mr. chilton, it wasn't your job to set prices. by manipulating or changing some of these limits, you could be, in fact, effective pricing. you may have the undesired result. >> right. >> the question is what is oil worth? >> yeah. >> i don't know. >> yeah. >> it maybe worth $300 a barrel. it maybe worth $50 a barrel. we need to let the markets decide that. i want to got back to spot month. because there's so much to cover here. but since price discovery, i think most people would agree it happens in the cash months or on the spot month. then what would be the need then for having position limits in the outer months? : when you get these large who have a trading strategy. it's different than what they've been in the markets traditionally. they're good price insensitive because they've got a lot of view of it. they've all their positions in the contract expiration comes up in every other trader knows they're going to do it. in these massive passes can have 30, 40, 50% of the market. i think congress commercials question of what you

chilton. note what he said, mr. president. that this analysis takes into account potential adversary capabilities. general chilton is confident in our deterrent and that the force structure under the treaty, under our triad will meet our needs. i do not think that we should dispute either general chilton, our secretary gates, long-serving professionals who have served with president bush and obama so very, very well. mr. president, i would add supplementing the excellent comments made by my colleague, the chairman, that from the beginning of our debates in the united states senate on arms control treaties or even before that, the so-called nunn-lugar cooperative threat-reduction program, there have been many senators very sincere in their viewpoint that they simply do not like arms control treaties. furthermore, they would counsel that you cannot trust the russians. and, therefore, agtd two together to have an aversion to arms control treaties and agreements and do not trust the russians and, furthermore, you really don't want

mr. president, i put most of my statement in the record since i only have 25 seconds. but general chilton, who's the comarntcommander of our strategc command, told the armed services committee on july 20, "as the combatant command also responsible for synchronizing global missile defense plans, operations and advocacy, i can say with confidence this treaty does not constrain current or future missile defense plans." and the balance of my statement i'll have to put in the record. the presiding officer: time has expired. the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. to say that the treaty doesn't constrain the united states misses the point of the argument we've been trying to make here over the course of the last day and a half. what the russians have done is established a legal pretext for withdrawal from the treaty. they've been very clever about it. up to the time that we've been told the president has sent us a letter, there was no pushback from the united states. now, i haven't seen this letter on it's a little hard to comment

well, at the time, general chilton gave this testimony on june 16, 2010, mr. president, president obama had already canceled the g.b.i. two-stage site in europe. so that's off the table. the g.b.i. site, the one we planned to do, is not there. the only thing that's left is a promise that we're going to develop from scratch an sm-3 block 2-b. we've got a smb-3. it's an entirely different missile. it's bigger around, it's taller, it's really an entirely new development process to develop this sm-3 block 2. the guidance system on the sm-3's that we use on ships has proven to be very capable, as has our g.b.i. guidance systems. and so that -- that's where we went. now, how did it come about that the president of the united states unilaterally reneged on the united states policy to deploy in poland and the czech republic? well, essentially this happened. the day after his election, the russians announced they were moving missiles near polish border. cables other documents and testimony indicates that very early in the presidency of president obama, the russians wer

mr. president, i believe it's important to recall that general chilton's support for four new start levelsas predicated on no russian cheating. he testified to the senate armed services committee on april 2, 2010, that one of the assumptions immediate when the nuclear posture review was complete was -- quote -- "an assumption that the russians would be compliant." it has been pointed out how many times russia has been a serious violator of arms control agreements. mr. president, in conclusion, reducing u.s. strategic nuclear forces, especially with delivery systems, is a very serious matter that has received insufficient attention. we have little to gain and much to lose if we cannot be certain that the numbers in new start are adequate. i think it's worth noting. former defense secretary schlesinger testified on april 29, 2010 -- and i quote -- "as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate though barely so." end quote. again, this is a modest amendment that takes into account the administration's own force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicle

mr. president. rec i albelieve it's important to recall that general chilton supports for new s.t.a.r.t.evels was predicated on nohe to russian cheating. he testified at the senate arme services committee on april 22,e 2010, that one of the posture review was completed was quote and a second that the russians and the post-negotiation time period would be compliant with the treaty, end quote. it's been pointed out in many times russia has been a serial h violator of armsow control agreements.ion, so, mr. president, in conclusion reducing u.s. strategic nuclear forces, especially with delivery systems is a very serious matter that has received insufficient c attention. we have little to gain and muchh to lose if we cannot be certaine that the numbers of new s.t.a.r.t. are adequate. i think it's worth noting former defense secretary schlesinger testified to the senate foreign relations committee and again, quote, as the steady context a strategic nuclear weapons the numbers specified are adequate,e though barely so, end quote. again this is a modest amendmens that takes into account the adm

mr. president, this amendment is not only unnecessary, i say "unnecessary" because as general chilton, who is the commander of u.s. strategic command says, he says, "i can say with confidence that this treaty does not constrain any current or future missile defense." in addition, secretary gates has said that what the russias wants to achieve was a restraint. he said "this treaty doesn't accomplish that for them. "quhation this amendment would do, however, even though the language is completely nonbinding, has no requirement in it whatsoever, this amendment requires us to go back to russia, renegotiate the treaty, open up whatever advantages or disadvantages they may perceive since the negotiation exist, and we would go through a prolonged negotiation. we have no verification whatsoever today because that ceased on december 5 of last year. we need to hold this treaty intact and pass it. i'd yield whatever time i have to the chairman of the armed services committee. mr. levin: mr. president snr. the presiding officer: the senator from michigan. mr. levin: every one of our military leaders h