and morgan stanley has said these guys are so smart, they're not contributing $80 billion. they're contributing only $22 billion. why? because when they say this -- we're going to contribute discounts to allow half of this so-called doughnut hole to be filled, that means there's going to be a lot more drugs sold. and, oh, by the way, the bill takes medicaid from 100% to 133%. that's going to be a lot more drugs sold as a result of this bill. so the real loss -- or contribution, if you will -- of the pharmaceutical industry is $22 billion over ten years, not $80 billion. and that doesn't even include -- remember, they just raised their prices 9%, three times the rate of inflation. so they're going to make up a lot of that, anyway. well, what i want to plead with the leadership in the white house and the leadership of the pharmaceutical industry, come back to your $80 billion real figure over ten years. and one way to get there is the amendment that i offered in the finance committee that was rejected on a nature revote of 13--- on a narrow vote of 13-10. out here on the floo

and morgan stanley has said these guys are so smart, they're not contributing $80 billion. they're contributing only $22 billion. why? because when they say this -- we're going to contribute discounts to allow half of this so-called doughnut hole to be filled, that means there's going to be a lot more drugs sold. and, oh, by the way, the bill takes medicaid from 100% to 133%. that's going to be a lot more drugs sold as a result of this bill. so the real loss -- or contribution, if you will -- of the pharmaceutical industry is $22 billion over ten years, not $80 billion. and that doesn't even include -- remember, they just raised their prices 9%, three times the rate of inflation. so they're going to make up a lot of that, anyway. well, what i want to plead with the leadership in the white house and the leadership of the pharmaceutical industry, come back to your $80 billion real figure over ten years. and one way to get there is the amendment that i offered in the finance committee that was rejected on a nature revote of 13--- on a narrow vote of 13-10. out here on the floo

they really do sympathize with goldman sachs, with jpmorgan chase, with morgan stanley, with bank of america, city corp and, yes, hedge funds of about $10 billion. these wonderful, healthy companies, why should they have to pay for the bailouts? because they benefit from that safety net. and going on to say the funds shall be available with use for the dissolution of a financial company to cover the costs incurred by the receiver to -- and to cover the costs of systemic stabilization actions. the funds shall not benefit any director of such company. and it says earlier on when we talk about the establishment of that fund on page 288, it can only be used the money that comes from morgan stanley and goldman sachs and jpmorgan chase. we won't have anybody to come play football because they have been told not to speculate. it says that such action -- they can only do this if such action is necessary for the purpose of financial stability and not for the purpose of preserving the covered financial company. and if there is a loan from taxpayers it makes it very clear, any funds from taxpay

morgan chase, morgan stanley and all like that, and it becomes the preferred option for people getting degrees in engineering, you know that things have gotten a little out of hand. i think one of the silver linings is more of those people who do have something useful. [laughter] >> so i think that proper is taken care of itself. i think it's important though, we don't want to on financial eyes of the u.s. economy. finance is an essential part of a modern economy, the reason we can all good fixed-rate mortgages, life insurance, how it ends that people can finance the business of. so i think we have to be careful not to demonize the entire financial system. it got to beat. it got too big as a share of economy. it is now contracting. maybe someday it'll go up again but i don't think it is a near-term problem. >> reading your book, the image in my mind was not a thriller, that of a screenplay of a 1930s horror show. [laughter] >> with aig and citicorp leading the role of bela lugosi and oris karloff. >> are you offering a movie deal here? [laughter] >> if only i could. i mean, those were

i did have an encounter with john mack who is the ceo of morgan stanley who actually was probably themost self-aware of the ceos who said recently that actually wall street people can't control themselves. it was a remarkable statement. and he said we need to be controlled. almost like he was an addict and we needed to take the crack pipe away. and i thought that was remarkable but i will tell you, most other people on wall street, not only do they not have that view, they are pushing back on any view that would put real reform in place. >> reporter: john cassidy, what would you add to that. start with a view of wall street and washington. i want to ask you about changes in economic, among economyists later but start with what andrew was talking about. >> i think andrew hit the nail on the head there when he talked about john mack saying we can't do this by ourselves. given the incentives these guys face who run these wall street firms, the way they make money is by lending to people and taking risks. and competing against each other. they are always going to lend more and take more r

and morgan stanley has said these guys are so smart, they're not contributing $80 billion. they're contributing only $22 billion. why? because when they say this -- we're going to contribute discounts to allow half of this so-called doughnut hole to be filled, that means there's going to be a lot more drugs sold. and, oh, by the way, the bill takes medicaid from 100% to 133%. that's going to be a lot more drugs sold as a result of this bill. so the real loss -- or contribution, if you will -- of the pharmaceutical industry is $22 billion over ten years, not $80 billion. and that doesn't even include -- remember, they just raised their prices 9%, three times the rate of inflation. so they're going to make up a lot of that, anyway. well, what i want to plead with the leadership in the white house and the leadership of the pharmaceutical industry, come back to your $80 billion real figure over ten years. and one way to get there is the amendment that i offered in the finance committee that was rejected on a nature revote of 13--- on a narrow vote of 13-10. out here on the floo

and we have now heard the counterparties, morgan stanley, deutsche bank, refused to take anything less than 100% on the dollar of what a.i.g. owed them. according to the special director general from the tarp program, they did that because they had gained collateral of their debt in the last days of a.i.g.'s collapse so they knew they could get paid in full, even if a.i.g. went into bankruptcy. the fdic says it believes it is better to take over company, to take into resolution companies that are failing sooner rather than later so they don't arrive and find that every asset of the company has been pledged as collateral which leads to a more expensive resolution, a resolution that inevitably is more disruptive of the economy. it gets at two problem, one the collateral -- where the company was insolvent and pledged collateral for existing debts in the last 90 tais before the resolution, the fdic can disregard it altogether. disregard the security altogether. then second, the short-term collateralized lending without any market displain based entirely on collateral without any thought to

numbers 100% discount would cost them $40 billion over ten years, but they would reap back by morgan stanley's numbers, $60 billion, or they would be -- the pharmaceutical industry -- $20 billion to the good. so it's a tale of two industries. the insurance industry, which grabbed its bag of marbles, said you all are not making the penalties severe enough. we're taking our bag of marbles and we're going home, and we're going to try to defeat your bill. the pharmaceutical industry, which is still hung in there but which can do a lot more. and i hope that as we get into these negotiations, mr. president, that they will be willing to step up and set the example of health care reform in america. mr. president,ive. -- mr. president, i yield the floor. mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. let me talk for a moment about one aspect of the health care legislation that has been of great concern to our nation's governors. the presiding officer can certainly appreciate the problem here since among other governors and former governors, the presiding officer had the responsibility of balancing a state budget w

we're watching morgan stanley and goldman sachs run wild. that is a recipe for more trouble.it does not necessarily mean a great depression, but it is riggeirresponsible. guest: people were essentially buying houses on margin this time. people were getting a five-year mortgages with blue rates under the notion they would be able to refinance in five years at higher value. they were betting that the houses would keep going up in value for ever. it did not happen, just like the stocks that they bought on margins. with stocks, you can clear it out quickly. the houses are still out there. it takes much longer for the market to adjust. there are too many houses in america. it will be awhile. roubini is ian example of a literary phenomenon. economists always said that the world is coming to an end. a lot of people are talking about the bible. he is now credited with calling the bubble. he is now running around saying the world is going to and again. once someone gets credit for something, people listen to him for ever. it is like a cult with people waiting for the world to end and

we're watching morgan stanley and goldman sachs run wild. that is a recipe for more trouble. it does not necessarily mean a great depression, but it is riggeirresponsible. guest: people were essentially buying houses on margin this time. people were getting a five-year mortgages with blue rates under the notion they would be able to refinance in five years at higher value. they were betting that the houses would keep going up in value for ever. it did not happen, just like the stocks that they bought on margins. with stocks, you can clear it out quickly. the houses are still out there. it takes much longer for the market to adjust. there are too many houses in america. it will be awhile. roubini is ian example of a literary phenomenon. economists always said that the world is coming to an end. a lot of people are talking about the bible. he is now credited with calling the bubble. he is now running around saying the world is going to and again. once someone gets credit for something, people listen to him for ever. it is like a cult with people waiting for the world to end and

morgan chase and morgan stanley and gold man sachs and the other some re sponsability financially for what's going on. they kill all reform. and the pretense that they were for a different form of it they leff it -- left it out of the bill. they secondly say that now that tarp money has gone to the big banks and they don't have to pay it back, by the way, and we are trying to use it socially to encourage small lending to give it to community banks to help people who are unemployed avoid having foreclosure until they get their jobs back, now they want to get rid of it. to whose benefit? the bilge banks. should we use tarp money to get the small banked and -- banks and community banking? should we use it to help people avoid unemployment? or should we do what they want to do and give it back so the big financial institutions aren't assessed. that's what's at risk here. the taxpayers aren't on the hook for this money. the large financial institutions are are. i know what they say, it'll be a restriction in capital. i think capital is a good thing. to the extent that capital was misused f

merrill lynch, goldman sachs, morgan stanley, these big institutions were not basically a financial conglomerate. they were investment banks, and they underwrote a lot of this stuff and help get us into trouble likewise, if you look if the big banks, the only true financial conglomerate was sitting group, but the rest of the big banks were not really commercial investment stakes, so i do not view this bill which eliminated the other -- which have largely been removed -- now i do not view that as of precipitating cause. it is a separate issue. did it allow some institutions to become larger? if you look of the names of just rattled off, they're pretty vague, so i would conclude by looking at the recommendation which says let selectively look at an institution and say if its plan is not satisfactory, then selectively we could force the divorce you are talking about, but i would not mandate it by law, and they're not that many regulated financial institutions anyhow. that is one of the ironies. we thought there would be financial conglomerates, and it turns out there were not many. >> do you have a

morgan chase and morgan stanley and gold man sachs and the other some re sponsability financially for what's going on. they kill all reform. and the pretense that they were for a different form of it they leff it -- left it out of the bill. they secondly say that now that tarp money has gone to the big banks and they don't have to pay it back, by the way, and we are trying to use it socially to encourage small lending to give it to community banks to help people who are unemployed avoid having foreclosure until they get their jobs back, now they want to get rid of it. to whose benefit? the bilge banks. should we use tarp money to get the small banked and -- banks and community banking? should we use it to help people avoid unemployment? or should we do what they want to do and give it back so the big financial institutions aren't assessed. that's what's at risk here. the taxpayers aren't on the hook for this money. the large financial institutions are are. i know what they say, it'll be a restriction in capital. i think capital is a good thing. to the extent that capital was misused f