mr barnes, s and p was uncomfortable but it was raided. should that have been taken into consideration? >> i cannot speak to this example. >> but you can speak to the question if there is a lack of cooperation and a deal is not likely to perform, should be rated? >> the analyst would take that into account and it would be part of their approach. all the members in committee would look at this. >> the analyst concludes that the deal is not likely to perform. should be given triple-a ratings? >> the committee process at standard and imports, no one person considers a redding. they can have different opinions that will come to committee. >> how about of the committee decides that a deal is not likely to perform? >> then it would either take action or change the ratings. >> if an analyst says that the bank of america is using the cdo take the risk of the books, should that be a factor? it the analyst banks that was going on with the cdo is taking bad assets of the company's books, does that affect the ratings process? >> i cannot speak to the

mr. barnes, for example?i mean certainly looking at the level of subordination, you know, the way you described it, you know, intuitively, if it's new to you, it does seem quite extreme. having said that, you know, our assumption that these securities were being packaged by loans which were diversified across the -- across the country, not all of the country had the degree of price appreciation and the subsequent correction that the likes of california and las vegas and some of the other parts of the states have -- has been well publicized and we look to the -- the credit enhancement provided on the actual mortgage itself, the 5% first loss protection, which is provided by the residual piece on the rnbs, and then the additional 30% to 50%, let's say 40%, that was effectively provided a further degree of credit enhancement from the tronchs beneath the super senior. now in retrospect, you know, -- >> but wait a second. the super senior was 60%. the aaa was 20%. i mean, the resultant security had 93% that was ra

mr barnes, s and p was uncomfortable but it was raided. should that have been taken into consideration? >> i cannot speak to this example. >> but you can speak to the question if there is a lack of cooperation and a deal is not likely to perform, should be rated? >> the analyst would take that into account and it would be part of their approach. all the members in committee would look at this. >> the analyst concludes that the deal is not likely to perform. should be given triple-a ratings? >> the committee process at standard and imports, no one person considers a redding. they can have different opinions that will come to committee. >> how about of the committee decides that a deal is not likely to perform? >> then it would either take action or change the ratings. >> if an analyst says that the bank of america is using the cdo take the risk of the books, should that be a factor? it the analyst banks that was going on with the cdo is taking bad assets of the company's books, does that affect the ratings process? >> i cannot speak to the

mr. murray barnes, former managing director, independent risk officer of citigroup, david bushnell, as you mentioned, chief financial officer, and thomas maheras, the former chairman and co-chief executive officer, citi markets and banking. i woke up this morning, my alarm was set at 5:00 a.m., and i have my radio on c-span, and i woke up to the voice of brooksley borne, the commissioner who was inquiring about, as we began our journey yesterday into this garden of good and evil, about synthetic cdo's, and what were they, and of course, if you listen to that discussion, it led in to commissioner byron gorgiou's trying to determine if you take a bunch of cdo's and slice them and dice them and turn them into aaa and super senior tranches that never were supposed to go bad and then i listen to commissioner wall wallison's excellent questioning of the panel leading us to a better understanding of these products that were created to be sold, which generated millions of dollars, in some years, tens of millions of dollars, to then citi management on the way up, but never resulted at any time even

mr. murray barnes, former managing director, independent risk officer of citigroup, david bushnell, as you mentioned, chief financial officer, and thomas maheras, the former chairman and co-chief executive officer, citi markets and banking. i woke up this morning, my alarm was set at 5:00 a.m., and i have my radio on c-span, and i woke up to the voice of brooksley borne, the commissioner who was inquiring about, as we began our journey yesterday into this garden of good and evil, about synthetic cdo's, and what were they, and of course, if you listen to that discussion, it led in to commissioner byron gorgiou's trying to determine if you take a bunch of cdo's and slice them and dice them and turn them into aaa and super senior tranches that never were supposed to go bad and then i listen to commissioner wall wallison's excellent questioning of the panel leading us to a better understanding of these products that were created to be sold, which generated millions of dollars, in some years, tens of millions of dollars, to then citi management on the way up, but never resulted at any time even