that led to the meeting in my office as i recall where mike tannin, then general haydon, then the head of the nsa and the cia, and george and the three of us talked, and there were things that the nsa thought they could do if they had additional authority. and i took that package of that proposal basically and went to see the president and sat down and went through it with him and he signed up to it and dealt with the caveat that if carefully managed he wanted to make certain that he personally approved at each step of the way and that they had to come in on approval on a regular basis. what emerged out of that is significantly enhanced capacity to be able to intercept communications originating outside of the united states possibly from what we referred to as a dirty number. to capture al qaeda he's got a computer, a rolodex, whatever it is, a group of phone number sand you want to know who he is talking to in the united states for example, and the safeguards that we build into it at the direction of the president involved the fact that every 30 or 45 days it varied from time to time.