the position his forces and iraqi police and army inside the city and smaller combat -- outpost make sure the insurgents could not rise up again and control the city. and by doing this he substantially altered the dynamic of the battle. it was a great example of counterinsurgency warfare but it was just one unit among many. nevertheless, it was pretty clear that attacking iraqi cities to save him was not the answer, in fallujah, the second battle of fallujah was the end to that. this period of the war spiraling downward not adequate support ended in february 2006 with the destruction of the shrine, the fourth holiest shrine in shia islam. up to this point the shia had been fairly responsive to calls to not make the situation worse. the ayatollah understood they outnumber the of the mrs. and, therefore, they could outvote everyone else and th

, you know, i can't believe that a former marine sergeant is entering into a debate with general mcmaster, but we were taught to go with up the hill against superior forces, and so why should i change now? [laughter] you know -- >> about the best method. we can talk afterwards. [laughter] >> well, that's, you know -- [laughter] that's, you know, no one said we were the smartest force, but we are the toughest force. [laughter] you know, the point i was making was not about extended commitments, because we have, indeed, demonstrated our capacity to maintain extended, deterrence-focused commitments in korea, in europe and elsewhere. i was talking about extended conflict. and that is a distinction with a difference. right? the american people can go for months without noticing that we have tens of thousands of troops in south korea. they can't go for a day without seeing what's going on in afghanistan. they tonight like it. that's the difference -- they don't like it. >> do they even know really what's going on in afghanistan? i think what's remarkable about afghanistan is i think it may be t