. >> he provides a different genealogy mayor richard sent who is the activists from cambridge merrill lynch that is called the ladies general who has the unprecedented struggle in 1963 and 642 help desegregate to sign a a peace accord but also goes to malcolm x leadership conference in detroit where the outcome delivers the famous message where he lays out the second revision of the national and international political revolution. >> host: you write malcolm x was nothing less than the civil-rights era invisible man. >> guest: of civility and the terms in way historians view malcolm x. they are not part of their heroic point*. he usually only pops up around 1963/64 and only serves as a foil to dr. kagan. he is characterized as a profit of rage he was not only a brilliant political strategist and not one of the most important figures of the postwar period. >> you know, back in the '50s the most important term -- important political organizer and holland. >> release from prison in 1952 after serving six years for burglary he transforms himself while in prison in massachusetts and comes out of

merrill lynch was geared 30 to one. these wall street banks had effectively turned themselves into hedge funds. so there was a hedge fund crisis, they were just hedge funds disguised as investment banks. i think is, so you know, the leverage with the big problem. it just came about in, came about in the inside of the financial system rather than on the progress. [inaudible] >> but they were customers. not enormous. the biggest buyers ironically of a lot of these turned out to be european banks. because for some complicated regular toy reason, they didn't have to take the capital charges for buying subprime loans under the capital ruled. so that's why it's been a mystery, until i realized why when the subprime market collapse did first bank that that went under was a german bank. and it's because it was financially in their interest to buy all the securities. so what was happening merrill lynch, goldman sachs, whoever were buying all these mortgages from florida, california, wherever, turn them into securities and sent t

merrill lynch was geared. these big wall street banks that turn themselves into a hedge funds other was a hedge fund crisis. hedge funds were disguised as investment banks i think would be my answer. so, you know, leverage with the big problem. it just came about, came about in the inside of the financial system rather on the periphery is. >> customers. >> they were but not enormous. the biggest buyers ironically of a lot of these securities turned out to be european banks because for some complicated regulatory reason they didn't have to take big capital charges for buying sub-prime loans under the capital rules so that is why there has been a mystery and the realize when the sub-prime market collapse was the german lenders bank and it is because it was financially in their interest to buy the securities so what was happening is, merrill lynch, goldman sachs of weber were buying all of these mortgages from florida, california whereever turn them into securities incense them to europe to sell them to german ba

. >> and we had several hearings on bank of america and merrill lynch and you were involved in that decision. you were supportive of what took place with the merger of -- the acquisition of merrill by bank of america, yes or no? >> that is right that at that time i was part of an effort to try to find a solution -- private solution to merrill lynch to that point and i thought that that action at the time was necessary and appropriate, yes. >> and today you have said that, you know, you think the initial decision relative to aig and the payment to the counterparty, you think that was appropriate, you stated that strongly in your written testimony, you talk about this is in the best interest of the american people. >> i do. i do. >> we did not act to help form banks, we acted because the consequences of failing at that time in those circumstances would have been catastrophic to our economy, american families and american businesses. you think it was definitely the right decision? >> i do. >> and the staff that worked for you at the new york fed would be in agreement with that analysis, that th

in july, a similar action was filed by merrill lynch against merrill lynch. and on august 7, nasaa announced the first ars settlement which was with citigroup pursuant to an investigation led by the texas state securities board. under which the company would fully reimburse its 40000 customers who had been unable to sell their auction rate securities and pay civil penalties of $100 million. significantly, the sec took no public action with respect to ars. until august 17, 2008, when they announced a preliminary settlement with citigroup comparable to the agreements already reached with members of nasaa. sadly, state investigations into corporate abuses that federal officials have missed through the years have resulted, not in reform at the federal level, what in criticism of the states. some federal agencies have responded by issuing regulations broadly preempting the state law, or even bringing suit against state officials. states have found themselves in gate with a battle against certain federal agencies simply to retain the authority to protect the intere

commissioner heather murren, retired merrill lynch dictor, pressed goldn sachs chief exutive lloyd blankfein on the issue. goldmais expected to award billions of dollars in bones next week. >> how can you reconle these things, gin what's going on in the couny economically? and do you feel thatour compensaon adequately reflects yourirm's behaviors, what the standards ofhe times are? >> if you look at the hiory of our compensationthe compensation alwaycorrelated with theesults of the firm, as it did last year. >> holman: blankin noted that he and other top execuves at goldman dinot receive bonuses last yea commission chairman phil angelides, aormer democratic treasurer of cifornia, sharply questioned him about goldm's practice opackaging risky mortgages anselling them to investorat the same time the firm took fincial positions tting against those troubled assets. >> what we do is ris manageme. cause we had this risk, becauswe were accumulating positions-- which, by the y, we acqred from clients who wanted to sell them to us-- have to out ourselves and provide ansource the other side of the tra

bank of america, possibly, not to talk about the losses that it could incur with the purchase of merrill lynch. so all of his backroom secrecy, this idea that big government and big banks are colluding to hide information from investors has led to these proposals to audit the fed, all kinds of other things. i think if we get out of the bailout business, people will feel more comfortable that there is transparency, consistent release of information. that the government isn't using its powers to favor certain institutions over others. so some of this pressure will go away. as for this specific proposal of auditing the bed, i don't think it's helpful because it looks like congress has -- the fed is always politicized. the congress obviously votes on the fed chairman, but we don't need more day-to-day political interference if there are auditing monetary policy, it confuses the markets as to what the fed is -- is it making its decisions based on the merits or based on its congressional audit. thank you. >> henry stern, new york specific. nicole, what you say seems eminently sensible to me, and i t

. >> and we had several hearings on bank of america and merrill lynch and you were involved in that decision. you were supportive of what took place with the merger of -- the acquisition of merrill by bank of america, yes or no? >> that is right that at that time i was part of an effort to try to find a solution -- private solution to merrill lynch to that point and i thought that that action at the time was necessary and appropriate, yes. >> and today you have said that, you know, you think the initial decision relative to aig and the payment to the counterparty, you think that was appropriate, you stated that strongly in your written testimony, you talk about this is in the best interest of the american people. >> i do. i do. >> we did not act to help form banks, we acted because the consequences of failing at that time in those circumstances would have been catastrophic to our economy, american families and american businesses. you think it was definitely the right decision? >> i do. >> and the staff that worked for you at the new york fed would be in agreement with that analysis, that th

securities and exchange commission accused bank of america of failing to disclose huge losses at merrill lynch before buying it. the bank is already charged with hiding bonuses paid at merrill. still, the news of a possible bank tax was met with anger on wall street. where some saw it as a way to get at bonuses. jamie diamond, chairman of jp morgan chase told a washington conference on monday, quote, i'm getting tired of the constant vilification. this is not a casino. still, the issue won't go away. the federal deposit insurance corporation said today that it may impose higher premiums on banks to discourage risky lending and investments. the question of whether to tax banks may not be limited simply the question of whether to tax banks may not be limited simply to costs associated with the so- called tarp program. all told, the federal reserve and the government committed several trillion dollars to the financial system at the height of the crisis. so what, if anything, should be done about the banks? we get two views. bert ely is a banking industry consultant who runs his own firm in northe

at that time, i was part of an effort to try to find a solution, private solution, to merrill lynch at the point. and i thought it was necessary and appropriate, yes. >> and today you said you think the initial decision relative to aji, if you think that was appropriate. you stated that strongly in your written testimony you talk about this is in the best interest of the american people. we did not act to help for banks. we acted as a consequence of having at the time in those consequences would've been catastrophic. do you think it was deadly the right decision? >> i do. >> and the staff that work for you at the new york fed would be in agreement with that analysis, that this was so critical this had to get done, the sky was going to fall, the world was going to and if we did not do what you decide to do relative to the counterparts, is that correct? >> i believe it is, but i think to be fair to say, there were those among us involved in this, in each of the industries that were involved, washington, new york treasure, who were deeply troubled by that choice. >> but you thought it was

. >> and we had several hearings on bank of america and merrill lynch and you were involved in that decisionright that at that time i was part of an effort to try to find a solution -- private solution to merrill lynch to that point and i @@nch to that point and i we acted because the consequences of failing at that time in those circumstances would have been catastrophic to our economy, american families and businesses. you think it was definitely the right desigs? >> i do. >> and the staff would be in agreement with that analysis, that this was so critical, this had to get done. the sky was going to fall, the world was going to end if we did not do what you decided to do. is that correct? >> i believe it is. but i think there are, to be fair to say, there were those among us involved in this, in each of the institutions involved, washington, new york treasury, who were deeply troubled by that choice were not comfortable with this. >> were comfortable but thought it was what you had to do. >> i believe that. yes. >> and was so important, that this was critical to american families, american

to write that brian moynihan recently took over bank of america after the troubled merger with merrill lynchd he is planning to say that these decisions can affect the main street. , but he will stop short of a statement from a few months ago, confirming that there will be a blowout 2009 profit level. although he is not expected to repeat that in his testimony, his remarks came one week after he drew fire for saying that he was doing god's work, but it was never clear what the subject of the atonement was. "we have reason to apologize, without focusing on the things that the firm did wrong. -- did wrong." gary, detroit. caller: how are you doing? i want to the answer your question with a question. if i took a job to clean out your fan at -- your finances and burn your house for the ground, would you want apology? thank you. host:ñr burlington, vermont. caller: i believe that apologies are very important, but there is a time and place for it. i believe that the time and place for these guys is when they come before the parole board. host: more on your thoughts and apologies in the business wo

. >> host: merrill lynch your on with michelle malkin. >> caller: i am a big fan.with all of the money that is being spent on the t.a.r.p, a stimulus, health care, that is bogging this country down tax wise, will we ever go back to a capitalistic country? or do you think obama's plan is to go through and turn us into a socialist nation? >> guest: he is referring to a strategy of the left that if you're not familiar with it, there is a very informative piece of and a merit -- informative thinker of the essentially creating a false crisis and chaos in order to secure the left agenda. as i said earlier in the show, i think the bush a administration helped inordinately unfortunately to pave the way for what obama is doing now. under the bush of frustration t.a.r.p was designed and first pass and then the same architects -- architects came to the but obama administration and tim geithner is a protege of those government sacks taxes that are continuing the policies hong -- and now it how many stealth bailouts have been rammed through without congressional authority at al

a month later there was a suit against ubs and july a similar action was filed against merrill lynch and on august 7 nablus -- nasaa announced the first summit with citigroup and that led to an investigation under which the company would fully reimburse the 40,000 customers who were unable to sell their option rate securities and pay penalties of $100 million. significant they the fcc took no public action with respect to ars until 2008 when they announced a preliminary settlement with citigroup comparable to the agreements already reached with members of nasaa. suddenly state investigations into corporate abuses that officials had mr. resulted not in reporting at the federal level but putting criticism at the state. some agencies have responded by issuing all agencies for state law or bringing suit against state officials. they have found themselves engaged in the battle of federal agencies simply to obtain the authority of the interest of the investors. the national security markets improvement act of 1996 significantly impacted the role of state regulators. it pre-empted many stat

with reasonable partnerships established in the northeastern states from new hampshire down to merrill lynch and also there are four canadian provinces joining the initiative as well. but interestingly some states like estrogen york or pennsylvania are not part of what they have the power plays. and california is one of the leading states in terms of reducing greenhouse gases and with the global warming solution act since 2006. and incur react there are over a carbon point* system and the consumers use less energy and they can get some credit back and get deiter cashback or give them gift cards. the difference is basically the u.s. is primary lead the for the state has the economy and makes changes. but it is privately-- primarily driven by the approach but notice there is some movement of the private sector because they commit profits as well. the ceo illustrates the consumption rate by type. it is about 7% and out of that with the renewable energy of 53% but it is less which is 2% but one-fourth of them come from waste. most countries have ambitious goals comment they now have over 50% of

and i think it covered their stearns, lehman brothers, merrill lynch, goldman sachs, and morgan stanley some of which -- one of which failed, some of which had to be acquired, and the others became bank holding companies. companies, during the financial crisis. did the program failed in providing sufficient prudential supervision? >> i think we have to conclude that that program was not successful in providing prudential supervision. the program as i understand was the love as a result to changes in european law that required the five largest u.s. investment banks be subject to consolidated supervision by some entity, and because they were investment banks and not commercial banks, they elected to be supervised by the sec. so the sec created the csc program. prior to that the good news is prior to that, and investment bank holding companies were not subject to any supervision at all. so that was you to be a good thing to bring under the umbrella of regulation. i think -- i have lots of concerns about the program and about many of the specifics in. but let me say that generally, i think

and i think it covered bear stearns, lehman brothers, merrill lynch, goldman sachs, and morgan stanley some of which -- one of which failed, some of which had to be acquired and the others became bank holding companies during the financial crisis. did the program fail in providing sufficient prudential supervision? >> i think we have to conclude that the program was not successful in providing prudential supervision. the program as i understand it was developed as a way to change european law that required that the five largest u.s. investment banks subject to consolidated supervision by some entity and because they were investment banks are not commercial banks they elect it to be supervised by the fcc. at the fcc the program prior to that investment bank holding companies were not subject to any supervision at all. so that was due to be a good thing to bring them under the umbrella of regulation. i think -- i have lots of concerns about the program and about many of the specifics. i may say that generally i think there were several problems. one is that it required the sec to become

i think it covered a bear stearns, lehman brothers, merrill lynch, goldman sachs, and morgan stanley. one of which failed, some of which had to be acquired, and the others became bank holding companies. that was during the financial crisis. did the program fail in providing sufficient credentials supervision? >> we have to conclude that the program was not successful. as i understand the program was developed in regard to changes in european law that require the five largest u.s. investment banks be subject to the consolidated supervision by some entity. because there were investment banks, not commercial ones, they elected to be supervised by the sec. the sec created the program. prior to that, the good news -- investment bank holding companies were not subject to any supervision at all. that was due to be good, to bring them under the umbrella of regulation. i have lots of concerns about the program and many of the specifics. generally, i think there were several problems. one is that requires the sec to become a provincial regulator, which is not traditionally what it had done. it

notably, goldman sachs, merrill lynch, and a handful of large european banks. i cannot understand why you did not seek european governments contribution to this bailout of their banking system. for monetary policy to regulation, consumer protection transparency and independence, your time as fed chairman has been a failure. you stated time and again during the housing bubble that there was no bubble. after the bubble bursting you repeatedly claimed the fallout would be small. and you clearly did not support the systemic risk that you claimed the fed was supposed to be looking out for. when i come -- where i come from, we punish failure, not reward it. that is certainly the way it was when i played baseball and it is the way across all of america, presently. judging by the current treasury secretary, some may think washington does reward failure, but that should not be the case. i will do everything i can to stop your nomination, and drag out this process as long as i can. we must put an end to your and the feds failure, and there is no better time than now. you

in july a similar action was filed by merrill lynch. and on august of 7, the first settlement with citigroup under which the company would fully reimburse it's 40,000 customers who had been unable to sell their auction-rate securities and pay several penalties of $100 million. significantly, the sec took no public action with respect to ars until august 7, 2008 when they announced a preliminary settlement comparable with members. sadly, state investigation into corporate abuse that is federal officials have missed through the years have resulted not in reform at the federal level but increases in other states. some federal agencies have responded by issues regulation broadly pri efforting the state law or even bringing suit against state officials. states have a battle against current federal agency simply to pretear the authority to protect the interest of the investors. the national security mortgage improvement act of 1996 significantly impacted the role of state regular -- regulators. it prohibited the state from taking preventive a