mr. blanton just mentioned is they have been very open. there has been a dialogue back and fort, and they know that there is a burden on secrecy but then on openness and have provided the proper weight test to that. that has been, i think, beneficial to the system. >> okay. there was an inspector general report in 2013 that said that 33% of the dia employees didn't understand their role. and even more outrageous in that report, they said 80% of the documents reviewed were misclassified. i guess first of all, i should ask how many different classifications are there because it seems like you could almost throw darts at a dart board and do better than that. could you comment on that and as to why that happens. >> comment on it, do you think things are better than three years ago? or maybe it was a flawed report. >> i would suspect it's not a flawed report. i think based on my experience for over 40 years, that's rather typical. it's a reflection of as much as we spend tax dollars to investigate people, to establish secure i.t. systems and th

mr. blanton just discussed. concerned also about the lack of clarity what are constitutes intelligence sources and methods which also can lead to overclassification. finally classifications aren't free. total security classification costs can exceeded $16 billion back in 2015. the moynihan commission has an excellent recommendation to improve the system. no longer be based on damage to national security. additional factors such as cost of protection, vulnerability, threat, rick, value of the information and public benefit from release could also be considered when making classification decisions. poe go is in agreement such factors should be considered to reduce executive branch secrecy. on the issue of retroactive classification, for years poe go expressed concerns brps activities to retroactively classify government information. we were involved in instances involving area 51 and unclassified briefings to members of congress in a whistle blower retaliation case. poe go believes reviews should include a compreh

mr. blanton just mentioned. there is a dialogue back and forth and they know that there is a burden on secrecy but then provided the proper way of that and has been beneficial to the system. >> okay. there was an inspector general report in 2013 that said 33% ntia employees didn't understand their role. and even more outrageous in that report, 80% of the documents reviewed because it's classified. how many classification there are. but could you comment on that? >> is better than it was three years ago. maybe it was a flawed report. are you familiar with the report? >> i would suspect it's not the report. i think a stun my experience that's rather typical. it is a reflection of as much as we spend tax dollars to investigate people, to establish secure i.t. and then things along those lines, we do not spend a comparable amount of money in terms of trying to train people in the basics. one of my concerns is that we make a distinction between original classification and derivative classification. my experience has

mr. blanton just discussed. they're also concerned about the lack of clarity, what constitutes intelligence sources and methods which also can lead to overclassification. finally, classifications aren't free. as the chairman mentioned, total security classification costs competed $16 billion back in 2015. the moynihan commission had an excellent recommendation to improve the system. classification decisions including the establishment of special access programs no longer be based on damage to national security. additional factors such as cost of protection, vulnerability, threat risk, value of the information and public benefit from release could also be considered when making classification decisions. we're in agreement such factors should be considered to reduce exclusive branch secrecy. on the issue of retroactive classification, for years we've expressed concerns about questionable activities to retroactively classify government information. we have firsthand experience because we were involved in instances

mr. blanton just discussed. they're also concerned about the lack of clarity, what constitutes intelligence sources and methods which also can lead to overclassification. finally, classifications aren't free. as the chairman mentioned, total security classification costs competed $16 billion back in 2015. the moynihan commission had an excellent recommendation to improve the system. classification decisions including the establishment of special access programs no longer be based on damage to national security. additional factors such as cost of protection, vulnerability, threat risk, value of the information and public benefit from release could also be considered when making classification decisions. we're in agreement such factors should be considered to reduce exclusive branch secrecy. on the issue of retroactive classification, for years we've expressed concerns about questionable activities to retroactively classify government information. we have firsthand experience because we were involved in instances

mr. tom blanton, director of the national security archive at the george washington university. and mr.cott -- is it amey? i want to make sure i pronounce that properly. mr. scott amey, general counsel on the project for government oversight. we welcome you and thank you for being here. pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. if you will please rise and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? thank you. you may be seated. let the record reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative. in order to allow time for discussion we would appreciate you limiting your verbal comments to no greater than five minutes to members have ample time to ask questions. your entire written statement and extraneous materials will be entered into the record. mr. leonard, you're now recognized for five minutes. the microphones in this committee, you have to straighten 'em up and put 'em right up uncomfortably close. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairm

mr. blanton discussed. the public is concerned about the lack of clarity about what constitutes intelligence sources and methods which was okay and the two over classification. finally, classification start for you. total security classification costs exceeded $16 billion back in 2015. the moynihan commission had next month recommendation to improve the system. classification decisions but in the establishment of the program the longer based on damage to national security. additional factors such as cost of protection, vulnerability, but if information in public understood from release could also be considered when making classification decisions. an agreement to such factors should be considered to reduce executive branch. on the issue of restrictive classification, for years has expressed concerns about? to produce to retract the classified information. first-hand experience because we were involved in area 51 and unclassified briefings to members across culver city whistleblower retaliation case. any rel