-- at least the telephoning metadata collection. and so my point is that this strongly suggests that the court will be highly skeptical of the claim that the third party doctrine can be applied in this new context, that it means that when the government collects the meta telephoning metadata, possibly other metadata as well, that there is tho fourth amendment violation. i'm not saying that metadata n t violation. i'm not saying that metadat fou amendment violation. i'm not saying that metadata would therefore be impermissible. what i think is we'll see a shift. and also a new focus on whether or not the foreign intelligence section applies and new pressure on what's known as the special needs doctrine which justifies a range of searches that require less than reasonable suspicion, sometimes suspicionless search based on compelling government needs separate from law enforcement needs. and then we have agreed to speak very shortly so i won't get into the details but i hope we get a chance to talk about the ways in which i think data c

by metadata and do the analysis that was done in smith. right? he did so -- it was sort of a -- he said that it's third party and it's like similar type information. but wouldn't -- doesn't the, doesn't it require that actually he -- well, should it require that determination is made based upon if you're talking about a right to privacy. you look at each part of the metadata and make a determination at that point. why shouldn't the court have to go through that exercise? >> i think that the record in this case reflects that if you're talking about the type of information that's at issue that we are talking about the same type of call data record -- call detail records at issue. so the number call, number received. the routing information, time and duration of the calls. we're not talking about name or address or financial information or cell site location. >> the question is whether the technology hasn't changed so much that the analysis that it's just a pen register doesn't work anymore. >> the next two points i would make on that are, on

people could -- the government could, if it chose, if someone looked into it, from this metadata could determine it's likely that someone was hiv positive or it's likely that someone had an abortion. couldn't verizon find out those things if it chose? couldn't verizon go into the records that it has and make the same kind of search and determine the same kind of private information and use it for purely commercial purposes, not remotely as important to anyone as the reason the government seeks this data -- to use this data to do, but just because they might be able to make money by selling a list of people that verizon thinks have recently developed an unwanted pregnancy and they could sell that list to abortions are us or an anti-abortion group to send information to those people. verizon could don't that? >> i don't flow if they could as a matter of our relationship with verizon. i don't think our contract provides for unregulated access to our call records. as a matter of fact, the only access that verizon typically has to our records is likely through its computerized collection of

the same thing is true of the telephone metadata. that's the critical difference between the situation we're talking about with respect to intelligence collection and the riley case. the riley case it was the defendant's phone. it was his phone on which he had his information. so the question is, to what extent can you get information from that person. under what circumstances can you get information from that person. the third party doctrine says once you've given the information to somebody else under what circumstances can you get the information from somebody else? now, having said that, i do think there is a strong sense that that doctrine can't necessarily be applied unqualifiedly in the current technological environment. and i do think that -- i tend to agree with chuck that what we're likely to see is a recalibration of the doctrine. and i think particularly of the context where people are storing their entire life in the cloud. it may be that there is a difference that courts will draw a difference between the types of infor

they were designed to be aggressive, especially the metadata bulk collection, that has been essentially the president said we're going to work to top doing-- stop dhooing. >> rose: do agree with the president on that. >> i agree with the president rses it should have been done-- shouldn't have been done. >> everything we did was right-- nothing was done that we shouldn't have done. >> rose: did the president say he was going to stop it. >> he did say that. >> rose: does that mean you shouldn't have been doing. >> no. >> rose: what is the reason to stop it? >> i think the reason is the public outcry over that. >> rose: we thought it was a good idea, and we are happy we did it, the only reason we are going to stop doing it is because the public seems to be up set. >> i wouldn't be quite so glib. we're always trying to get this right had. this is my main point had. there is lots of discussion, what is the right thing to do here. that program was one that was believed to be necessary by the intelligence community. but once it was revealed and the president made the decision to reform it, th

people could -- the government could, if it chose, if someone looked into it, from this metadata could determine it's likely that someone was hiv positive or it's likely that someone had an abortion. couldn't verizon find out those things if it chose? couldn't verizon go into the records that it has and make the same kind of search and determine the same kind of private information and use it for purely commercial purposes, not remotely as important to anyone as the reason the government seeks this data -- to use this data to do, but just because they might be able to make money by selling a list of people that verizon thinks have recently developed an unwanted pregnancy and they could sell that list to abortions are us or an anti-abortion group to send information to those people. verizon could don't that? >> i don't flow if they could as a matter of our relationship with verizon. i don't think our contract provides for unregulated access to our call records. as a matter of fact, the only access that verizon typically has to our records is likely through its computerized collection of

that's the metadata program. the change the president made in his speech is that nsa used to be able to do three hops, seed number to the bronx to who he called to the next one. president made it two hops. seed number, bad guy, bronx, one hop out. the president also said nsa has to go to the court every time it makes that query. this is very unusual. keep in mind what the court is judging. the court is judging whether or not nsa has a reasonable, arcticable suspicion that that foreign number collected through foreign intelligence is actually affiliated with i'al qaeda. it's not you the court is checking on. it's not your rights it is double booking. it's looking over the shoulder of the intelligence professional to see whether or not their intelligence judgment was correct. last full year nsa has records, that yelling through saying anybody talk to them happened 288 times. >> and then 702 and we will open it up to questions. >> it starts to get -- people's eyes glaze over. you are talking about nuances. this is c

under this other provision of the law, exactly what we are applying for a goodly metadata 215 k. so that sets the context for this debate over the legality of the program under the statute and also constitutionally. another thing that is relevant to the transparency issue is that the director of national intelligence also has a public web site where publishes declassified documents. interestingly enough it's a tumbler page. it's actually an interesting resource were for declassified documents in this context. there's a lot of historical historical information they are historical information there now and they are continuing to publish more and more information there as well. we have also had public reports issued by the liberty oversight board. one report finding that the 215 metadata program was in fact illegal and it was also an effective and in a report by the president's review group that was appointed last year to review intelligence programs made a similar finding about effectiveness and make other significant recommendations. there has been a lot of reporting going on in a

by metadata that was done in smith. he said that it's third party and it's, like, similar-type information. but wouldn't -- doesn't the -- doesn't it require that actually he should require that actually that determination is made based upon if you're talking about the right pricing, you look at each part of the metadata and make the right determination. >> i think that the record in this case reflects, if you're talking about the type of information that's at issue, that we are talking about the same type of call detail records that were at issue in smith. so the number call and number received, routing information, time and duration of the calls. we're not talking about name or address or financial information. >> so the next two points that i would make on that are, one, the ability of met-data to reveal useful information was known at the time of smith and even though the expectation is that phone companies are assembling the metadata, that did not give rise to a protected fourth amendment interest. right before her

in 2006 they applied for the first business record call me metadata order. that fisa court granted that application without even writing a written opinion. they didn't write a written opinion because the department of justice basically pointed at the 2004 opinion and said this within internet metadata is what we're applying for. it sort of sets the framing and the context for this debate over the legality of the program again under the statute and also constitutionally. another thing that's sort of relevant to the transparency issue is that the director of national intelligence. also has a public-facing website where it publishes declassified documents interestingly enough it's a tumblr page. it's actually an interesting resource for declassified documents in this context. there's a lot of historical information up there now and they are continuing to publish more and more information there as well. we have also had public reports issued by the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. one report finding that the 215 metadata program was illegal and it wa

that's collection and metadata. that's why we did it.t was in response to a very specific challenge. if we had not in some way dealt with, we would have gone deaf. technology change number two. nsa spent most of its life watching the soviet union. there isn't anyone in the room, regardless of your political persuasion is going to raise that much of a finger, civil liberties concerns with nsa intercepting soviet rocket forces communications coming out of moscow going over hops over the mountains out to icbm fields in siberia, you know, while we're looking for interesting words to pop up on the net like launch. [ laughter ] the 21st century equivalent of that isolated signal on a dedicated network being run by a superpower, the 21st century equivalent of that signal are proliferator terrorist, money launderer, child trafficker, e-mails, coexisting with your e-mails in a single unified, global communication structure. there is no way nsa continues to do what it used to do for you if it can't go out there and be in the flow why your communic

the one of james clapper, where he is being questioned by ron wyden who actually knows about the metadataollection program but doesn't want to say. >> let's go to senator ron wyden questioning director of intelligence james clyburn during a 2013 senate hearing. this is before stones revelations about the and or say -- nsa surveillance program. >> does the nsa collect any type of data at all, millions or hundreds of millions of americans? >> no, sir. >> it does not. >> not wittingly. our cases where they could inadvertently perhaps collect, but not wittingly. >> so there you have james laura, explain, what he was forced to say after the snow in revelations. >> this is an important moment. i think both for snowden when he was watching it, but the situation -- what is happening there, ron wyden sits on the intelligence committee and he knew very well the nsa was collecting the metadata records, the sort of call records under section 215 of the patriot act under "secret" interpretation of the law. so ron wyden knows this and is trying to question james clapper. james clapper clearly lies beca

metadata does not provide the content of any communication, it is incomplete information, and even that is developed access and when time is of the efforts. i wish we had time and armor, especially when lives are on the line. we usually do not. there is a misconception is that is building a back door. that also is not true. we are not seeking a backdoor approach. we want to use the front door with transparency. we want clear guidance provided by law. we are completely comfortable with court orders and legal process, front doors that provide us the evidence and information we need to investigate crime and prevent attacks. are goingrsaries to try to exploit vulnerabilities they find, but we think it makes more sense to address any security risks by developing interception solutions at the front and in the design phase rather than resorting to patchwork solutions when law enforcement comes knocking after the fact. with the sophisticated encryption there may be no solution at all, even the government at a dead end, all in the name of privacy and network security. folks sometimes say you cou

the first is folks say, good folks say, you still have access to metadata which includes photo records and location information stored with the telecommunication carriers, and that is absolutely true. metadata does not provide the content of any communication, it is incomplete information, and even that is developed access and when time is of the efforts. i wish we had time, especially when lives are on the line. we usually do not. there is a misconception is that is building a back door. that also is not true. we are not seeking a backdoor approach. we want to use the front door with transparency. we want clear guidance provided by law. we are completely comfortable with court orders and legal process, front doors that provide us the evidence and information we need to investigate crime and prevent attacks. cyber adversaries are going to try to exploit vulnerabilities they find, but we think it makes more sense to address any security risks by developing interception solutions at the front and in the design phase rather than resorting to patchwork solutions when law enforcement comes

especially the metadata bulk collection. thiswas -- i agree at point.indiscernible] did was the right. >> if they're going to stop it does that mean we shouldn't have been doing it? >> no. the public outcry over this and the need -- >> we thought this was a good idea, and the only reason we are going to stop is because the public is upset. >> i would not be so glib. we were always trying to get this right. there is always a discussion of what is the right thing to do. that program was believed to be necessary by the intelligence immunity. once it was revealed and the president made the decision to reform it, and we are going to move forward. the main point is the president it is going to maintain operational effectiveness. even with reforms the goal is to keep it as effective as it was before. >> did it hurt our relationship with any country we have had a relationship with? >> i don't think that these programs -- there were other aspects of what was revealed about the way nsa does collection that interfered. it harms those relationships. you mentioned t

from all over the internet, put it through our systems, vet the information that goes with it, add metadataend it all over the company. whenever breaking news happens this studio will light up, these people will be working to confirm information, and we'll bring you what has happened whenever it does. >> well, you have got ton see that during this hour, and it's been a very busy year for us from the polar vortex to the fight against isis to candy crush on the wall, and so much more. on behalf of shepard smith, and the entire fox news deck, we're glad you trusted to us bring you the news fasters and more accurately than ever before. and of course, when news breaks out, we'll break in. >>> on this day in 2001 the war in afghanistan began. george w. bush said the goal was to crush al qaeda and the tall began and bring osama bin laden to justice. u.s. special forces finally took down bin laden almost a decade later in pakistan. but america entered its longest war 13 years ago today. i'm harris faulkner in for shep. "your world" with neil cavuto is next. the dow is coming down. we're at 267 off.

but metadata does not provide the content of any communications. it's incomplete information, and even that is difficult to access when time is of the essence. i wish we had time in our work, especially when lives are the line. we usually don't. there was a misconception that building a lawful intercept solution is about building a back door, one that foreign adversaries or hackers to crime. that also is out in not true. we want to use the front door with clarity and transparency. we want clear guidance provided by law. we are completely comfortable with court orders, and legal process, front doors, that provide us the evidence and information we need to investigate crimes and prevent attacks. cybers a're varies, there's no -- adversaries are going to use any -- it makes sense to develop intercept solutions at the front end in the design phase, rather than resorting to patchwork solutions when law enforcement comes knocking after the fact, and with the sophisticated encryption there may be no solution at all, leaving the government at a total dead

the idea of the national security administration collecting metadata and billions and trillions can find a few needles in the enormous haystack and the federal government c'mon to. i don't know what that means. this is something to be done at the local level and see something disturbing unfolding. >> at least in the case of that fellow who went into the parliament in canada, his mother said she hadn't seen him in five years. some of these people just drop out. you wonder what's the net around them of family and friends that's going to say he's off the rails? >> some of them do drop out. by the way, i would put this in the same basket of something we haven't talked about today which is school shootings. when you see something, say something. this is a theme that we use to fight fight terrorism since 9/11. where people can call in. they're public. you see these. when you see these troubling postings, you have some place to go with it. let's take a school shooting. the santa bar pbara shooter. his mother was scared to death her son was going to do this. i think it's something you can approa

if we have the metadata to go to see who the person has been in contact with over the past couple ofidentify the link chart of what's going on with that group. but that's not easy. we're always balancing how much data can the government collect, how long can they store it for versus civil liberties. >> it's sad to think that someone like myself who grew up in buffalo, new york, that unfortunately they're going to have to tighten security along the u.s./canadian border to make it more difficult for people to go back and forth out of those concerns. thanks very much. >>> coming up, a 28-year-old's amazing journey from working in a meat packing company in wisconsin to mighting against isis in syria. this is kathleen. setting up the perfect wedding day starts with her minor arthritis pain, and two pills. afternoon arrives and feeling good, but her knee pain returns. that's two more pills. the evening's event brings laughter, joy, and more pain. what's that, like six pills today? yeah. .i could take two aleve for all day relief. really? for my arthritis pain, i now choose aleve. 2 pills.

you can look at the metadata and you can tell whether a person turned off or not or whether it was a technical failure. a technical failure could include an officer snapping the camera, but that can be diagnosed afterwards. i am hopeful. i am optimistic. i believe -- i hope we will not say, or it will be few and far between, where we have an incident like what happened in ferguson, where someone dies as the result of a police officer, and we do not have video evidence of it whatsoever. i think the technology is there. certainly, when ferguson happened, the thought i had and a lot of people had was, there is no dash cam footage? i have police in military equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, full camouflage, and infrared goggles, you are telling me they did not have the technology and means to install a dash cam in each car? moreover, i think if you have a situation where there were dash cam's installed, or even a body camera, and they give out for one reason or another before a terrible tragic incident, regardless of who is to blame, if the technology goes out, it will lo

we're only getting the metadata, the calling data. when the editors came back and told us that, eric and i said, they're lying to you. finally, after a while, eric and i were able to convince them they were being lied to and i think that had a major impact on their final decision to run the story. >> so the story comes out. you went until a surprise for your book, but there's something else "the times" decided not to publish, what you are being prosecuted for now. story, anas another operation involving the iran nuclear weapons program in which the cia had used a russian defector to give nuclear blueprints to the iranians. and the idea was that they're supposed to be flawed blueprints that within send the iranians down the wrong track on building a bomb. at the russian told them immediately, oh, i can see the flaws. scientist.clear he says, i can see the flaws in the iranians will see the flaws. then he sent a letter when he gave the blueprints to the iranians, he gave a letter to the iranian saying, you can see there are problems in

idea that the central government, the national security administration or something, collecting metadatast quantities, billions and trillions can then find these knew needles in that enormous haystack and the federal government did monitor in i don't know what that means. this has to be done at the local level with people who know these people and see something unfolding. >> in the case of that fellow who went into the parliament in canada. his mother said she hadn't seen him in five years. some of these people just drop out. so what is the net around them of family and friends who will say he's off the rail? >> some of them do drop out. i would put this in the same basket as something we haven't talked about today, which is school shootings. i would put all of this in the same category of when you see something, say something. this is a theme we use to fight terrorism since 9/11. we need a mechanism at the federal level where people can call in, where it -- troubling social postings -- because they're public, when you see these tribling postings, you have someplace to go with it. let's

what this is is basically metadata of snail mail. they copy everything on the outside of the packages and letters and that let's me know who you're communicating with, your banking information, credit card, that kind of thing, but it is not opening the mail. you need a warrant for that. >> ifill: it seems pretty low tech in some respects. >> it is. but also have very hi-tech, massive banks of computers that take pictures of every single letter and package that comes through and they do utilize that for law enforcement purposes as well. >> ifill: is that the reason they record everything or sit just the side effect? >> it's a side effect. you have this technology to do this thing they use it and limit it ways for law enforcement purposes. but the main purpose of it is actually to deliver the mail process. >> ifill: explain to us how it works. >> so, say i'm law enforcement agency and investigating you, i go to the postal inspection service saying i have reason to believe that miss ifill is guilty of something, or illegally running dru

normalization of torture over the past decade, for the vastly growing surveillance state, which grabs the metadata every man, woman and child in the united states, and in fact around the world, and the corporate liberalism is also responsible for the erosion of rights that date back to the magna carta in some cases even earlier. now we have detention without trial, detention without charge in many cases, as a result of the direction that our government has taken in an acute way over the last decade but in a gradual way over the last half century at least, if not even longer. so corporate liberalism is something that is crosssive of many of the things we love most dearly. the free market, of freedom in government, and indeed of human rights and basic decency. so why is it so difficult? why does ralph have to wright this book in order to show us how to fight this system? why is that not everyone simply recognizes the evil for what it is? again, here i think the name is accurate because it kind of shows us how a confusion has been introduced into our political discourse which cripples us and makes us

the metal -- the metadata and you can tell whether a person turned off or not or whether it was a technical failure. a technical failure could include an officer snapping the camera, but that can be diagnosed afterwards. i am hopeful. i am optimistic. -- i hope we will not say, or it will be few and far between, where we have an instant -- an incident like what happened in ferguson, where someone dies as the result of a police officer, and we do not have video evidence of it whatsoever. i think the technology is there. certainly, when ferguson happened, the thought i had and a lot of evil had was, there is the dash cam footage -- there is no dash cam footage? i have police in military equipment worth hundreds of albums of dollars, full camouflage, and infrared goggles, you are telling me they did not have the technology and means to install a dash cam in each car? moreover, i think if you have a situation where there were dash cam's installed, or even a body camera, and they give out for one reason or another before a terrible tragic incident, to blame, of who is if the technology goes out,

>> i'm not sure all the metadata and algorithms -- in any case, isis is much more sophisticated thana. it's a lot harder job. what's the fbi going to do when some guy gets on a site and looks at these -- i look at the videos but i'm not guilty of anything. but you have to commit a crime for the fbi to do something. >> this is a very worrisome development. stand by. the story unfortunately is not going away. we're following multiple breaking stories. we have more details coming in to "the situation room" about today's deadly school shooting in washington state. also, ebola in new york, a doctor is in isolation after testing positive for the deadly virus. his fiancee and friends are under quarantine. there are urgent efforts under way to trace other contacts. more news right after this. you're driving along, having a perfectly nice day, when out of nowhere a pick-up truck slams into your brand new car. one second it wasn't there and the next second... boom! you've had your first accident. now you have to make your first claim. so you talk to your insurance company and... boom! you're b

of some of the surveillance that was occurring on american citizens and i think that the verizon metadata showed all of the verizon customers have the core records and i think that was very surprising to people and that is the very first one that came out but were scandalized and justifiably so. i feel that it was poorly understood in the ability to spy on the u.s. soil and i also think that the present resolution and the involvement of silicon valley with the state intelligence apparatus is something -- one of the reason this could be surprising piece of writing to someone like me that's been in the industry for such a long time. one of the key points of tension is the relationship between companies, between industries and the government cooperate with us. we can only fight the crime if we work together. >> this is a difficult double-edged sword. i think that there are instances that are paid with taxpayer dollars. they are paid online and that sort of thing and worry about spying and so forth. what is noticed as an economic impact. i used to work for google and the companies when the na

i think the technology is there where it's obvious whether it's turned on or off or not with the metadata and with the recording. you can tell whether a person turned it off or not or whether it was a technical failure. certainly a technical failure could include an officer not using the camera. i am hopeful and i'm optimistic. i believe that, i hope that we are not as few and far between where he had an incident what happened in ferguson where someone dies as a result of a police officer and we do not have video evidence of that whatsoever. i think the technology is there. certainly in ferguson when it happened the first thought i had a lot of people had was where was the dash camera? there's no dash-cam footage and now you have ferguson police and military equipment with hundreds of thousands of dollars and the whole camouflage and infrared goggles. moreover i think that if you have a situation where a dash-cam is installed or the body camera in both the dash cam and the body camera for example he gives out for one reason or another before a terrible tragic incident regardless of who is

normalization of torture over the past decade, for the vastly growing surveillance state, which grabs the metadata every man, woman and child in the united states, and in fact around the world, and the corporate liberalism is also responsible for the erosion of rights that date back to the magna carta in some cases even earlier. now we have detention without trial, detention without charge in many cases, as a result of the direction that our government has taken in an acute way over the last decade but in a gradual way over the last half century at least, if not even longer. so corporate liberalism is something that is crosssive of many of the things we love most dearly. the free market, of freedom in government, and indeed of human rights and basic decency. so why is it so difficult? why does ralph have to wright this book in order to show us how to fight this system? why is that not everyone simply recognizes the evil for what it is? again, here i think the name is accurate because it kind of shows us how a confusion has been introduced into our political discourse which cripples us and makes us

i think the verizon metadata revelation that showed that all of the verizon's customers had their call records that were being handed over wholesale to the nsa under 5-i. i think that was very surprising to people. that was the very first one that came out. people were somewhat scandalized by that and i think justifiably so. i think it was probably poorly understood that, nsa's ability to spy on u.s. citizens on u.s. soil. i also think that the prism revelations, involvement of silicon valley with the state intelligence apparatus was also something that, i mean, i think one of the reasons why these could be surprising someone like me who has been in the security industry for a long time because in many ways these are legal questions, not question of technology or capability. so i was certainly surprised that about the sort of amount and scope of date that was being harvested from u.s. companies for intelligence purposes. >> that points to one of the key points of tension that i think snowden revealed is that, relationship between companies, between industry and the government. i mean t

ahmed was lead counsel in the ae first criminal case to challenge bulk metadata collection by the nsa after the snowden disclosures, and he currently represents journalist barrett brown. formerly he taught at the national security clinic at the university of texas school of law and he was a staff attorneya at repreef uk where he represented guantanamo detainees in their habeas corp aus proceedings. ahmed kapour. >> good afternoon.ood afte it's really an honor to be here today, not only because i admirs mr. risen's journalism but because what brings us together transcends mr. risen, it transcends the freedom of the press foundation, it transcends the roster of reporters that have spoken and written in encouragement. it brings us together today is the first amendment of the t amn united states constitution andd specifically the portion of that amendment guaranteeing the freedom of the press without persecution or unnecessary it w it was thomas jefferson that once claimed that a democracy cannot be both ignorant and free and the framers of the and constitution believed thatth if u.s. cit

they've asked for this much metadata. if they lose the case, we continuity know.ns don't care. they don't care anything about twitter. >> a lot of people say, if i don't have anything to hide, what the heck? >> we never think we have anything to hide until we get stopped. we never think we're doing anything wrong on our taxes, until the government audits. google and linkedin have done similar. >> so is there anything that we as users of social media need to keep in mind? >> yeah, this is election season. this is a perfect time. if you're on twitter, i encourage everybody, tweet your member of congress, saying, hey, look, we're in favor of twitter being able to publish it. talk to your department, you can add hash tag that you support twitter. >> jason johnson, so glad to have you with us. co-catch a flight. i don't want to tell people where he's going. he's going to a wedding. he's looking forward to it. >> former students. >> musting something night. >>> let's get to "morning read." u.s. military troops are in liberia to help fight off the spread of ebola. teams