mr. ambrose and your team. here it is. we will start with mr. vargo. you probably don't have an opinion as to whether kick detection was obscured. you don't have a dog in that dispute? >> i would agree with that statement. the number the simultaneous decisions would be used to evaluate a case. >> mr. bly. i read your report. you offered an opinion you might. do you have anything to add? >> no, sir. the primarily reasons for our report, it could have, 40 or 50 minutes before the crash. those reasons were not observed and acted on until quite late in the event. you're right. it's possible the activities may have made it so that the crew didn't notice. but we all said it didn't have to. we believe the well was monitorable even with the simultaneous activities you should way. >> i think, you know, you didn't try to put yourself ahead of any particular person. you just apined at what was going on. you disagree with that >>. mr. ambrose. >> i think the term "simultaneous activities" may mean something different. the activities you're talking about are sequen

mr. ambrose? >> same. >> mr. vargo. >> i believe there was no flow, that's correct. >> so at the time of the cement job, and i think this may be an important point for the public to understand, at the time when the cement job was complete when the fluid was still in the well, everybody here agrees that the well was, as they say, static. it was not flowing, there was no influx from the reservoir at that point. is that correct, mr. bly? >> that's correct. >> does anybody disagree with that point? one thing that i think we've found in our investigation is that given the posture of the parties -- and it's understandable at some point, people advocate positions with some amount of certainty and we in a somewhat neutral posture have had some difficulty finding the same level of certainty in some of the positions. on cement in particular one of the problems we face is that this cement down here is a long way, it's a long way down the macondo well x now it's been further isolated by more cement in the well itself. so man

mr. ambrose. at some point, members of the rig crew understood what the procedures would be that day. >> it would of been in the first meeting. they did not include the spacer. that was added -- we do not have evidence, but the spacer was added in to the plan some time before the meeting and the displacement. >> your folks on the reagan knew that morning but the temporary abandonment procedures and the sequence of events were going to be from that operation that, correct? >> they received it and they discussed it in the would have known about it. >> did anybody to your knowledge from transocean. to any concerns about the riskiness of those temporary abandonment procedures? >> so far those that we have talked to, no. others, i do not know what they thought of the plan. >> as of right now, you have no knowledge of anyone on transocean voice any concerns about the riskiness of these particular temporary abandonment procedures? >> i have no specific knowledge of somebody standing up and saying that. >

mr. ambrose. at some point, members of the crew understood what the procedures were going to be for going forward that day, correct? >> would have been in the meeting, yes. >> they understood what the sequence was going to pay? >> yes. however, this did not include the spacer that was added. it was added into the plan. >> putting a side thespacer, -- the spacer, your folks knew what the procedures were going to bay -- be, correct? >> yes. >> did anyone from transocean voice concerns about the temporary abandonment procedures? >> so far that we have talked to, no. the ones that we cannot talk to, i do not know. >> as of now, you get no evidence that anyone at transocean, on the rig or not, voiced concerns about the riskiness of the temporary abandonment procedures? >> i have no knowledge of someone speaking up. >> i would like to turn it over to sam. he is going to ask questions about cement. >> i would like to suggest that we take a five-minute break. >> 5 minutes. >> i want to talk about the ceme

mr. ambrose? >> again, you know, cementing is outside of the transactions area -- the area of expert's and we have very little amount of data. >> mr. vargo? >> i believe the cementing operation did not isolate the hydrocarbon bearing zone. that was snoun the modeling that was done prior to the operation and i would have no reason to believe that we would have isolation, especially when you look at the fact that we had hydrocarbons going out from the well so i believe there was no isolation over the reservoir. >> that is not answering my question. my question is there any way to be sure why it did not do it job? >> because we do not have the ability to centralize the pipe properly. the hydraulic simulations indicate that we had channeling prior to the operation. i believe that is reasonable information to indicate that we did not have isolation. >> with you be sure about that? >> it is my opinion sir. >> i will take that as a no. you can't be sure? >> do you believe there was isolation? >> i think w

mr. ambrose yesterday, and again, we don't have a transcript so this is my memory of this. mr. mbrose said something like, maybe the driller looked at the first part of this for a minute, and it looked okay and then he looked a way to do under the task. now, he doesn't know that. nobody knows what happened. but the point is that it seems that if there is a possibility, we think, that you hen't been, that there may be one of these low frequency high risk events, and, you know, the wll is underbalanced, maybe it's not enough, maybe, maybe it's the culture of the company is that somebody might think the driller would look at this line and in turn away and do something else. maybe that's a symptom of something that needs to be addressed. >> i think that really describes it well. in this particular cse, if we take a second pressure rise when the pubs were turned off as even more diagnostic as an influx into the well, it's a period of about six minutes. and we heard that for the first minute and a half or so, minute, minute and a half, that behavior is actually pretty reasonable and c

mr. ambrose yesterday, and again, we don't have a transcript so this is my memory of this. mr. mbrose said something like, maybe the driller looked at the first part of this for a minute, and it looked okay and then he looked a way to do under the task. now, he doesn't know that. nobody knows what happened. but the point is that it seems that if there is a possibility, we think, that you haven't been, that there may be one of these low frequency high risk events, and, you know, the well is underbalanced, maybe it's not enough, maybe, maybe it's the culture of the company is that somebody might think the driller would look at this line and in turn away and do something else. maybe that's a symptom of something that needs to be addressed. >> i think that really describes it well. in this particular case, if we take a second pressure rise when the pubs were turned off as even more diagnostic as an influx into the well, it's a period of about six minutes. and we heard that for the first minute and a half or so, minute, minute and a half, that behavior is actually pretty reasonable a

mr. ambrose, i noticed something sitting here that i want to touch on. we all saw this before that the 21: 01 and 21: 14 there was anomalies, and the first steps taken by the crew were at 21:41, and i think we've said maybe nobody in the crew noticed an anomaly until 21:40, when the mud came up on the rig floor, do you recall that? >> i do. >> a day or two ago you sent me the slide on the end of the well activity, and i was sitting here looking at it, and i noticed something, and the issue is this indicates that the kick wasn't noticed until 21:40 and the anomalies were not noticed. let's look at your slide. your slide here says stop pumping to check anomaly. it's not 21: 41 or 21:40, but 21:35, see that? then you evaluate the anomaly to something like 21:38. the slide you gave me, appears, doesn't it, that your crew, it's your slide, you prepared it and asked me to show it, and i showed it, but your slide appears to show that your crew recognized an anomaly at 21: 35 and evalvatted the -- evaluated the anomaly four or five minutes ahead of the time that