mr. angelides. -- yes, mr. angelides. >> there are two greeks on this committee. mr. buffett, do you fault the management of a new lease -- moody's, or at least that? how is it that they went forward and continued to rate the securities, is essentially, no differently than they had been doing in the face of the bubble? >> i want to put this in perspective. offering an opinion is one thing. offering opinion that they are triple a is quite another. >> i think in 2007, $500 billion were rated triple a. about $100 billion plus is when you began to be the downgrade. maybe they should not be rated investment grade. >> of course, they were subsequently downgraded. mr. buffett? >> i do not know what took place internally, but from listening to this and what i see on the chart, it looks like they tweaked their model. it is sometimes difficult for people to adjust their opinion that much in a short period of time. >> that is right. too many mixed metaphors here. i guess i would like to ask you, i know you testified in your internal testimony that you thought the government made

mr. angelides. -- yes, mr. angelides. >> there are two greeks on this committee. mr. buffett, do you fault the management of a new lease -- moody's, or at least that? how is it that they went forward and continued to rate the securities, is essentially, no differently than they had been dog in the face of the bubble? >> i want to put this in perspective. offering an opinion is one thing. offering opinion that they are triple a is quite another. >> i think in 2007, $500 billion were rated triple a. about $100 billion plus is when you began to be the downgrade. maybe they should not be rated investment grade. >> of course, they were subsequently downgraded. mr. buffett? >> i do not know what took place internally, but from listening to this and what i see on the chart, it looks like they tweaked their model. it is sometimes difficult for people to adjust their opinion that much in a short period of time. >> that is right. too many mixed metaphors here. i guess i would like to ask you, i know you testifi in your inrnal testimony that you thought the governmenmade the rig

mr. angelides. -- yes, mr. angides. >> there are two greeks on this committee. mr. buffett, do you fault the management of a new lease -- moody's, or at least that? how is it that they went forward and continued to rate the securities, is essentially, no differently than they had been doing in the face of the bubble? >> i want to put this in perspective. offering an opinion is one thin offering opinion that they are triple a is quite another. >> think in 2007, $500 billion were rated triple a. about $100 billion plus is when you began to be the downgrade. maybe ey should not be rated investment grade. >> ofourse, they were subsequently downgraded. mr. buffett? >> i do not know what took place internally, but from listening to this and what i see on t chart, it looks like they twead their model. it is sometimes difficult for people to adjust their opinion that much in a short piod of time. >> that is right. too many mixed metaphors here. guess i would like to ask you, i know you testified in your internal testimony that you thought the government made the right decis

mr. weill. dr. witt? >> chairman angelides, vice chairman thomas, members of the commission, my name is gary witt. for the last two years, i have been teaching full time at temple university in philadelphia. and no longer have any affiliation with moody's. i am pleased to be able to participate in today's discussion the options i express are mine alone, the opinions express are mine alone. theinancial stabili act that recently passed both houses of congress expands the powers of e sec. the sec will determine over th coming months and years how best to use these new powers to foster more accurate credit ratings. i hope they find our deliberations useful. i waan analyst and then managing director in the u.s. derivatives group in moody's from septeer 2000 to september 2005 when i was reassigned within moody's away from cdos. i wa one of three team managing directors in is cdo group fro march '04 to september '05. i was responsible for e following eas. cash flow, abs, market value cdos, collateralized fund obligations, catastrophe bonds and with another team, structured financial orating companie if t