it absolutely is, to me, it offends my sense of fair play that day the foreign banks, goldman and morgan, 100 cents on the $1. two banks in my district still have not been paid. they are not systemically important. as a government, you say one standard is for these zero large companies. pe're going to give them some benefits. we will say we will pay the creditors off, but you do not d+ that for a small bank. it is a societal problem. people are already saying, wait a minute, when i lost my house, you can say, well wait a minute. when i was in trouble i had to pay off those debtt. no one came in and paid off my creditors. >> republicans have made the point of bailouts going back too january 2009 with the regulatory debates. looking back on the worst financial crisis. you supported the worst around of tarp. do you have any regrets supporttng tarp? >> i will say thhs. i will advocate for dividends. that part of the bill was the other part of the bill, they were never able to pull off the toxic assets which i think we have been a bad deal for the taxpayers. with the provision that roy and i

morgan stanley is a bank holding company. so what's happened in the last two years, is we have a financial structure where we have very large, powerful, complex institutions that will stay as large and powerful and complex as they are, where there's an integration of trading and insurance and investment bank activities. and that hasn't been touched by this bill. and i would argue, that's the main failing of a very large bill with a lot of details that fundamentally there's no change in that. >> brown: let me ask douglas elliott one more issue out of the very many that we could go through here, the volcker rule, the so-called, the-- to get the-- to restrict companies from trading on their own accounts. what is here and what is not? >> well the ended up coming through in a fairly strong way in the sense that the regulators frankly, don't like the volcker rule, and i don't , either. i don't think it will achieve what it purport achieve because it's purporting to take account of excessive investment risk and limit it, but it does

that to me -- it just offends my sense of fair play, that they paid the foreign banks, goldman and morgan, 100 ents on the dollar. i have two banks in my district that still haven't been paid. well, they are not systemically important. well, as a government you say ok, there's one standard that is forethese large -- forethese large companies, we are going to give them benefit. but you don't do that for a small bangor individual, it is not only an economic problem for you, but it is a societal problem for you. people say wait a minute, i lost my house. or you can say, "wait a minute, when i was troubled, i had to go to bankruptcy. i had to pay those debts. no one came in and paid my creditors off." >> looking back on the worst of the financial crisis in september and october of 2008, you supported the fiist round of the financial rescue package, tarp. do you have any regrets about supporting it at that time? >> no. but i have regrets -- and i will say ttis. roy blunt and i were able to advocate for dividends and warrants. and that art of the bill was the part they found was practical and c

morgan chase? >> i am not trying to win an argument here. what i'm trying to do is convince you, chairman, that the federal reserve board members are concerned about a specific type of institution. investment banks. they're concerned about these firms that are too big to fail. >> i accept that. what i am saying is, i don't think this is the right approach. if it was, there is no basis. i am not just trying to make argument points, but apparently, the problem of too big to fail, assuming the moral hazard is too big to fail, i don't understand if this is the right approach. why applied only to non depository institutions and not to them? i am willing to work with the gentleman on this. there are three aspects of this resolution and i think we are in agreement on a couple of them. one of them is that the institution dyes. no taxpayer money should be involved. the third question to talk about is, does it create moral hazard if you say that in some circumstances, the death of one of these large institutions whether it is a bank or non- bank, crea

morgan stanley. they have a whole lot more power than the people in my community in the financial realm. why is that? chances are if you talk to your relatives and neighbors, you'll find that over half of the money that they are spending to pay for their mortgage or pay for their car loans doesn't go to a local financial institution in the town in which you live, it goes to a distant institution somewhere else that sucks money, sucks wealth, sucks power away from your community and places it somewhere else system of this is a really threshold question. what does the bill do with the power to create money? today, it's shocking, but 2/3 of the financial assets of this country, 2/3, are held by those six institutions. before the financial crisis of 2008, they only held a third of the power. now they have 2/3 of the power. i say that's way too much. that's not a competitive financial system. that's what economists would call an oligopoly. very few having very much and taking it away from the rest of us s

morgan, goldman sachs, bank of america, all of them have huge operations of hedge funds. j.p. morgan is actually -- it operates the largest hedge fund in the world, according to some rankings. so, they would really be forced to spin off their hedge fund operations, separate them from their main businesses, sell them off. and the also have major investments in those funds and the private equity, especially their private equity. they invest heavily, along with their clients. they still have to scale those back, but it is not going to be as much as they steer it was going to be. host: 202 is the area code if you would like to talk about the regulations deal that was reached at 540 -- 5:40 a.m. by the conference committee of the house and senate. all the democrats voted for it at all republicans voted against it. yalman onaran from bloomberg, another contentious issue was the issue of derivatives and senator blanche lincoln of arkansas had a big role. what happened? guest: senator lincoln, who faces reelection this year, at the last minute really -- this bill has been going on for

morgan chase. j.p. morgan chase shares your commitment to helping homeowners and stabilizing the housing market in our country. we're working to help families stay in their homes by making their payments affordable. we have helped prevent hundreds of thousands of foreclosures through our own proprietary modification program, hamp, and other programs. we have refinanced $21 billion of loans under harp. hamp modification performance has been strong. we are completing more than 10,000 permanant modifications per month. on average, home owners see their monthly payments reduced by more than $530, 28%. we are adopting an implementing the federal government's second lein modification program to help more borrowers. actively use temporary forbearance agreements, similar to the program recently announced by the administration. you asked us to focus our testimony on how wean make foreclosure prevention initiatives more effective for borrowers. from the beginning of 2009 to the end of may 2010, chase offered almo

. >> larry: will he ever change, morgan -- mayor? >> i don't think so.hat to a certain degree he's mellowed, but he's not going to change. what he feels, he says. >> larry: the supreme court never -- they refused to consider his appeal, right? they didn't grant certiorari. >> yeah. that's quite a story. >> larry: briefly tell me. >> in 1997 they had the case wherein the supreme court said they really wanted a case where they had standing. in that particular case the person was not terminal and also was not in remedial pain and suffering. they wanted a case like that. so the thomas youk case, the case he was convicted of, we took to the supreme court, and without any reason they rejected it without taking it, which i felt was not just unusual but inappropriate. >> larry: jack, did you think they'd hear it? >> the supreme court? >> larry: mm-hmm. >> no. >> larry: why not? can't say too controversy. >> because from my judgment from what i know, the supreme court's corrupt. >> larry: correct. >> corrupt. what's the aim of the supreme court? what's its purpos

morgan, goldman sachs, bank of america, all of them have huge operations of hedge funds. j.p.an is actually -- it operates the largest hedge fund in the world, according to some rankings. so, they would really be forced to spin off their hedge fund operations, separate them from their main businesses, sell them off. and the also have major investments in those funds and the private equity, especially their private equity. they invest heavily, along with their clients. they still have to scale those back, but it is not going to be as much as they steer it was going to be. host: 202 is the area code if you would like to talk about the regulations deal that was reached at 540 -- 5:40 a.m. by the conference committee of the house and senate. all the democrats voted for it at all republicans voted against it. yalman onaran from bloomberg, another contentious issue was the issue of derivatives and senator blanche lincoln of arkansas had a big role. what happened? guest: senator lincoln, who faces reelection this year, at the last minute really -- this bill has been going on for abou

morgan chase. j.p. morgan chase shares your commitment to helping homeowners and stabilizing the housing market in our country. we're working to help families stay in their homes by making their payments affordable. we have helped prevent hundreds of thousands of foreclosures through our own proprietary modification program, hamp, and other programs. we have refinanced $21 billion of loans under harp. hamp modification performance has been strong. we are completing more than 10,000 permanant modifications per month. on average, home owners see their monthly payments reduced by more than $530, 28%. we are adopting an implementing the federal government's second lein modification program to help more borrowers. actively use temporary forbearance agreements, similar to the program recently announced by the administration. you asked us to focus our testimony on how we can make foreclosure prevention initiatives more effective for borrowers. from the beginning of 2009 to the end of may 2010, chase offered al

we told the european banks, we told goldman and morgan, we'll pay these credit swaps off at 100%. they can could that under this bill. they can bail out creditors and counterparties. and they can even sell and transfer to the fdic the assets of a failing firm. now, how do they do that? well, they have to borrow money. you can't buy something for free. you can't guarantee things without money. under the house bill you can borrow 90% of the fair value of the failed firm's total consolidated assets, you're going to borrow it. in order, the government, the taxpayers are going to borrow 90% of that amount. what are we talking about? potentially, with just the largest six companies in america, bank of america, morgan-chase, citi, wells fargo, goadman sax, the so-called wall street bank, most of which, including goldman sachs has said, we like this provision, it's a great provision. the federal government can borrow for those six firms $8.5 trillion, yet we do not ask, where are you going to borrow this money from? are you going to go back to the chinese? what will it cost? how will it a

the next call is richard in morgan city, tennessee, on independent line. you are on washington journal. caller: i would just like to ask a question. obama said that they have been on the oil spills since day one, and it took him 52 days to get through the ocean. we are hurting the down here in tennessee. we have floods and everything and they will even help us any. host: those gloves really got overlooked, didn't they? caller: we sure did. host: you have the oil spill, you had the potential times square bomber in new york going on. you guys kind of got lost in the middle of all of that. how many people died? caller: 8, i think. host: how close are you to national? caller: 50 miles. host: what do you do in morgan city. caller: there are no jobs. host: what do you do? caller: retired from the railroad. but it takes what i got to take care of my two sons -- i have a 30-year-old who is out of work and a 41-year-old who can't get a job. host: thank you for coming in. "financial times" -- the u. of mines with washington for tighter sanctions on iran -- eu aligns

morgan, goldman sachs, bank of america, all of them have huge operations of hedge funds. j.p. morgan is actually -- it operates the largest hedge fund in the world, according to some rankings. so, they would really be forced to spin off their hedge fund operations, separate them from their main businesses, sell them off. and the also have major investments in those funds and the private equity, especially their private equity. they invest heavily, along with their clients. they still have to scale those back, but it is not going to be as much as they steer it was going to be. host: 202 is the area code if you would like to talk about the regulations deal that was reached at 540 -- 5:40 a.m. by the conference committee of the house and senate. all the democrats voted for it at all republicans voted against it. yalman onaran from bloomberg, another contentious issue was the issue of derivatives and senator blanche lincoln of arkansas had a big role. what happened? guest: senator lincoln, who faces reelection this year, at the last minute really -- this bill has been going on for

i have a list here of wells fargo, gold man sax, morgan stanley, jp morgan, u.s. bank, bank of america. citigroup, others. are these banks in danger of rolling over and dying on us? would you answer that for me, please. and i will hang up and listen to your answer. thank you. guest: thanks for the question. thanks for the question. i don't know if i am a total banking expert and i don't know all of those. i mean, i'm familiar with most of them. i think the best answer to the question is, you know, on the one hand they are many of them still are probably struggling with some commercial real estate loans. there was some mention of that in the feds report that that is still potentially an issue for some big banks and even some of the smaller ones. on the other hand, what we saw with the bank bailout is that the government has put its weight behind particularly larger banks. and so it's hard. they have almost said that they are not going to let them fail. so i flight now the government is selling its share in city group slowly but surely. i think recently sold a lot o

morgan chase. j.p. morgan chase shares your commitment to helping homeowners and stabilizing the housing market in our country. we're working to help families stay in their homes by aking their payments affordable. we have helped prevent hundreds of thousands of foreclosures through our own proprietary modification program, hamp, and other programs. we have refinanced $21 billion of loans under harp. hamp modification performance has been strong. we are completing more than 10,000 permanant modifications per month. on average, home owners see their monthly payments reduced by more than $530, 28%. we are adopting an implementing the federal government's second lein modification program to help more borrowers. actively use temporary forbearance agreements, similar to the program recently announced by the administration. you asked us to focus our testimony on how we can make foreclosure prevention initiatives more effective for borrowers. from the beginning of 2009 to the end of may 2010, chase offered alm

morgan, we will constrain the leverage and risk that the take on. if they get to a pooition where they couud not survive on their own, we will step in and dismember them safely. we will minimize the risk of loss to the taxpayer, and make sure they can be broken up in a quasi bank like mechanism. that is what this does. the absence of tools is what forced us to take those exceptionally offensive measures in the fall of 2008 and the first half of 2009 it to put up >> the example of long-term capital management will be one where that was not a bank, and the government came into backstop. they did arrange a rrscue that would lead one to think that that is what the government is quick to do for the other ffrms. rescuing became an exxected norm. there are zero entities out there, presumably credit holders' equity holders that are supposed to be regulating these firms. the creditors, who did not experienced the upside, were the ones that had the most to lose. it is not a large stretch to think that they were failing in that role because they felt they were

yes, as a boy, i thought i might become an american hero like frances marion, daniel morgan, or patrickhenry, james madison, and then there was a time that i thought i might become a great baseball player. i like to play catcher. with that violin i had dreams of becoming another fitch chrysler. so i had all of those boyhood dreams. i wanted to be everything. i. koch are rabbit once -- i caught a rabbit once, and mamma broke his neck at the next morning and i took it down to what we call the hard road 3 miles away and gave it to mr. fred f. jennings and he gave me 15 cents for it. then i had dreams of becoming a great game hunter. [laughter] i had all of those dreams, but i never dreamed of becoming a united states senator. thank you for those questions. [applause] >> robert byrd served more than 50 years in the u.s. senate, a longer than anyone else in history. he was 92 years old. looking ahead to our live coverage, and about 20 minutes we will take you to the center for strategic and international studies from -- for remarks from steny core year. he will be joined by the national secu

morgan chase in upstate yo sas let go inave of layoffthat eveuay shutterethtire syracuse operations centerob wento indian and ed colcting unemoyment benefits. her n wo i ed everything o tre. now that she is aboo run t f benefits, has arted taking money out ofer.a. and he health insurance face fe of long her he. i hear similar stors from over the coury. jos amicans are deerately looking r wo, jo to gorounyet. last weeki coucd a arin my suommitteeo discus log-term unemploym problems. re are aew of thfacts highlightthheing. arly0% o the employed haven'be abl find a job r more than six mont. he highe number ever corded, whh goesack must be cated to restore the lar market tit e-cesslel. this huge jobs lecreaby eit years ofross enomic smagt under th bh admination,as left fi unpl worrs cpeting for every availle job. rnding to ese record tes long-te uemployment, our firstriority st bto maintain theurre erg feral umployment programs that have psed two wee ago. peope have been waiting for two eks. these programa ng time ago, t the senate has to car thlegiaton if the senate fails to ctin edal unempym

morgan's position was $78.6 trillion in notional amount. can such an enormous complex parts of your business be successfully managed by han beings? >> i think they are dangerous and i could not manage it. is hard for me to imagine a system or regulatory system that can supervise something like that. one of the ironies is that there were only fourig auditing firms in the united states. i will guarantee you a few things -- tw big firms audited by the same auditor, you will find different prices. it is mind-boggling we lost $400 million in a very benign period with npressure iran. maybe that is why lehman brothers also much money. >> 2 you also pointed out that in your most recent shareholder letter, the 20081 that i am referring to, and bought the 20091, that it is almost impossible for an investor looking at the financial statement of these big derivatives dealers to really know what their financial situation is. >> and if you had 1000 pages of disclosure, it would be impossible. i try to tell the shareholders basically the positions are. i

morgan's position was $78.6 trillion in notional amount. can such an enormous complex parts of your business be successfully managed by human beings? >> i think they are dangerous and i could not manage it. it is hard for me to imagine a system or regulatory system that can supervise something like that. one of the ironies is that there were only four big auditing firms in the united states. i will guarantee you a few things -- two big firms audited by the same auditor, you will find different prices. it is mind-boggling. we lost $400 million in a very benign period with no pressure iran. maybe that is why lehman brothers also much money. >> 2 you also pointed out that in your most recent shareholder letter, the 20081 that i am referring to, and bought the 20091, that it is almost impossible for an investor looking at the financial statement of these big derivatives dealers to really know what their financial situation is. >> and if you had 1000 pages of disclosure, it would be impossible. i try to tell the shareholders basically the positi

but morgan stanl has saithat only one in 20 chance moratorium will end in six months a moratoriumis instituted. if you're a persont( that works or $500,000 per day and it only you two weeks to flow to the coast of africa with a one in 20 chance, would you decide? host: why not step back and given the outcome of this oi spill, the impact on the shoreline, which is also jobs the fherman, e shrimpers who cannot do because of the oil spill, why not take a step back and wait? guest: there is a plan for increasing safety. it is from the national academy of engineering, i believe. and they mention these experts t tey peerying tha reviewed the recomndatn. but experts came out yesterday with a skating revival of that, saying that theyoot agree scathin buttal of that saying that they do not withhe moratorium. the esident said his administration would be guided by a science and not politics. here is a decision that is being guided by politics anno by science. thscientists say you can continue to do your drilling and oil and they do not favor the moratorium. and when they speak to the fishermen, they also

morgan, we will constrain the leverage and risk that the take on. if they get to a pooition where they could not survive on their own, we will step in and dismember them safely. we will minimize the risk of loss to the taxpayer, and make sure they can be broken up in a quasi bank like mechanism. that is what this does. the absence of tools is what forced us to take those exceptionally offensive measures in the fall of 2008 and the first half of 2009 it to put up >> the example of long-term capital management will be one where that was not a bank,,and the government came into backstop. they did arrange a rrscue that would lead one to think that that is what the government is quick to do for the other ffrms. rescuing became an expected normm there are zerro entities out%% there, presummbly credit holders' equity holders that are supposed to be regulating these firms. the creditors, who did not experienced the upside, were the ones that had the most to lose. it is not a large stretch to think that they were failing in that role because they felt they w

morgan chase, mr. paulsen's hedge fund, that's the way we wanted to do it, we couldn't get it through republicans in the senate. first republicans in the senate said don't do it, other republicans then say why did you do it? i'll make a pledge right now, the economy i chair will bring out a bill that has an assessment on the financial institutions above $50 billion so members who miss it will get a chance to show us they care. we'll bring it there and have that come forward. i don't want to talk a little bit about subprime lending and the partial history we get. the fact is, the republican party controlled the house and the senate from 1995 through 2006. during that period they showed remarkable restraint. as eager as they were to destroy subprime lending, as passionate as they were to reform fannie mae and freddie mac they didn't do it. that's a degree of abstinence unparalleled in political history. they were in charge. whose fault was it? it was my fault. as people said before, people have accused m

morgan, we will constrain the leverage and risk that the take on. if they get to a pooition where they could not survive on their own, we will step in and dismember them safely. we will minimize the risk of loss to the taxpayer, and make sure they can be broken up in a quasi bank like mechanism. that is what this does. the absence of tools is what forced us to take those exceptionally offensive measures in the fall of 2008 and the first half of 2009 it to put up >> the example of long-term capital management will be one where that was not a bank, and the government came into backstop. they did arrange a rrscue that would lead one to think that that is what the government is quick to do for the other ffrms. rescuing became an expected norm. there are zero entities out there, presumably credit holders' equity holders that are supposed to be regulating these firms. the creditors, who did not experienced the upside, were the ones that had the most to lose. it is not a large stretch to think that they were failing in that role because they felt they were

which i recall that gail morgan got in a lot of trouble for saying. i find that ironic. that's a trading system, companies that need to pollute more can trade with this cap that is being rationed downward. price on carbon has been more elucit to me. one aspect has been this -- what do they call it, transportation user fee, a gas tax. a certain pass-thru of a per gallon fee on gas. and that's considered by some to be sort of a less invasive, less pervasive smaller government solution. and then there is a lot of trial balloons that will be floated over the next few weeks as harry reid tries to pull this bill together. >> the question is what gets the vote. and that is essentially by the bill. and it changes every day. so it's not at all clear to me. in the end when i covered the house it was all about 2-18, because that was a majority of 1-45, and in the senate it was about 60. >> david goldston, is there some sort of scaled back or alternative to an economy wide cap and trade system that would be in progress from your organization's perspective? >> we will see, we are sti

morgan in cutting off their swap desk and making them recapitalize somewhere else.hat will cost some of these companies billions, some of their most lucrative businesses. companies like goldman sachs would be greatly affected. america basically has a corner on the market with swaps and derivatives with about 97% of the market. there are many foreign banks like the royal bank of scotland salivating at that prospect of them americans giving away their market share. leave it to congress to make a mistake and do this. host: the phone numbers are on the bottom of the screen for our guests, at one time or legislative director for a republican congressional member from florida. he is the director of senate dilutions of heritage action for america. how is that related to the heritage foundation? guest: the heritage foundation has been a 5013c for more than 35 years, a conservative think+ tank mainly focused on limited government, a free economy. things like that, strong national defense. through the years we have been limited to what we could do on capitol hill, having a ce

morgan's position was $78.6 trillion in nional amount. can such an enormousomplex parts of your business be successfully managed by human beings? >> i think they are dangerous and i could not manage it. it is hard for me to imagine a system or regulatory system that can supervise something like that. one of the ironies ishat there were only four big auditing firms in the united states. i will guarantee you a few things -- two big firms audited by the same auditor, you will find difrent prices. it is mind-boggling. we lost $400 million in a very benign period with no pressure iran. maybe that is why lehman brothers also much money. >> 2 you also pointed out that in your most rect shareholder letter, the 20081 that i am referring to, and bought the 20091, that it i almost impossible for an investor looking at the financial statement of these big derivatives dealers to really know what their financial situation is. >>and if you had 1000 pages of disclosure, it would be impossible. i try to tell the shareholders basically the positions are. i

host: sean morgan, a viewer who calls himself gen-x futurist on twitter, writes should there be a free education opportunity to allow older unemployed workers to pursue a more profittable life off the social security system? we'll put that out there as a comment. let's go back to park hill, oklahoma as we listen to this caller we'll show you some statistics about older workers in society that are part of aarp's studies. you're on the air independent line. jerry, go ahead, please. let me push the button. caller: i've been watching you for so many years almost from the get-go, i swear to god, susan, you and brian are like fine wine. you keep getting better and better. i don't have -- that's gary, not jerry. i take umbrage at that. i'm a 63-year-old disabled veteran. four people in the boomer generation, i am really as i find it the worm has turned. i'm one of the lucky ones. i had lost my son to brain cancer and became homeless, and they found out some of my history and the v.a. ran me through and i got a disability coming in. but i remember what it was like there being in the late 40's

but morgan stanley has said that there is only one in 20 chance that the moratorium will end in six monthsium is instituted. if you're a persont( that works for $500,000 per day and it only takes you two weeks to flow to the coast of africa with a one in 20 chance, would you decide? host: why not step back and given the outcome of this oil spill, the impact on the shoreline, which is also impacting jobs, the fisherman, the shrimpers who cannot do their jobs because of the oil spill, why not take a step back and wait? guest: there is a plan for increasing safety. it is from the national academy of engineering, i believe. and they mention these experts by name saying that they peer reviewed the recommendation. but experts came out yesterday with a skating revival of that, saying that they do not agree with -- a scathing rebuttal of that saying that they do not agree with the moratorium. the president said his administration would be guided by a science and not politics. here is a decision that is apparently being guided by politics and not by science. the scientists say you can continue to d

morgan. 900,000 modifications you have made. >> since 2007, we have helped 900,000 homeowners.ecently, we offered h.a.m.p. to 50,000 customers. >> a small percentage. >> 630,000 modifications since 2008. 70,000 or through h.a.m.p.. >> we have about 60,000 currently in trial. . period. >> wells fargo? >> we have 500,000 modification. 20,000 of them are inside h.a.m.p. 45,000 are in permanent modification. >> 2507000 in h.a.m.p. >> how many are permanent? 10%?s than the people who qualify for h.a.m.p. went through this process. i just described the intimidating process they had to go through. how many of those -- the people who qualify for h.a.m.p., would any of those not qualify for your own modification programs? >> for the people who fell out of camp, we were able to save about 50% more. >> and it is working? >> it is working. >> the potential does exist. and the treasury enabled it to make more sense for the investor. >> manning? >> many, but i do not know the exact number. >> the question, i believe, was how many would have qualified under proprietary modification programs.

morgan, we will constrain the leverage and risk that the take on. if they get to a pooition where they could not survive on their own, we will step in and dismember them safely. we will minimize the risk of loss to the taxpayer, and make sure they can be broken up in a quasi bank like mechanism. that is what this does. the absence of tools is what forced us to take those exceptionally offensive measures in the fall of 2008 and the first half of 2009 it to put up >> the example of long-term capital management will be one where that was not a bank, and the government came into backstop. they did arrange a rrscue that would lead one to think that that is what the government is quick to do for the other ffrms. rescuing became an expected norm. there are zero entities out there, presumably credit holders' equity holders that are supposed to be regulating these firms. the creditors, who did not experienced the upside, were the ones that had the most to lose. it is not a large stretch to think that they were failing in that role because they felt they were